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Abstract
IT outsourcing to clouds bears new challenges to the technical implementation of
legally compliant clouds. On the one hand, outsourcing companies have to comply
with legal requirements. On the other hand, cloud providers have to support their
customers in achieving compliance with these legal requirements when processing
data in the cloud. Consequently, the questions arise when IT outsourcing to clouds
is lawful, which legal requirements apply to data processing in clouds, and how
cloud providers can support their customers on achieving legal compliance.
In this thesis, answers to these questions are given by performing a legal analysis
identifying the legal requirements and a technical analysis identifying how legal
requirements can be addressed in the context of cloud computing. Further, an in-
formation flow analysis is done, resulting in a system theoretical model that is able
to describe information flow control in clouds based on the security classification
of virtual resources and hardware resources. In a proof-of-concept implementation
which is based on the OpenStack open-source cloud platform, it is shown that in-
formation flow control can be implemented as a part of cloud management and that
legal compliance can be monitored and reported based on the actual assignment
of virtual resources to hardware resources. Thereby, cloud providers are able to
provide cloud customers with cloud resources, which are automatically assigned
to hardware resources that comply with the legal requirements of the cloud cus-
tomers. This consequently empowers cloud customers to utilise cloud resources
according to their legal requirements and to keep control of managing the legal
compliance of their data processing in clouds.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and methodology
IT outsourcing to clouds brings new challenges to the technical implementation of legally com-
pliant clouds. The questions arise as to when IT outsourcing to clouds is lawful and how cloud
providers have to support their customers to achieve legal compliance. In this thesis, answers to
these questions are identified by analysing legal requirements and technical constraints which
are typically applying in the context of cloud computing. Further, a system theoretical model
is defined that is capable to describe information flow control in clouds based on applicable
legal requirements and technical constraints. In a proof-of-concept implementation, it is shown
that information flow control can be implemented as a part of the virtualisation management in
clouds and that legal compliance can be monitored and reported based on the actual assignment
of virtual resources to hardware resources.
This chapter introduces the topic investigated in this thesis and provides an overview of
methodology and results. The following Section 1.1 motivates the topic of IT outsourcing to
clouds. The problem description investigated in this thesis is given in Section 1.2. Then, the
goal and objectives of this thesis are described in Section 1.3. An overview of the methodology
follows in Section 1.4. In the end, Section 1.5 provides an overview of the structure of this
thesis, and Section 1.6 summarises the scientific contributions.
1.1 Prospects of IT outsourcing to clouds
Many organisations seek to outsource their IT infrastructure and IT processes partially or fully.
For this purpose, an organisation contracts a service organisation having the desired expertise
and offering the requested services. The degree of IT outsourcing can range from outsourcing
the operation of single IT systems (like servers) to the operation and maintenance of the IT in-
frastructure including servers and workstations. IT outsourcing can also cover the execution of
IT processes (like accounting) by service organisations. Both operation of IT infrastructure and
execution of IT processes by a service organisation are generally denoted outsourced services.
A common reason for outsourcing is the reduction of operating costs. Here, service organ-
isations which specialise in the cost- and/or time-efficient operation of IT infrastructures and
execution of IT processes can help to reduce operating costs. For example, a data centre can
operate their customers’ servers more efficiently since the support infrastructure (including fa-
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cility, cooling and power supply) is utilised by multiple customers. An other reason is that the
operation of IT infrastructures and execution of IT processes often require expert knowledge
which usually is not part of the business operations of outsourcing organisations. In this case,
a service organisation having such expert knowledge is capable of supporting outsourcing or-
ganisations with professional services they otherwise couldn’t handle on their own (or at least
not on the same professional level).
Particularly difficult to serve are service demands that are non-continuous and occur in re-
sponse to specific events or circumstances (e.g., annual accounts and release dates of pre-selling
contingents with great demand). In such cases, outsourced services have to be provisioned in
a timely manner and in a way proportionate to the demands of the outsourcing organisation.
In particular, the IT infrastructure necessary for serving such on-demand services has to scale
properly to avoid shortages and interruptions. Here, cloud computing represents a service
model that addresses the provisioning of on-demand services in a flexible and scalable manner.
In this context, service organisations are cloud providers operating the cloud infrastructures
hosting the outsourced services, and the outsourcing organisations are cloud customers. To
address flexibility and scalability in cloud computing, available hardware resources are pooled
using virtualisation techniques which make it possible to provision proportions of computing
resources to multiple cloud customers (i.e., outsourcing organisations). The cloud customers
can order cloud services (e.g., virtual servers or applications) on demand and in a self-service
manner. Requested cloud services are then provisioned automatically according to the cloud
customer’s needs.
Cloud computing combines the flexible and scalable usage of computational power (as in
grid computing) with automated on-demand self-services making it a good candidate for IT
outsourcing. There are three distinguished services models in cloud computing that can be
utilised by the cloud customer for IT outsourcing: (1) Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), i.e.,
the operation of single IT systems up to complex IT infrastructures in clouds (like Amazon Web
Service (AWS) [5] and Microsoft Azure [143]), (2) Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), i.e., the de-
velopment and provisioning of cloud services (like Google App Engine1 and Apprenda2), and
(3) Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), i.e., cloud hosted applications (like Google Docs3 and Cisco
WebEx4). Thus, cloud computing covers a large number of possible outsourcing scenarios.
However, there are many organisations hesitating to outsource their IT infrastructure and
IT processes to clouds. Instead, these organisations prefer traditional outsourcing to dedicated
data centres and to service organisations not utilising cloud computing. There exist multiple
reasons why organisations decide not to outsource to cloud infrastructures. A major reason
is that organisations have to comply with legal obligations that apply when processing their
data. For instance, European organisations have to comply with European data protection law
which explicitly regulates the transfer of data to third countries and particularly stipulates an
adequate level of protection at the target location (Art. 25 Data Protection Directive). Further,
there exist specific requirements on confidentiality (e.g., German professional secrecy, §203
1Google App Engine Documentation, on the Internet: https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs (last vis-
ited: 30.06.2015)
2Apprenda, on the Internet: http:\www.apprenda.com/ (last visited: 30.06.2015)
3Google Docs, on the Internet: http://www.google.com/docs/about/ (last visited: 30.06.2015)
4Cisco WebEx, on the Internet: http://www.webex.de/ (last visited: 30.06.2015)
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Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)), integrity (e.g., German tax data must not be modified, §146 para. 4
Abgabenordnung (AO)), and availability (e.g., German personal data are subject to availability
control, cl. 2 no. 7 of appendix to §9 cl. 1 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG)), which have
to be ensured during data processing including the outsourcing to clouds. Additionally, there
exist regulations which limit or prohibit IT outsourcing. For example, in Germany, accounts
have to be kept and stored within Germany, and outsourcing is subject to authorisation (§238
Handesgesetzbuch (HGB)). Outsourced services have to comply with these legal obligations.
This is difficult to achieve when outsourcing to clouds.
On the one hand, many cloud providers operate cloud infrastructures in multiple countries
(e.g., AWS, Microsoft Azure, Fujitsu Cloud, IBM Cloud), and therefore, cloud services may
be hosted in different countries, which can be problematical if requirements on transfer con-
trol apply. Particularly for European organisations outsourcing personal data, cloud providers
located outside of the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) are problematical
since transfer of personal data to third countries is only admissible if an adequate level of pro-
tection is ensured. There exist reasonable doubts whether this is generally the case for cloud
providers which are established outside of the EU/EEA [29].
On the other hand, outsourcing organisations are generally responsible for the IT outsourc-
ing and often are obliged to inspect the legal compliance of service organisations, for example,
in the context of European data protection law (Art. 7 lit. a in association with Art. 6 para. 1
Data Protection Directive) and in the German financial sector (§25a para. 1 cl. 5 Kreditwe-
sengesetz (KWG)). However, the inspection of cloud providers and cloud infrastructures by
outsourcing organisations is difficult. If the cloud infrastructure is hosted in multiple data cen-
tres which are located in multiple countries then the outsourcing organisation has to inspect
each data centre individually which requires considerable efforts. Additionally, expert knowl-
edge on the operation of cloud infrastructures is required at the outsourcing organisation which
possibly is not the case and also requires additional efforts. Further, inspections of data cen-
tres by every single outsourcing organisation can create considerable overhead and can even
cause disturbance to the secure operation of data centres if there is a huge number of outsourc-
ing organisations (which is usually the case for large cloud providers). Another issue is that
the inspection has to be done individually for every outsourced service. Due to virtualisation,
the inspection of outsourced services requires the identification and inspection of each provi-
sioned virtual resource and each related hardware resource that is utilised. Here, cooperation
of the cloud provider is necessary, since the outsourcing organisations have no insight into the
virtualisation management and particularly not the utilised hardware resources in clouds.
Consequently, in the case of IT outsourcing to clouds, outsourcing organisations become
cloud customers and are in need of legally compliant processing of their data in the cloud. To
address this need, cloud providers have to be able to support their customers in their efforts
to achieve legal compliance by processing data within clouds according to applicable legal
requirements and by enabling the monitoring and reporting in respect to data processing within
clouds. The importance of achieving legal compliance in clouds is underlined by the fact that
cloud computing has become a critical infrastructure [67].
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1.2 Problem statement on legally compliant cloud computing
The case of IT outsourcing to clouds incorporates legal and technical challenges. On the one
hand, there are legal requirements that apply to the data processing of cloud customers and to
IT outsourcing generally. These legal requirements have to be supported by cloud providers
when processing data on behalf of their customers. On the other hand, cloud computing is
highly automated using virtualisation techniques and distributed computing. In order that cloud
providers can support the legal requirements of their customers and IT outsourcing, these re-
quirements have to be translated into technical requirements, which are then implemented in
cloud infrastructures. Consequently, the questions arise, which legal requirements apply when
outsourcing IT to clouds and how can they be supported in cloud infrastructures? To answer
this question, it is necessary to investigate both applicable legislation and technical capabilities
of cloud computing.
A repetitive legal requirement is the regulation of processing abroad, which often is treated
differently from processing inland. For example, European data protection law requires an
adequate level of protection if personal data are processed outside of the EU/EEA (Art. 25
Data Protection Directive), and German tax law restricts the outsourcing of accounts to foreign
countries (§238 HGB). Consequently, in the case of IT outsourcing to clouds, this type of re-
quirement – beside others identified in this thesis – has to be supported by the cloud provider. If
a cloud customer orders a cloud resource (e.g., a virtual machine) that, for instance, is only to be
hosted in Europe then the cloud provider has to ensure that only data centres located in Europe
are commissioned to host this cloud resource. Since resource management in clouds is fully au-
tomated the question arises, how customers’ requirements can be translated to security policies
which are enforced automatically by only assigning data centres complying with the customers’
requirements. The same is true for legal requirements addressing security constraints in respect
to confidentiality, integrity and availability. In this context, multiple key questions arise: How
does the cloud provider know which data centre provides the required level of security and how
are data centres selected by automated resource management accordingly? Furthermore, how
do cloud providers monitor and report on compliment resource assignments if they are legally
obligated to do so (e.g., in the context of German data protection law), and what is necessary
to ensure that a cloud customer is able to inspect a cloud provider on legally compliant data
processing? These questions have to be answered when outsourcing data processing to clouds.
This thesis identifies possible answers by investigating legal compliance of IaaS clouds in the
context of European and particularly German legislation.
1.3 Goal and objectives of the thesis
The goal of this thesis is to define the legal and technical boundary of IT outsourcing by Euro-
pean and German cloud customers in the case of globally distributed cloud computing with a
particular focus on location-determined resource management.
To achieve this goal, there are several objectives that have to be fulfilled. They can be
categorised by (1) understanding the mutual dependencies of legislation and technology in the
cloud computing context and by (2) the information theoretical implementation of location-
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determined data processing in cloud computing environments. They are defined as follows.
Understanding the mutual dependencies of legislation and technology:
• Objective 1: Identification of the legal requirements on IT outsourcing using cloud com-
puting (in the specific case of European and German legislation).
• Objective 2: Identification of the capabilities of technical implementations of cloud
computing (considering current and future requirements).
• Objective 3: Understanding the technical implications of the legal requirements on the
utilisation, provisioning, and hosting of Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) for IT out-
sourcing.
• Objective 4: Identification of the legal and technical boundary implicated by established
legislation and the cloud computing paradigm.
Information theoretical implementation of location-determined data processing:
• Objective 5: Modelling legal and technical requirements with respect to the security
goals of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location determination, including
– Extension of existing concepts by availability and location determination (Item
5.1); and
– Introduction of new concepts for location determination (Item 5.2).
• Objective 6: Implementation of location-determined data processing within cloud re-
source management, including the monitoring of compliance with legal and technical
requirements by the cloud provider and the reporting on compliance to the cloud cus-
tomer.
• Objective 7: Identification of the feasibility of trustworthy compliance enforcement,
monitoring, and reporting within cloud infrastructure (by the cloud provider to the cloud
customer), including:
– Demonstration of the feasibility of location-determined data processing and com-
pliance monitoring and reporting in cloud computing environments (Item 7.1); and
– Evaluation of the achievable scalability, reliability, trustworthiness, and legal com-
pliance of location-determined data processing (Item 7.2).
1.4 Methodological approach
The methodological approach chosen in this thesis aims to achieve the goal of defining the
legal and technical boundary of IT outsourcing to clouds (cf. Section 1.3). This requires
the investigation of legal requirements applying to IT outsourcing to clouds and the technical
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capabilities of cloud computing to address applicable legal requirements. For this reason this
thesis follows an interdisciplinary approach covering both legal and technical investigations.
Generally, the methodological approach of the thesis consists of five sequential steps which
are illustrated in Figure 1.1. In a first step, a legal analysis is performed identifying relevant
legal norms and legal requirements for IT outsourcing to clouds. Then, in a second step, the
technical capabilities of supporting the identified legal requirements are analysed. The result
is a number of technical requirements, which has to be implemented in clouds, and to which
extend these requirements are addressed by current research. A finding of the second step is
the lack of modelling security and particularly location constraints and their enforcement in
cloud resource management (cf. Section 4.4). Also a result of the second step is a general
terminology and entity-relationship model describing cloud infrastructures using an ontology’s
notion. In a third step, based on the methods of information flow control, an information model
is defined that classifies information flows in cloud infrastructures by security and location
constraints and thereby allows the control of information flows within cloud infrastructures.
The forth steps shows the feasibility of the information model by practical evaluation of a proof-
of-concept implementation based on the open-source cloud platform OpenStack. In a final
step, the legal and technical boundary is concluded in an analytical evaluation comparing the
findings of the legal analysis with the observations made on the technical implementation. The
legal and technical methods used in these steps are explained in more detail in the following.
Figure 1.1: Methodological approach of the thesis.
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The legal part of the thesis covers a descriptive legal analysis of legal norms correspond-
ing to IT outsourcing to clouds in European and particularly German legislation. The goal of
this analysis is the identification of those requirements, which have an impact on the techni-
cal implementation of cloud computing. To make such a statement, it would be theoretically
necessary to investigate all corresponding legal norms in the EU/EEA and Germany. This is
however not feasible because of the large number of existing legal norms within EU/EEA and
Germany. Moreover, a complete analysis is not necessary to identify technical requirements
that are necessary for implementing legally compliant clouds, since it is sufficient to understand
which general requirements are addressed by law and which options are possible. A good start-
ing points for the legal analysis are legal norms with particular importance for data processing
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and IT outsourcing. In this thesis, the legal requirements are exemplified by data protection
law and export control on a European and German level and additionally by German sectoral
requirements in finance, taxation, medial and healthcare, and public agencies. Thereby, mul-
tiple common cases of IT outsourcing are covered, which consequently also apply to cloud
computing. To identify the requirements and possible options, a descriptive legal analysis is
made. Resulting from the analysis are a number of legally defined technical requirements,
which apply to clouds in the context of IT outsourcing.
The technical part of the thesis consists of (1) a technical analysis of cloud computing and
its support of legal compliance, (2) the definition of an information model addressing the iden-
tified research gap, and (3) the implementation and evaluation of the findings in this thesis. The
goal of the technical part is the technical implementation of legally compliant clouds. There-
fore the technical capabilities of cloud computing are investigated. The result of the analysis
of cloud computing is a mathematical model describing entities and relations in cloud infras-
tructures. It is defined using a notion for ontologies to enable its usage on a formal basis. The
entities and relations in the model are derived from the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) cloud reference architecture [134] and by the analysis of five prominent
cloud platforms in practice. The model forms the basis for the cloud terminology used in this
thesis. Further, it is the basis for the analysis of supported legal compliance in clouds and for
the information model formulated in this thesis. The analysis of supported legal compliance
in clouds investigates the state of the art in science and practice with respect to the ability to
address the technical requirement identified in legal analysis and compare it with the require-
ments identified in the legal analysis. The result of the analysis is a research gap on dealing
systematically with security and location constraints of cloud customers to support legal com-
pliant data processing in clouds. The identified research gap is addressed in this thesis by an
information model which is able to describe security and location constraints of cloud cus-
tomers and can be used in the cloud management process to enforce legally compliant resource
allocation within cloud infrastructures. To define the information model, a system theoretical
approach on information flow control is used. For this purpose, information flows in clouds are
identified based on the cloud resources in cloud infrastructures. This allows the classification
of cloud resources by security and location constraints and make it possible to decide and en-
force on information flows between cloud resources. The validity of the information model is
shown by proving the security properties of the system controlling the information flows and
by the description of a theoretical approach to implement information flow control in cloud
management. The feasibility of practical application is shown through experimental and ana-
lytical evaluation. The experimental evaluation covers a proof-of-concept implementation and
a test of its ability to support location constraints in the assignment process of virtual machines.
For the proof-of-concept implementation, the open-source cloud platform OpenStack and its
extensions for resource pooling and logging were modified. In the analytical evaluation, the
ability to comply with legislation and service-level agreements (SLAs), technical feasibility
with respect to cloud computing characteristics, and the trustworthiness of implementations
are reflected. As a result of the analytical evaluation, the legal and technical limits in legally
compliant cloud computing are identified describing a legal and technical boundary of cloud
computing which is the ultimate result of this thesis.
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1.5 Structure of the thesis
The current chapter motivates the context of the topic of the thesis (cf. Section 1.1) and defines
the description of the problem (cf. Section 1.2) as well as the goal and objectives of this
thesis (cf. Section 1.3). Further, the underlying methodological approach (cf. Section 1.4)
and the structure of this document (cf. Section 1.5) are explained. In addition, the scientific
contribution of this thesis is described, highlighting major findings and the delta in research
(cf. Section 1.6). The remainder of this document is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 provides background on cloud computing (cf. Section 2.1), IT outsourcing to
clouds (cf. Section 2.2), and legal compliance (cf. Section 2.3). Further, research work related
to the thesis topic is summarised (cf. Section 2.4) and major aspects of legally compliant cloud
computing are concluded (cf. Section 2.5).
The legal analysis is performed in Chapter 3. A general analysis of the lawfullness of cloud
computing is provided in Section 3.1. Subsequently, requirements of German data protection
law is discussed, as it applies to carrying out data processing (cf. Section 3.2). In Section 3.3,
the intermediate result of necessary safeguards at the cloud provider is presented. Then, the
sectoral requirements are exemplified on the basis of European and German export control
and German legislation on finances, taxation, medical care and healthcare, and public agencies
(cf. Section3.4). Section 3.5 identifies special requirements which are of particular importance
when outsourcing to clouds. Section 3.6 concludes the identified technical requirements in
European and German legislation.
Chapter 4 covers the technical analysis of cloud computing and its ability to support achiev-
ing legal compliance. In Section 4.1, cloud terminology and cloud entries and their relations
are defined by deriving an IaaS cloud computing ontology. The technical analysis of clouds’
ability to support achieving legal compliance is then made with respect to security management
(cf. Section 4.2) and compliance management (cf. Section 4.3). The identified research gap
and the implications on implementing legally compliant clouds are concluded in Section 4.4).
Chapter 5 deals with the system-theoretical approach to information flow control in clouds.
The information flows in clouds are identified in Section 5.1. Existing research on information
flow control is investigated in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, a model for information flow control
in clouds is presented. Section 5.4 explains how information flow control can be implemented
in clouds, followed by conclusions in Section 5.5.
The experimental and analytical evaluation is done in Chapter 6. The description of the
proof-of-concept implementation and the experimental set-up and results are presented in Sec-
tion 6.1. Section 6.2 covers the evaluation in respect to legal compliance, technical feasibility,
and trustworthiness of implementations. Section 6.3 concludes the legal and technical bound-
ary of legally compliant cloud computing.
Chapter 7 concludes the results and findings of this thesis, reflects on application and prac-
tical implications, and provides an outlook on future research topics.
The appendix contains (i) details of the proofs made in Chapter 5, (ii) the example policies
and the underlying XML-schema used in the experiment, (iii) the logs and screen-shots of the
experiment, (iv) the glossary, the acronyms and symbols used in this thesis, (v) lists of figures,
tables, listings and definitions, and (vi) the references.
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1.6 Scientific contribution
This thesis contributes in multiple ways to the research on legally compliant IT outsourcing to
clouds. The most significant contributions are listed in the following:
• The systematic identification of technical requirements that are defined in legal norms
of European and German legislation and which are generally applicable to IT outsourc-
ing to clouds, including detailed inspection of necessary safeguards at cloud providers
and on location-determined data processing. Particular findings are (1) the identification
of the necessary level of security, (2) the usage of security policies, (3) the implementa-
tion and enforcement of safeguards (i.e., basic security measures, access control, trans-
mission control, and countermeasures and indecent response), and (4) the monitoring,
documentation and reporting of compliance (cf. Section 3.6).
• The definition of a taxonomy and entity-relationship model on cloud infrastructures
in an ontology’s notion, which is able to map virtual resources with hardware resources
using mathematical functions on sets of the respective resources (cf. Section 4.1).
• The combination of the two basic models on information flow control by Bell and
La Padula and Denning into a single model (cf. Lemma 5.1) and its adoption into the
integrity-based model by Biba (cf. Lemma 5.2).
• The definition of a general model on latices-based information flow control, which is
provably secure (cf. Theorem 5.5) and supports general security characteristics including
confidentiality, integrity, availability and location constraints.
• The definition of a lattices of location classes introducing location constraints to the
methods information flow control (cf. Section 5.3.2).
• The definition of a lattices of availability classes introducing availability to the methods
information flow control (cf. Section 5.3.3).
• The application of of lattice-based information flow control on virtual resources in
clouds (cf. Section 5.3.4.1) and its implementation in the cloud management process
(cf. Section 5.3.4.2) using security policies (cf. Section 5.3.4.2). In particular, infor-
mation flow is control on the basis of the security classification of virtual and hardware
resources.
• The definition of a security-class-based metric for calculating optimal resource allo-
cations in clouds (cf. Section 5.4.2), which covers multi-dimensional security require-
ments (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location).
• The proposal of an architecture for compliance monitoring and reporting in clouds
(cf. 5.4.3), which enables automated monitoring of and reporting on the assignment of
virtual resources to hardware resources in respect to their security classifications.
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• The implementation of the Location-Determining resource management and log-
ging Architecture (LDA), which is a proof-of-concept on location-determined data pro-
cessing in clouds using the open-source cloud platform OpenStack (cf. Section 6.1).
• A particular finding of the the legal analysis is the identification of a conflict of German
tax law with the technical reality of cloud computing. German tax law obliges that
there is direct access to the IT systems during a tax inspection (recital 165, GoBD). This
does not fit with the basic concept of remote enquiry in cloud computing, which is the
opposite of direct access (cf. Section 3.4.2).
• The extension of the existing classification of cloud computing into a service and
deliver model through the new dimension of hardware locality, which distinguishes be-
tween national and global clouds specifically (cf. Remark 2.5).
• The analysis and proposal of a trustworthy classification of hardware resources in
clouds (cf. Section 5.4.1), which provides a basis for lattice-based information flow
control on virtual resources in clouds.
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Chapter 2
Cloud computing and legal compliance
This chapter provides the necessary background for understanding the investigations on legally
compliant cloud computing made in this thesis, In Section 2.1, a basic overview of cloud ter-
minology is given, including concepts of utilisation and alternative approaches to outsourcing.
Preparing the legal analysis in Chapter 3, Section 2.2 introduces actors and their interaction in
the context of outsourcing to clouds and motivates the relevance of legal compliance for cloud
customers and cloud providers. General observations on technical characteristics of clouds and
their impact on legal compliance are introduced in Section 2.3. These observations form a
supportive basis for the legal analysis in Chapter 3. Section 2.4 summarises the related work
identified by this thesis followed by conclusions on legally compliant clouds in Section 2.5.
2.1 The cloud computing paradigm
In this section, the necessary background and terminology of cloud computing for this thesis
is introduced. Therefore, a definition of cloud computing based on existing definitions is for-
mulated. Further, concepts of utilisation and their impact on legal compliance are discussed
in the context of IT outsourcing. Additionally, alternative approaches for IT outsourcing are
investigated, and in particular, similarities and differences with respect to legal compliance are
discussed.
2.1.1 Towards a comprehensive definition of cloud computing
The current understanding of cloud computing has emerged from two broadly accepted defini-
tions of cloud computing, manifested in most of the existing cloud computing implementations.
The first is defined by Vaquero et al. and provides a consolidated definition of existing concepts
and implementations of cloud computing in 2008 [211]. The second is defined by the NIST and
represents the core definition of the NIST’s cloud computing standards [141], and for example,
is also adopted by the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) [70, p. 9]
and the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [46, pp. 11 et seqq.]. Both definitions are compatible
with each other and can be merged to a single, more comprehensive definition as follows.
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Definition 2.1 (Cloud computing) Cloud computing is a concept for hosting, provisioning,
and utilising a shared pool of virtualised computing resources in a scalable, ubiquitous, on-
demand, and easily usable manner. The computing resources are accessible via network, paid
by usage, automatically and rapidly provisioned and released with minimal effort and interac-
tion, and have guaranteed characteristics defined in customised SLAs.
Remark 2.1 (Hosting, provisioning, and utilisation) While the original definitions focus on
the utilisation of computing resources and their characteristics [211][141], cloud computing
also covers the hosting and provisioning of computing resources. Hosting and provisioning
are implicitly covered by the mentioned definition, since defining characteristics of computing
resources also includes implications on their hosting and provisioning. Without loss of gener-
ality, the explicit extension of the existing definitions makes it possible to address additionally
the technical aspects of cloud hosting and provisioning which are relevant for the investigation
of legally compliant cloud computing (cf. Section 3.6).
Of particular relevance for investigating the question of how to implement legal compli-
ance in clouds are the technical characteristics of cloud infrastructures and how implementing
legal compliance is affected by these characteristics. In particular the question arises, how
much cloud computing will be left after implementing legal compliance. This requires an in-
vestigations of existing cloud characteristics and the possible impact of implementing legal
requirements. As an extension to the Definition 2.1, the following characteristics are consid-
ered essential to cloud computing. They are derived from the definitions given by NIST and
Vaquero et al.. Based on these characteristics, the analytical evaluation in Section 6.2 investi-
gates the impact of implementing legal compliance in clouds.
2.1.1.1 Resource pooling [141] | virtualisation [211]
The computing resources at the hosting site are virtualised and pooled to provision portions of
computing resources to multiple cloud customers in consideration of multitenency. In general,
the hosting process is technically transparent (i.e., unrecognisable) for the cloud customer. For
example, the location of the provided resources is unknown to the cloud customer. In any
case, virtualisation can introduce notable side effects like network delay (e.g., caused by the
overhead of virtual networks). The computing resources are specifically defined within the
cloud computing ontology in Section 4.1. Resource pooling and virtualisation are of particular
relevance for cloud computing since they are the technological enabler of cloud computing and
imply the abstraction of cloud resources from hardware infrastructure. The impact on legal
compliance is investigated more spefically in Section 2.3.3.
2.1.1.2 Rapid elasticity [141] | scalability [211]
Computing resources are provisioned and released elastically and scale according to the cloud
customers’ demands. Albeit the physical computing resources are limited, the provided com-
puting resources can appear to be unlimited and flexibly configurable to virtually any amount or
size. With respect to legal compliance, the question arises whether enforcing legal constraints
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results in limiting the elasticity and scalability, because available resources cannot be utilised
due to legal constraints.
2.1.1.3 On-demand self-service [141] | pay-per-use utility model [211]
Computing resources are automatically provisioned as needed if and only if the cloud customer
requests them. The payment is based on the amount of usage (e.g., by capacity or time). When
implementing legal compliance, this characteristic may be influenced by additional efforts to
ensure legal constraints. Two questions arise: whether accounting of additional efforts is pos-
sible and whether provisioning resources automatically is still feasible.
2.1.1.4 Measured service [141]
Resource management automatically measures and controls the operation of cloud resources
(e.g., optimising hardware utilisation, monitoring health, and measuring usage). It is possible
to report the use of computing resources to both the cloud provider and the cloud customer.
This characteristic is of particular interest when it comes to gauging the legal compliance of
services. The feasibility and trustworthiness of such measurements are paramount for reliable
results.
2.1.1.5 Broad network access [141]
The computing resources are accessed through standard mechanisms of network communica-
tion (e.g., Internet) via heterogeneous end systems (i.e., client platforms like mobile phones and
workstations). This characteristic is highly important to ensure the availability and accessibility
of cloud resources by cloud customers. This is because cloud customers usually utilise cloud
resources from remote locations requiring network access. Two questions arise: whether there
exist legal constraints that hinder access from remote location and how such legal constraints
should be dealt with.
Remark 2.2 (Technical implications of cloud characteristics) All considered cloud charac-
teristics have technical implications for the implementation of legal compliance in the context
of cloud computing.
The implications of resource pooling using virtualisation are expected to be strong. This
is because the computing resources can be distributed to different hosting sites that may be
located in different countries with possibly different applicable legislation. Additionally, the
introduced abstraction of resource virtualisation requires additional effort to monitor and re-
port on resource locations. To cover this, a detailed analysis of the technical implications of
distributed computing is provided in Section 2.3.2. For virtualisation a detailed analysis is
provided in Section 2.3.3.
The implications of rapid elasticity and scalability are limited to usability issues and com-
pliance with SLAs. Therefore, these characteristics are revisited in the evaluation in Sec-
tion 6.2.2. The on-demand self-service and pay-per-use utility models relate only to the busi-
ness contract between cloud provider and cloud customer and have no impact on the legal
compliance investigated in this thesis.
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The measured service has strong implications for possible documentation, monitoring, and
reporting activities that can be utilised to support compliance management. A detailed analysis
of the documentation, monitoring, and reporting capabilities is presented in Section 4.3.
The broad network access directly refers to the needs of access and transmission control
(cf. Sections 3.6.3.2 and 3.6.3.3), since the connection used to access or transfer data can be
used maliciously by an attacker (e.g., by spoofing the client’s identity or eavesdropping on the
communication). The technical abilities to secure communication and to impleemnt access and
transfer control are investigated in Section 4.2.3.
2.1.2 Concepts of utilisation
The utilisation of cloud computing can be distinguished by three service models and four de-
ployment models [141]. All models describe a different form of cloud utilisation, which im-
plementations all have different technical implications on legal compliance of data processing
in the cloud. All models and the technical implications are investigated in the following.
2.1.2.1 Service models
The service models describe the type of service that is provided to the cloud customer. Each
service model defines a different level of service abstraction representing the administrative
effort and flexibility a cloud customer has.
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) represents the provisioning of applications hosted on a cloud
infrastructure. The applications are accessible via network using heterogeneous end systems.
While the application is running in the cloud, it appears to be running on the cloud customer’s
end system. SaaS provides the highest level of resource abstraction. The cloud customer has
no direct interactions with either hosting infrastructure or the remote operating system. The
application integrates seamlessly into the environment on the cloud customer’s end system.
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) describes the provisioning of a platform for development and
deployment of applications hosted on a cloud infrastructure. The platform provides the cloud
customer with a framework with which to design, implement and deploy cloud applications.
Such a framework may provide software development tools as well as libraries and services
that can be included in the developed applications. As with SaaS, the framework is accessible
via network using heterogeneous end systems. The level of abstraction is high, since the cloud
customer has no direct interaction with either the hosting infrastructure or the remote operating
system. However, the development and deployment of cloud applications requires access to
the basic functionality of deployment mechanisms, which leads to an abstraction level lower
than in SaaS, since the deployment and operation of applications are also managed by the cloud
customer.
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) represents the provisioning of computing resources in
the form of freely configurable virtual resources (e.g., virtual machines and storage) that are
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hosted on a cloud infrastructure. The cloud customer fully controls the software running on the
virtual resources (including operating system and applications). The cloud provider may offer
predefined installations of operating systems and applications to the cloud customer. The level
of abstraction is low, since the cloud customer has full access to the virtual resources and has to
manage software deployment and operation on his or her own. However, the underlying cloud
infrastructure is not visible to the cloud customer and the provisioning of computing resources
is fully under control of the cloud provider.
Remark 2.3 (Technical implications of service models) All three service models have in com-
mon that they have an abstract view on the provisioned computing resources. The computing
resources are created by resource virtualisiation enabling their management and provisioning
by resource pooling. As mentioned in Remark 2.2, resource pooling and virtualisation have
a strong impact on applicable legislation and on the ability of monitoring and reporting legal
compliance, which is discussed in Section 2.3.
Remark 2.4 (Reduction to IaaS) An interesting observation is that it is possible in principle
to host the platform used for PaaS and the applications used for SaaS on computing resources
provided in IaaS. This allows (in a first step) to reduce the inspection of all service models
to the inspection of IaaS. Consequently, the analysis of the technical implications of legally
compliant cloud computing can also be reduced to the investigation of IaaS. However, it is
still necessary to investigate the implications only given by the special characteristics of PaaS
and SaaS that are not addressable on IaaS level (e.g., application deployment and application
behaviour), but this can be done separately.
In the following, the technical analysis is reduced to the implications of IaaS. An outlook
on possible investigations of PaaS and SaaS characteristics is given in Section 7.3.
2.1.2.2 Deployment models
The deployment models describe the deployment configuration of the underlying cloud infras-
tructure. Each deployment model defines to what degree the cloud infrastructure is shared
among cloud customers.
Private cloud In the private-cloud model, the cloud infrastructure is exclusively provisioned
to and used by a single organisational entity (i.e., cloud customer with multiple user accounts).
The cloud infrastructure can be on the premises of the cloud customer or off the premises
(located at a third-party cloud provider). The responsibility for operation and management of
the cloud infrastructure can lie with the cloud customer or the cloud provider, where shared
responsibilities are also possible. For the private cloud the level of isolation is very high, since
the cloud infrastructure is only accessible by a single cloud customer. The deployment model
is very similar to traditional IT outsourcing (cf. Section 2.1.3.3). Therefore the complexity of
the shared operation is low, since it can be distinguished by the responsibilities of the cloud
customer and the cloud provider.
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Community cloud The community-cloud model is similar to the private-cloud model, but
the infrastructure is accessible by a group of cloud customers with shared concerns. The re-
sponsibility for the operation and management of the cloud infrastructure can lie with one or
more of the cloud customers or with a third-party cloud provider, and shared responsibilities
are also possible. The level of isolation is still high for community clouds, since the access
is limited to a group of cloud customers. However, the complexity of the shared operation
can be high, since a large number of cloud customers can be involved in the operation of the
cloud infrastructure (and therefore, the interdependencies of the involved components can be
complex).
Public cloud In the public-cloud model, the cloud infrastructure is provided by a cloud
provider for public usage. All cloud resources are openly usable by any cloud customer. The
level of isolation is low, since the resources are shared openly. However, there can be a multi-
tenancy model implemented for controlling access to specific cloud resources (cf. Broad net-
work access [141]). The complexity of the operation is low, since there is a single third-party
cloud provider operating the cloud infrastructure. In federated cloud scenarios, the complexity
of operation can increase with the number of involved cloud providers. Such scenarios are
particularly covered by the hybrid-cloud model.
Hybrid cloud It is possible to combine two or more of the previous models to form a hybrid-
cloud model. For example, a federated public-cloud infrastructure can be considered a hybrid
cloud, since it consists of a number of public-cloud infrastructures that are interconnected via
a community cloud belonging to the cloud provider. An other example is a combination of
public and private clouds, where the cloud infrastructure can provide openly usable computing
resources as well as protected computing resources that are exclusively accessible by specific
cloud customers. Depending on the combination of the existing deployment models, the level
of isolation and the complexity of operation can be different. As a rule of thumb, the level of
isolation is less or equal to what it is in the combined deployment models, and the complexity
of operation is greater or equivalent.
Remark 2.5 (National vs. global cloud) Cloud infrastructures can be located within a single
country (national cloud) or be distributed among several countries (global cloud). This is a
novel criterion with which to classify clouds which is covered neither by the service models
nor by the deployment models. For that reason, the classification in national clouds and global
clouds is introduced by this thesis explicitly.
From a technical perspective, there is no difference between a cloud infrastructure is lo-
cated within a single country an one located in multiple countries. From a legal perspective,
this difference is crucial for the legally compliant operation of a cloud infrastructure, since the
applicable legislation depends on the country the cloud infrastructure is located in. The most
complex case is the operation of a cloud infrastructure distributed globally (i.e., over multi-
ple countries) providing public and private cloud services. Without loss of generality, global
clouds are investigated in this thesis. An analysis of the distribution characteristics of cloud
infrastructures is provided in Section 2.3.2.
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2.1.3 Alternative approaches
The characteristics of cloud computing make it a promising candidate for IT outsourcing in
practice. In particular, IaaS and private clouds offer service characteristics that are very similar
to traditional IT outsourcing scenarios. However, cloud computing is not the only approach to
provide IT services to customers. Examples of existing alternative approaches are examined in
the following.
2.1.3.1 Traditional IT outsourcing
Traditional IT outsourcing can be defined as the provisioning of human and/or physical re-
sources by a third-party organisation as a contribution to or replacement for the IT infrastruc-
ture of the outsourcing organisation [135]. Following this definition, IT outsourcing can be
characterised into five1 modes: data processing, systems integration, systems design/planning,
telecoms/network, and application development. Traditional IT outsourcing is limited in its
flexibility, since it is contracted by project or period (cf. [135]). Thus, all resource require-
ments have to be defined beforehand, including all expected requirements for scalability and
utilisation.
In comparison, all modes of IT outsourcing can be addressed by cloud computing. Data
processing, telecoms/network, and systems integration can be covered by IaaS and SaaS, and
systems design/planning and application development can be supported by PaaS. On the one
hand, cloud computing is limited to providing the physical resources (i.e., IT infrastructure),
and human resources are usually2 not provided. On the other hand, cloud computing goes be-
yond traditional IT outsourcing by providing more flexibility (e.g., on-demand and scalability).
The implications of traditional IT outsourcing on legal compliance can be considered be-
ing similar to those of private cloud computing. In both cases, there is a bilateral relationship
– established between the outsourcing-service provider (agent) and the outsourcing customer
(principal) – covering contracted resource provisioning and utilisation. In particular, the loca-
tion of the computing resources and the responsibilities associated with operating them can be
clearly distinguished by the outsourcing customer and the outsourcing provider.
2.1.3.2 Grid computing
A paradigm closely related to cloud computing is the grid computing paradigm. Both paradigms
have much in common their architecture and technology (e.g., large scale, distribution, resource
pooling, remote access) [24], but there are also differences, for example, with respect to com-
putation and data model, application, and abstraction [74]. The service and deployment models
of grid computing are different from that of cloud computing, but with respect to legal com-
pliance, they both share the same issues arising from resource virtualisation and distributed
1Loh and Venkatraman [135] also mentioned ‘data centre’ as a sixth mode of IT outsourcing. In today’s under-
standing of outsourced data processing, the outsourced operation of a data centre can be considered a large-scale
application of outsourced data processing, and can therefore be merged with ‘data processing’.
2There are approaches to utilising human resources in cloud computing, e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk, on the
Internet: http://aws.amazon.com/de/mturk/ (last visited: 30.06.2015).
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computing. Simplified, grid computing can be considered to be similar to IaaS, while having
supercomputing capabilities instead.
2.1.3.3 Other distributed service-oriented architectures (SOAs)
There are other approaches to providing distributed computing services. Prominent examples
are Web Services, which are defined by the Web Service Description Language (WSDL) [220],
and Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) [154]. Both provide middle-
ware for machine-to-machine (M2M) communication utilising remote procedure calls (RPCs).
Unlike cloud computing, the mentioned SOAs do not provide computing resources, but are
used to exchange data or perform operations on provided data. However, the endpoints of
the RPC can be globally distributed, and the introduction of middle-ware for communication
introduces an abstract view on the endpoints similar to the resource virtualisation in cloud
computing. Consequently, cloud computing and distributed SOAs have similar challenges with
respect to legal compliance, although they are implemented using different technologies.
2.2 Understanding IT outsourcing to cloud infrastructures
Within the scenario of IT outsourcing to the cloud, the cloud customer contracts the cloud
provider to provision cloud resources that are utilised to operate the cloud customer’s IT in-
frastructure. Beside the cloud provider and the cloud customer, there are additional actors that
are also involved. For example, the hardware resources of the cloud infrastructure are oper-
ated by one or more hosting sites. It is important for the achievement of legal compliance that
the information flow between the actors involved should comply with the requirements of ap-
plicable legislation and contractual agreements. If information flow complies with applicable
legislation and contractual agreements, the information flow is considered allowed. Otherwise,
the information flow is considered forbidden. Further, if there is allowed information flow be-
tween actors, these actors are considered legitimate, and otherwise illegitimate. Inversely, all
information flow to an illegitimate actor is considered forbidden. An example of an illegitimate
actor is an attacker.
Even though there is allowed information flow between legitimate actors, there might be
information that is not allowed to be shared with all legitimate actors. For example, information
that is allowed to be processed only within a specific country (e.g., German tax data), is allowed
to flow only between legitimate actors located in that specific country. Therefore, it is necessary
to differentiate between allowed and forbidden information flow with respect to legitimate
actors.
Section 2.2.1 identifies the possible legitimate actors that are involved in IT outsourcing to
the cloud, and, based on their interaction, a relationship model is defined, which is used in this
thesis. In Section 2.2.2, the relevance of legal compliance for the key actors, i.e., cloud provider
and corporate customer, is investigated. Further, basic reasons and incentives for implementing
legal compliance in clouds are identified.
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2.2.1 Legitimate actors and their interaction
In this thesis, the cloud model consists of seven different actors that can be involved in an
IT outsourcing scenario. Figure 2.1 depicts these actors and the way they interact. In any
given instance, each actor can be absent or represented one or multiple times. The interaction
between actors is bidirectional and can be one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many. The
actors interact with their connected neighbours and in particular with instances of themselves.
Figure 2.1: Legitimate actors and their relationship in IT outsourcing to cloud infrastructures.
Private Customer Corporate Customer Service Provider
Software Vendor
Cloud Provider
Hardware Provider
Hardware Vendor
Authorised
Third Party
The main interacting actors are the corporate customer and the cloud provider, but there
are also private customers, the service provider, the hardware provider, the software vendor,
the hardware vendor, and authorised third parties. Authorised third parties like governmental
authorities (e.g., tax authority) and assigned inspectors (e.g., certified public accountant) are
considered to be a special case, since these actors are not involved in the outsource scenario
itself, but can be involved when executing a legal act (e.g., tax inspection) or an audit. In such
a case, the authority might interact with any of the involved actors as necessary.
Each of the legitimate actors is described in the following.
Cloud provider The cloud provider is considered the actor operating the cloud infrastructure
as a whole. A cloud provider can be responsible for operating the cloud infrastructure within
a single country (i.e., operating a national cloud or a local cluster of a global cloud), but also
can be responsible for operating the cloud infrastructure in multiple countries (i.e., operating
a global cloud or a global cluster of a global cloud). The cloud provider is responsible for all
operations performed by the cloud infrastructure and, in particular, for the cloud’s manage-
ment. The cloud provider interacts with the corporate customers using cloud services for IT
outsourcing and with the service provider offering services on the cloud platform, and with the
hardware provider subcontracted to operate the hosting sites. Additionally, the cloud provider
interacts with vendors with regard to software and hardware which are used for the cloud offers.
In the scenario of federated cloud computing, cloud providers interact with each other when
they are exchanging data or cloud resources. This is also true when local or global clusters of
a global cloud are operated by different cloud providers.
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Service provider A service provider is an actor operating and managing cloud resources
without operating a cloud infrastructure. Instead, the cloud resources of a service provider
are hosted on a cloud infrastructure operated by a cloud provider. A cloud provider can be a
service provider, too. In particular, this is the case when a cloud provider manages and operates
cloud services in a global cloud where global or local clusters are operated by individual cloud
providers. The service provider interacts with the corporate customers using the cloud services
for IT outsourcing, with the cloud providers hosting the cloud services, and with the software
vendors supplying the software used in services. Additionally, service providers interact with
each other when using other cloud services for providing their own cloud services (e.g., using
a spam filtering service for an email service). Service providers are responsible for the cloud
services they offer. The subcontracted cloud provider acts on behalf of service providers.
Hardware provider A site that operates hardware resources which is utilised to host cloud
resources for a cloud provider is considered a hardware provider (e.g., hosting sites and data
centres). A hardware provider can also be a cloud provider when hardware resources and cloud
resources are both operated by the same provider. Operating the hardware resource of the cloud
infrastructure, the hardware provider is primarily interacting with the cloud provider and also
with other hardware providers when exchanging data or cloud resources with other hardware
providers. A hardware provider also interacts with hardware vendors individually with respect
to obtained hardware. The hardware provider is responsible for hosting cloud resources as
requested by the cloud provider and acts on behalf of the cloud provider.
Software vendor Software vendors license and/or sell the software used in cloud services.
This licensing/selling interaction is done with the cloud provider, the service provider and the
corporate customer, depending on who is using the software and the specific licence model.
Usually, licensing is done before software is used. Therefore, software vendors have only little
influence on the actual processing of data within the cloud. However, the quality and logic of
the software have an influence on the security of data processing within the cloud. A software
vendor might be interacting with other software vendors when utilising third party software for
their own products. Depending on the licence model, the software vendor can be responsible
for security incidents and errors caused by the software.
Hardware vendor The hardware vendor leases or sells the hardware used by the hardware
provider. Therefore, the hardware vendor interacts with the hardware provider directly or with
the cloud provider in case that the cloud provider buys the hardware which is then operated
(on behalf of the cloud provider) by the hardware provider. Further, the hardware vendor inter-
acts with other hardware vendors when utilising third party hardware for their own hardware.
Usually, the hardware provider is responsible for the reliability of the hardware, but not for the
security of the software and cloud resources that are hosted on it. In detail, this depends on the
contract between the hardware vendor and the hardware provider (or the cloud provider).
Corporate customer Corporate customers are considered organisations that outsource their
IT to the cloud or use cloud services. In the context of IT outsourcing there are only corporate
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customers using cloud resources, since there are no private customers using the cloud. There-
fore, corporate customers interact on the one hand with their customers, which might be private
persons or other organisations. The latter are considered corporate customers, too. On the other
hand, corporate customers interact with the service and cloud providers directly in order to ac-
cess and manage their cloud services. They also might interact with software vendors for the
purpose of licensing or acquiring software that is used within the cloud resources. Corporate
customers are responsible for the data processing done on cloud resources.
Private customer Private persons whose personal data is processed within the cloud are con-
sidered private customers. In the scenario of IT outsourcing, private customers do not use cloud
services on their own. Nonetheless, private customers get involved when their interact with a
corporate customer (i.e., if they are the customer of the corporate customer). In this context,
private data might be processed on behalf of corporate customers within the cloud if corpo-
rate customers move data belonging to their private customers into the cloud. The corporate
customer is responsible for doing this, but the cloud provider can also become responsible for
processing private data in the cloud, for example, when transmitting data to the outside of the
EU/EEA (cf. Section 3.2). Usually, private customers interact only with corporate customers.
Private customers may also interact with each other, for example, when sharing data with each
other or interacting as a group. If data are transmitted outside of the EU/EEA, there might be
interaction with the cloud provider (for example, when the private customer claims the right of
access).
Authorised third party Authorised third parties are considered all entities that are not in-
volved in the IT outsourcing directly but get involved due to a legal authorisation or an assign-
ment by one or more of the involved actors. Examples of such third parties are governmental
authorities (such as the tax authority according to German tax law; cf. 3.4.2), data protection
authorities according to European data protection law (cf. Art. 20 No. 2 of the Directive
95/46/EC), and assigned inspectors performing an audit (such as the certified public accoun-
tant in conjunction with the standards on service organisation controls SSAE 16 and the ISAE
3402). These third parties have in common that they are not involved in the process of IT
outsourcing but authorised (by law or contractual agreement) to verify compliance with legal
and/or contractual requirements. Therefore, they have to interact with all actors that are under
inspection and, particularly, review the data processing performed by these actors. An example
is the inspection of a German cloud customer by the German tax authority. For such an in-
spection, it is necessary to review the data processing systems including those systems used for
outsourced data processing (according to GDPdU1 No. I.1.a). In this example, the inspection
of the corporate customer by the tax authority includes the inspection of related data processing
at all involved cloud providers’ and hardware providers’ sites.
In general, authorised third parties might interact with any other involved actors depending
on the specific case and granted authority. In the following, it is assumed that authorised
third parties interact with all other involved actors. This rather general assumption makes it
1Administrative regulation “Grundsätze zum Datenzugriff und zur Prüfbarkeit digitaler Unterlagen (GDPdU)” (in
German) established by the German Federal Ministry of Finance (cf. BMF IV D 2 - S 0316 - 136/01).
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possible to focus the information model on the information flow between the actors originally
involved in the IT outsourcing scenario without neglecting the possible information flow to
the authorised third parties. However, it might be necessary to control the information flow
to authorised third parties more specifically (e.g., tax authorities must have access to tax data
but usually not necessarily to personal data). This requires additional research with a focus on
information flow to authorised third parties, which is not part of this thesis. Possible extensions
of the model that is presented in this thesis are discussed in the outlook (cf. Section 7.3).
2.2.2 Relevance of legal compliance
Having identified cloud providers and corporate customers, the key actors in the scenario of IT
outsourcing to clouds, it is necessary to understand the meaning of legal compliance from the
perspective of these actors. Their reasons and incentives for implementing legal compliance
form the basis of investigating legal requirements and their implementation in the context of IT
outsourcing to clouds.
Corporate customers have to comply with legislation generally. For example, they have
to comply with data protection law when processing personal data, and with tax law when
processing data relevant to tax law. These legal requirements also apply to corporate cus-
tomers when they are outsourcing their IT to clouds. Additionally, restrictions may apply to
the outsourcing itself, for example in German tax law outsourcing is allowed only with explicit
permission of the competent revenue authority (§146 para. 2 cl. 1 AO). When outsourcing data
processing, the corporate customers are usually responsible for this act (e.g., for personal data
in EU/EEA according to Art. 7 lit. a in association with Art. 6 para. 1 Data Protection Di-
rective). Therefore, it is in their interest that the service organisation (here the cloud provider)
should act in compliance with legal constraints applicable to the corporate customers. They
may even be obliged to inspect the cloud provider (e.g., according to German data protection
law, §11 para. 2 cl. 4 BDSG). For that reason, the technical implementation of clouds has to
support the inspection of the cloud provider by the corporate customer. In this context, it is of
particular interest, which characteristics and requirements are covered by such inspections and
therefore can be monitored and reported on.
Cloud providers are contracted by corporate customers and have to comply with the bi-
lateral contract including SLAs addressing legal constraints of the corporate customers. For
example, if the corporate customer is obliged to guarantee the accessibility of their tax data
to the competent revenue authority, the cloud provider has to ensure the availability of the tax
data in a case of an inspection by the competent revenue authority. For the cloud providers, it is
important to know what legal requirements of their corporate customers they have to fulfil upon
service delivery. Cloud infrastructures have to be capable to support these legal requirements
by decision and enforcement mechanisms as well as monitoring and reporting mechanisms.
Due to the high degree of automation, these mechanisms have to operate with little or no hu-
man interaction if possible. However, inspections by the cloud provider, corporate customers,
and competent authorities must be possible. Further, cloud providers usually subcontract hard-
ware providers and third party hardware provider, which also have to comply with the legal
requirements of the corporate customers. To achieve this, decision-making and enforcement
mechanisms as well as monitoring and reporting mechanisms have to cover the subcontracted
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provider as well as the cloud provider.
In this thesis, these requirements are addressed in a first step by identifying legal require-
ments of the corporate customers that imply requirements on technical implementation at the
cloud provider. This is covered by the legal analysis in Chapter 3. In a second step, technical
ability of clouds to cover identified legal requirements is investigated in Chapter 4. The iden-
tified research gap is covered in a final step, performed in Chapter 5, by an information model
addressing the decision and enforcement of legal requirements in clouds, which also supports
monitoring and reporting mechanisms.
2.3 Technical impact of clouds on legal compliance
In Section 2.1 several technical observations that are important for investigating the legal com-
pliance of cloud infrastructures were made. First, cloud infrastructure consists of virtual re-
sources and hardware resources. To evaluate the legal compliance of cloud infrastructures it is
necessary to understand their relevance. Second, the utilisation of distributed computing and
virtualisation in cloud computing are important characteristics of cloud computing, having a
severe impact on the legal compliance of cloud infrastructures. Their technical implications
when it comes to legal compliance have to be clarified. In the following, the technical im-
plications of cloud infrastructures, distributed computing, and virtualisation of the evaluation
process and the legal compliance in general are discussed.
2.3.1 Evaluating cloud infrastructures
Cloud computing can be described as the process of mapping virtual resources to hardware
resources. To evaluate the legal compliance of a cloud infrastructure, it is necessary to in-
vestigate legal compliance on the level of virtual resources, hardware resources and the cloud
management process.
While the legally compliant utilisation of virtual resources is the cloud customer’s respon-
sibility, the provisioning and hosting of virtual resources is the cloud provider’s responsibility.
The provisioning is made at the cloud customer’s request. Therefore, the cloud provider has to
ensure compliance with the cloud customer’s preferences, which are usually regulated by SLAs
that are expressed via the cloud customer’s management front-end and enforced by the cloud
management process. Thus, the legal compliance of provisioning and hosting virtual resources
depends on the legally compliant execution of the cloud management process.
The cloud management process assigns hardware resources for the operation of virtual
resources. Its legal compliance depends on assigning hardware resources that legally comply
with the requirements of the virtual resources (i.e., the cloud customer’s preferences).
To conclude, the legal compliance of the cloud infrastructure depends on the legally com-
pliant operation of the underlying hardware resources and their assignment to requested virtual
resources. The technical capacity of the cloud provider to enforce legally compliant operation
and assignment depends on the implemented cloud security management, which is discussed
in Section 4.2. The impact of distributed hardware resources and their abstraction to virtual
resources is discussed in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
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2.3.2 Distributed computing and location inhomogeneity
The abstract view on the underlying hardware resources allows the hosting of virtual resources
at different locations seamlessly. The decision where virtual resources are hosted is done on a
macro level by selecting the hosting site and on a micro level by selecting the hardware resource
at the hosting site (cf. Section 4.1.4). On both levels, the decision affects the legal compliance
of virtual resources.
On the macro level, the selection of the hosting sites influences which country the vir-
tual resources are effectively hosted in and who is locally responsible for the operation of the
hosting hardware. Hosting sites can be distributed over different countries, and therefore, they
can be located in different jurisdictions. Therefore, selecting the hosting site implies selecting
the applicable legislation, which is key to the make legal compliant decisions in respect to the
location. Furthermore, the hosting sites are usually operated by different organisations and re-
sponsible persons. This means that the responsibilities for operating the hosting hardware are
split among a group of entities (i.e., private or legal persons), which can individually imple-
ment security and compliance management. This can result in a technical and organisational
divergence on effective security and compliance between hosting sites. To some extent, this
divergence can be compensated for by the cloud provider (e.g., by communicating unified se-
curity policies and monitoring the effective security at the hosting sites). For flexible and robust
security management, such divergences have to be considered when making decisions on allo-
cating resources to specific hosting sites. Therefore, specific information on the current state
of security and compliance at each hosting site has to be communicated to the cloud provider.
On the other hand, the hosting sites have to be informed of security policies and applicable
constraints of the allocated cloud services. The latter information is particularly important for
the enforcement of applicable requirements at the hosting site.
On the micro level, the cloud management process decides which hardware is locally used
to host virtual resources. In general, the hardware equipment at a hosting site is not necessarily
homogeneous, because hardware tends to be stocked or substituted successively rather than
replaced completely on every upgrade or replacement. This consequently results in a hetero-
geneous mix of servers at most hosting sites with differences in hardware-supported security
features. On the one hand, this heterogeneity can be intentional to provide the ability to cover
different hardware requirements of virtual resources (e.g., GPU support). On the other hand,
it can result in different sets of security measures implemented. For example, servers with
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) installed support the operation of trusted virtual machine
monitors (TVMM) [79], which provide mechanisms to ensure and validate the integrity of ex-
ecuted software. However, it cannot be assumed that every server has TPMsupport installed
(e.g., the FUJITSU Server PRIMERGY Blade-Systems do not support TPM by default1). For
the compliant operation of virtual resources, the differences in local hardware when it comes
to security features has to be be considered in the cloud management process.
As discussed above, the distributed operation of cloud services requires the cloud man-
agement to deal with inhomogeneity in several ways. In this context, location is an important
1According to the data sheets on the Internet http://globalsp.ts.fujitsu.com/dmsp/Publications/
public/ds-py-bx400-s1.pdf and http://globalsp.ts.fujitsu.com/dmsp/Publications/public/
ds-py-bx900-s2.pdf (Last visited: 30.06.2015)
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property to address and manage these inhomogeneities, which can be definedas follows.
Definition 2.2 (Location in-/homogeneity) A cloud infrastructure has the property of loca-
tion inhomogeneity if and only if its underlying hardware resources are distributed among
different hosting sites which (a) are located in different countries (with different applicable
legislation) or (b) implement different sets of security measures.
Conversely, a cloud infrastructure has the property of location homogeneity if and only
if the hardware resources are distributed among hosting sites which are located in a single
country (or in different countries with the same applicable legislation) and implement the same
set of security measures.
Remark 2.6 (Distinction from location diversity) The definition of location inhomogeneity
has to be distinguished from the definition for location diversity used in the anonymity context
of location-based services. There, location diversity defines a measure for the probability of
associating a communication process (i.e., query) with a certain location [222]. Both defini-
tions have in common that they define a property that is resulting from interpreting the data
processing at multiple locations. Strong location diversity means that there is a large number
of undistinguishable positions, because they have the same observed properties. This is dia-
metrically opposed to location inhomogeneity, where the observed properties are necessarily
distinguishable (by jurisdiction or responsible operator). However, location homogeneity sup-
ports location diversity, since the jurisdiction and the responsible operator are the same for all
positions of data processing.
Remark 2.7 (Hardware in-/homogeneity) To address the difference in the location of sup-
ported computational and security features independently, such a difference is called hardware
inhomogeneity. On the other hand, hardware homogeneity expresses the fact that there are no
differences in the supported computational and security features. Hardware in-/homogeneity
can be used to describe the hardware resources of cloud infrastructures, of global/local clus-
ters, and of hosting sites.
2.3.3 Impact of virtualisation
The main implication of virtualisation is that the hardware resources are hidden from the cloud
customer and can be easily exchanged on demand. While this obfuscation and flexibility is an
intended feature of the cloud management process, it leads to new challenges in monitoring and
validating the effective legal compliance. In general, there is no dedicated hardware in the cloud
that can be monitored and validated by cloud customers with regard to its legally compliant
operation. This is true only for private cloud scenarios. In particular, the cloud customer
usually1 has no contact with the hardware operators – in contrast to traditional outsourcing
scenarios (cf. Section 2.1.3.1) – to gather evidence on the effective legal compliance of the
hardware resources. Without this knowledge, cloud customers have to rely on information
provided by the cloud provider.
1In general, the cloud customer has contact with the cloud provider, which subcontracts the hardware sites. An
exception from this is when the cloud provider is also the hardware provider.
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While the possibilities had by the cloud customer to monitor and validate the effective legal
compliance are limited, the customer’s services can be arbitrarily distributed on different host-
ing sites and be co-hosted with services of other customers without the customer’s notice. This
can result in an unnoticed breach of required security constraints, for example, in illegitimated
transfer of German tax data to a third country (cf. Section 3.5.3.2) or unauthorised disclosure
to other cloud customers.
To conclude, the compliance control of the IT services outsourced by the corporate cus-
tomer depends on the reports and evidence provided by the cloud provider. The abilities of
cloud providers to document, monitor and report on compliance are discussed in Section 4.3.
2.4 Summary of related work
This thesis investigates the mutual dependencies of legislation and technology in the context
of IT outsourcing to clouds with respect to European and particularly German legislation. To
address open challenges, an information theoretical implementation of location-determined
data processing is proposed that deals with location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 2.2) in clouds and
supports legal compliance.1 Dealing with the location of data processing has been identified as
a legal and technical challenge by multiple authors (e.g., in terms of ‘data location’ [117] [41],
‘data locality’ [191], and ‘multi location issue’ [230]). However, a detailed analysis of literature
in respect to this particular topic (cf. Section 4.2) revealed that location inhomogeneity in
clouds is only partly addressed by current research.
It is possible to decide and enforce the manner in which virtual resources are assigned to
hardware resources in clouds based on countries using a list of secure third countries in the
context of European data protection law [202]. Further, the virtual machine placement can
be attested remotely in relation to the hosting hypervisor and compute server using technol-
ogy of trusted hypervisors and trusted platform modules [180, pp. 12 et seqq.]. The same is
true for cloud storage [3] [4]. When tagging clouds resources with information on their (geo-
)location, cloud providers can compliantly assign virtual resources to hardware resources by
location constraints [217]. There also exist multiple approaches to resource allocation strate-
gies considering location constraints (e.g., location-aware MapReduce [122] [161] [162] [92],
customised location constraints [128], co-location of virtual machines [14], optimal location in
cloud networks [129], customer-centric resource allocation [187] [196], and inter-cloud archi-
tectures [90]). However, if legal aspects are considered, only data protection law is considered.
Other legal requirements such as those of given by tax law or export control are not considered.
Further, none of the mentioned approaches covers an information model which verifies and
ensures the correctness of the decisions and enforcements (in respect to assignment of virtual
resources to hardware resources) made by the cloud providers.
Related work on information flow control is investigated in Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.2,
which reveals that methods of MAC are applicable, but the location inhomogeneity in clouds
has not been addressed, yet. Applying information flow control to clouds has been considered
before. Having the development of secure cloud services in mind, Bacon et al. propose to use
1In Chapter 4, this problem is defined more specifically as the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6).
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methods of information flow control in PaaS cloud environments [13]. Based on the ground-
breaking approaches of Bell and La Padula [20], Denning [52], Biba [22], it is possible to prove
confidentiality and integrity with respect to information flow in systems generally (including
IaaS cloud environments like shown in Section 5.2.3). Further, these models can be com-
bined into a single model addressing both confidentiality and integrity [175]. It is also possible
to consider location constraints such as co-location [201] and user location [166]. However,
current research does not cover the modelling of location constraints, which apply when as-
signing virtual resources to hardware resources and which are based on the legal requirements
of corporate customers. Also, none of the current approaches supports availability, which is an
important legal requirement, e.g. in the context of German tax law (cf. Section 3.3.3).
To conclude, the review of current research revealed that there is awareness of location
inhomogeneity and its importance for legally compliant cloud computing, but that current ap-
proaches focus on data protection law (other legal norms are not considered) or do not consider
legal requirements at all. Further, there exist multiple approaches addressing location con-
straints, when assigning resources in clouds. However, none of them supports the reliable
verification of decisions made and enforcements when it comes to the information that is al-
lowed flow between hardware resources. With the methods of information flow control, the
decision on and enforcement of allowed information flows can be verified with respect to con-
fidentiality, integrity and co-location of virtual resources. Nonetheless, availability and the
location of hardware resources are not supported by existing approaches. This thesis provides
a novel approach, extending methods of information flow control to cover availability and lo-
cation constraints in order to ensure legally compliant cloud resource allocation based on legal
and technical requirements in IT outsourcing to clouds.
2.5 Conclusions on legally compliant clouds
When corporate customers are outsourcing their IT to IaaS clouds, it is important that the
provisioning and hosting of the utilised virtual resources should be legally compliant with
applicable legislation. Which legal requirements apply can be different for each individual
corporate customer and is investigated in Chapter 3. The cloud providers have to translate
these requirements into legally compliant cloud computing. While cloud computing consists of
hosting, provisioning and utilisation of computing resources, this implies three different views
on computing resources: 1) the physical view on the hosting infrastructure (i.e., hardware
resources), 2) the logical view on resource provisioning (i.e., cloud management), and 3) the
logical view on resource utilisation (i.e., virtual resources). All views have a different level
of abstraction, including management and utilisation of cloud resources. To ensure legally
compliant data processing in clouds, it is necessary to understand the technical mechanisms
of hosting, provisioning, and utilisation and to identify their impact on legal compliance. In
particular, the technical concepts behind resource pooling and virtualisation are key to this
understanding. In this thesis, these concepts and their interconnection are investigated for IaaS
(cf. Remark 2.4) in hybrid clouds which are globally distributed (cf. Remark 2.5). The capacity
of cloud environments to support legal requirements in such a scenario of IT outsourcing is
investigated in the technical analysis in Chapter 4. The identified research gap is then addressed
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by proposed methods of information flow control in Chapter 5, which is evaluated in Chapter 6.
Chapter 3 investigates the underlying legal requirements of IT outsourcing to clouds.
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Chapter 3
Legal analysis and technical
requirements
This thesis aims to identify and implement the legal requirements of outsourced data processing
in clouds technically.1 A particular focus lies on data and corporate customers originating
both from EU/EEA countries in general and particularly Germany, while the cloud providers
may operate globally. In such a context, the challenge arises that data which are protected by
European and German legislation may be processed in foreign jurisdictions. Legislation of the
origin and foreign country may not be compatible, resulting in conflicting requirements,2 or
the foreign jurisdiction lacks adequate regulations.3
This chapter identifies the legal requirements for IT outsourcing using cloud computing
in the specific case of European and German legislation (Objective 1). Particularly, the le-
gal requirements that a cloud provider has to satisfy – and therefore to implement technically
– are investigated with the focus on data protection law and selected sectoral requirements
commonly found in the context of IT outsourcing. A specific focus is on identifying legal re-
quirements which have an impact on the technical implementation of clouds. For this purpose,
it is necessary to identify corresponding legal norms on IT outsourcing and data processing
of European and German legislation and clarify the lawfulness of cloud computing. Based on
corresponding legal norms, it is possible to understand the technical implications and derive
general and specific requirements for implementing clouds.
In Section 3.1, the lawfulness of cloud computing is examined based on the data types
processed in the cloud. In particular, legal norms regulating data processing and basic require-
ments are identified. Section 3.2 investigates the specific requirements for processing personal
data in the cloud using the example of carrying out data processing under Germany data pro-
1Parts of the structure and content of this chapter trace back to preliminary work which were performed in the
context of an expert opinion given to Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH. The expert opinion has not been
published.
2For example, the USA PATRIOT Act obliges European companies affiliated with companies located in the United
States of America (USA) to provide access to customer data to investigative authority without consent nor notice
of the data subjects, which is generally conflicted with European data protection law [219].
3For example, in the context of transmitting personal data to third countries, third countries may lack of an adequate
level of protection (recital 57 in conj. with Art. 25 para. 4 Data Protection Directive).
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tection law. In particular, the responsibility and duties of cloud providers and restrictions on
data transmission are derived. Section 3.3 analyses requirements on necessary safeguards at
the cloud provider. Especially technical safeguards are investigated, including requirements
for implementing confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In Section 3.4, the sectoral require-
ments of data processing in clouds are examined. For exemple, the specific requirements in
the financial, medical and healthcare, and public sector as well as those prescribed by tax law
and regulations on export control are covered. In Section 3.5, special requirements that apply
with particular relevance for the context of IT outsourcing – and therefore require specific care
by the cloud provider – are discussed. Particularly, requirements for the storage of data, doc-
umentation in the cloud, special access by investigative authorities, and location-determined
data processing are examined. Section 3.6 concludes with the technical requirements implied
by the legal requirements investigated in this chapter.
3.1 Lawfulness of cloud computing
In principle, the lawfulness of data processing is regulated by legal norms that are applicable to
the specific context of data processing. For example, data protection law regulates the process-
ing of personal data, and tax law regulates the processing of tax data. The data processing must
follow these legal norms. The lawfulness of cloud computing is given if data processing within
the cloud is in compliance with all applicable legal norms. Each legal norm specifies the cir-
cumstance under which it is applicable. Further, each legal norm provides basic requirements
that have to be obeyed by corporate customers and cloud providers as well.
This section determines the categories of data that are processed in the cloud and the corre-
sponding legal norms. Further, basic requirements are identified which have to be considered
when processing these categories of data in the cloud.
3.1.1 Data categories and corresponding legal norms
In the context of IT outsourcing to the cloud, the corporate customer transfers data to the
cloud originating from multiple sources and designated for different processing purposes. For
example, data may contain customer information, economic data, and intellectual property
belonging to third parties. Whether data processing is lawful and which requirements apply is
defined by legal norms corresponding to the processed data.
Generally, data can be classified by the following four categories: personal data, business
data, property right protected data, and unprotected data. Each category is introduced below,
and the corresponding legal norms are identified. Further, these categories are not necessarily
disjunct. For example, customer data may be considered personal data since they reference
real persons, and at the same time they are business data since they are associated with a
specific corporate customer and are of importance for that customer’s operational business. If
data belong to multiple categories then multiple norms and the requirements of each category
involved may apply. Generally, such data are denoted mixed data.
30
Personal data (also personally identifiable information1) are data that are (or can be) as-
sociated (i.e., personally identifiable) with a real person (a.k.a. the data subject) in general).2
Within the cloud, the personal data of corporate customers’ private clients or employees can
be processed. In the European Union, protection of personal data is a basic right (Art. 8
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)3 and protected by the Data Protection
Directive (Directive 95/46/EC). In future, the Data Protection Directive will be replaced by the
upcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is not to be expected to happen
before 2017.4 In this thesis, the investigations will focus on current data protection law but also
upcoming changes made by the upcoming regulation are considered where applicable.
The Data Protection Directive is implemented by the national data protection acts of each
member state. In Germany it is generally the BDSG which regulates the processing of per-
sonal data by public bodies and authorities of the federal government and non-public agencies.
Additionally, there exist data protection laws in each federal state regulating data processing
by its public bodies and authorities. However, there are special laws regulating data protec-
tion within a specific context which have priority over the BDSG (§1 para. 3 cl. 1 BDSG).
For example, personal data within electronic communication, i.e., customer data, traffic data,
usage data, and content data, are protected by the Telemediengesetz (TMG), primarily imple-
menting the Directive on Electronic Commerce (Directive 2000/31/EG) – the latter explicitly
does not cover data protection (Art. 1 para. 5 lit. b Directive on Electronic Commerce)5 – and
the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) implementing in particular the Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications (Directive 2002/58/EC). In electronic communication, the protec-
tion of content data (i.e., the confidentiality of the communications, Art. 5 Directive on Privacy
1Established by the NIST [140] and originally defined by the United States Government Accountability Office
[209]: “any information about an individual [...], including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual’s identity [...]; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual [...].”
2In Germany, there is an ongoing legal discussion about whether personal identifiability is measured by the scope
of the controller/processor (i.e., subjective scope) or by the general possibility (i.e., objective scope) [28, ch. 1
§3 III.1]. On European level, the Article 29 Working Party stated [11, pp. 15 seqq.] that “a mere hypothetical
possibility to single out the individual [sic!] is not enough to consider the person as identifiable”, that the purpose
of data processing is “one relevant factor [...] for assessing all the means likely reasonably [sic!] to be used
either by the controller or by any other person” and that a “case-by-case analysis should be carried out”. This
generally supports the subjective scope but does not necessarily exclude the objective, particularly not for purposes
including admissible transfer to third parties. Then again, cloud computing can provide a large variety of means
for identifying individuals including access to additional information sources and data mining tools on demand
[164], where the use of these means becomes more likely. In this thesis, the applicability of the large scope
(i.e., generally identifiable) is assumed since case-by-case analyses are beyond the scope of this theses and legal
certainty is generally provided due to being compliant with the most general case. This is in conformance with the
recommendation by Brennscheidt [28, ibid.] and the definition on linkability of personally identifiable information
by the NIST [140, ch. 2.1].
3In the European Economic Area (EEA), this right is established by Art. 8 European Convention on Human Rights
which covers privacy generally and particularly data protection in correspondence to the ECtHR’s interpretation
(decision dated 13.11.12, application no. 24029/07, recital 187).
4The regulation has not yet been finalised (June 2015), and will apply two years after coming into force (Art. 91
GDPR). At that point the regulation will become directly applicable (Art. 288 para. 2 TFEU) and replace all
national data protection law. Particularly in Germany, many sectoral regulation will become obsolete [104].
5This is the reason that the TMG implements the Data Protection Directive only for tele-media services (accom-
modating the priority of TMG’s area specific regulations on data processing over the BDSG), which usually are
information society services (according to Directive 2000/31/EC).
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and Electronic Communications)1 and the protection of location data other than traffic data
(Art. 9 Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications) are regulated separately.
Furthermore, in the context of German social security services, personal data are protected
by the Sozialgesetzbücher (SGB), and moreover, personal data are protected by the StGB if
there are obligations of professional secrecy (§203 StGB in association with Art. 8 para. 3 Data
Protection Directive). Additionally, personal data that are given to a German finance authority,
i.e., tax data, are protected by tax secrecy regulations according to §30 AO. Brennscheidt men-
tions that there exists a large number of area specific regulations on data protection in Germany
[28, ch. 1 §3 III.4.c].
Encrypted personal data are considered personal data that are encrypted using a secure2
cipher algorithm. At least in German legislation, it is an open question whether encrypted
personal data are still protected by data protection law [28, ch. 1 §3 III.1]. A hypothesis
formulated by Spies [188] is that data protection law generally applies on transfer of encrypted
personal data into the cloud, unless the cloud provider proves that the data are encrypted and
that only the data subject can access the data (with the key necessary for decryption). Spies
argues that encrypted personal data may not be considered personal data but anonymised data
(according to §3 para. 6 BDSG). Current investigations by Brennscheidt indicates that the
discussion is still open but there are strong arguments3 for considering encrypted personal data
still protected by data protection law. At a European level, the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party consider “encryption with secret key” pseudonymisation which “when used
alone will not result in an anonymous dataset” since it “reduces the linkability” and, therefore,
is “a useful security measure but not a method of anonymisation” [12, ch. 4]. This is also in
conformance with the NIST’s definition of the linkability of personally identifiable information
[140, ch. 2.1]. Consequently, in this thesis, personal data are considered continuously protected
by data protection law whether they are encrypted or not.
Business data are data associated with an organisation and usually contain trade secrets.
In clouds, business data of corporate customers and corporate clients of a corporate customer
might be processed as well as business data from software providers, hardware providers, ser-
vice providers and cloud providers themselves. Business data are usually protected by non-
disclosure agreements (NDAs) in business contracts. Particularly the outsourcing contract be-
tween cloud provider and corporate customer may contain NDAs. There are additional require-
ments for data processing that may apply to business data for specific contexts. For example, in
Germany, business data are protected against disclosure by §203 StGB if there are obligations
of professional secrecy and in the context of unfair competition (§§17, 18 Gesetz gegen den
unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG)).
1In Germany, content data are protected by the BDSG and, in the context of telecommunication, also by the secrecy
of telecommunication according to §88 TKG.
2In the sense of using current cipher algorithms with sufficient key lengths, which are adequate to protection re-
quirements and period of usage according to existing recommendations [85].
3According to Brennscheidt [28, ch. 1 §3 III.1]: Encryption is a necessary safeguard which shall not change the
data themselves. Further, decryption might be possible in the future without the necessary key due to progress in
breaking the cipher. Additionally, the applicability of data protection law may change during processing – due to
encryption and decryption – resulting in unpredictably of the effective protection, which is to the data subject’s
disadvantage.
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Property right protected data are data that contain (or represent) intellectual property
and, therefore, are protected by intellectual property right and copy right law. The applicable
requirements on processing property right protected data depend on multiple factors including
applicable property rights and used license models. In particular, in the context of IaaS, dealing
with intellectual property can be complex, especially if corporate customers utilise licensed
software [102, part 3 recital 143]. Also, the lawfulness of temporal duplication in clouds is
discussed controversially [102, part 3 recital 151], which is particularly relevant for the cloud
provider when migrating virtual resources or creating backups. Due to this complexity, a case-
by-case analysis of property rights and their impact on outsourcing data processing to the cloud
is necessary, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, property right protected data
and their processing in the cloud are not further investigated in this thesis. Possibilities for
applying methods identified in this thesis to processing of property right protected data are
disused in the outlook (cf. Section 7.3).
Unprotected data are the remainder of all data that are not considered personal data, busi-
ness data, or property right protected data. The collection and processing of such data are
unregulated and basically legal. Therefore, they can be processed freely and without any addi-
tional requirements in the cloud. Before marking data unprotected, the cloud providers should
clarify that neither legal norms nor specific legal requirements apply. In particular, it is possible
for unprotected data to become personal data, for example by linking unprotected data with a
person. In general, unprotected data can be processed any time in the cloud whether safeguards
are applied or not. Therefore, they are not further investigated in this thesis.
3.1.2 Basic requirements for data processing in clouds
Lawful cloud computing must comply with applicable legal norms. As a precondition, the
cloud customers who are outsourcing data to the cloud must be admissible to collect and pro-
cess the data.
For personal data, collection and processing is forbidden where the prohibition can be
lifted (Art. 7 Data Protection Directive). Generally, the lawfulness of collecting and process-
ing personal data of both the corporate customer’s private clients and employees is given by
their contractual relationship with the corporate customer (Art. 7 lit. b Data Protection Di-
rective). Alternatively, the data subjects may give their explicit consent (Art. 7 lit. a Data
Protection Directive). That can be necessary in the particular case of collecting and processing
special categories of personal data, e.g., medical and health data, when the contractual rela-
tionship is not sufficient (Art. 8 para. 1 Data Protection Directive). Here, the explicit consent
of the data subject is regularly necessary (Art. 8 para. 2 lit. a Data Protection Directive).
In order to process personal data without explicit consent, (special) legal permission have to
apply.1 In particular, legal permissions can apply if the necessity of data processing is explic-
itly given by law (Art. 7 lit. c–f Art. 8 lit. b,c and e second part Data Protection Directive).
Further, collection and processing of personal data are only allowed for “specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes”, i.e., purpose limitation (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. b Data Protection Directive),
1In general according to Art. 7 lit. c–f Data Protection Directive and for special categories of personal data
according to Art. 8 para. 2 lit. b–e Data Protection Directive.
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and the processing of personal data must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation
to the purposes” (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. c Data Protection Directive). The latter is particularly
addressed in German legislation by the principle of data avoidance (§3a BDSG). This implies
that the nature, scope, and quality of the processing personal data is additionally restricted by
the purpose of processing. Generally, the outsourcing contract states whether purpose limita-
tion applies and for what purposes the given data are to be processed (Art. 17 para. 3 Data
Protection Directive and, in Germany, §11 para. 2 no. 2 BDSG). Therefore, the cloud provider
and the corporate customers have to consider applicable purpose limitations when designing
the contract. In particular, they have to define adequate measures that have to be implemented
in the cloud ensuring the compliance of data processing with purpose limitation. Further, “the
controller must implement appropriate technical and organizational [sic!] measures to protect
personal data” (Art. 17 para. 1 Data Protection Directive).1 In particular, the “measures shall
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature
of the data to be protected” (Art 17 para. 1 cl. 2 Data Protection Directive). Which measures
apply for cloud computing and the necessary safeguards at the cloud provider are investigated
in Section 3.3). Another important aspect is that transfer of personal data to third countries
generally requires an adequate level of protection that is ensured by the third country (Art.
25 para. 1 Data Protection Directive and, in Germany, §4b para. 2 cl. 2 in conj. with §4b
para. 3 BDSG). This implies the necessity of transfer control for personal data, in particular
for recipients located in third countries. Transfer control is investigated in more detail for data
transmissions in the context of carrying out data processing in Section 3.2.3, and against the
background of the necessity for location-determined data processing in Section 3.5.3.
For business data, collection and processing is generally admissible if it is not prohibited
specifically. The nature, scope, and quality of data processing are usually addressed within the
context of service descriptions (which are part of the outsourcing contracts) [102, part 2 recital
196 seq.]. Basically, the lawfulness of processing business data within the cloud depends on the
lawfulness of outsourcing the related IT processes to the cloud and, further, is clarified by the
outsourcing contract between the corporate customer and the cloud provider. The lawfulness
of outsourcing an IT process might be regulated by corresponding sectoral legislation. For
example, in the German financial sector, the delegation of accountability is banned (§25b para.
2 KWG) [26, part 9 recital 18] and, by German tax law, the accounting generally has to take
place inland(§146 para. 2 AO) [26, part 8 recital 9]. More details on sectoral requirements
can be found in Section 3.4, which investigates these requirements specifically, including the
requirements for and constraints on admissible outsourcing to the cloud. If the outsourcing of
the IT process is admissible (or not further regulated) then the lawfulness of data processing in
the cloud is regulated by the outsourcing contract.
For outsourcing in general, the contract addresses applicable legal norms and how to
deal with multiple jurisdictions [102, part 2 recital 132 seqq.] including place of jurisdiction
and applicable legislation [102, part 2 recital 169 seqq.]. Further, an IT-outsourcing contract is
1In Germany, technical and organisational measures are addressed by §9 and appendix to §9 cl. 1 BDSG.
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generally a mixed-type contract in respect to the services delivered1. For that reason, the nature,
scale, and quality of the outsourced data processing depends on the service description in the
contract [102, part 2 recital 196 seq.]. Additionally, rights of use are clarified by the outsourcing
contract [26, part 13 ch. B.V.], which are not necessarily limited to property right protected
data transferred to the cloud and can also cover rights to the shared results of collaboration
[26, part 13 recital 112 seq.] and rights of access to databases stored in the cloud [26, part 13
recital 116]. In conclusion, the cloud provider is obliged to process data in compliance with
the outsourcing contract which defines the nature, scale, and quality of data processing.
3.2 Limits and handling of carrying out data processing
To gain a better understanding of the nature and scope of requirements in IT outsourcing, the
example of carrying out data processing2 in the German data protection law (§11 BDSG) is
investigated. Carrying out data processing is regulated with respect to responsibility of data
processing, details of the outsourcing contract, inspection of the processor, lawfulness of trans-
mission, and considering processing of data requiring specific care (e.g., implementation addi-
tional safeguards). Therefore, carrying out data processing is an good candidate investigating
nature and scope of regulations on IT outsourcing to the cloud.
Carrying out data processing is considered a privilege to lawfully transfer personal data
between the controller3 and the processor,4, and therefore it is not considered a transfer to a
third party (§3 para. 8 cl. 2 BDSG).5 The privilege of carrying out data processing can only
apply if all legal requirements are met.6 In particular, the assignment of responsibility is not
included in carrying out data processing [28, ch. 2 §5 I]. There are also sectoral requirements
with an impact on carrying out data processing (cf. Section 3.4). For example, there are
additional requirements for the legality of carrying out data processing for personal data in the
context of German social security services (§80 SGB X; see also Section 3.4.4). In the context
of cloud computing, carrying out data processing basically applies if responsibilities relevant
for ensuring that data protection remains with the controller.7 In the following, carrying out
data processing is investigated in the context of processing personal data in the cloud generally,
and it is assumed that it is basically applicable in the context of IT outsourcing to the cloud.
The remainder of this section identifies requirements for carrying out data processing with
respect to responsibilities of controller and processor, including contract details (cf. Sec-
1Contract classification by Nägele and Jacobs [148, ch. II.2]: Lease: software and data storage (and IaaS, PaaS,
and SaaS cloud services in general [102, part 158 recital 158]); works contract: backup and installation, im-
plementation, and modification of software; service contract: computational power, maintenance and support of
software.
2The term refers to “carrying out of processing by way of a processor” (Art. 17 para. 3 Data Protection Directive).
3The controller is responsible for the data processing (Art. 2 (d), Data Protection Directive).
4The processor performs the data processing (Art. 2 lit. e Data Protection Directive); also mentioned service
organisation [8].
5A third party is an involved person/party “other than the data subject, the controller, the processor” (Art. 2 lit. f
Data Protection Directive).
6Requirements are defined in §11 BDSG including set-up and execution of carrying out data processing [28, ch. 2
§5 II].
7In accordance with the statements of German supervisory authorities [102, part 4 recital 53].
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tion 3.2.1), inspection of the processor (cf. Section 3.2.2), lawful data transmission (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2.3), and dealing with professional secrets (cf. Section 3.2.4). In particular, resulting
technical implications for cloud computing and the obligations of cloud providers are iden-
tified. To investigate the applicable requirements, European and German legislation are in-
spected since European legislation establishes the implementation of data protection law by
the member states and particularly by Germany.
3.2.1 Processor, controller, and their responsibilities
Basically, the corporate customer contracts the cloud provider to process personal data in the
cloud. Therefore, the corporate customer is considered the controller. Further, the cloud
provider is considered the processor since the cloud provider is contracted to act on behalf
of the corporate customer.
By being the controller, the corporate customer has to ensure legality of the data process-
ing (according to Art. 7 lit. a in association with Art. 6 para. 1 Data Protection Directive
and its German implementation by §11 BDSG) including purpose limitation (Art. 6 para. 1
lit. b, c Data Protection Directive), quality of the data processing (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. d Data
Protection Directive), and compliance with retention and deletion periods (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. e
Data Protection Directive; see also Section 3.5.1). Moreover, the controller has to govern the
processor generally (Art. 17 para. 3 Data Protection Law) and, by German data protection law,
has to inspect the organisational and technical measures of the processor (§11 para. 2 cl. 4
BDSG). Furthermore, the controller is generally responsible for providing information accord-
ing to the right of access (Art. 12 Data Protection Directive), right to rectify (Art. 12 lit. b Data
Protection Directive), and right to object (Art. 14 Data Protection Directive). Additionally,
the controller is responsible for notifying the supervisory authority (Art. 18 Data Protection
Directive).
Basically, the responsibilities of the processor are to “act only on instructions from the
controller” (Art. 17 para. 3 Data Protection Directive) and to implement appropriate technical
and organisational measures (Art. 17 para. 1 in assertion with Art. 17 para. 3 Data Protection
Directive). The instructions from the controller are specified in the contract between controller
and processor (§11 para. 2 no. 2 BDSG). Particularly relevant for cloud computing, the contract
states necessary technical and organisational measures that have to be implemented by the
processor (§11 para. 2 no. 3 BDSG in conj. with §9 BDSG), correction, deletion and blocking
of data (§11 para. 2 no. 4 BDSG), the inspection obligations of the processor including internal
inspection and inspection by competent supervisory authorities (§11 para. 2 no. 5 in conj. with
§11 para. 4 BDSG, particularly regarding §§4g, 10, and 38 BDSG), explicit authorisations
on subcontracting (§11 para. 2 no. 6 BDSG), inspection by the controller (§11 para. 2 no.
7 BDSG), processor’s obligation to notify on infringements of data protection law and the
contract by the controller (§11 para. 2 no. 8 BDSG), and return of data media to the controller
and deletion of data stored at the processor at the end of the contract (§11 para. 2 no. 10
BDSG). These clauses will also be included in the upcoming GDPR, and additionally, the
processor will be regularly considered the controller if personal data are processed other than
as instructed by the controller (Art. 26 para. 4 GDPR) and will have to inform on data breaches
(Art. 31 GDPR) [104, ch. 4].
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In conclusion, the controller has to require the processor to implement measures (i.e.,
safeguards) ensuring legal compliance in the cloud and to inspect effectiveness and compli-
ance with safeguards. On the other hand, the processor must follow the instructions of the
controller and implement appropriate safeguards. A notable requirement is that the contract
explicitly has to state if subcontracting is allowed. In the context of cloud computing, such a
clause can be very restricting since cloud providers generally subcontract hardware providers
to operate the hardware infrastructure of the cloud. Further investigations concerning the nec-
essary safeguards at the cloud provider for handing subcontracts are located in Section 3.3.4.
Another notable requirement is the inspection of legal compliance at the processor. This has
to be done by the processor (internally) and by the controller (supervisory). Additionally, in-
spections by competent supervisory authorities may apply. Due to the complexity of cloud
infrastructures (e.g., virtualisation, distributed computing, and multiple involved parties), su-
pervisory inspection can be difficult. Requirements for inspection of the cloud provider and
their implementation are investigated in Section 3.2.2 specifically.
3.2.2 Inspection of the processor
The data processing at the processors has to be inspected internally by the processors them-
selves and must be supervised by the controllers and supervisory authorities (cf. Section 3.2.1).
In general, all inspection results must be documented (§11 para. 2 cl. 5 BDSG).
In particular, the internal inspections by the processor (i.e., cloud provider) are performed
by the processor’s data protection officer (§§4f, 4g BDSG)1 and cover primarily the effective-
ness of technical and organisational measures (§9 BDSG) implemented at the processor. Addi-
tionally, internal inspections apply to implementing automated searches of personal data (§10
BDSG)
Further, the supervisory inspection by the controller (i.e., corporate customer) has to be
done before the first time data are processed and on a regular basis during data processing
(§11 para. 2 cl. 4 BDSG).2 The goal of the inspection is to ensure and proof the compliance
of the technical and organisational measures with the applicable contract and data protection
law. On the one hand this can be done by the controller or by a named investigator acting
on behalf of the controller, for example, in form of announced sample checks.3 On the other
hand, it is considered best practice that this should be done by the processor,4 for example, by
proving up-to-date attestation, audit reports done by independent authorities (also in extracts),
certification of IT-Security and data protection audits as announced by §9a BDSG. Standards
and certifications addressing IT security and data protection law are, for example, the German
‘IT-Grundschutz’ [31], ISO/IEC 27004 [111], ISO 27005 [109], and the European Privacy Seal
for IT Products and IT-Based Services (EuroPriSe) [208].
1In this thesis, it is assumed that cloud providers generally are required to commission a data protection officer (cf.
Section 3.3.6)
2The upcoming GDPR does not regulate these types of inspection [104, ch. 4.b].
3This is particularly the case for automated search of personal data (§28 para. 2 cl. 4 in conj. with §10 para. 4
BDSG).
4For instance, according to the model contract [82] and the inspection template [83] provided by the Gesellschaft
für Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (GDD).
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Moreover, the supervisory inspection by competent supervisory authorities must be
possible generally (§11 para. 2 no. 5 in conj. with §11 para. 4 BDSG and §38 BDSG).
This may include providing access to data processing facilities, data processing software and
processed data to inspectors of the supervisory authority (§38 para. 4 BDSG).
In conclusion, the cloud provider has to both implement internal inspection and support
the supervisory inspection by externals (namely, the corporate customer and supervisory au-
thority). Even if the inspection by the corporate customer is substituted by applying sufficient
measures according to an adequate security standard or certification, the inspection by the su-
pervisory authority cannot be avoided generally. This implies that the cloud infrastructure must
support external inspection and, particularly, provide the necessary access to all inspected com-
ponents. This can be complicated in the case of global cloud computing if data are processed
in foreign countries where the supervisory authority has no authority (also cf. Section 3.2.3).
Additionally, the cloud provider has to document all information relevant to the inspection (in-
cluding information on the inspection) to guarantee a successful inspection. Moreover, provid-
ing access to externals may be a problem if access is granted to data of corporate customers not
involved in the inspection (also cf. Section 3.3.5). The ultimate consequence is that the cloud
provider has to implement adequate measures for monitoring, documentation, and reporting of
compliance if dealing with all the issues mentioned above.
3.2.3 Prohibition and limitation of data transmission
A particular requirement of German data protection law is transfer control (According to no.
4 of the appendix to §9 cl. 1 BDSG). While data transfer addresses the act of handover, data
transmission describes the (technical and organisational) implementation of that act. For ex-
ample, the data transmission into the cloud technically describes the act of handover between
corporate customer and cloud provider (usually via a network connection between the IT infras-
tructure of the corporate customer and the cloud). In the context of carrying out data processing,
the transmission between controller and processes is privileged and, therefore, not considered
a transfer (§3 para. 4 no. 3 in conj. with §3 para. 8 cl. 3 BDSG; see also Section 3.2.1).
However, there are boundaries that have to be considered. In particular, data transmission may
imply data transfer to third parties which have not been granted the privilege of carrying out
data processing and, therefore, transfer control may apply.
In the remainder of this section, the different scenarios of transmission that can apply in
the context of cloud computing are investigated:
Data transmission into the cloud is carried out from the corporate customer to the cloud
provider. First of all, it has to be distinguished if the transmission is part of a carrying out data
processing or an assignment of responsibilities. For carrying out data processing, the trans-
mission of personal data between controller and processor generally is admissible. However,
data transmission into the cloud may result in data transmission to subcontracted third par-
ties (particularly hardware provider and cloud providers) operating computational resources of
the cloud infrastructure (which may include cloud services operated by service providers).1
In such a case, the subcontracting has to be explicitly authorised in the outsourcing contract
1In fact, there could be a long chain of subcontracts involving all kinds of legitimate actors (cf. Section 2.2.1).
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(cf. Section 3.2.1) or otherwise is prohibited.1 For assignment of responsibility, transmission
of personal data from the corporate customer to the cloud provider requires explicit permis-
sion by a legal norm or the explicit consent of all involved data subjects (cf. Section 3.1.2).
In such a case, the privilege of carrying out data processing does not apply, and the cloud
provider becomes responsible (i.e., controller) for processing personal data in the cloud (cf.
Section 3.2.1). Nevertheless, the responsibility for data transmission into the cloud generally
lies with the corporate customer since he or she is the controller responsible for processing
the transmitted personal data generally (cf. Section 3.2.1). Furthermore, the legality of data
transmission to the cloud depends on the recipients involved and their location.2 Recipients
(here: cloud providers and hardware providers) may be located in countries different from the
sender’s origin (here: corporate customer’s origin). In any case, an adequate level of protection
(Art. 25 para. 1 Data Protection Directive) has to be ensured by the controller (which is gener-
ally the corporate customer and for cross-boarder transmissions regularly the cloud provider)
at the recipients’ location (cf. Section 3.1.2; see also cross-border transmission below).
Data transmission within the cloud is carried out by the cloud provider and regularly
performed to ensure optimal use of the hardware infrastructure as well as for backup and re-
covery operations. Such data transmission may result in data transmission to the subcontracted
hardware provider. Likewise in the case of data transmission into the cloud, involving sub-
contractors has to be explicitly allowed within the contract between controller and processor.
While the corporate customer is responsible for data processing in the cloud, the cloud provider
has to process data as contracted (cf. Section 3.2.1) which may include restrictions on recip-
ients and recipients’ location to ensure an adequate level of protection (Art. 25 para. 1 Data
Protection Directive). In the case of assignment of responsibility, the cloud provider becomes
controller for his or her assigned responsibilities including data transmission within the cloud
in general. Again (cf. data transmission into the cloud above), an adequate level of protection
has to be ensured by the controller.
Cross-border transmission is the case if sender and recipient are not located within the
same country. Generally, there is choice of law (According to Art. 6 of Rome I in conj. with
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008). Applicable law usually is clarified in the contract, and partic-
ularly, it is specified how data protection law and carrying out data processing apply.3 In the
EU/EEA, the lawfulness of cross-border transmissions of personal data to third counties (i.e, to
the outside of the EU/EEA) requires an adequate level of protection to be ensured in the recip-
ient’s country (Art. 25 para. 1 Data Protection Directive) and may require adequate safeguards
implemented by the recipients to to ensure protection of personal data (Corresponding to Art.
26 para. 2 Data Protection Directive). A more detailed analysis on admissible transmission to
third countries and applicable requirements and restrictions can be found in Section 3.5.3. It
is important to note that the privilege of carrying out data processing does not apply to data
transmission to third countries since then the recipient is considered a third party §3 para. 8 cl.
1For the requirements and responsibilities involved in subcontracting see Section 3.3.4.
2In this context, it is significant to distinguish between locations within EU/EEA and third country (Art. 25, 26
Data Protection Directive).
3For instance: the standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third
countries under Directive 95/46/EC (URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/de/TXT/?uri=
CELEX:32010D0087; last visited: 30.06.2015).
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3 BDSG). In this case, the cloud provider becomes responsible controller for the transmission
[86, §4b recital 5]. In any case, the corporate customer remains responsible for the lawfulness
of the transmission in general (Art. 6 para. 2 Data Protection Directive in conj. with §4b para.
5 BDSG) and is liable for damage (Art. 23 para. 1 Data Protection Directive in conj. with
§7 BDSG). This implies that the corporate customer has a particular interest that the cloud
provider complies with transmission restrictions and that compliance with them is a particular
topic of inspections (cf. Section 3.2.2)
Transmission to third parties Beside all previously mentioned requirements on transmis-
sion, additional requirements may apply when data are transmitted to third parties. If the third
party is subcontracted by the cloud provider then this has to be explicitly authorised in the
contract between cloud provider and corporate customer (cf. Section 3.2.1). Which require-
ments particularly apply in this case are discussed in Section 3.3.4. In any case, there has to be
explicit permission by a legal norm, which is regularly an adequate level of protection at the
recipient’s location (cf. “cross-boarder transmission” above and Section 3.1.2). Further, non-
disclosure agreements and service level agreements may apply additionally if they are stated in
the contract between cloud provider and corporate customer.
Automated search of personal data In German data protection law, data transfer using an
automated search of personal data.1 is regulated explicitly by §10 BDSG Automated searching
is basically allowed for personal data (§10 para. 1 BDSG)2 and requires additional documen-
tation to specifically support inspections (§10 para. 2 BDSG). Further, explicit authorisation
by the responsible supervisory authority is required (§10 para. 3 BDSG). The site requesting
the data is responsible for the data transfer (§10 para. 4 cl. 1 BDSG). The site storing the
personal data (and making them available for the automated search) can be required to inspect
an automated search of personal data and, therefore, has to implement measures for sample
checks (§10 para. 4 cl. 2 seqq., BDSG).
In the context of carrying out data processing, regulations on automated searches of per-
sonal data may not apply to data transmissions between controller and processor since the
controller is generally responsible for implementing legal requirements (§11 para. 1 cl. 1
BDSG). Particularly, §10 BDSG does not apply to the processor (§11 para. 4 BDSG). Out-
side of the context of carrying out data processing, the cloud provider may be responsible for
data transmission (if requesting personal data by automated searching) and additional duties on
inspection and documentation may apply (if storing personal data for automated searching).
1Corresponding with the definition of Art. 24 para. 2 lit. b Member States’ Initiative 2007/C 71/13.
2Prerequisites: protection of legitimate interests and proportionality.
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3.2.4 Professional secret
Corporate customers may be required to keep professional secrets, e.g., German nursing ser-
vices1 and hospitals have obligations of secrecy according to §21 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 SGB IX and
§203 StGB.2 If corporate customers are required to keep professional secrets then a contracted
cloud provider and their subcontractors also are required to keep these professional secrets
[103, ch. IV.]. Further, cloud providers and their subcontractors might be prosecuted under
German criminal code if professional secrets of corporate customers are disclosed. In particu-
lar, in case of an offence, they may be considered accomplices and therefore the offender and
the accomplice might be treated as equals (§203 para. 3 cl. 2 StGB). Therefore, cloud providers
have to be aware if corporate customers transfer data into the cloud which are protected by pro-
fessional secrets. In such a case, the transfer of the data can be considered a disclosure [102,
part 7 recital 65] and therefore illegal without consent of the data subject [172, ch. V] [103, ch.
IV] (see also Section 3.4.4). If the transfer is legal, proper safeguards are necessary to protect
the professional secret properly. Details on safeguards generally addressing confidentiality and
secrecy in the cloud are discussed in Section 3.3.1.
3.3 Necessary safeguards at the cloud provider
Cloud providers are required by law and the contract with the corporate customer to exercise
due diligences, for example in the context of carrying out data processing (cf. Section 3.2.1).
Therefore, they have to take technical and organisational measures to implement adequate
safeguards and ensure an adequate level of protection (cf. Section 3.1.2). There exist mul-
tiple IT security standards and best practices, providing methods for implementing effective
safeguards. For instance, the ISO/IEC 27000-series provides guidelines on implementing in-
formation security management (i.e, ISO/IEC 27002 [113] and ISO/IEC 27003 [110] in conj.
with ISO/IEC 27001 [112]). The ISO/IEC 27000-series has also been adopted in the German
‘IT-Grundschutz’ [30] which provides a comprehensive catalogue of best practices [31].
This section will discuss the legal requirements for safeguards at the cloud provider and
identify recommendations and best practices on their implementation in IT security standards.
A particular focus is on requirements for technical measures in clouds.
3.3.1 Confidentiality
Frequently, processed data are considered confidential. For personal data, this is the case in
general since the data secret applies (Art. 16, Data Protection Directive and §5 BDSG). Fur-
ther, professional secrets may apply to personal data (§203 StGB; see also Section 3.2.4). In
addition, the secrecy of personal data may apply in a specific context, e.g., the protection of
1IT outsourcing and cloud computing are highly relevant for nursing services due to demands on revenue-cost-
optimisation and automated data processing [100]. There already exist cloud offerings specialised for nursing
services, e.g., Mobile Pflege Cloud by the Deutsches Medizinrechenzentrum (DMRZ) (http://www.dmrz.
de/mobile-rechtssichere-pflegedokumentation-nach-gesetzlichen-vorgaben.html (last visited:
30.06.2015).
2For the obligation of secrecy of nursing staff, see Roßbruch [172, ch. II.].
41
personal data in German social law (§35 SGB I and §78 SGB X) and the secrecy of telecommu-
nications in German (§88 TKG and §206 StGB). For business data, outsourcing contracts may
state non-disclosure agreements. In particular, the trade secret in Germany (§§17, 18 UWG)
and German tax secrecy1 (§30 AO) may apply for business data.
To ensure confidentiality, technical and organisational measures have to be implemented by
the data processing parties. This is particularly in the context of data protection the case (Art.
17 para. 1 in conj. with recital 46 Data Protection Directive and, in Germany, §9 BDSG). For
example, in Germany data protection law, technical and organisational measures addressing
confidentiality are defined specifically. Corresponding to the appendix to §9 cl. 1 BDSG,
control measures have to be implemented for physical access, data access, data usage, and data
transfer to ensure that personal data are not disclosed to unauthorised persons. In particular,
data encryption is considered an adequate control measure (cl. 3 of appendix to §9 cl. 1 BDSG).
This implies that the cloud provider generally has to implement these control measures when
processing personal data in the cloud.2 Another example of requirements for technical and
organisational measures addressing confidentiality can be found in the context of processing
tax data. In German tax law, access control measures have to be implemented to protect tax data
from unauthorised access (recital 103 GoBD). On the other hand, if tax data are encrypted it has
to be ensured that there is access in decrypted form (recital 134 GoBD; see also Section 3.3.3).
Regularly, service contracts contain SLAs for confidentiality particularly in the form of NDAs.
These have to be implemented by the cloud provider as well.
In conclusion, data confidentiality and secrecy also have to be ensured in the cloud. This
may require implementing access and transfer control including data encryption. However,
these measures must not restrict access by (or transfer to) competent authorities.
3.3.2 Authenticity and integrity
Another frequent requirement for data processing is data integrity. To fulfil the service contract,
cloud providers have to ensure the correctness of the data processing. Usually, SLAs ensuring
data integrity (e.g., protection against manipulation and ensured data quality) are included in
the service contract. Closely related to integrity is authenticity, which particularly addresses
securely identified data sources, recipients and users. Additionally, authenticity is a basic re-
quirement for ensuring access, usage, and transmission control and, therefore, for ensuring the
confidentiality and secrecy of data (cf. Section 3.3.1). Further, data integrity can be of im-
portance in the context of inspections – e.g., inspection of the processor by the controller (cf.
Section 3.2.2) – if it is necessary to prove the correctness of documentation.
Data integrity is explicitly addressed by European data protection law (Art. 6 para. 1 lit.
d Data Protection Directive), and German data protection law summarises both authenticity
and integrity within the requirement on input control (cl. 2 no. 5 of appendix to §9 cl. 1
BDSG). Further, data integrity is of particular importance for processing tax data. For example
1Mentioned in Common Position (EC) No 24/2002 (annex “statement of the council’s reasons” VIII. 5.).
2This also applies in the context of carrying out data processing. Here, the corporate customer is responsible for
their implementation, and the cloud provider is required to implement them by the contract with the corporate
customer (cf. Section 3.2.1).
42
in German tax law, tax data must not modified (§146 para. 4 AO) and its immutability has to
be ensured explicitly (recital 110 GoBD).
This implies that in the cloud, too, data integrity has to be protected. The cloud provider
may be required (for example, by SLAs in the service contracts) to implement measures that
support data integrity. If implementing access, usage or transfer control, the cloud provider
has to implement authenticity measures to securely identify involved data sources and persons.
This is particularly important when subcontractors are involved (cf. Section 3.3.4). Further,
authenticity is a prerequisite for implementing multi-tenancy (cf. 3.3.5).
3.3.3 Availability
The availability of data and services within the cloud is essential. Without availability the
cloud provider cannot fulfil the service contract, and the corporate customers can neither ac-
cess their data nor use the contracted services. Moreover, availability is an important require-
ment addressed in multiple legal norms. In German data protection law, availability control
is an explicitly required measure that has to be implemented (cl. 2 no. 7 of appendix to §9
cl. 1 BDSG). Further, German tax regulations require the availability of tax data and related
software and hardware1 for inspection/investigation by the responsible tax office (recital 118
no. 2 and recital 130 GoBD). Furthermore, there are multiple obligations to store data for a
specific period of time, for example, German tax data have to be stored for at least six years
(§147 para. 3 AO). Additionally, data availability may be ended by deletion obligations, for
example, accounting data in German telecommunications services must not be stored longer
than six month (§97 para. 3 TKG). If deletion periods are shorter then retention periods than
there is a conflict which is solved in the context of German data protection law by replacing
deletion with the blocking of the data (§20 para. 3 and §35 para. 3 BDSG and §84 para. 3
SGB X, respectively). An overview of retention and deletion periods of German legal norms
investigated in this thesis can be found in Section 3.5.1 (see also table tab:selectionPeriods).
Usually, the responsibility for data availability is with the corporate customers since they
are controllers (for processing personal data; cf. Section 3.2.1) or directly considered respon-
sible by applicable legal norms (e.g., tax law requires taxpayers to ensure data availability for
tax inspections). However, the cloud provider may also be responsible, for example, upon
becoming the controller in the context of transmitting personal data to third countries (cf. Sec-
tion 3.2.3). Additionally, the outsourcing contract may contain SLAs on data and service avail-
ability which is usually the case since this is an important criterion of service quality. Therefore,
the cloud provider has to implement measures to ensure the availability of data and services.
3.3.4 Handling subcontractors
If cloud providers contract hardware providers to operate the hardware infrastructure of the
cloud then the hardware providers are considered subcontractors. There may also be other sub-
contractors involved by the cloud provider, i.e., service provider, software vendor, hardware
1Software and hardware access are relevant for direct and indirect access by the inspectors (cf. recital 174 and 175
GoBD).
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vendor and other cloud provider (cf. Section 2.2.1). The lawfulness of involving subcontrac-
tors is generally clarified in the contract between cloud provider and corporate customer. This
is particularly the case for carrying out data processing (cf. 3.2.1). In this context, the sub-
contracts have to correspond to the contracts with the corporate customers and the authority
of the corporate customers has to be considered properly (in particular with respect to inspec-
tion) [102, part 4 recital 91]. This includes professional secrets, which have to be explicitly
addressed in the subcontracts (cf. Section 3.2.4).
This implies that the cloud provider has to involve subcontractors carefully. Safeguards
also have to be implemented at the subcontractor level, and if the subcontractor are located in
third countries an adequate level of protection generally has to be ensured (Art. 25 para. 1 Data
Protection Directive). This is particularly true for cross-boarder transmissions in the context
of carrying out data processing (cf. 3.2.3). Also, the cloud provider has to ensure that the
inspection of subcontractors is possible with respect to fulfilment of orders and implementation
of adequate safeguards (also cf. Section 3.2.2). Further, restrictions on transmission may limit
the legitimate recipients among available subcontractors, for example, in the case of cross-
boarder transmissions in the context of carrying out data processing (cf. 3.2.3). In particular,
transmission control might be necessary when involving subcontractors.
3.3.5 Multi-tenancy and rule of separation
Within the cloud, software and data of different corporate customers are processed on the same
hardware infrastructure and, due to virtualisation, frequently on the same hardware. Multi-
tenancy means that the software and data of a single corporate customer are accessible and
modified only by the corporate customer him- or herself. In particular, the software and data
of each corporate customer are isolated from the software and data of all other corporate cus-
tomers. While multi-tenancy is a technical principle, it is also introduced by law, i.e., in general
by transmission and access restrictions. Further, for processing personal data the rule of sepa-
ration applies (cl. 2 no. 8 of appendix to §9 cl. 1 BDSG). The latter includes the segregation
of duties, which is not necessarily addressed by multi-tenancy. Segregation of duties ensures
that separate duties and particularly contradicting duties are executed by different persons (or
parties). Generally, segregation of duties is implemented by organisational controls, but can
also be enforced technically, for example, by access control on data, software and hardware. In
the context of cloud computing, examples of segregation of duties are separating backup and
data processing (for safety reasons) and distributing the hosting of corporate customers among
different hardware providers (to support multi-tenancy and transmission control).
3.3.6 Other obligations
Alongside the safeguards mentioned above, there are also organisational obligations addressing
process and risk management. Particularly in the financial sector, additional regulations exist
that require the implementation of proper risk management (cf. Section 3.4.1).
Moreover, German data protection law requires the commission of a data protection officer
(§11 para. 4 no. 2 in conj. with §4f BDSG) if there are more than nine employees involved in
the processing of personal data, which is usually but not necessary the case for cloud providers
44
(automation allows the operation of clouds with a small staff). With the upcoming GDPR, the
requirements for when a data protection officer has to be commissioned have changed. The
threshold is increased to 250 employees (Art. 35 para. 1 lit. b GDPR). Further, commissioning
is necessary if nature, scope and/or purposes “requires regular and systematic monitoring of
data subjects” (Art. 35 para. 1 lit. b GDPR). Both is unlikely to apply to cloud providers which
are involved in IT outsourcing. Therefore, it is likely that these cloud providers do not have to
commission a data protection officer after the new GDPR has entered into force.
For automated data processing within the Cloud, there exist in data protection law noti-
fication obligations (Art. 18 Data Protection Directive) which in Germany apply for all data
processing parties (§4d para. 1 BDSG). The notification obligation does not apply if a data
protection officer is commissioned (Art. 18 para. 2 cl. 2 second part Data Protective Directive
and, in Germany, §4d para. 2 BDSG). or if the data subject has given his or her consent to the
data processing (§4d para. 3 BDSG).
Further, prior checking of data processing systems may apply (Art. 20, Data Protection
Directive and, in Germany, §4d para. 5 BDSG). In Germany, this is particularly the case for
processing special categories of data and for purposes of evaluating the data subject with re-
spect to personality including skills, performance and behaviour (§4d para. 5 cl. 2 BDSG).
Exceptions are legal obligations to process the data, consent of the data subject, and the neces-
sity to process the data in order to establish the execution or cessation of contractual obligation.
In these cases, the prior checking may be omitted.
There also exist several retention, deletion and documentation obligations which are in-
vestigated in more detail in Section 3.5.1. In particular, the results of the inspection of the
processor by the controller in the context of carrying out data processing (cf. Section 3.2.2)
have to be documented (§11 para. 2 cl. 5 BDSG). Also, data processing of financial and tax
data are subject of documentation (cf. Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.2). Documentation is also
helpful in supporting the controller to satisfy the rights of private clients and employees of the
corporate customer, for instance, the right of access (Art. 12 Data Protection Directive), the
right to rectify (Art. 12 lit. b Data Protection Directive), and the right to object (Art. 14 Data
Protection Directive).
If there are cross-border transmissions to third countries by the cloud provider then the
cloud provider is obliged to satisfy these rights, too, because of becoming controller for these
transmissions (cf. Cross-border Transmission).
All obligations mentioned above are organisational but have implications for the technical
implementation of clouds. The cloud infrastructure have to support (or at least not hinder)
the implementation of the mentioned organisational obligations. This includes particularly the
documentation of the cloud infrastructure and operation for the purpose of inspection by the
data protection officer, prior checking, and satisfying retention and documentation obligations.
3.4 Dealing with sectoral requirements
In Section 3.2, the requirements of data protection law were exemplified by carrying out data
processing in Germany. European and specifically German data protection law defines high
standards for an adequate level of protection when processing personal data. Beside data pro-
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tection law, there exist other legal norms regulating data processing, outsourcing, and data
transfer. This section investigates selected sectoral regulations, which apply in the context of
IT outsourcing regularly. In Section 3.4.1, the requirements of the financial sector are exempli-
fied by German legislation. Section 3.4.2 examines German tax law. Export control within the
EU/EEA and Germany is investigated in Section 3.4.3. Specific requirements applying in the
German medical and healthcare sector are discussed in Section 3.4.4. In the end, outsourcing
by public authorities is investigated using the example of the German public sector.
3.4.1 Financial sector
In German legislation, outsourcing of financial services is specifically regulated. For example,
there exist regulations for the outsourcing of banking (§§25a, 25b KWG), payment services
(§20 ZAG), stockbroking (§§25a, 25b KWG in conj. with §33 para. 2 cl. 1 WpHG), insurance
(§64a VAG), and investment management (§80 KAGB). While the regulations on outsourcing
banking, payment services and stockbroking are similar (§20 Zahlungsdiensteaufsichtsgesetz
(ZAG) corresponds with §25b KWG while §25a KWG specifies additional requirements for
stockbroking), the regulations on outsourcing insurance and investment management deviate.
In the following, the particular requirements for IT outsourcing to the cloud in these areas are
investigated.
Banking, payment services, and stockbroking
The outsourcing of banking, payment services, and stockbroking is in principle admissible but
requires proper measures (§25a para. 1 cl. 1 KWG and §20 para. 1 cl. 1 ZAG, respectively).
In particular, correctness and regularity of business, services, and business organisation has to
be ensured (§25a para. 1 cl. 2 KWG and §20 para. 1 cl. 2 ZAG, respectively), with a special
care for segregation of duties (§25a para. 1 cl. 2 no. 3 lit. a KWG; see also Section 3.3.5) and
an appropriate and effective risk management (§25a para. 1 cl. 3 KWG and §20 para. 1 cl. 3
ZAG, respectively). Proper measures must include at least:
• identification, evaluation, management, monitoring, and reporting of risks (§25a para. 1
cl. 3 KWG and §20 para. 1 cl. 3 ZAG, respectively);
• appropriate personnel (i.e., experts) and effective technical and organisational implemen-
tations (§25a para. 1 cl. 3 no. 4 KWG);
• implementation of an emergency concept, in particular for IT systems (§25a para. 1 cl.
3 no. 5 KWG);
• periodic inspection for appropriateness and effectiveness (§25a para. 1, cl. 5 KWG); and
• complete documentation (§25a para. 1 cl. 6 no. 2 KWG).
Further, the responsibilities of the management are not permitted to be delegated (§25b para.
2 cl. 4 KWG and §20 para. 1 cl. 4 ZAG, respectively). The outsourcing corporate customer
remains fully responsible (§25b para. 2 cl. 5 KWG and §20 para. 1 cl. 5 ZAG, respectively).
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For stockbroking, the outsourcing must not change the legal relationship of the corporate cus-
tomer to his or her customers or responsibilities (§33 para. 2 cl. 2 WpHG), nor must it change
the terms of the operating permit (§33 para. 3 cl. 1 WpHG). Moreover, outsourcing shall
not hamper the supervisory authority and other examiners from inspection and controlling, es-
pecially not, if cross-border transmissions to the outside of Germany or the EEA exist (§25b
para. 3 KWG and §20 para. 1 cl. 6, 7 ZAG, respectively). The contract between the corporate
customer and the cloud provider has to be in written form and must cover the privileges of the
corporate customer, including authority and cancellation, and the responsibilities of the cloud
provider (§25b para. 3 cl. 3 KWG and §20 para. 1 cl. 8 ZAG, respectively). Subcontracting
is possible and has to address these requirements within the subcontracts of the cloud provider
[102, part 8b recital 69 seq.].
Additionally, there is a regulation called Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement
(MaRisk) [32] which is applicable according to §25a para. 6 KWG and specifies the require-
ments for risk management and its implementation. These requirements apply if outsourcing is
significant (MaRisk AT 9 in conj. with §25a para. 2 KWG) [102, part 8b recital 16] and, in par-
ticular, to cloud computing if services and functions of a financial institution are administered
[102, part 8b recital 19 seq.]. The latter is regularly the case if the outsourcing of services and
functions is based on IaaS [102, part 8b recital 28]. If outsourcing is significant it is decided
on a case-by-case basis [102, part 8b recital 32]. Alongside with formal requirements for the
outsourcing contract – which are similar to those of carrying out data processing [102, part 8b
recital 43] (see also Section 3.2.1) – there exist requirements on service quality [102, part 8b
recital 44 seqq.] including: (1) specifications on the place of fulfilment, (2) implementation
of monitoring and control mechanisms,1 (3) service availability plus responsibility in case of
malperformance, (4) monitoring, inspection and controlling by the corporate customer, author-
ity of the corporate customer, and (5) subcontracting which requires explicit approval by the
corporate customer [102, part 8b recital 70]. Further, there are requirements for access control
and multitenancy [102, part 8b recital 71 seqq.] (see also Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.5). In
particular, safeguards ensuring integrity, availability, authenticity, and confidentiality have to
be implemented according to existing IT security standards [102, part 8b recital 78 seqq.], like
the ISO/IEC 27000-series [112] [113] [110] [111] [109] and the German IT-Grundschutz [30]
[31]. Furthermore, business continuity has to be considered by including incident response and
recovery measures [102, part 8b recital 82 seq.].
Insurance Outsourcing in the context of insurance is regulated in Germany by the Ver-
sicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (VAG). According to §64a para. 4 VAG, the requirements for insur-
ance agencies are similar to those for financial institutes [102, part 8b recital 92]. In particular,
the outsourcing has to be properly executed, and it must neither impair the management and
monitoring capability of the management nor hamper the supervisory authority from carrying
out inspection and controlling (§64a para. 4 cl. 1 VAG). Further, the necessary authority to
obtain information and issue instructions has to be implemented within the outsourcing con-
tract (§64a para. 4 cl. 2 VAG). This implies that cloud providers are bound by instruction from
1To mitigate the loss of control, when outsourcing to the cloud, it is proposed that control mechanisms should also
cover the virtualisation management [102, part 8b recital 46].
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the corporate customers, similar to outsourcing of banking, payment services and stockbroking
(and carrying out data processing, too).
Investment management Outsourcing in the context of investment management is specifi-
cally regulated in German legislation by §36 Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (KAGB). Outsourcing
is allowed under particular restrictions, one of which is that the service organisation has suf-
ficient resources and an experienced and reliable management (§36 para. 1 no. 2 KAGB). A
further restriction is that outsourcing to third countries requires ensured cooperation between
the German federal agency and the supervisory authority of the third country (§36 para. 1 no. 4
KAGB). Additionally, continuous inspection of the service organisation is required (§36 para.
1 no. 8 KAGB). According to §36 para. 36 para. 6 KAGB, subcontracting is allowed if the
corporate customer has explicitly approved it, the German federal agency is notified, and the
requirements for outsourcing stated §36 para. 1 no. 2–8 KAGB have been implemented.
Conclusion In the financial sector, outsourcing to the cloud has requirements that are similar
to those for carrying out data processing (cf. Section 3.2) apply. The cloud provider is bound by
instructions from the corporate customers and has to implement safeguards covering confiden-
tiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability. In particular, access control and multi-tenancy
have to be ensured. Further, safeguards have to be ensured by implementing IT security stan-
dards like the ISO/IEC 27000-series. Additionally, service execution has to be monitored in-
cluding inspections and reporting. This particular includes documentation. Additionally, there
exist restrictions on cross-board transmissions and access by competent supervisory authorities
has to be ensured if necessary.
3.4.2 Tax data in the cloud
If business processes are outsources to the cloud this can have relevance in the context of tax-
ation. For example, if using IaaS then the cloud may be considered a permanent establishment
which is then relevant for the taxation of corporate customers.1 Another important aspect in
the context of taxation is the inspection by competent supervisory authorities. Particularly in
the case of electronic accounting, the high degree of regulation in Germany is higher than in
other countries where often no regulations exists [102, part 6 recital 78]. Therefore, German
tax law is a good example to investigate those requirements that can apply to outsourcing of
tax data (i.e., data relevant for taxation) to the cloud.
In Germany, keeping accounts (according to §238 HGB) is generally regulated by the AO.
In the case of electronic accounting (which is regularly the case when outsourcing tax data
to the cloud), the German regulation, Grundsätze zur ordnungsmäßigen Führung und Aufbe-
wahrung von Büchern, Aufzeichnungen und Unterlagen in elektronischer Form sowie zum
Datenzugriff (GoBD)2 [33], provides additional and more specific requirements on electronic
1Generally, it can be assumed that this is only the case for private clouds and depends case-by-case [102, part 6
recital 26 seqq.]. On the other hand, for cloud provider leasing and buying server is regularly relevant [102, idid.].
2Applicable since 1st Jan. 2015; replacing Grundsätze zum Datenzugriff und zur Prüfbarkeit digitaler Unterlagen
(GDPdU) and Grundsätze ordnungsgemäßiger DV-gestüzter Buchführungssysteme (GoBS).
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accounting. In general, electronic accounting is admissible but requires integrity of archived
data [102, part 6 recital 77]. In particular, immutability during transmissions has to be ensured
[102, part 6 recital 90]. Further, documentation and internal controlling is required as well as
changing of existing entries must not possible [102, part 6 recital 77]. An particular interest-
ing observation is that beside accounts1 also correspondence via email is considered tax data
[102, part 6 recital 84]. This implies that tax regulations not only apply to cloud resources
directly connected to accounting (e.g., virtual machines hosting accounting software and tax
data achieves) but also to other cloud resources like email servers and archives. This obliges
the corporate customer to verify if tax regulations apply to data outsourced to the cloud and
clearly specify how the cloud provider has to process them. Otherwise, the corporate customer
may violate German tax law if the cloud provider, for example, transfers data to third countries.
Generally, tax data have to be stored inland but a storage outside is possible according to §146
para. 2 cl. 1 AO and §14b para. 2 UStG but the competent revenue authority has to be informed
on location of data processing and involved cloud providers and hardware providers [102, part
6 recital 87] (see also Section 3.5.3).
The GoBD also addresses external audits and inspections by competent revenue authority
which have access privileges according to §147 para. 6 AO (recital 158 GoBD). In this context,
access has to be provided to all IT systems containing tax data in general including documen-
tation of the IT systems and an overview of all data stored within (recital 159 GoBD). If tax
data are outsourced to the cloud also IT systems of the cloud may be included in audits and
inspections. This can lead to multiple problems, for example, if the prosecution demands phys-
ical access to cloud resources [102, part 7 recital 10 seqq.]. Particular issues are the location of
cloud resources in foreign countries and storage of tax data with data of other corporate cus-
tomers on the same hardware resource. Section 3.5.2 generally investigates confiscation and
distraint in the cloud. More detailed information on how the cloud provider has to deal with
such cases can be found there. Even the usual case of an inspection by the competent revenue
authority bear complex issues. An example is the direct access (Z1)2 where data have to be
accessed via the original IT system (i.e., the cloud infrastructure and the associated remote
system) only but remote enquiry is inadmissible (recital 165, GoBD). Remote enquiry is a ba-
sic concept of cloud computing. Therefore, the requirements of direct access are technically
unaccomplishable for clouds. A possible solution might be to migrated the cloud resources to
a hardware resource which is physical accessible by the competent revenue authority. In this
case, the access may be direct but possibly lacks of a remote software which is required to read
out and visualise the data. Consequently, how to deal best (and without causing any legal or
technical issues) with direct access in clouds remains legally and technically unanswered. An
alternative for inspecting cloud resources might be indirect access (Z2) (recital 166 GoBD).
In this case, the corporate customer (or commissioned third party) analyses the tax data as
instructed by the competent revenue authority and provides read-only access on the analysed
data. Also possible is the data medium provision (Z3) (recital 167 GoBD). Here, all tax data
1A comprehensive overview of documents relevant for record retention is provided by Hilbert [102, part 6 recital
81 seqq.].
2GoBD distinguishes by three types of access: direct access (Z1), indirect access (Z2), and data medium provision
(Z3) (recital 165–167 GoBD).
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are provided on a data medium differently from hardware resources used in the cloud, and
particularly, no access to the IT system is necessary.1
In conclusion, outsourcing of tax data to the cloud is generally admissible but requires
the authorisation of the competent revenue authority. The corporate customer has to ensure
that the cloud provider processes tax data in compliance with applicable requirements. These
requirements particularly cover providing information on the location of the data-processing
system and of the cloud provider (plus any subcontractors involved), ensuring the integrity of
archived data, and providing unhampered, timely and automated access to tax data for external
audits and inspections by competent revenue authorities.
3.4.3 Export control and dual-use
Generally, exportation is regulated on an international, European, and national level [102, part
8f recital 5]. A particular focus of export control is on dual-use technology, i.e., technology
which can be used for both civil and military purposes[102, part 8f recital 7]. In the EU/EEA,
export control with respect to dual use is regulated by the Dual-Use Regulation (EU/428/2009).
According to Appendix I of this regulation, software and technology for telecommunication
(category 5 part 1 Dual-Use Regulation) and information security (category 5 part 2 Dual-
Use Regulation) may be affected. In particular, restrictions on cryptographic software from
other regulations – including implemented national law of European member states – must be
followed (category 5 part 2 Dual-Use Regulation). In Germany, export control is regulated
by the Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG) and the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV) with a
particular focus on military technology which is specified in the export control list.2 [102, part
8f recital 15]
In the context of cloud computing, export control applies if software and technology men-
tioned by the export control list is exported [102, part 8f recital 34]. This is particularly the case
if data (technology or software mentioned by the export control list) are transmitted (even tem-
porarily) to third countries and if cloud services are offered to the corporate customer located
in third countries (on screen visualisation in third countries is sufficient) [102, Idid.]In this
context, every cross-boarder transmission can be relevant for export control including trans-
missions (1) to servers located abroad [102, part 8f recital 40], (2) between member states of
the EU/EEA (since export control is also regulated on national level) [102, part 8f recital 43
seq.], (3) to clouds located in third countries, (4) via third countries (for each involved country)
[102, part 8f recital 47 seqq.], and to authorised employees of corporate customers temporarily
located abroad [102, part 8f recital 51 seq.]. This implies that for software and technology
mentioned by the export control list any cross-boarder transmission (into, within or from the
cloud) is subject to export control and requires transmission control (similar to carrying out
data processing; cf. Section 3.2.3).
In general, the corporate customer is responsible for transmitting data relevant to export
control into the cloud, and for ensuring compliance with export control. Further, it is not clar-
ified when the cloud provider can also become responsible, in particular, if the cloud provider
1In this context access is rather inadmissible (recital 167 cl. 2 GoBD).
2Latest version: attachment 1 to the AWV as amended on 05.08.2013 (BGBl. I no. 45, pp. 2898 seqq.).
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knew about restrictions of export control or should have known about them [102, part 8f recital
76]. In any case, providing cloud services to corporate customers abroad can be inadmissi-
ble according to §34 AWG if the corporate customers are established in countries listed for
embargo1 or if the corporate customers or their representatives are listed for embargo in the
context of terrorism.2 Therefore, it is recommended to clarify within the outsourcing contract
that export control applies and that data with relevance to export control are not allowed to be
stored in foreign countries [102, part 8f recital 77].
In conclusion, transmission control has to be implemented in clouds if data with relevance
to export control (i.e., software and technology mentioned on European and national export
control lists) are processed. Transmission control has to cover (1) hardware resources utilised
for hosting cloud resources, (2) routes and links used for data transmissions, and (3) client sys-
tems accessing the cloud externally. Further, the corporate customer is responsible for inform-
ing the cloud provider fo whether export control applies and to which countries transmission
is allowed. Additionally, providing cloud services to corporate customers abroad can be inad-
missible if there is an embargo of the countries where the corporate customers are established
or if the corporate customers or their representatives are listed for embargo. Where there is an
embargo, the cloud provider has to ensure the enforcement of export control.
3.4.4 Medical and healthcare sector
In the medical and healthcare sector, additional requirements – along with general requirements
on processing personal data (cf. Section 3.1.2 – may apply to the processing of personal data.
Within the EU/EEA, heath data are considered a special category of data (according to Art. 8
para. 1 Data Protection Directive) and their processing is forbidden where the prohibition may
be lifted (according to Art. 8 para. 2 Data Protection Directive). The cases for lifting of the
prohibition are similar to those for processing of personal data generally (cf. Section 3.1.2)
but with increased thresholds. For example, it is possible that “laws of the member [state]
provides [sic!] that the prohibition [...] may not be lifted by the data subject’s giving his [or
her] consent” (Art. 8 para. 2 lit. a Data Protection Directive).3 Another example is, that lawful
processing of employee data requires adequate safeguards (Art. 8 para. 2 lit. b Data Protection
Directive). Further, additional obligations of secrecy may apply. For example in Germany, if
the corporate customer is processing personal data in the context of social security services
(according to SGB X) then the obligation of secrecy applies according to the service contracts
with the service providers (§21 para. 1 no. 5 SGB IX). Additionally, the corporate customer
1German embargo list dated 15.06.2015 provided by the Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA)
(on the Internet: http://www.ausfuhrkontrolle.info/ausfuhrkontrolle/de/embargos/uebersicht/
uebersicht_laender_bezogene_embargos.pdf last visited: 30.06.2015).
2In Germany, the BAFA provides information on terrorism related embargos (on the Internet: http://
www.ausfuhrkontrolle.info/ausfuhrkontrolle/de/embargos/terrorismus/index.html last visited:
30.06.2015) and provides the Handbuch der deutschen Exportkontrolle (HADDEX) including embargo lists in dig-
ital form (on the Internet: http://www.bundesanzeiger-verlag.de/de/aw-portal/exportkontrolle/
produkte/sanktionslisten.html last visited: 30.06.2015).
3For instance, in German, any transmission of patient data for the purpose of billing (according to SGB V) by
hospital facilities and penal doctors to private service companies is inadmissible (Bundessozialgericht (BSG),
Decision dated 10.12.2008 – B 6 KA 37/ 07 R, head note 2).
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may be obliged to a professional secret (cf. Section 3.2.4) which is usually the case for medical
facilities and healthcare service providers, for instances in Germany, according to §203 StGB
[172, ch. II]). In this case, the data subject usually must agree to the revelation of the secret
information to the cloud provider and involved subcontractors.1
If health data are transmitted to the outside of the EU/EEA then particular care is required.
If the recipient’s location does not have an adequate level of protection the recipient must be
able to ensure the necessary safeguards [86, §4b recital 7]. When evaluating the appropriateness
of the safeguards, it should be considered that the risk for the data subject is assumed to be high
[86, §4b recital 11]. Furthermore, the recipient must be informed of the given purpose of the
transmission and told that he or she must follow the purpose limitation [86, §4b recital 19].
Moreover, all requirements that apply to personal data also apply to health data. For in-
stance, in Germany, this includes obligations to (1) implement technical and organisational
measures (§9 BDSG in conj. with appendix to §9 cl. 1 BDSG), (2) cooperate – particularly on
inspections – with competent supervisory authorities (§38 para. 3–4 BDSG), and (3) allow for
the inalienable rights of the data subjects (§6 para. 1 BDSG) including the right to information
(§§19 and 34 BDSG).
In conclusion, the outsourcing of the processing of health data to the cloud is admissible
but usually requires the implementation of safeguards ensuring the confidentiality and secrecy
of the data (see also Section 3.3.1). In particular, the implementation of transmission control is
paramount since cross-boarder transmissions may be prohibited if the recipient cannot ensure
adequate safeguards (see also 3.2.3). Further, inspection of competent supervisory authorities
has to be supported by the cloud provider which implies that adequate documentation and
reporting mechanisms are required (see also Section 3.2.2).
3.4.5 Public sector
Specifically for the public sector, restrictions on outsourcing sovereign duties and responsibil-
ities as well as requirement for tendering procedures are of particular relevance.
In general, the outsourcing of sovereign duties and responsibilities is restricted by na-
tional law, for instance in Germany, according to Art. 33 para. 4 Grundgesetz (GG) [137].
Outsourcing of sovereign duties and responsibilities to the private sector might be prohibited
but, for example in Germany, technical support can be outsourced if it does not include the
authority to make decisions on sovereign duties and responsibilities [98, Ch. 5 recital 102
seqq.].
Further, regulations on tendering procedures may apply. The framework for regulations
in the context of tendering procedures is the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the year 1996 which is implemented in European and
German law [102, part 8c recital 8]. In the context of cloud computing, the European Directive
2004/18/EG is most relevant, and in Germany, the forth part of Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschränkungen (GWB) and Section 2 of Vergabe- und Vertragsordnung für Leistungen Teil
1In Germany, the data subject’s consent is considered sufficient for such revelations [172, ch. V] [103, ch. IV].
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A (VOL/A) apply [102, part 8c recital 9–10].1 Relevant for cloud providers is that they may
have to provide information on subcontracting (Art. 25 Directive 2004/18/EG corresponding to
Art. 71 para. 2 Directive 2014/24/EU) including the nature and involvement of subcontractors.
Further, “obligations relating to employment protection provisions and the working conditions
which are in force in the place where the works are to be carried out or the service is to be
provided” have to be taken into account (Art. 27 para. 2 in conj. with Art. 27 para. 1 Directive
2004/18/EG.2) This includes employment protection provisions and the working conditions of
the premises of subcontractors such as hardware providers. Consequently, the cloud provider
has to know which hardware providers will be involved and the consequences on employment
protection provisions and the working conditions. For example, if 24/7 support is required and
night work has significantly increased costs then the cloud provider may decide to locate the
support at multiple locations in different time zones to avoid night work. Another example
are cloud services covering tasks that are executed by employees (like the amazon machanical
turk).3 In this case, employees may have to be selected according to applicable requirements
of employment protection provisions and working conditions. This implies that the place of
fulfilment can be relevant, and therefore, fulfilment in specific countries can be inadmissible.
In such cases, the cloud provider has to select subcontractors not established in inadmissible
countries. Another issue is that, in the particular context of German data protection law, it is
controversially discussed whether it is legal when German authorities involve processors from
outside of the EU/EEA [137, ch. III.c.I]. For legal certainty, subcontracting processors from
outside of the EU/EEA should be avoided when processing personal data for German authori-
ties.
To avoid these issues on outsourcing within the public sector, governmental clouds (i.e.,
operated under governmental authority) have been established in multiple member states of
the European Union [69]. Within ENISA’s report on governmental clouds of 2013 [69, ch.
5], recommendations on existing solutions were given, including the definition of a uniform
governmental cloud strategy and further (1) implementation of standard procedures on mon-
itoring, data handling, and data migration, (2) implementation of “a regulatory framework to
address the locality problem”, (3) a guarantee of compliance with European and national law,
(4) implementation of a common framework for SLAs, and (5) enhancement of security mea-
sures in governmental clouds including “research on governmental cloud security” and “pri-
vacy enforcement”. This implies that governmental clouds require technically implemented
safeguards particularly ensuring security of processed data and compliance with applicable
legislation, which is in conformance with the observations made on necessary safeguards at the
cloud provider in Section 3.3.
1Directive 2004/18/EG will be replaced by Directive 2014/24/EU on 18.04.2016. The following investigations are
based on the current Directive 2004/18/EG. Difference from Directive 2014/24/EU are mentioned where applica-
ble.
2Corresponding to Art. 71 para. 6 in conj. with Art. 18. para. 2 Directive 2014/24/EU
3Amazon mechanical turk, on the Internet: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited:
30.06.2015).
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3.5 Special requirements
Within European and German legislation, there are requirements that are of particular interest
for cloud computing since they are applicable generally and have technical implications for
the data processing and the implementation of cloud computing. This section discusses the
requirements for retention, deletion and documentation using the example of German legal
norms investigated in the previous sections. Further, the specific case is inspected where cloud
data are subject of search and confiscation. In this context, it is particularly relevant how
cloud providers should cooperate with investigative authorities and grant access to stored data.
Moreover, requirements for the location of data processing and cross-boarder transmissions are
analysed. In particular, the need to determine the location of IT systems processing data in the
cloud is investigated using the examples of European and particularly German data protection
law as well as German tax law.
3.5.1 Retention, deletion and documentation
When processing data requirements to store data for a given time period or delete data within
a given time period can apply. In this section, time periods and requirements for storing and
deleting data that are relevant for cloud computing are exemplified by German legislation.
Requirements for storing data for a given time period, i.e., the retention period, apply if
data have to be archived for documentation and inspection reasons. For instance according to
German telecommunication law, the origin and recipients of personal data have to be stored
for two years (§34 para. 1a BDSG). Within retention periods, requirements to keep data avail-
able and to grant access (e.g., for inspections by competent supervisory authorities) can apply,
which are addressed in the following provision obligations. For example, provision obligations
regularly apply to German tax data (§147 para. 5 and 6 AO). Further, retention periods and
provision obligations can be coupled with documentation requirements, e.g., documentation of
the IT systems utilised for processing tax data (according to recital 159 GoBD).
Requirements to delete data within a given time period, i.e., deletion period apply if storing
data is no longer necessary or even prohibited. Deletion periods regularly apply in the context
of German data protection law, when processing personal data. Here, personal data have to be
deleted if their storing is not longer admissible or necessary for the purposes for which they
were originally collected and processed (§35 para. 2 and §20 para. 2 BDSG). Particularly for
commercial data processing, the necessity has to be controlled within particular time periods
(§35 para. 2 no. 4 BDSG).
In general, storage and deletion requirements apply to the controller, but they regularly also
apply to contracted processors and their subcontractors if the controller has to ensure that his or
her contracted processors and their subcontractors comply with these requirements. Therefore,
requirements regarding retention, provision, deletion and documentation and how to deal with
them are usually implemented within outsourcing contracts and subcontracts.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of retention periods and deletion periods for data categories
addressed by German legal norms discussed in this thesis. Generally, for all data categories
deletion periods apply, except for tax data. Traffic data have to be deleted immediately after
termination of connection (§96 para. 1 TKG). Another observation is that there are long time
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Table 3.1: Selection of retention and deletion periods in German legislation
Data category Retention period Deletion period Regulation(s)
Processing of personal data
– personal data —
for no longer than is
admissible or necessary for
the purposesab
§35 para. 2 and §20 para. 2 BDSG
– personal data in the context of social
security services
— §84 para. 2 SGB X
– for purposes of address trading and
advertising (origin and recipients of
transmitted data)
2 years §34 para. 1a BDSG
– patient data 10 yearsc
§10 para. 3 Berufsordnungen der
Ärztekammern
Tele-media servicesd
– personal data (in respect to service
usage)
—
immediately after termination
of usagea
§13 para. 4 no. 2 TMG
– usage data —
for no longer than is
necessary for accountinga
§15 para. 4 TMG
Telecommunication servicese
– customer data —
after contract termination at
the end of the following
calendar year
§95 para. 3 TKG
– accounting data —
for not longer then 6 month
after billing
§97 para. 3 TKG
– traffic data (generally) —
immediately after termination
of connection
§96 para. 1 TKG
– data relevant for security authorities —
after contract termination at
the end of the following year
§111 para. 4 TKG
Keeping of accounts
– tax data with relevance to provide
evidence
6 years —
§147 para. 3 AO; §§238 and 257,
HGB; recital 113 seqq. GoBD
– tax data with relevance to cadastre and
accounting
10 years —
– procedure documentation (generally) 10 years —
– procedure documentation (only relevant
with relevance to provide evidence)
6 years —
aIf there are contradictory retention periods then blocking instead of deletion applies (§35 para. 3 and §20 para. 3 BDSG).
bFor commercial data processing, check of necessity three years after saving and four years after execution of affairs (§35 para. 2
no. 4 BDSG)
cEven longer in exceptional cases, e.g., according to radiation protection law and radiation control law up to 30 years.
dAccording to §1 para. 1 TMG (usually information society services according to Directive 2000/31/EC)
eAccording to §3 no. 24 TKG
periods of retention (up to ten years and in the medical context even longer). Particularly for tax
data, secure storage and availability for inspection by competent authorities have to be ensured
for multiple years. If data are no longer needed before the retention period expires blocking
access to data can be substituted for its deletion, both generally (§20 para. 3 and §35 para. 3
BDSG) and in the context of social security services (§84 para. 3 SGB X). In the case of IT
outsourcing to clouds, blocking has to be supported by the cloud provider. Further, the corpo-
rate customer has to require the cloud provider to ensure blocking access to data and deletion
of data and inspect compliant implementation by the cloud provider (cf. Section 3.2.1). Fur-
thermore, cloud providers have to ensure that their subcontractors implement the requirements
for blocking access and deletion of data compliantly, too.
In conclusion, the corporate customers may be required to store, provide or delete data
within given time periods. When processing data to which such requirements apply in the
cloud, the cloud provider has to be able to ensure proper storage and deletion of the data. This
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includes ensuring data availability for access and blocking data access if necessary. Further,
subcontractors of the cloud provider have to ensure this as well. Otherwise, there is a risk of
violating retention periods and deletion periods and data processing in the cloud may not be
lawful. Additionally, the corporate customer may be required to document data processing and
utilised IT systems. In such a case, the cloud provider has to be able to provide documentation
on data processing within the cloud and necessary documentation on IT systems. Without the
support of the cloud provider on documentation, the corporate customer may not be able to
comply with documentation requirements and data processing in the cloud may not be lawful.
This is particularly the case for processing tax data within the cloud (cf. Section 3.4.2).
3.5.2 Search and confiscation in the cloud
If a corporate customer is subjected to prosecution then data stored in the name of that corporate
customer within the cloud can be affected by a warrant to search or confiscate. In such a case,
the investigative authorities are regularly granted the power not only to search the corporate
customer’s premises but also the cloud infrastructure storing data of that corporate customer.
For instance, in Germany, access to the corporate customer’s data stored in the cloud by Ger-
man authorities is generally legitimated according to §94 Strafprozeßordnung (StPo) [102, part
7 recital 31 seq.]. If the requested data are not provided voluntarily the investigative authority
can confiscate the data (§94 para. 2 StPo). For cloud providers, this is relevant when one of
their corporate customers is searched (in Germany: according to §§102 seqq. StPo) and the
prosecution is entitled by court to confiscate data (according to §98 StPo) [102, part 7 recital
34]. In such a case, it is recommended that the cloud provider be able to provide the data,
which are subjected to search and potentially confiscation freely1 and without infringement of
requirements by civil law [102, idid.]. Further, the cloud provider may be required to perform
a so called ‘quick freeze’, i.e., “to preserve and maintain the integrity of that computer data for
a period of time as long as necessary, up to a maximum of ninety days, to enable the competent
authorities to seek its disclosure” (Art. 16 para. 2 Convention on Cybercrime (CETS no. 185)),
which is not explicitly implemented in German legislation but applicable within the limits of
§§94,95 StPo [102, part 7 recital 35]. Generally, confiscation potentially covers all data acces-
sible within the searched premises (in Germany: §110 para. 3 StPo)2 [102, part 7 recital 35
seqq.]. This includes searching data stored in the cloud using corporate customers’ IT systems
for access [102, part 7 recital 37]. Further, the search of servers abroad can be complicated
since this usually requires the cooperation of the country’s authorities at the searched server’s
location [102, part 7 recital 40].3
1Moreover, the cloud provider is required to handover the data on demand (§95 para. 1 StPo).
2The application of §110 para. 3 StPo on data stored in clouds is arguable, since on the one hand legitimacy for
searching is only given if here is an urgent risk of losing this data otherwise but on the other hand cloud providers
regularly offer services protecting against data loss (e.g., backup) [102, part 7 recital 39 seqq.].
3When searching servers remotely (i.e., online searching), it can happen that the search is unintentionally expanded
to foreign countries, if the cloud servers are distributed globally and the location of accessed servers is not visible
to the investigators. On the other hand, it is unlikely (but not impossible) that the authorities in the foreign county
will take notice of such an online search.
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Hilbert [102, part 7 recital 50 seqq.] provides recommendations for how cloud providers
(and corporate customers) should prepare for being searched to ensure cooperation with the
investigative authority and avoid infringements of civil law. First of all, the assignment of a
responsible contact person is recommended, and the contact person should be entitled with all
necessary competence and discretionary power to ensure internal cooperation and handing over
of requested data [102, part 7 recital 51 seqq.]. Further, technical and organisational measures
are recommended including logically separated storages for each corporate customer and the
ability to reproduce stored data on a physically separated data medium [102, part 7 recital
53]. In particular, before deleting any data the investigative authority should be contacted
[102, part 7 recital 58]. This implies that (if technically possible) automated deletion should
be paused during search. Blocking is possibly an adequate replacement during search (see
also Section 3.5.1). Additionally, it can be necessary to revoke access privileges of corporate
customers being subjected to prosecution [102, part 7 recital 95].
In conclusion, the cloud provider should be able to legally support authorities on search
and confiscation in a way that unrelated data and services remain unaffected. This includes
ensuring the rules of separation and the confidentiality, integrity and availability of unrelated
data. Further, measures for isolating data and for limiting access of authorities to isolated data
are necessary. These measures are similar to the measures that are necessary for supporting
inspections by supervisory authorities and other authorised examiners, e.g., likewise in the
financial sector (cf. Section 3.4.1) or according to tax law (cf. Section 3.4.2).
3.5.3 Necessity for location-determined data processing
In global clouds (cf. Remark 2.5), hardware resources are located in multiple countries, and
therefore, data transmissions within the cloud possibly constitute cross-boarder transmissions
(see also Section 3.2.3). Cross-boarder transmissions can have a severe impact on whether data
processing is legally compliant. For example, data processing within certain countries may re-
quire additional security precautions and/or specific prerequisites, e.g., if processing personal
data in third countries not having an adequate level of protection (cf. Section 3.2.3), and can
even be inadmissible, e.g., if processing German tax data abroad without permission of the
competent revenue authority (cf. Section 3.4.2). There exist multiple legal norms in Europe
and Germany addressing requirements for admissible locations for data transfer, data process-
ing and outsourcing. This section investigates specifically location-related requirements in leg-
islation and their technical implications for cloud computing using the example of European
and particularly German data protection law as well as the example of German tax law.
3.5.3.1 Location constraints in European and German data protection law
In European data protection law, data transfer to third countries generally requires an adequate
level of protection to be ensured at the recipient’s location (Art. 25 para. 1 Data Protection
Directive). Whether or not the ensured level of protection is adequate “shall be assessed in
the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation” including “the nature
of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation [...], the country of
origin and country of final destination, the rules of law [...] in force [...] and the professional
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rules and security measures which are complied with in that country” (Art. 25 para. 2 Data
Protection Directive). If “a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection”,
“measures necessary to prevent any transfer of data of the same type to the third country in
question” shall be taken (Art. 25 para. 4 Data Protection Directive). Further, there exist
derogations when transfer of data to third countries not ensuring an adequate level of protection
are admissible (Art. 26 Data Protection Directive) including the data subject’s consent (para.
1 lit. a idid.), necessity for a contractual relationship with the data subjects (para. 1 lit. b, c
idid.) or protecting their vital interests (para. 1 lit. e idid.), necessity and legal obligation in the
context of important public interest and legal claims (para. 1 lit. d idid.), explicit authorisation
by the member state if “the controller adduces adequate safeguards” (para. 2 idid.).
In Germany, Art. 25 and 26 of the Data Protection Directive are implemented by §§4b
and 4c BDSG, respectively. The necessity for an adequate level of protection is implied by the
requirement to protect the data subject’s legitimate interests to object to a data processing in
countries that does not have an adequate level of protection (§4b para. 2 cl. 2). Derogations
in terms of Art. 26 Data Protection Directive are implemented identically by §4c BDSG. In
particular, §4c para. 2 cl. 1 specifies that explicit authorisation can given by a competent
supervisory authority provided that adequate safeguards are ensured.
Consequently, it is of particular importance for the admissibility of data transfer in Euro-
pean and German legislation whether an adequate level of protection is ensured at the recip-
ient’s location or adequate safeguards are ensured by the recipient. Here, the question arises
as to which countries have an adequate level of protection and what are adequate safeguards if
not.
The EU commission has approved adequate levels of protection for “Andorra, Argentina,
Canada (commercial organisations), Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New
Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay and the US Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbour Privacy
Principles” [65].1 For all other countries there are additional precautions necessary to ensure
the implementation of adequate safeguards. The European commission provides two sets of
standard contractual clauses that are recommended to be included within the contract between
sender and recipient (Decision 2001/497/EC and Decision 2004/915/EC). The first set of stan-
dard contract clauses “for the transfer of personal data to third countries which do not ensure
an adequate level of protection” in the annex of Decision 2001/497/EC particularly covers
obligations of the data importer, i.e., recipient (Clause 5 idid.) including:
• to enure that there is no reason to believe that legislation applicable to the data importer
prevents the fulfilment of the contract (Clause 5 lit. a idid.);
• “to process the personal data in accordance with the mandatory data protection princi-
ples” (Clause 5 lit. b idid.);2
1It is of particular interest that there are doubts on the effectiveness of Safe Harbor Privacy Principles in practice
[102, part 4 recital 238] and the use of standard contractual clauses have been suspended in Germany [102, part
4 recital 242]. Even if agreements on ensuring adequate safeguards exist, the transmission may be prohibited by
competent supervisory authorities [102, part 4 recital 241].
2There are two options on mandatory data protection principles: that of appendix 2 and that of appendix 3 of the
Decision 2001/497/EC. Both are investigated subsequently to the standard contract clauses (along with those of
Annex A Directive 2004/915/EC).
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• “to deal promptly and properly with all reasonable inquiries from the data exporter or
the data subject [...] and cooperate with the competent supervisory authority” (Clause 5
lit. c idid.); and
• “to submit its data processing facilities for audit” (Clause 5 lit. d idid.).
The governing law is the law of the member state in which the data exporter is established
(Clause 10 idid.). The second set of standard contract clauses “for the transfer of personal
data from the Community to third countries (controller to controller transfer)” provided in the
annex of Decision 2004/915/EC specifies additional obligations of the data importer (II. idid.)
including:
• “appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect the personal data [...], and
which provide a level of security appropriate to the risk represented by the processing
and the nature of the data to be protected” (II. lit. a idid.) including that the access to the
personal data “respect[s] and maintain[s] the confidentiality and security of the personal
data” (II. lit. b idid.);
• personal data will be processed for specified purposes (II. lit. d idid.)
• personal data is not provided “to a third party data controller located outside the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA) unless it notifies the data exporter about the transfer” and
adequate protection is provided by the third country, the third party data controller signs
an approved data transfer agreement, data subjects have the opportunity to object, and, if
applicable, data subjects have given unambiguous consent for onward transfers of sensi-
tive data (II lit. i idid.).
Again, the governing law is the law of the member state in which the data exporter is estab-
lished (IV. idid.) with optional exceptions (II. lit. h idid.). Along with the standard contract
clauses, mandatory data protection principles apply covering (i) purpose limitation, (ii) rights
of access, rectification, erasure and blocking of data, and (iii) restrictions on onward transfers.1
Additionally, appendix 3 Decision 2001/497/EC and annex A Decision 2004/915/EC address
(1) data quality and proportionality, (2) transparency,2 (3) security and confidentiality, (4) spe-
cial categories of data/sensitive data, (5) direct marketing/data used for marketing purposes,
and (6) automated decisions. In summary, the mandatory data protection principles cover ba-
sically all data protection principles of European data protection law, which is the purpose of
the standard contract clauses.
In conclusion, the corporate customer and the cloud provider have to be aware of data trans-
fers to third countries, which are regularly implied by cross-boarder transmission to recipients
established outside of the EU/EEA. In such a case, the country at the recipient’s location has
1These requirements are covered by all versions of mandatory data protection principles, i.e., those of appendix 2
and appendix 3 Decision 2001/497/EC and of annex A Decision 2004/915/EC.
2Transparency is particularly regulated by the upcoming GDPR where “transparent and easily accessible policies
with regard to the processing of personal data and for the exercise of data subjects’ rights” become necessary (Art.
11 para. 1 idid.) and requires the differentiation of involved parties’ obligations as well as the protection of the
legitimate interests of cloud providers [104, ch. 3.c].
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to ensure an adequate level of protection or the recipient has to provide adequate safeguards.1
In the context of data transmission within the cloud, this implies the necessity of transmis-
sion control based on the location of subcontracted cloud and hardware providers as well as
on the origin of corporate customers (due to being controllers for outsourcing data process-
ing to the cloud). Moreover, adequate safeguards particularly include restrictions on onward
transfers which generally are implemented by technical and organisational measures on trans-
mission control. Therefore, transmission control ensures location-determined data processing
is paramount for the processing of personal data in global clouds.
3.5.3.2 Location constraints in German tax law
In Germany, account books (according to §238 HGB) generally have to be kept and stored
within Germany (§146 para. 2 cl. 1 AO). As an exception, the keeping and storage of electronic
accounts outside of Germany may be authorised by the competent revenue authority2 upon
written application (§146 para. 2a cl. 1 AO) and under restriction of explicit permission and
the following preconditions (§146 para. 2a cl. 2AO):
• the location of the data-processing system, as well as name and address of the recipient(s)
(i.e., cloud provider plus involved subcontractors) is known;
• the taxpayer (i.e., corporate customer) complies with her or his duties according to §§90,
93, 97, 140–147, and 200 para. 1 and 2 AO;
• access to data for the purpose of external audits/inspections by the competent revenue
authority is granted; and
• taxation is not impeded.
Moreover, the retransfer of the data to German territory must be possible at any time (§146
para. 2a cl. 3 AO) as well as access, including that data “can be rendered readable without
undue delay and can be processed automatically” (§147 para. 2 cl. 1 no. 2 AO).
This implies that the cloud provider has to be able to inform the corporate customer on all
possible locations of data processing and all involved recipients beforehand of outsourcing tax
data to the cloud. Further, the cloud provider has to ensure that during the outsourcing tax data
is processed only at communicated locations and by communicated recipients. It is possible
that communicated locations and recipients do not necessarily cover all possible locations and
recipients, which then implies the necessity of implementing transmission controls by location
and recipient within the cloud. This is particularly the case if the cloud provider subcontracts
cloud/hardware providers after establishing the outsourcing. Additionally, the cloud provider
has to ensure the availability of tax data for the purposes of external inspections and retransfer
1Exceptions may apply, for instance, to the data subject’s consent, but are not necessarily applicable for all data
transmission of a single corporate customer. Therefore, case-by-case specifications by the corporate customer and
case-by-case decisions by the cloud provider would be necessary for every data transmission, which is not regularly
practical for automated data processing. Instead, a basis for decision-making is required, which is universally valid.
Such a basis can be the presence of an adequate level of protection or adequate safeguards
2For example, customs authority for customs and competent tax authority for profit tax [102, part 6 recital 108].
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to German territory. In particular, access has to be granted without undue delay. Consequently,
high availability constraints apply when processing tax data within the cloud. This further
limits possible recipients for transfering tax data to since cloud/hardware providers do not
necessarily provide the same level of availability due to location and hardware inhomogeneity
(cf. Def. 2.2 and Remark 2.7, respectively). Moreover, applicable requirements on legitimate
recipients regularly vary with the corporate customer, since approval is given on an individual
basis. Consequently, it is necessary for the cloud provider to decide carefully (in advance
and during processing) and for every single corporate customer, which cloud and hardware
providers are involved in the processing of outsourced tax data.
3.5.3.3 Conclusions on location constraints on cloud computing
Regulations on admissible locations for data processing are addressed by multiple European
and German legal norms. Besides data protection law and tax law – which both exemplify
requirements on location-determined data processing – there also exist other examples. For
instance, there exist export controls on military related technology, which regulates admissible
recipients and recipients’ countries (cf. Section 3.4.3). But also outside of the European Union
there exist regulations on admissible locations for data processing. The NIST identifies the
issue of “data location” and takes the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)
regulations on storing federal documents in the United States of America (USA) as an example.
Consequently, the recipients of data transmissions and their location are highly relevant for the
admissibility of data transmissions. It is necessary to implement transmission control.
In the context of cloud computing, the recipients of data transmissions are regularly sub-
contracted cloud and hardware providers since they operate the IT systems where the data are
processed. Generally, cloud providers have to be aware of data transmissions’ recipients, target
locations and if data transmissions are cross-boarder. However, it is usually in the knowledge
of the corporate customer whether restrictions on data transmission apply or not. Consequently,
it is necessary for the corporate customer to communicate applicable restrictions to the cloud
provider. Further, the cloud provider has to be able to consider these restrictions when as-
signing cloud resources for processing data and transmitting data within the cloud, particularly
when involving subcontracted cloud and hardware providers. This includes the selection of
subcontractors by adequate level of protection and ensured safeguards.
In conclusion, when implementing transmission control in the cloud, the cloud provider
has to consider (1) the legal framework conditions (including an adequate level of protection)
at the recipient’s location, (2) the safeguards ensured by the recipient (including implemented
security measures), (3) the nature of the data transmitted, and (4) the origin of the data and the
corporate customer.
3.6 Conclusions on technical requirements
There are multiple legal norms at a European and German level addressing technical require-
ments which are also applicable to IT outsourcing to the cloud. First of all, the data protection
law regulating requirements for processing personal data, but also sectoral requirements like
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tax law and export control may apply when processing data in the cloud. The technical implica-
tions of these regulations are not necessarily the same but often similar technical requirements
can be found in multiple legal norms resulting in necessary safeguards that have to be imple-
mented by the cloud provider (cf. Section 3.3). Many legal norms address requirements on
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Also, there exist multiple regulations with respect
to storing data including retention and deletion requirements (cf. Section 3.5.1). Moreover,
transmission control is a technical requirement which is regularly necessary when processing
personal data and tax data (cf. Section 3.5.3). It also applies when export control is compulsory
(cf. Section 3.4.3). Another important aspect is the supervisory inspection of cloud providers.
This includes controlling cloud providers by corporate customers as well as formal inspections
by competent supervisory authorities including inspections with respect to data protection (cf.
Section 3.2.2) and tax inspections (cf. Section 3.4.2). In the context of the criminal code, search
and confiscation by investigative authorities can also occur (cf. Section 3.5.2). In all these cases
(i.e., inspection, search and confiscation), the cloud provider has to be able to provide access to
requested data and IT systems. Further, cloud providers are required to ensure multi-tenancy
and the rule of separation (cf. Section 3.3.5) which require access control mechanisms.
Whether technical requirements apply and to what extend they have to be implemented
depends on which legal norms are applicable and also on the contractual agreements between
cloud providers and corporate customers. This section concludes the technical requirements
which derive from the legal requirements identified in this chapter previously. Of particular
importance is the identification of necessary safeguards and security measures that have to
be implemented by the cloud providers, which are described in Section 3.6.1. Further, Sec-
tion3.6.2 reflects the necessity to formulate applicable safeguards and security measures in
technically enforceable security policies. The safeguards and security measures which have to
be implemented and enforced in clouds are concluded in Section 3.6.3. In Section 3.6.4 the
implications for compliance management are summarised, and Section 3.6.5 finally sums up
all conclusions on technical requirements in clouds.
3.6.1 Identification of the necessary level of security
For cloud providers, it is necessary to ensure an adequate level of security when processing cor-
porate customers’ data. What level of security is adequate depends on the applicable require-
ments of legal norms corresponding to data categories processed and of contractual agree-
ments between cloud provider and corporate customer. When transferring personal data to
third countries, there has to be an adequate level of protection ensured at the target location
(cf. Section 3.5.3.1). Otherwise, processing of personal data at the target location generally is
inadmissible and may be admissible only in specific cases including restrictions of additional
safeguards by the cloud provider. Also the processing of other categories of data require safe-
guards with respect to implemented security measures. For example, availability and integrity
constraints apply when processing tax data (cf. Section 3.4.2), and the processing is usually re-
stricted to specified countries (cf. Section 3.5.3.2). Generally, corresponding legal framework
conditions and compliance with these has to be considered when processing data within the
cloud. The corresponding legal framework conditions depend on the categories of processed
data and their origin as well as the location where corporate customer, cloud provider and in-
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volved subcontractors are established. Consequently, the cloud provider has to select carefully
the hosting locations by legal framework conditions (corresponding to processed data and to
hosting location) and the level of security due to implemented security measures and effective
safeguards.
Both the legal framework conditions and level of security are classified by the necessary,
ensured and effective set of conditions and measures, which are defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Legal framework conditions) Generally, legal framework conditions describe
a set of conditions (i.e., safeguards and obligations) within corresponding legal frameworks.
More specifically, the necessary legal framework conditions are the set of conditions according
to corresponding legal frameworks that has to be ensured by legal frameworks at locations of
data processing, i.e., at the establishment of the controller or processor (for instance, the ad-
equate level of protection defines legal framework conditions, which have to be ensured when
processing personal data in third countries). Further, the ensured legal framework conditions
specify the set of conditions ensured by the legal framework at a specific location of data pro-
cessing (for instance, safeguards ensured by German data protection law). Furthermore, the
effective legal framework conditions define the set of conditions for corresponding legal frame-
works that apply when processing a specific set of data.
Definition 3.2 (Level of security) Generally, level of security describes a set of security mea-
sures. More specifically, the necessary level of security is the set of security measures that has
to be implemented according to effective legal framework conditions and contractual agree-
ments. Further, the ensured level of security specifies the set of security measures required by
ensured legal framework conditions and, additionally, applicable contractual agreements, i.e.,
at the establishment of the controller or processor. Furthermore, the effective level of security
defines the set of security measures implemented at a specific location of data processing.
Before data processing, it is necessary to validate if the ensured legal framework conditions
satisfy the necessary legal framework conditions.1 The result of the validation of the ensured
legal framework conditions can be three different cases:
1. The ensured legal framework conditions are satisfied. Then, it is usually allowed to
process the data and the necessary level of security is specified according to the ensured
legal framework conditions.
2. The ensured legal framework conditions are not satisfying but can be healed by applying
additional safeguards. In this case, the necessary level of security is specified by the
necessary legal framework conditions.
3. The ensured legal framework conditions are not satisfying and cannot be healed by ap-
plying additional safeguards. In this case, the data processing is generally inadmissible.
1This is generally the case if there is no cross-boarder transfer, for example, when processing personal data only in
Germany. Further, in terms of European data protection law, this means: when processing personal data in third
countries, there has to be an adequate level of protection.
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To validate the legal framework conditions (and therefore identify the necessary level of
security) the following pieces of information are paramount:
• the location of data processing including storage, backup and support/administration
(e.g., Germany, EU/EEA, third country);
• the category of data (data type) that is processed (e.g., personal data, business data, or
tax data);
• the origin of the processor and controller of the data processing as well as of the data
subject; and
• the applicable requirements from contracts and service level agreements between the
cloud provider and the cloud customer.
This implies that that the cloud provider has to be able to identify the necessary level of
security using the information mentioned above and to allocate cloud resources accordingly.
To this end, it is important to make the required information technically available within the
cloud. Furthermore, an information model is needed to describe the applicable rules, covering
location, data type, and origin as well as the applicable requirements from contracts and service
level agreements. The information model can then be used to communicate the requirements
between corporate customer, cloud provider and subcontractors and to enforce the necessary
level of security including location-determined data processing (cf. Section 3.5.3).
3.6.2 Security policies
The implementation and enforcement of the necessary level of security requires the definition
of security policies in a technically enforceable form. It must be possible to express all ap-
plicable security constraints and requirements which includes the mapping of data categories
with safeguards and measures that have to be ensured. To support multi-tenancy, the rules have
to be expressible and distinguishable by each cloud customer’s preferences and requirements.
Moreover, the rules of both the cloud customers and the cloud provider have to be expressible.
Also, it should be possible to identify and cope with conflicts between different sets of rules
that may apply at the same time. To support compliance reviews and forensic analysis, it is
important that the security policies be legible and comprehensible.
This is in compliance with the cloud security guidelines of the CSA providing best practices
on content and implementation of security policies [46, Sec. 7.7.1] and the ISO 27001 standard
providing general guidelines on implementation of security policies [112].
3.6.3 Implementation and enforcement of safeguards
The requirements specified within the security policies have to be implemented and enforced
by the cloud provider. To this end, the cloud provider has to provide safeguards including
effective security measures implemented in the cloud. These safeguards aim to protect the
data processing on behalf of the cloud customer and support agreed service quality and legal
compliance.
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3.6.3.1 Basic security measures
Basic security measures aim to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data gen-
erally. They also provide the basis for ensuring the authenticity of the data and involved entities
as well as the non-repudiation of service usage, access control, secure processing of data and
transmission control. Additionally, basic measures cover data security including backup and
recovery mechanisms as well as methods for aggregation and anonymisation of personal data.
Also secure deletion and blocking of data (if deletion is not allowed due to retention periods)
are included. Further, they ensure the technical enforcement of the separation of duties and the
segregation of data and their processing. In classic outsourcing scenarios, these requirements
are well understood and best practices of IT security standards provide detailed guidelines on
their implementation (e.g., ISO 27005 [113] and the German ‘IT-Grundschutz Kataloge’ [31]).
3.6.3.2 Access control
To protect entrusted data, the cloud provider has to ensure that data are accessed and processed
only by authorised entities. This includes the distinguishing between corporate customers,
subcontracted cloud and hardware providers and the cloud provider, and has to support dif-
ferent privileges of employees and the entitled entities of these bodies. Therefore, the cloud
provider has to implement an identity management system and access control mechanisms, for
example role-based access control. Further, all these mechanisms have to support logging and
documentation if it is necessary to retrace data access for inspections or legal procedures. In
addition, access control mechanisms have to support legal access by competent supervisory
and investigative authorities, limiting the granted access to a necessary minimum.
3.6.3.3 Transmission control
Transmission control technically ensures that data transmissions are only performed if they are
admissible. To this end, it has to ensured that the recipient is authorised to process the data
and that the ensured level of security and ensured legal framework conditions at the recipient’s
location is adequate.1 Therefore, each data transmission as well as allocation and migration
of virtual resources must comply with applicable transmission restrictions (which can vary for
different corporate customers). The decision is made on the recipient’s ensured level of se-
curity and enforces the necessary level of security. This means it is necessary to identify the
recipient, the recipient’s location, the transmitted data category, its origin, and the requirements
originating from contracts and service level agreements (cf. Section 3.6.1). Further, transmis-
sion control mechanisms have to support logging and documentation in case it is necessary to
retrace data transmissions for inspections or legal procedures.
3.6.3.4 Countermeasures and incident response
The cloud management has to be able to deal with disturbances and irregular events like errors
and attacks. These may be caused by the cloud provider him- or herself, a cloud customer
1In the context of European data protection law, this implies an adequate level of protection.
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or an external entity. Therefore, it is necessary to implement mechanisms to monitor, prevent
and terminate infringements and malicious behaviour including authorised incident response
teams. Countermeasures and incident responses should be monitored and documented to pro-
vide evidence for the compliance and proportionality of any taken action. Best practices on
countermeasures and incident response are provided by IT security standards like the German
‘IT-Grundschutz’ [31] and other security guidelines like the ones provided by the CSA [46].
3.6.4 Monitoring, documentation, and reporting of compliance
To achieve legal compliance, the necessary level of security has to be implemented by effective
safeguards and security measures. Here, compliance monitoring is an effective method to
ensure this by measuring and documenting the effectiveness and implementation of safeguards
and security measures. In particular, the logging and reviewing of data processing and storage,
attempted and granted access, and administrator activities is necessary. Compliance reporting
to corporate customers is of particular importance for IT outsourcing to the cloud. It empowers
the corporate customer to monitor the cloud provider’s compliance and can support prescribed
inspections by corporate customers.
An important aspect is the protection against misuse and manipulation. Only authorised
entities must have access to monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Further, documentation
(including logging data) and reports have to be integrity protected to ensure their evidence.
Also monitoring, documentation and reporting itself have to be documented and reviewed to
ensure proportionality and protection against misuse.
3.6.5 Final conclusion
For legal compliance, the cloud provider has to implement and enforce several safeguards that
support the cloud customer’s requirements for security and legal compliance. Therefore, the
cloud customer needs to be able to communicate these requirements to the cloud provider
and in turn the cloud provider needs to be able to report on the compliant implementation
of these requirements. In particular, it is important to deal with the requirements of each
customer individually, since the requirements of each customer may be different. Within the
cloud infrastructure, the cloud management process needs to assign virtual resources based on
the physical location of the hardware resource and its ensured level of security. As a result of the
legal analysis, this leads to the technical requirement of location determined data processing,
which enables decision making and enforcement based on an ensured level of security and
the necessary level of security. How the technical requirements can be addressed in clouds is
investigated in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Technical analysis of cloud computing
and supporting legal compliance
Having identified the technical requirements which derive from legal norms applicable to IT
outsourcing to clouds, it is possible to investigate the technical capabilities of clouds to address
these requirements (Objective 2). Based on these requirements, it is possible to investigate
the technical implications of cloud infrastructures when it comes to their compliance with the
legal requirements the legal requirements identified in Section 3.6 (Objective 3). This is done
with a focus on the utilisation, provisioning, and hosting of virtual resources in IaaS cloud
infrastructures for IT outsourcing .
To achieve this, it is necessary to understand the technical characteristics of cloud infras-
tructures first. Particularly, knowledge of the operation of virtual and hardware resources and
their management in the cloud is required. Based on that knowledge it is possible to under-
stand how security measures and safeguards can be implemented to achieve legal compliance.
Finally, the technical capabilities of compliance monitoring and reporting are investigated.
The terminology and structure of cloud environments is investigated in Section 4.1. There-
fore, virtual resources, hardware resources and the cloud management process are described
based on the observation of existing cloud infrastructures. The result is an entity-relationship
model which is formulated in an ontology’s notation and serves as a basis for all further in-
vestigations and descriptions of cloud infrastructures and their behaviour. In Section 4.2, the
abilities of cloud security management to satisfy the identified legal requirements are analy-
sis based on literature and existing implementations. In particular, the academic void and the
shortcomings of the current practice are identified enabling the classification of challenges in
the domain of security management addressed in this thesis. In Section 4.3, the technical ca-
pacity to support compliance management in the cloud is analysed. Again, the academic void
and shortcomings of current practice are identified, which forms a basis for classifying the
challenges in the domain of compliance management addressed in this thesis.
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4.1 Towards an IaaS cloud computing ontology
To understand the technical capacity to implement legally compliant data processing in clouds,
it is necessary to understand the structure and operation of cloud infrastructures and how they
provide cloud services technically.
In this section, a cloud computing taxonomy for IaaS is specified. For this taxonomy, an
analysis of existing cloud infrastructures is performed including standards and best practices
in data centre design and management as well as cloud computing reference architectures. As
a result an entity-relationship model is defined that provide a comprehensive description of
virtual resources, hardware resources and the cloud management process. The model is formu-
lated using the formal notation of an ontology and, thereby, is the first step towards an ontology
on IaaS cloud infrastructures. This has the advantage that the model is ready for formal verifica-
tion in respect of its plausibility and being self-contained. Such formal verifications are outside
the scope of this thesis and are not further investigated. However, using the systematic methods
of ontology construction supports the characteristics of plausibility and being self-contained.
How the provided model can be verified in respect of these characteristics is discussed in the
outlook (cf. Section 7.3).
In general, cloud infrastructures can be classified (1) by infrastructure elements required for
managing cloud services, security, and privacy, and (2) by infrastructure elements required for
service orchestration (cf. NIST’s cloud computing reference architecture [134]). The manage-
ment elements provide functions for the overall control and operation of the cloud infrastructure
including the interaction with the cloud customer and cloud provider. The elements for service
orchestration are organised in a layered structure covering 1) the cloud services (i.e., virtual
resources for IaaS), 2) the abstraction and control of computing resources, and 3) the hardware
resources.
Figure 4.1: Infrastructure of an IaaS cloud provider according to NIST reference architecture
[134].
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Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the cloud infrastructure elements of an IaaS cloud
provider. Beside the service orchestration, there are management elements for provisioning
the cloud services to the customer (including the management front-ends for cloud customers
and provider as well as accounting) and for ensuring the secure operation of the cloud infras-
tructure and protecting the cloud customer’s privacy.
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In the following, virtual resources, hardware resources, and the cloud management process
in IaaS cloud infrastructures are specified in an entity-relationship model. First, the formal
model of description is given (cf. Section 4.1.1). Then, the cloud customer’s view of virtual re-
sources (cf. Section 4.1.2) and the hosting site’s view of hardware resources (cf. Section 4.1.3)
are described by type and relevant properties. Finally, the cloud provider’s view of the cloud
infrastructure and the cloud management process are specified (cf. Section 4.1.4).
4.1.1 The entity-relationship model (using an ontology’s notation)
For the purpose of defining the cloud entities and their relationships, a mathematical model is
used defining classes and relations of the objects described in the notation of an ontology as
follows.
Definition 4.1 (Object [Ontology]) An object o is considered an item of interest classified by
the ontology and has a defined set of object properties describing the object. The notation of
the set of object properties is defined as follows. o|P := {p1, ..., pn} with n ∈ N. An object can
be a composition of a defined set of objects, i.e., o := {o1, ...,om} with m ∈ N.
An example of an object is a virtual machine instance with the properties of having hard-
ware support and being highly available. Further, a virtual machine instance can be considered
a composition of, for example, a virtual CPU, virtual memory and virtual storage.
Definition 4.2 (Class [Ontology]) A class C is a set of objects having a defined set of proper-
ties in common, where:
C := {c1, ...,cn} with n ∈ N and ci is an object for i ∈ {1, ...,n} .
Each Object that is element of C is also considered an instance of C.
Definition 4.3 (Extends-relation) The extends-relation ∼ex is defined as a relation between
two classes A and B as follows.
A∼ex B :⇔ A⊂ B .
Class A is considered specialisation of class B.
Definition 4.4 (Is-associated-relation) The is-associated-relation∼ass is defined as a relation
between two classes A and B as follows.
A∼ass B :⇔
∀b ∈ B∃a ∈ A : a ∈ b and
∀a ∈ A∃b ∈ B : a ∈ b .
Class A is considered component of class B.
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Definition 4.5 (Is-property-relation) The is-property-relation∼isp is defined as a relation be-
tween two classes A and B as follows.
A∼isp B :⇔
∀b ∈ B : b|P = {p1, ..., pn}⇒ ∃i ∈ {1, ...,n} : pi ∈ A (with n ∈ N) and
∀p ∈ A∃b ∈ B : b ∈ b|P .
Class A is considered property of class B.
4.1.2 Classification of virtual resources
In IaaS, virtual resources can be classified as computational resources (i.e., virtual machines),
data storage (i.e., virtual storage), or communication (i.e., virtual links connecting end systems
and virtual network services like Quality of Service (QoS) management) [227]. Therefore,
virtual machines, virtual storage, virtual links, and virtual network services are good candidate
classes for classifying computing resources in IaaS (i.e., virtual resources). Virtual resources
are highly relevant for investigating legal compliance in clouds, since the data of corporate
customers are processed technically inside of virtual resources. For corporate customers using
an IaaS cloud for IT outsourcing, virtual resources are the type of cloud resources they interact
with.
4.1.2.1 Reference cloud infrastructures
There exist comprehensive surveys looking at existing cloud infrastructures, which can be used
to identify cloud infrastructures that are representative of IaaS. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, the most recent1 surveys including commercial cloud infrastructures were per-
formed by Rimal et al. [170] and Prodan and Ostermann [165] in 2009, and Zhang et al. [228]
in 2010. Each of the surveys investigates 14 cloud infrastructures (23 different ones in total)
and uses a taxonomy – which conforms to the cloud computing paradigm introduced in Sec-
tion 2.1 – for classifying and comparing the cloud infrastructures. The survey performed by
Rimal et al. focuses on the underlying technology of cloud infrastructures and does not cover a
classification on computing resources. Prodan and Ostermann distinguish in their survey com-
puting resources by CPU, memory, storage, and hosted operating system. While the analysis of
CPU-related resources is multi-dimensional (e.g., cores and architecture), the other categories
are investigated in a single dimension (i.e., size for storage and memory, and architecture of
hosted operating system). Communication resources are not covered by the survey. In the
work of Zhang et al., the implementations of Amazon EC2 (which is part of AWS), Windows
Azure, and Google App Engine are compared. The comparison summarises technical details
on data centre architectures, distributed file systems, and distributed resource management. All
three surveys show that IaaS cloud infrastructures are very similar and usually differ in techni-
cal details like resource capacities or underlying hypervisor technology. All three surveys are
dated in 2009 and 2010, and therefore, they can be considered outdated with respect to pro-
vided information on performance and technology, and with respect to completeness of hosted
1As of June 2015
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services. However, the conceptual observations are still up to date and can be validated easily
by inspecting current cloud infrastructures.
Further, there exist several comprehensive surveys on open(-source) cloud infrastructures.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the most recent1 surveys on open cloud infrastructure
were performed by Endo et al. [64] in 2010, and Mahjoub et al. [136] and Voras et al. [215]
in 2011. Endo et al. investigate in their survey seven open cloud infrastructures. They provide
insight into the computational architecture and resource management of the infrastructures and
compare them. The survey by Mahjoub et al. covers six different open cloud infrastructures
and focuses on hypervisor technology. Additionally, it provides information on the infrastruc-
ture and provided virtual resources. Voras et al. investigate in their survey nine different open
cloud infrastructures with respect to storage, virtualisation, management, security, and vendor
support. As a conclusion, Red Hat Cloud Foundations, OpenNebula, and Ubuntu Enterprise
Cloud are rated the most mature cloud infrastructures. Considering the fact that Red Hat and
Ubuntu are among the main development partners in the OpenStack project, OpenStack is also
a good candidate for further investigations. Like the surveys including commercial cloud in-
frastructures, these three can be considered outdated with respect to provided information on
performance and technology, since all investigated open cloud infrastructures provided multi-
ple updated releases per year introducing new features and technologies. For example, Open-
Stack introduced the concept of compute cells (i.e., multi-instantiated resource pooling) in the
year 2013.2 However, they provide a good overview of architectural concepts and features of
open cloud infrastructures.
For further investigation, three commercial and two open cloud infrastructures are selected
as reference for existing cloud infrastructures and are analysed on the basis of current docu-
mentation and literature. For the commercial cloud infrastructures, the following candidates
are selected:
• Amazon Web Service (AWS) [5] is selected for its mature concept of distributed resource
provision. Additionally, it is well documented in literature.
• Windows Azure [143] is selected as one of the major competitors of AWS, which unlike
AWS provides both PaaS and IaaS. Windows Azure is well documented as well.
• Fujitsu Cloud IaaS Trusted Public S5 is selected because of its mature concepts for high
availability, which are beyond current standards in practice.
Following the recommendation of Voras et al., OpenStack [157] and OpenNebula [156])
are selected as candidates for open cloud infrastructures.
Based on the investigation of these cloud infrastructures, a classification of IaaS comput-
ing resources is provided in the following. The results of the comparison of the five cloud
infrastructures are summarised in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.2: Classification of the cloud customer’s environment with focus on IaaS.
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4.1.2.2 Cloud customer’s environment
Summarising the previous observations on cloud infrastructures and cloud services, Figure 4.2
depicts the classification of a cloud customer’s environment. The environment consists of
the cloud customer’s management front-end and the provisioned cloud services. The cloud
services are classified by the three service models, each of which contains certain types of ser-
vice. For IaaS (highlighted in Figure 4.2), the service types are virtual machines (VM), virtual
storage (VS), virtual links (VL), and virtual network services (VNS), which are specified in
the following.
4.1.2.3 Virtual machine VM
The class virtual machine VM:= {vm1, ...,vmn} is a set of virtual machine instances vmi with
n ∈ N and i ∈ {1, ...,n}. The properties and components of VM are depicted in Figure 4.3 and
explained in the following. Table A.1 of Appendix A provides an overview of the observed
properties that a virtual machine instance can have in current cloud infrastructures.
Each virtual machine instance vmi ∈ VM consists of computing resources classified by
virtual CPU, virtual memory, virtual storage, and image (i.e., hosted operating system and
installed applications).
Special hardware requirements VM|PHW The class VM|PHW contains all properties ad-
dressing direct hardware support (e.g., hyper-threading for high performance data processing,
1As of June 2015
2Compute cells were introduced with the release of OpenStack 2013.1 (Grizzly), on the Internet: https://wiki.
openstack.org/wiki/ReleaseNotes/Grizzly (last visited: 30.06.2015)
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Figure 4.3: Virtual machine classification.
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hardware-based en-/decoding using GPU, and high I/O memory access) and private cloud host-
ing.
Table A.1 shows that all investigated cloud infrastructures provide support for special hard-
ware requirements. However, the supported requirements can vary from private cloud hosting
only to a variety of hardware-supported computing.
Specialised image VM|PImg The class VM|PImg contains all properties characterising the
image (i.e., installed operating system and applications) that is running on a virtual machine
instance. In general, images can be pre-defined by the cloud provider or customised by the
cloud customer. Both types of image can be configured to support specific workspace envi-
ronments (e.g., for office environments or development platforms) or applications (e.g., web
server or database server).
All investigated infrastructures support the provisioning of pre-defined images, and three
of them support customised images (cf. Table A.1). The pre-defined images vary from plain
installations of operating systems to complex installations of office or development environ-
ments. Particularly, Windows Azure supports images that are used in their PaaS instances.
Special service requirements VM|PServ The class VM|PServ contains all properties address-
ing specific requirements on the operation and provisioning of the virtual machine instances
(e.g., resource pooling and availability).
Four of the investigated infrastructures support availability options (i.e., high availability,
scaling, provisioning, and utilisation) and two of them support resource pooling (cf. Table A.1).
Windows Azure does not support special service requirements.
Fault tolerance VM|PFT The class VM|PFT contains all properties characterising fault tol-
erance mechanisms for virtual machine instances (i.e., backup, replication, and recovery).
All investigated infrastructures support fault tolerance. However, the supported mecha-
nisms are focused on backup, replication, and recovery of virtual storage instances associated
with the virtual machine instance (cf. Table A.1). Four of the infrastructures explicitly support
recovery mechanisms for virtual machine instances. Two infrastructures provide support ser-
vices for automated recovery of virtual machine instances. In all cases of recovery, the virtual
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machine instance is restarted. Only OpenNebula supports full recovery of virtual machines
including virtual machine memory and non-persistent storage.
4.1.2.4 Virtual storage VS
The classVS:= {vs1, ...,vsn} is a set of virtual storage instances vsi with n∈N and i∈{1, ...,n}.
VS is atomic (i.e., has no components). A virtual storage instance vsi describes a fixed amount
of storage capacity. Table A.2 of Appendix A shows the observed properties that a virtual
storage instance can have in current cloud infrastructures. The properties of VS are depicted in
Figure 4.4 and explained in the following.
Figure 4.4: Virtual storage classification.
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Durability VS|PDura The class VS|PDura contains the durability properties of virtual storage
instances. The durability of virtual storage instances can be either non-persistent or persistent.
All investigated infrastructures provide both non-persistent and persistent virtual storage
instances (cf. Table A.2). In OpenNebula, storage is freely configurable to be either persis-
tent or non-persistent. For all other, non-persistent virtual storage instances are used to store
the operating system and temporal data, and persistent virtual storage instances are used for
application data and backup.
Connection VS|PCon The class VS|PCon contains the connection properties of virtual stor-
age instances with respect to the virtual machine instance. The connection of virtual storage
instances can be either local (i.e., co-located with the virtual machine instance) or remote.
All investigated infrastructures support remotely located virtual storage instances (cf. Ta-
ble A.2). Three of them also support locally connected virtual storage instances.
ArchitectureVS|PArch The classVS|PArch contains the architecture properties of virtual stor-
age instance. The architecture of virtual storage instances can be either block storage (i.e., or-
ganised by blocks of binary data) or object storage (i.e., organised by using references on data
objects).
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All investigated infrastructures support block storage for virtual storage instances (cf. Ta-
ble A.2). Four of them also support object storage.
Special service requirements VS|PServ The class VS|PServ contains all properties address-
ing specific requirements on the operation and provisioning of virtual storage instances (e.g.,
availability, access, and distribution).
All investigated infrastructures support different types of service requirement for virtual
storage instances (cf. Table A.2). Content distribution and access-related properties are sup-
ported by four infrastructures. The Fujitsu Cloud infrastructure focuses on the support of
availability- and security-related properties.
Special hardware requirementsVS|PHW The classVS|PHW contains all properties address-
ing direct hardware support (e.g., SSD-support) and private cloud hosting.
Two of the investigated infrastructures do not support special hardware requirements for
virtual storage instances (cf. Table A.2). AWS provides SSD-support and for OpenStack, re-
source pooling is a planned property. The Fujitsu cloud infrastructure provides private cloud
computing by hosting on dedicated servers. OpenNebula supports customisable hardware sup-
port by introducing three types of hardware resource pooling concept.
Fault tolerance VS|PFT The class VS|PFT contains all properties characterising fault toler-
ance mechanisms for virtual storage instances (i.e., backup, replication, and recovery).
All of the investigated infrastructures support fault tolerance mechanisms for virtual storage
instances (cf. Table A.2). There are mechanisms supporting both single-site and distributed
backup and recovery. In all cases of recovery, the virtual machine instance has to be stopped
to recover associated virtual storage instances and both the virtual machine’s memory and any
non-persistent storage is lost. Windows Azure provides a support service for the automated
recovery of virtual storage instances.
4.1.2.5 Virtual link VL
The class virtual link VL:= {vl1, ...,vln} is a set of virtual link instances vli with n ∈ N and
i ∈ {1, ...,n}. A virtual link instance vli describes a connection between two end-systems (e.g.,
a virtual machine instance and a cloud customer’s device). Table A.3 of Appendix A shows the
observed properties that a virtual link instance can have in current cloud infrastructures. The
properties of VL are depicted in Figure 4.5 and explained in the following.
Access network VL|PAccess The class VL|PAccess contains the access network properties of
a virtual link instance. These properties are given if a virtual link instance is used to provide
access to the virtual resource instances. The access network can be either a publicly available
or privately used connection of the cloud customer.
All investigated infrastructures provide both public and private access networks (cf. Ta-
ble A.3). Two infrastructures provide a private access network by default. All other infrastruc-
tures provide a public access network by default.
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Figure 4.5: Virtual link classification.
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Special hardware requirements VL|PHW The class VL|PHW contains all properties ad-
dressing direct hardware support (e.g., specialised access router).
Three of the investigated infrastructures do not support special hardware requirements for
virtual link instances (cf. Table A.3). The two other infrastructures support the utilisation of
specialised access routers.
QoS requirements VL|PQoS The class VL|PQoS contains all properties addressing QoS re-
quirements of the virtual link instances (e.g., bandwidth, delay, and packet loss rate).
All investigated infrastructures support QoS requirements for virtual link instances (cf.
Table A.3). Three infrastructures support high availability. AWS supports low latency and high
performance networking.
Fault tolerance VL|PFT The class VL|PFT contains all properties characterising fault toler-
ance mechanisms for virtual link instances (e.g., redundancy and error correction).
Two of the investigated infrastructures provide support for redundancy (cf. Table A.3).
Windows Azure provides 2-out-of-2 redundancy (2oo2) for private access networks (i.e., net-
work connect only fails if both links fail at the same time). The Fujitsu Cloud infrastructure
provides by default redundancy on all network devices a Local Area Network (LAN) cabling.
For AWS, there is – to the best of the author’s knowledge – no publicly available information
on fault tolerance available. It is reasonable to assume that all infrastructure uses basic er-
ror detection and correction mechanisms provided by standard communication protocols (e.g.,
checksums and acknowledgements).
4.1.2.6 Virtual network service VNS
The class virtual network service VNS:= {vns1, ...,vnsn} is a set of virtual network service
instances vnsi with n ∈ N and i ∈ {1, ...,n}. A virtual network service instance vnsi is a vir-
tualised application in communication networks (e.g., Virtual Private Network (VPN) man-
agement, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), and load balancing). Table A.4 of
Appendix A shows examples of observed types of virtual network service instance in current
cloud infrastructures and their properties. The types and properties of VNS are depicted in
Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Virtual network service classification.
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All investigated cloud infrastructures provide a variety of virtual network services (cf. Ta-
ble A.4). While most services are optional, DHCP is provided by default in all infrastructures,
since automatic network configuration is important for scalability and self-servicing.
Fault tolerance VNS|PFT The class VNS|PFT contains all properties characterising fault
tolerance mechanisms for virtual network service instances (e.g., redundancy and recovery).
For any infrastructure, there is no publicly available information on the fault tolerance of
the virtual network services (cf. Table A.4). However, it is reasonable to assume that fault
tolerance mechanisms are implemented for the fail-safe operation of automatically provided
network configurations.
4.1.2.7 Virtual resource VR
For completeness, the class virtual resource VR is defined as the union of all virtual resource
classes that were defined previously: VR:= VM∪VS∪VL∪VNS.
4.1.3 Classification of hardware resources
The backbone of cloud infrastructures is the hosting sites (i.e., data centres) providing the
required hardware resources to operate and provide cloud services.
A hosting site is usually located in a building specifically designed for operating hardware
resources. It contains IT facilities representing the hardware resources that can be classified by
network (i.e., communication infrastructure), services (of the communication infrastructure),
computation (i.e., server), storage, and management (cf. Cisco VMDC Layers [44]). Beside
the hardware resources, there are support facilities (e.g., cooling, UPS, power supply, and
racks) that are necessary for operating the hardware resources. Additionally, there are building
facilities (e.g., alarm devices, physical access control, and fire protection) that are necessary
for the operation, maintenance, and protection of the building itself.
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To gain a better view of hardware resources, it is necessary to understand how they are
structured and operated in practice. Here, the design guide for Virtualized Multiservice Data
Center (VMDC) [44] and the Common Information Model (CIM) of the Distributed Manage-
ment Task Force (DMTF) [57] provide representative and comprehensive information. The
design guide for VMDC provides detailed information on state of the art data centre infrastruc-
ture set-up and operation as recommended by CISCO,1 which are one of the leading companies
for the wired and wireless LAN access infrastructures [200]. The CIM is a standard for man-
agement information for IT systems and covers a systematic description of IT systems and their
interaction. Both references are used in the following to derive a classification of hardware re-
sources provided by hosting sites in the context of cloud computing.
4.1.3.1 Hosting site HS
Summarising the previous observations, the class hosting site HS is defined as a set of sup-
port facilities, building facilities, and IT facilities. Figure 4.7 depicts the components of the
class hosting site. The hardware resources are represented by the IT facilities (highlighted in
Figure 4.7) and are classified by management infrastructure, compute server, data storage, and
communication infrastructure. Each of these classes is specified in the following.
Figure 4.7: Classification of hosting sites with a focus on the IT facility.
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4.1.3.2 Management infrastructure MI
The class management infrastructureMI:= {mi1, ...,min} is a set of management infrastructure
instances mii with n ∈ N and i ∈ {1, ...,n}. The components of MI are depicted in Figure 4.8.
A management infrastructure instance mii is an automated management function classified
by fault management, configuration management, accounting management, performance man-
1Cisco Systems, Inc., in the Internet: http://www.cisco.com (last visited: 30.06.2015).
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agement, and security management (cf. CCITT recommendation on management functions
[197]). The management function classes are specified as follows.
Figure 4.8: Classification of the management infrastructure.
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• Fault management FMF: The class FMF is a set of functions for detecting, isolating
and correcting abnormal operation of the IT facilities (cf. [197], pp. 15 et. seqq.).
In particular, this includes the functions for backup f m f Bak, replication f m f Repl , and
recovery f m f Recover of IT facilities.
• Configuration management CM: The class CM is a set of functions for controlling,
identifying, collecting data from, and providing data to IT facilities (cf. [197], pp. 37 et.
seqq.).
• Accounting management AMF: The class AMF is a set of functions for measuring
usage and determining costs of IT facilities, and charging customers, i.e., cloud providers
(cf. [197], pp. 53 et. seqq.).1
• Performance management PMF: The class PMF is a set of functions for evaluating
and reporting on the behaviour and effectiveness of IT facilities (cf. [197], pp. 5 et.
seqq.).
• Security management SMF: The class SMF is a set of functions for preventing and de-
tecting security incidents, containment and recovery of IT facilities after the occurrence
of security incidents, and security administration (cf. [197], pp. 62 et. seqq.).
4.1.3.3 Compute server CS
The class compute serverCS:= {cs1, ...,csn} is a set of compute server instances csi with n∈N
and i ∈ {1, ...,n}. The components of CS are depicted in Figure 4.9.
A compute server instance csi is a physical server (organised in racks or as stand-alone)
consisting of hardware components and of hosted applications, which are specified as follows.
1From the point of view of a hosting site, the cloud provider is a customer who requests hardware resources for
operating a cloud infrastructure. Usually, there is no direct contact between a hosting site and a cloud customer.
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• Hardware component HW: The class HW is a set of different types of hardware com-
ponent (e.g., CPU, GPU, data storage, memory, and interfaces) a physical server is built
of. Each hardware component can be used to provide a specific amount of computation
resource (e.g., CPU cycles and memory size).
• Application APP: The class APP is a set of application types (e.g., file server, database,
and hypervisor) that are hosted on the compute server. Each application type can have
multiple, independent instances that can be utilised for providing cloud services (e.g.,
virtual network services and virtual machines).
Figure 4.9: Compute server classification.
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4.1.3.4 Data storage DS
The class data storage DS:= {ds1, ...,dsn} is a set of data storage instances dsi with n ∈ N
and i ∈ {1, ...,n}. As depicted in Figure 4.10, a data storage instance dsi (i.e., physical data
storage) can be classified by type into internal storage (of the compute server), locally attached
storage (of the compute server), and remote storage (provided via communication infrastruc-
ture), which are specified in the following.
Internal data storage IDS The class IDS is a set of data storage instances ds ∈DS that are
located inside a physical server chassis. IDS can be classified into different types of internal
data storage device (e.g., hard disk drive (HDD), solid-state drive (SSD), and tape).
Locally attached data storageADS The classADS is a set of data storage instances ds∈DS
that are locally attached to a physical server (e.g., via Universal Serial Bus (USB) or via Serial
Advanced Technology Attachment (SATA) for Direct Attached Storage (DAS)). ADS can be
classified into different types of attached data storage device (e.g., HDD, SSD, and tape).
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Remote data storage RDS The class RDS is a set of data storage instances ds ∈DS that are
available via a network connection (e.g., via LAN or Storage Area Network (SAN)). RDS can
be classified into different types of remote data storage type (e.g., network-attached storage
(NAS) and SAN).
Figure 4.10: Data storage classification.
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Remark 4.1 (Fault tolerance of data storage) For reasons of fault tolerance, data storage
is usually managed in multiple layers of synchronised replications. An example of a two-
layer replication would be a first-level replication for storage protection, and a second-level
replication for disaster recovery (cf. VMDC service tiers [44]). For a data storage instance
ds ∈ DS, this replication is modelled as follows.
(ds,ds| f m f Repl,ds| f m f Repl| f m f Repl) with f m f Repl ∈ FMF .
For the same instance, a 1-layer replication with 2oo2 redundancy is modelled as follows.
(ds,ds| f m f Repl,ds| f m f Repl ′) with f m f Repl ∈ FMF .
4.1.3.5 Communication infrastructure CI
The class communication infrastructure CI:= {ds1, ...,dsn} is a set of communication infras-
tructure instances dsi with n ∈ N and i ∈ {1, ...,n}.
A communication infrastructure instance dsi consists of all elements of a network infras-
tructure that are necessary for the communication between compute system instances and
data storage instances. These are communication services (e.g., Virtual Local Area Network
(VLAN) management, QoS management, and routing) and service endpoints required for cre-
ating end-to-end connections between compute system instances and data storage instances (cf.
CIM network schema [57]).
The components of CI are depicted in Figure 4.10 and specified in the following:
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Figure 4.11: Communication infrastructure classification.
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Communication infrastructure service CIS The class CIS is a set of service instances and
can be classified by different types of service (e.g., VLAN management, routing, and DHCP).
Each service instance is an application instance (e.g., DHCP server) hosted on a compute server
connected to the communication infrastructure.
End-to-end connection CON The class CON is a set of end-to-end connection instances
established between two or more compute server instances and/or data storage instances. For
example, an end-to-end connection instance con between the compute server instances cs1 and
cs2 is described as follows.
con(cs1,cs2) := con∼ (cs1,cs2) .
An end-to-end connection instance con has the following properties.
• RangeCON|PRange: The propertyCON|PRange:= {con|PRange,In,con|PRange,Ex} describes
whether the connection endpoints of con are located within the hosting site (con|PRange,In),
or one or more connection endpoints of con are located outside of the hosting site
(con|PRange,Ex).
• Communication topology CON|PTop: The property CON|PTop describes the topology
of the communication, for example, one-to-one communication (con|PTop,1−1) or one-
to-many (con|PTop,1−∗). For example, an 1-to-n communication between the compute
server instance cs1 and the group of compute server instances cs2, ...,csn (with n ∈ N) is
described as follows.
con(cs1,(cs2, ...,csn)) := con∼ (cs1,(cs2, ...,csn))
with con ∈ CON and con|PTop,1−n ∈ CON|PTop .
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4.1.4 Cloud infrastructure
For service orchestration at the cloud provider, computing resources are composed to cloud
services that are provided to the cloud customers. The cloud management process describes
the management and composition of virtual resource instances at the cloud provider. It covers
the creation, migration, and destruction of virtual resource instances, the pooling of compute
resources provided by the hosting sites, and the composition of virtual resource instances to
cloud services usable by the cloud customer. It also provides interfaces to the management
front-ends of cloud customers and cloud providers, for example the Open Cloud Computing
Interface (OCCI) [142] and the Cloud Infrastructure Management Interface (CIMI) [54].
Cloud infrastructures are usually organised in local resource clusters, which are coordi-
nated by superordinate global clusters. Figure 4.12 depicts the cloud infrastructure with the
management front-ends and the underlying clusters and hosting sites. The global clusters pool
the local clusters, (e.g., ‘Regions’ in OpenStack and AWS or ‘oZones’ in OpenNebula). The
local clusters typically cover the resources of a single hosting site (e.g., ‘availability zones’ of
AWS or ‘Islands’ of the Fujitsu cloud infrastructure) and can be hierarchically structured into
smaller subclusters, for example into ‘cells’ in OpenStack or ‘cluster’ and ‘virtual data centres’
in OpenNebula. The subclusters help to organise hardware resources and are usually located at
the same hosting site as is the superordinate local cluster. Without loss of generality, subclus-
ters are considered in the following as a part of the local cluster, and therefore as having the
same location and same entity responsible for its operation.
Figure 4.12: Components of the cloud management structure.
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The cloud management process operates on the cloud management infrastructure. Fig-
ure 4.13 depicts the components of the cloud management process, their location within the
cloud management infrastructure, and their control hierarchy as they can be observed in exist-
ing cloud infrastructures [204]. At the top there is the cloud service fabric providing the cloud
services to the customer and the cloud manager controlled by the cloud provider. Each global
cluster consists of a service orchestrator which creates cloud services by composing virtual re-
sources, the fabrics of the virtual resources, and the global cluster manager. Each local cluster
consists of the resource manager controlling the virtual resources provided by the underlying
hosting site.
The components of both the cloud management infrastructure and the cloud management
process are specified in the following.
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Figure 4.13: Components of the cloud management process.
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4.1.4.1 Cloud infrastructure CL
The class CL defines a set of cloud infrastructure instances. Each cloud infrastructure instance
consists of a cloud manager instance, a cloud service fabric instance, and a set of global cluster
instances, which all are specified in the following.
Cloud manager CM The class CM defines a set of cloud manager instances that are respon-
sible for coordinating the operation and interaction of all components of the cloud infrastruc-
ture instance (i.e., cloud service fabric instance and global cluster instances). A cloud manager
instance is controlled by the cloud management front-end of the cloud provider.
Cloud service fabric CSF The class CSF defines a set of cloud service fabric instances that
are responsible for coordinating the creation and provisioning of cloud services (i.e., virtual
resources for IaaS). Each cloud service fabric instance is controlled by the cloud management
front-end of the cloud customer and provides cloud service instances operated by the global
clusters. A cloud service fabric instance cs f ∈ CSF is defined a function cs f : P(VR)→
P(VR)|GC| that partitions the input set V R ∈ P(VR) on the global clusters, i.e.,
cs f (V R) := (V Rgc1 , ...,V Rgcn) with n = |GC| and gci ∈GC for i ∈ {1, ...,n} .
4.1.4.2 Global cluster GC
The class GC defines a set of global cluster instances representing regions or zones grouping
local infrastructure elements within the cloud infrastructure. A global cluster instance consists
of global cluster manager instance, a service orchestrator instance, fabric instances for com-
pute, storage and network resources, and a set of local clusters, which are all specified in the
following.
Global cluster manager GCM The class GCM defines a set of global cluster manager in-
stances that are responsible for coordinating the operation and interaction of all components
of the global cluster infrastructure instance (i.e., service orchestrator instance, fabric instances,
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and local cluster instances). A global cluster manager instance is controlled by the cloud man-
ager instance of the superordinate cloud infrastructure instance.
Service orchestrator SO The class SO defines a set of service orchestrator instances that
are responsible for composing the virtual resources to cloud service instances. Each ser-
vice orchestrator instance requests virtual resources from the fabric instances and provides
cloud service instances to the service fabric instance of the superordinate cloud infrastruc-
ture instance. A service orchestrator instance so ∈ SO is defined as a function so : P(VR)→
P(VM)×P(VS)×P(VL∪VNS) that partitions the input set V R ∈ P(VR) on the global clus-
ter’s fabrics, i.e.,
so(V R) := (V M,V S,V N) with V M ∈ VM, V S ∈ VS and V N ∈ VL∪VNS .
Fabrics CF, SF, NF The class CF defines a set of compute fabric instances that are responsi-
ble for coordinating the creation and provisioning of virtual machine instances. Each compute
fabric instance is controlled by the global cluster manager instance and provides virtual ma-
chine instances to the service orchestrator. A compute fabric instance c f ∈ CF is defined as a
function c f : P(VM)→ P(VM)|LCgc| that partitions the input set V M ∈ P(VM) on the set of
local clusters LCgc ⊆ LC of the global cluster gc ∈GC, i.e.,
c f (V M) := (V Mlc1 , ...,V Mlcn) with n =
∣∣LCgc∣∣ and lci ∈ LCgc for i ∈ {1, ...,n} .
The class SF is defined analogously for the creation and provision of virtual storage instances,
and NF is defined analogously for virtual link instances and virtual network service instances,
respectively.
4.1.4.3 Local cluster LC
The class LC defines a set of local cluster instances representing local infrastructure elements
located at a single hosting site. A local cluster instance consists of a local cluster manager
instance, manger instances for compute, storage and network resources, and compute, storage
and network resource instances, which all are specified in the following.
Local cluster manager GCM The class GCM defines a set of local cluster manager in-
stances that are responsible for coordinating the operation and interaction of all components
of the local cluster infrastructure instance (i.e., resource manager instances and resources) and
interacts with the management infrastructure instances of the underlying hosting site. A local
cluster manager instance is controlled by the global cluster instance of the superordinate global
cluster instance.
Resource managerCM, SM,NM The classCM defines a set of compute manager instances
that control the creation, operation, and destruction of virtual machine instances, which is
performed by the compute node instances. A compute manager instance cm ∈ CM is defined
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as a function cm : P(VM)→ P(VM)|CNlc| that partitions the input set V M ∈ P(VM) on the set
of compute nodes instances CNlc ⊆ CN of the local cluster lc ∈ LC, i.e.,
cm(V M) := (V Mcn1 , ...,V Mcnn) with n =
∣∣CNlc∣∣ and cni ∈CNlc for i ∈ {1, ...,n} .
The class SM is defined analogously for virtual storage instances in conjunction with stor-
age pool instances, and the class NM analogously for virtual link and virtual network service
instances in conjunction with network node instances.
Compute node CN The class CM defines a set of compute node instances which are provid-
ing the virtual machine instances. Each compute node instance represents a compute server of
the underlying hosting site instance and operates a hypervisor instance that can create, operate,
and destroy virtual machine instances. Each compute node instance is controlled by the com-
pute manager instance of the same local cluster instance. A compute node instance cn ∈ CN
is defined as a function cn : P(VM)→ CS that assigns the input set V M ∈ P(VM) to the set
of compute server instances CSlc ⊆ CS at the hosting site associated with the local cluster
lc ∈ LC, i.e.,
cn(V M) := cs with cs ∈CSlc .
Storage pools OS, BS, IS The class OS is defined as a set of object storage pool instances
providing virtual storage which is structured in objects. Each object storage pool instance
consists of one or more data storage instances of the underlying hosting site instance and is
controlled by the storage manager instance of the same local cluster instance. An object storage
pool instance os ∈ OS is defined as a function os : P(VS)→ P(DS) that assigns the input set
V S ∈ P(VS) to the set of data storage instances DSlc ⊆ DS at the hosting site associated with
the local cluster lc ∈ LC, i.e.,
os(V S) := DS with DS⊆ DSlc and ∀vs ∈V S ∃ds ∈ DS : os({vs}) =
{
ds
}
.
The class BS is defined analogously for block storage. The class IS is defined analogously as a
set of image storage pool instances (a.k.a. image repository) that are responsible for providing
image instances for the creation of virtual machine instances.
Network node NN The class NN is defined as a set of network node instances that are re-
sponsible for providing and operating virtual link and virtual network service instances. Each
network node instance represents an element of the communication infrastructure instance of
the underlying hosting site instance and is controlled by the network manager instance of
the same local cluster instance. A network node instance nn ∈ NN is defined as a function
nn : P(VL∪VNS)→ P(CIS∪CON) that assigns the input set V Nlc ∈ P(VL∪VNS) to the
output set COMhs⊆P(CIS∪CON) at the hosting site hs∈HS associated with the local cluster
86
lc ∈ LC, i.e.,
nn(V N) :=COM
with COM ⊆COMlc ,
∀vl ∈V N∩VL ∃con ∈COM∩CON : nn({con}) = {vl} , and
∀vns ∈V N∩VNS ∃cis ∈COM∩CIS : nn({vns}) = {cis} .
4.1.4.4 Cloud management process cmp
The cloud management process is defined as the function cmp : P(VR)×P(HW) that maps
requested virtual resource instances to the necessary hardware resource instances. The cloud
management process can be described as the composition ◦ of its components’ functions, i.e.,
for the functions f and g1, ...gn, defined as follows,
f : X → Y1× ...×Yn , f (x) := (y1, ...,yn) and gi : Yi→ Zi , g(y) := z
with n ∈ N and i ∈ {1, ...,n} ,
the composition f ◦ (g1, ...,gn) is defined:
f ◦ (g1, ...,gn) : X → Z1× ...×Zn , f ◦ (g1, ...,gn)(x) := ( f
∣∣Y1 ◦g1(x), ..., f ∣∣Yn ◦gn(x))
with f
∣∣Yi : X → Yi , f ∣∣Yi(x) = yi .
The composition of single-dimensional functions is represented for n = 1. Further, the compo-
sition of multi-dimensional functions f : X → Y1× ...×Yn and g : Y1× ...×Yn→ Z with n ∈ N
can be described as the composition f ◦ (g1, ...,gn)◦h with gi : Yi→ Z decomposition of g for
i ∈ {1, ...,n} and h : Zn→ Z recomposition of g.
An example of a management process instance cmp that is requesting virtual machine
instances from a compute node instance would be (assuming that there is only one instance of
each global cluster, local cluster and compute node):
cmp = cs f ◦ so◦ c f ◦ cm◦ cn
with cs f ∈ CSF, so ∈ SO, c f ∈ CF, cm ∈ CM, and cn ∈ CN .
Table 4.1 lists examples of the resource mapping by the cloud management process. The
first column describes the input (i.e., virtual resource instances) of the cloud management pro-
cess. The second column shows the components of the composed cloud management process.
The third column lists the result (i.e., hardware resource instances) of the cloud management
process. In this manner, it is possible to describe the mapping of any virtual resource instance
(and its properties) to its assigned hardware resources as a result of the cloud management
process.
Consequently, the model describes all relevant entities and relations of an IaaS cloud in-
frastructure. Virtual resources, hardware resources and the cloud management process (linking
virtual resources and hardware resources with each other) are covered. By using the formal
notation of an ontology, the model forms a basis for the information flow analysis in Chapter 5.
For its construction, five representative cloud infrastructures and existing standards and best
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practices on data centre design and cloud architectures were investigated. This provides a good
basis for a plausible and self-contained model. Since the notation of an ontology is used for the
construction of the model, it is even possible to perform, in a next step, a formal verification of
the characteristics described. The formal verification of the model is outside the scope of this
thesis and not further investigated. In Section 7.3, an outlook on how to perform such a formal
verification is given.
Having understood the structure of IaaS cloud infrastructures, it is now possible to in-
vestigate the technical capabilities on security and compliance management in such clouds.
Section 4.2 investigates the cloud security management and Section 4.3 analyses compliance
management in clouds.
4.2 Cloud security management
Cloud security is a widely investigated research area. There are several surveys and guidelines
identifying security and privacy challenges within cloud computing (e.g., [117] [191] [41]
[230]). Figure 4.14 provides a comprehensive (but not necessarily exhaustive) overview of
the security and privacy challenges mentioned in the literature according to the classification
scheme provided by NIST [117].
The research challenges addressed in this thesis (cf. Section 1.3) fall into the area of com-
pliance and in particular into the area of law and regulations and of data location. More
specifically, the technical challenges in cloud computing of implementing the legal require-
ments identified in Section 3.6 are addressed. Additionally, visibility in the context of com-
pliance monitoring and auditability in the context of providing evidence in compliance reports
are addressed.
In the following, the capabilities and technical prerequisites required to comply with the
identified legal requirements are analysed in general and with respect to existing literature and
current practice. This section covers the analysis of capabilities and technical prerequisites
of cloud security management with respect to the legal requirements identified in the legal
analysis (cf. Section 3.6). The capabilities and prerequisites for documenting, monitoring, and
reporting to support cloud compliance management are examined in Section 4.3.
4.2.1 Effective level of security
According the Def. 3.2, the effective level of security specifies the implemented security mea-
sures at the location of data processing (i.e., at the hosting site). The cloud provider has to en-
sure that the cloud management process assigns virtual resources only to hosting sites, which
have an effective level of security that satisfies the necessary level of security applicable to
hosted virtual resources.
This refers to the location inhomogeneity identified in cloud infrastructures (cf. Defini-
tion 2.2). Location homogeneity implies that both ensured legal framework conditions and
effective level of security are the same for all hosting sites. Location inhomogeneity implies
that for some hosting sites the ensured legal framework conditions or the effective level of secu-
rity are not the same. If the ensured legal framework conditions are not the same then also the
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Figure 4.14: Classification security and privacy challenges in cloud computing according to NIST
[117] and other existing surveys and guidelines [191] [41] [230].
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ensured level of security is not the same either, since the obligations when it comes to security
measures differs at those locations with different legal framework conditions. In any case, in
legally compliant clouds, the effective level of security can be higher than the ensured level of
security but legal framework conditions may bypass implemented security measures anyway
since they are not ensured For instance, extensive access privileges by investigative authorities
in the USA render access and transfer control measures useless in general. Further, the en-
sured level of security specifies the minimum level of security which has to be implemented
at a specific location. Assuming legal compliance (i.e., the effective level of security is never
lower than ensured level of security),1 the cloud provider has to verify that each hosting site
which is involved in data processing has an ensured level of security satisfying the necessary
level of security for the data being processed. In the following, the challenge of deciding on
the ensured level of security and of enforcing the necessary level of security is defined as the
challenge of location inhomogeneity:
Definition 4.6 (Challenge of location inhomogeneity) The challenge of location inhomoge-
neity the need to describe the context of determin and enforcement within an information model
and for methods to identify, to decide based on ensured level of security (which is minimum for
effective level of security), and to enforce the necessary level of security.
The information model has to be able to express the applicable requirements with respect
to (1) the location of the data processing, (2) the category of the processed data, (3) the origin
of the processor, controller, and data subjects or ‘data owner’, and (4) the applicable require-
ments from contracts and SLA (cf. Section 3.6.1). For proper decision and enforcement, the
identification method has to be able to acquire reliabe information on the data processing lo-
cation and its ensured level of security. Based on the information model and the information
provided by the identification method, the decision and enforcement methods have to ensure
that the resource allocation of the cloud management process complies with the necessary level
of security (i.e., the ensured level of security at the location of allocated hardware resources
satisfies the necessary level of security that is required for the requested virtual resources).
In the literature, the challenge of location inhomogeneity is addressed in the context of in-
formation privacy with the terms ‘data location’ [117][41], ‘data locality’ [191], and ‘multi lo-
cation issue’ [230], which are allocated in the intersection of, on the one hand, location-centric
and -aware data processing, and on the other hand, information- and data-centric security.
In the area of location-centric and -aware data processing, there is a good deal of research
on user location and privacy in mobile cloud computing [71] and in location- and context-
aware systems [16], but none of this research addresses the location of data processing and the
necessary level of security within the cloud.
The research area of information- and data-centric security seeks to disentangle the security
from the underlying communication, storage and processing mechanisms and applying security
mechanisms directly to data. Examples of this are the XML-based security standards XML-
Encryption[60] and XML-Signature [18], or security mechanisms for identifier integrity and
1In any case, the cloud provider regularly has to ensure the compliance of subcontractors, e.g., by contractual
agreements including inspections of compliance and the effectiveness of any security measures implemented.
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origin verification used in information-centric networking [2] [84]. Information- and data-
centric security mechanisms are designed to apply security to data directly and independently
of the processing environment. Therefore, information- and data-centric security mechanisms
are able to attach security information (e.g., security policies) to data and make them available
for data processing systems, but (intentionally by design) it does not take into account the
location of data processing and the necessary level of security.
Methods for documenting and retrieving the origin of data are investigated in the area of
data provenance, for example, using documentation and annotation of data processing and data
transfer[145] and modelling data provenance on the World Wide Web (WWW) [229] enabling
queries on the origin of the data. These methods can be used to identify the creator of specific
data, but the location of the data and its processing as well as the necessary level of security are
not considered.
In general, the challenge of location inhomogeneity can be considered to be related to the
area of information flow analysis, since it requires an information model used for identifica-
tion, decision on, and enforcement of information flows. Particularly related to the challenges
are the investigations on modelling access and mobility control using network references [87],
which makes it possible to describe end-to-end security policies [201]. Further, methods of
information flow analysis can be applied to detect co-location of virtual machines based on hy-
pervisor information and used to protect from side-channel attacks through VM migration and
halting/resuming strategies [14]. To conclude, none of these research works directly addresses
the challenges of the necessary level of security. Nonetheless, information flow analysis pro-
vides methods to model and verify security requirements in the context of distributed systems,
which make the methods of information flow analysis a good candidate to describe the infor-
mation model covering determination and enforcement of the necessary level of security. In
particular, it has been observed that information flow control policies can be used to model
legal regulations [14]
In practice, the challenge of location inhomogeneity is addressed by solutions providing
nationally hosted cloud computing (e.g., Initiative Cloud Services Made in Germany,1 AWS
GovCloud (US),2 FUJITSU Cloud IaaS Private Hosted3). To the best of the author’s knowl-
edge, there is only one approach addressing technically the validation of the effective level of
security of hosting sites in cross-boarder cloud computing. There also exists an approach that
partially addresses the challenge of location inhomogeneity by reliably identifying the location
of virtual machines. Both approaches are discussed below.
The EU FP7 integrated project OPTIMIS4 addresses the necessary level of security with
respect to European data protection law. In the approach [202], the necessary level of secu-
1The initiative called Cloud Services Made in Germany provides a platform on which to promote cloud provider
located in Germany and explicitly governed by German legislation. On the Internet (in German): http://www.
cloud-services-made-in-germany.de/ (last visited: 30.06.2015)
2AWS GovCloud (US). On the Internet: http://aws.amazon.com/govcloud-us/ (last visited: 30.06.2015)
3FUJITSU Cloud IaaS Private Hosted addresses the challenge of “geographically-specific regulations” and is
“tailored to the specific needs of the local territory”. On the Internet: http://www.fujitsu.com/global/
services/infrastructure/iaas/ (last visited: 30.06.2015)
4EU FP7 integrated project OPTIMIS. On the Internet: http://www.optimis-project.eu/ (last visited:
30.06.2015)
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rity is described using WS-Agreement (cf. WS-Agreement standard [9]) by listing all counties
and hosting sites that satisfy the necessary level of security [231]. Decision and enforcement
on these listings are performed during resource placement. The location of virtual machine
and virtual storage placement is identified via IP address range verification and exploitation of
the rack awareness features of Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) (cf. the Hadoop user
guide [10] and the description of rack awareness [123]). The decision is based on whether
a hosting site is located within the European Union or not. The enforcement is done before
resource allocation and continuously monitored during operation to consider resource migra-
tion. Addressing the problem for virtual machine and virtual storage placement, the reliability
of the verification depends on the correct allocation of rack identifier and IP address ranges,
which are both under control of the hosting sites and have no implemented security or integrity
mechanisms. They are particular easy to manipulate. The IP address of a network connec-
tion endpoint can be unrecognisably disguised by using network address translation. The rack
identifier used for the rack awareness depends on the association with its parents node, which
is “proprietary to each organization” [123]. Thus, the rack identifier can be defined arbitrarily
by the hosting site, and consecutively, abusable to obfuscate the physical location, for exam-
ple, through linking them with parent nodes of other hosting sites. The approach of OPTIMIS
addresses the validation of the ensured level of security, but does not provide generally applica-
ble and trustworthy mechanism1 to identify the location of virtual resources and their assigned
hardware resources. However, it is generally possible to locate data in the cloud in a trustwor-
thy manner in combination using geo-location methods and proof of storage (POS) protocols
[3] [4], neither of which is applied in OPTIMIS. Further, the approach uses a policy language
to describe requirements for the necessary level of security, but do not provide an information
model to describe locations and requirements in general. However, the approach is a proof of
concept for considering the necessary level of security in cloud infrastructures.
The EU FP7 integrated project, TCloud,2 investigates – among other topics – privacy and
data protection by identifying the location of virtual machines related to the hosting hypervi-
sor and compute server using trusted hypervisors and trusted platform modules in OpenStack
[180, pp. 12 et seqq.]. Therefore, an information model is used to describe the location of
virtual machines dependent on the hosting compute server [1]. This information model allows
the decision on and enforcement of the location of virtual machines based on co-location and
previously assigned context-information (e.g., integrity level and location). While providing
a reliable method to identify the hosting compute server of a virtual machine, the approach
addresses neither the necessary level of security nor the effective level of security. In particular,
no methods to for automated decision making and enforcement are provided. However, it is
possible that the cloud customer manually assigns constraints to requested virtual machines
specifying preferred compute servers [53, pp. 55 et seqq.]. Such a manual assignment requires
knowledge of the physical infrastructure of the cloud that a cloud customer does not usually
have, and moreover, manual assignment lacks the support of scalability and rapid elasticity
1The approach depends on the rack awareness feature of HDFS running “on a cluster of computers with a tree
hierarchical network topology” [123] and its association with IP address ranges, neither of which is either general
or secure.
2EU FP7 integrated project TCloud, on the Internet: http://www.tclouds-project.eu/ (last visited:
30.06.2015).
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required in cloud computing (cf. Section 2.1.1). To conclude, the approach of TClouds does
not solve the challenge of location inhomogeneity but provides a proof of concept on (1) se-
curely identifying the compute server that is hosting a specific virtual machine by using trusted
computing and (2) enforcing the assignment of virtual machines to a specific compute server
in OpenStack.
Further, there exists a draft of a proof of concept implementation of trusted geo-location
in clouds [217] showing that it is possible to geo-tagging cloud resources and enforce resource
allocation by using trusted computing pools in OpenStack. While this approach addresses the
need for geo-location-aware resource allocation in clouds, the approach lacks an information
model describing all location constraints of corporate customers and ensuring a correct (i.e.,
free of conflicts) decision making and enforcement in respect to location constraints, when
allocating cloud resources. However, the implementation uses a similar (but different) approach
as presented in the proof of concept implementation in this thesis. Therefore, similarities and
differences are discussed in more detail in Section 6.1.2.
In this thesis, the challenge of location inhomogeneity is addressed (1) by defining an
information model using methods of information flow control in Section 5.3, (2) by identifying
reliable methods to identify the location of data processing in cloud computing in Section 5.4.1,
and (3) by identifying reliable and scalable methods of decision making and enforcement and
applying them to the cloud management process in Section 5.4.2.
4.2.2 Cloud security policies
The basis for deciding on the ensured level of security and enforcing the necessary level of
security within the cloud management process is the information model expressing the security
requirements of cloud customers and cloud provider. These requirements are expressed and
communicated via security polices, which are on the one hand the organisational standard and
on the other hand the technical representation of all applicable security requirements. Thus, se-
curity policies enable the cloud provider to communicate security requirements to the hosting
site and to implement automated decision making and enforcement within the cloud manage-
ment process. According to Section 3.6.2 the following requirements have to be satisfied by
any security policy.
• It is expressed in a technically enforceable form to be processable by the cloud man-
agement process as well as by the configuration and security management functions at
the hosting sites.
• It is possible to express all applicable rules, including the mapping of data types with
applicable safeguards. In particular, the policies language is extendible allowing to de-
scribe new requirements that may arise in future.
• To support multi-tenancy, rules are expressible and distinguishable by cloud customers.
• It is possible to identify and cope with conflicts between different sets of rules. In
particular, there are defined merge and intersection operators for combining different
sets of rules.
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• It is legible and comprehensible to enable review and audit processes that may apply
before, during, and after data processing.
The literature identifies several approaches to express legal and security requirements us-
ing security policies. An important area is the modelling of legal regulations for software and
system engineering [158] [159]. This area covers several methods, for example, methods of
symbolic logic, first-order temporal logic, markup-based representations, and goal modelling.
It is a general observation in this area that modelling legal regulations directly often struggles
with the complexity and ambiguity of legal regulations [158]. Comparing the existing methods
for modelling legal requirements, markup-based representations and in particular Extensible
Markup Language (XML) [27] turns out to be the most suitable approach for expressing legal
requirements in a technically enforceable and legible form [158]. Additionally, XML is an
expressive and flexible language that is fully specifiable and verifiable using language schemes
like XML Schema Definition (XSD) [199] and relax NG [45]. This makes XML a good can-
didate to specify security policies for the automated decision making and enforcement within
the cloud management process.
There already exist several XML-based policy languages, for example, in the context of
access control [223], privacy management [125], and trust management [182]. Further, many
of the existing XML-based security standards are applicable in the context of cloud security
[186]. In the context of cloud computing, there are also approaches to express SLA for example
by defining a novel language [163] or extending the WS-Agreement standard1 [231]. However,
none of these XML-based policy languages express the required information for enforcing the
necessary level of security (i.e., location, data type, origin, and applicable requirements; cf.
Def. 4.6). In any case, an extension of an existing policy language or the definition of a novel
policy language is required to express these requirements.
In practice, there is little information on the security policies used in existing commercial
cloud infrastructures and their expressiveness, since they are dealt with in the context of the
internal, non-transparent cloud management process.
The investigation of open cloud infrastructures reveals that there is only little standardisa-
tion and little support of security requirements. For example, OpenStack2 uses the standard on
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)3 to define key-value pairs, which are specific to OpenStack.
In OpenNebula,4 predefined lists of key-value pairs specific to OpenNebular are used. Here,
the focus lies on load balancing, and security requirements are not considered. Eucalyptus uses
predefined policies for resource scheduling, which supports throughput, response time, and
fairness / waiting time [192]. There is no support for security requirements, but it is possible
to implement new schedule algorithms [192]. The approach of the EU FP7 integrated project
OPTIMIS extends the WS-Agreement standard5 by introducing white-listing for countries and
hosting sites with an adequate level of protection.
1WS-Agreement standard [9].
2OpenStack documentation on policies, on the Internet: http://docs.openstack.org/developer/glance/
policies.html (last visited: 30.06.2015).
3The JSON Data Interchange Format [66].
4OpenNebula documentation on resource scheduling, on the Internet: http://archives.opennebula.org/
documentation:rel4.4:schg (last visited: 30.06.2015).
5WS-Agreement standard [9].
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In this thesis, a security policy is required to perform an experimental evaluation imple-
mented in OpenStack (cf. Section 6.1). However, the identification and development of a
suitable security policy is not the scope of this thesis. Therefore, a simplistic XML-based pol-
icy language is defined to express the required information for deciding on and ensured level
of security and enforce the necessary level of security according to the information model de-
scribed in Section 5.3 and make them available to the cloud management process in OpenStack.
Possible approaches to the development of more sophisticated security policies are discussed
in Section 7.3.
4.2.3 Security measures in the cloud
Applicable legislation and the cloud customer’s preferences define the safeguards that have to
be implemented. These safeguards aim to protect the data processing on behalf of the cloud
customer and support the enforcement of requirements described in SLA.
There are four areas identified by the legal analysis in Section 3.6.3 that have to be covered
by implemented and enforced safeguards within the cloud: (1) basic security measures, (2)
access control, (3) transfer control, and (4) countermeasures and incident response. All of
these areas are analysed in the following sections.
4.2.3.1 Basic security measures
Basic security measures aim to secure communication and secure data storing/processing. This
is achieved by applying methods for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of virtual resources, hardware resources, and the cloud management process, including data
stored and processed within. Additionally, these methods support the effective operation of
mechanisms for access control (cf. Section 4.2.3.2) and transfer control (cf. Section 4.2.3.3).
Communication and data processing in the cloud In cloud infrastructures, basic security
measures can be applied to different levels of resource abstraction and management, i.e., (a)
cloud management process, (b) virtual resources, and (c) hardware resources. Each of these
levels has specific communication relations and processed types of data that are depicted in
Figure 4.15.
On the cloud management level (cf. Figure 4.15), there are three different types of com-
munication relation: (1) the vertical communication of the cloud management using Cloud
Management Interfaces (CMIs) (e.g., OCCI [142] and CIMI [54]) to manage and operate vir-
tual resources), (2) the horizontal communication of the federation management using Fed-
eration Management Interfaces (FMIs) (e.g., cross-cloud federation manager [38] and virtual
execution environment manager [171]), and (3) the communication between the local clusters
and the hosting sites using Virtualisation Management Interfaces (VMIs) (e.g., Open Virtual-
ization Format (OVF) [56] and Virtualization Management (VMAN) [55]).
The processed data at this level are customer data (e.g., master data to manage the con-
tract with the customer, and credentials for connecting with the cloud infrastructure) and cloud
management data necessary for operating the cloud infrastructure (e.g., system data of the
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Figure 4.15: Overview of communication relations and processed data in IaaS clouds
C
h
C
h
Management Front-end
(Cloud Customer)
Management Front-end
(Cloud Provider)
Cloud Infrastructure
Global Cluster
Local 
Cluster
Hosting 
Site
Local 
Cluster
Hosting 
Site
Global Cluster
...
...
Cloud 
Infrastructure
Global 
Cluster
...
...
...
Ch
Ch
Ch
C
h
C
h
Local 
Cluster
Hosting 
Site
Local 
Cluster
Hosting 
Site
C
h
C
h
C
h
Local 
Cluster
Hosting 
Site
Ch
Cloud Management
Interface (CMI)
CMI
CMI
FMI
FMI
Federation Management
Interface (FMI)
V
ir
tu
a
lis
a
ti
o
n
 M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
In
te
rf
a
c
e
 (
V
M
I)
End System
(Cloud Customer)
Gateway
VM VM
VM
C
h
Ch
VM
VS
VS
Gateway
VM
VM
VM
Ch
C
h
Ch
VPN
VLAN
I/O BUS
Internet
CS
V
M
VMM
V
M...
CS
V
M
VMM
V
M...
Ch
DS DS
DS
C
h
Ch
SAN
L
A
N
CS
G
a
te
w
a
y
CS
NAS
Ch
LAN
End System
(Cloud Customer)
G
a
te
w
a
y
CS
CS
CS
Ch
VPN
Internet
Cloud Management
Virtual Resources
Hardware Resources
Processed data:
- customer data (e.g., master 
data, credentials,...)
- cloud management data (e.g., 
system data, security policies, 
configuration,...)
- hardware resource data (vide 
infra, partially or fully available)
- virtual resource data (vide infra, 
partially or fully available)
Processed data:
- customer's data (e.g., tax data, 
private data, business data,...)
- virtual resource data (e.g., 
system data, configuaration,
guest OS, applications,...)
Processed data:
- hypervisor data (e.g., 
configuration, security policies,...)
- hardware resource data (e.g., 
system data, configuration,...)
- virtual resource data (vide supra, 
partially or fully available)
- customer’s data (vide supra, 
partially or fully accessable)
End System
(Public User)
C
h
End System
(Public User)
Communication 
channel (analysed)
Communication 
channel (similar to 
analysed one)
Ch
infrastructure, applied security policies, and configuration data of managed systems and pro-
vided services). In particular, configuration data of virtual resources and hardware resources
are processed for management purposes.
On the virtual resource level (cf. Figure 4.15), there are four different types of commu-
nication relation: (1) VPN used to establish private access networks (e.g., IPsec [119] and
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SSL/TLS [205]), (2) VLAN for connecting virtual machines (e.g., IEEE 802.1Q [106] and
VPLS [121][130]), (3) Internet-based application transport protocols (e.g., HTTP for WWW-
based applications), and (4) (virtual) I/O busses used to connect virtual storage with virtual
machines (implemented by using, for example, HDFS [10] for block storage and NFS [184]
for object storage).
Processed data on this level are cloud customer’s data that are transmitted from end systems
to virtual resources for data processing within the cloud. Cloud customer’s data can cover, for
example, tax data, private data, and business data (cf. identified data types in Section 3.5.3.3).
Additionally, virtual resource data are processed, including the system and configuration data
of the virtual resources and the data on the hosted guest OS and applications.
On the hardware resource level (cf. Figure 4.15), there are four different types of commu-
nication relation: (1) LANs providing switched Ethernet (possibly in conjunction with VLAN
technologies [44, pp. 2–1 et seq.]) for connecting the compute system (CS) hosting virtual
machines and other applications, like NAS, (2) SANs providing switched Ethernet (possibly
in conjunction with VLAN technologies [44, p. 2–2]) specialised for storage provisioning, (3)
VPNs implementing the private access networks of the virtual resource layer (vide supra), and
(4) Internet-based transport protocols implementing the public access network (vide supra),
respectively.
Processed data on this level are the hypervisor data, including applied configurations and
security policies, and the hardware resource data, for example, applied configurations and sys-
tem data of the compute server and data storage units. Additionally, the virtual resource data
(vide supra) are fully or partly available through the management functions of the hypervisors
that are also used by the VMI. Moreover, the customer’s data are fully or partially accessible
using virtual machine introspection [149] or via direct hardware access [178].
Communication security The integrity and confidentiality of communication channels
in IP-based networks is well understood and can be established in many ways, for example:
• by using secure transport protocols addressing confidentiality and integrity, e.g., Hy-
pertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) [42] instead of Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) communications (e.g., used in OpenNebula for communication with the OCCI
server [156]);
• by using secure VPN and VLAN protocols, e.g., IPsec (supports confidentiality [119])
and SSL/TLS (supports confidentiality and integrity [205]); and
• by using XML security standards (e.g., XML encryption [60] and XML signature [18])
on XML-based message formats (for example, applicable to cross-cloud federation man-
ager [38] and VMAN [55]).
In particular, there exist approaches on communication security that are specific to cloud man-
agement, for example, Cloud Data Management Interface (CDMI) implements transport secu-
rity for cloud storage management [190, p. 33]).
The availability of communication channels in IP-based networks is also well under-
stood. There exist accurate models for measurement [213]. There are multiple identified
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threats to availability, for example, hardware failure and congestion due to extensive use or
attacks [181]. Further, there exist multiple approaches addressing these threats, for exam-
ple, implementing diversity for improved availability [183] and introducing intrusion detection
and prevention [36] to mitigate attacks on availability. In practice, the availability of com-
munication channels in virtualised infrastructures can be implemented by redundant hardware
resources [44, pp. 2–12 et seqq.].
To conclude commutation security in cloud infrastructures, there are methods imple-
menting confidentiality, integrity and availability on communication channels used in cloud
infrastructures. In particular, the communication between the cloud infrastructure and the
management interfaces as well as the communication between cloud infrastructures can be
protected.
Data security In general, the confidentiality of data is addressed by using cryptosystems
for data encryption (e.g., AES [151] and DES [150]). It is possible to use such cryptosystems
to encrypt data storage [96] and memory [224] during system operation. Such approaches
protect from unauthorised attempts to read the data directly from the data storage or memory
(e.g., via direct hardware access [178]). However in virtual machines, these techniques are
less effective against attempts to use virtual machine introspection [149], since the data are
decrypted before it is processed in virtual machines. A possible solution for this issue is to
use homomorphic cryptoschemes, which allow processing to be performed on encrypted data
[147]. Alternatively, the usage of trusted hypervisors can help to prevent unauthorised virtual
machine introspection [79]. In the context of data privacy, there exist approaches using data
aggregation [48] and transformation [198] to remove private data ensuring a certain degree
of anonymity. These methods can help to ensure the confidentiality of data by removing the
protected data or reducing the granularity of information in the data. Therefore, they are not
suitable for lossless data processing.
The integrity of data is usually addressed by detection and correction methods to ad-
dress possible modification of the processed data (e.g., cryptographic hashes [59] and error-
correcting codes (ECCs) [94]). Using cryptographic hashes combined with signature schemes
additionally provides guarantees on the detection of modifications, since the detection code is
protected, too (e.g., DSA [152]). There also exist legal standards and regulations on the use of
signature schemes for electronic signatures (e.g., the German signature law and the Electronic
Signature Directive 1999/93/EC).
The availability of data aims to guarantee access to data and protect data from loss. There
are several strategies for guaranteeing access, including storage redundancy in disk arrays [77],
data duplication [138] and globally distributed storage replication [124]. There exist best
practices on storage high-availability for hosting sites [44, pp. 2–17 et seq.], and there ex-
ist cloud services offering increased data availability (e.g., geo-replication in Windows Azure
Storage [143]). To protect from data loss, there exist several approaches and implementations
on backup and recovery strategies [40], which can be applied to virtual storage as well [138].
There also exist backup and recovery services for virtual storage in cloud infrastructures (e.g.,
the snapshot function of Amazon S3 [5] and Fujitsu Backup as a Service [75]).
To conclude data security in cloud infrastructures, there exist solutions implementing
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confidentiality, integrity, and availability on a hardware resource and virtual resource level.
Additionally, these solutions can be applied to data processing in cloud management (e.g., us-
ing database encryption [50] in combination with storage availably and signature schemes to
protect customer data). However, basic security measures in virtual resources may render inef-
fective when the underlying hypervisor is exploited to attack the hosted virtual machines (e.g.,
by using virtual machine introspection [80]). Here, virtualisation security is required [78],
which is operated and managed by the cloud provider [43]. However, virtualisation security is
not recognisable on the level of virtual resources (but only on hypervisor level). Without the co-
operation of the cloud provider, the cloud customer has no opportunity to gain any information
on implemented virtualisation security in the cloud.
Conclusion and relevance in this thesis The analysis of basic security measures shows that
there already exist applicable solutions for secure communication and data processing in cloud
computing. A particular issue is the possibility of the hypervisor undermining basic security
measures on the virtual resource level. This issue is addressable by trusted hypervisors. Such
security measures are not visible to the cloud customer and reporting by the cloud provider
is required to provide evidence of such measures being applied to the cloud customer. In
this thesis it is assumed that basic security measures are applied to ensure a secure operation
of the cloud infrastructure. In the following, the implementation and establishment of basic
security measures for communication and data security in cloud infrastructures are not further
investigated. Methods for monitoring and reporting on the effective operation of basic security
measures are discussed in Section 4.3.
4.2.3.2 Identity and access management
According to the legal analysis (cf. Section 3.6.3.2), it is necessary to implement access control
mechanisms to ensure the authentication and authorisation of data processing entities (e.g.,
cloud providers, cloud customers, and hosting sites).
This requires the implementation of identity and access management on the cloud providers
site as well as on the cloud customers’ sites and at hosting sites. The identity management has
to ensure the authenticity of actors (i.e., employees and entitled entities of cloud providers, of
the cloud customers, and of the hosting sites) that are involved in data processing and accessing
cloud infrastructures and provided resources. Based on the identity and authorisation of the
accessing actors, the access management has to enforce access control on virtual resources,
hardware resources, and the cloud management process, including data stored and processed
within these. To provide evidence on enforcement of access control, access management has to
document for each access attempt (using logging mechanisms) whether access was granted or
not. Such evidence also supports the non-repudiation of actions (e.g., data access and service
operation) performed by the accessing actors.
In the literature, identity and access management is investigated in many directions in-
cluding the context of authentication methods and protocols (e.g., Kerberos [114]), standards
and protocols for exchanging authentication and authorisation data (e.g., SAML [35] and
OAuth [95]), identity management systems (e.g., Liberty Alliance [34] or Shibboleth [37]),
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access control models [176] (particularly role-based access control (RBAC) [177] and privacy-
aware RBAC [153]), and use-case-specific approaches (e.g., user-centric management [61] and
federation management [76]).
In particular, identity and access management is mentioned in standards on cloud manage-
ment interfaces, for example CDMI designed for cloud storage management supports authen-
tication, authorisation and access control [190, p. 33], and the OCCI standard recommends to
use Transport Layer Security (TLS) for authentication [142, p. 22]
In practice, many cloud infrastructures support identity and access management. For ex-
ample, the OpenStack Identity Service Keystone implements an identity management system
providing authentication and authorisation mechanisms for accessing virtual resources, hard-
ware resources and components of the cloud management process (cf. ‘Keystone’ in Open-
Stack documentation [157]). Additionally, there exist extensions for OpenStack, introducing
OpenID authentication [120] and SAML authentication [49]. Other examples are the authen-
tication mechanisms of OpenNebula (cf. ‘User Security and Authentication’ in OpenNebula
documentation [156]) for Amazon S3 (cf. ‘Access control’ and ‘Signing and Authenticating
REST Requests’ in Amazon S3 documentation [5]) and of Windows Azure (cf. ‘Multi-Factor
Authentication’ in Windows Azure documentation [143]).
To conclude, there exist several solutions applicable to identity and access management. In
particular, authentication and authorisation methods and protocols are well understood. Access
control is often modelled using a role-based approach. Existing cloud infrastructures usually
implement identity and access management mechanisms for virtual resources, hardware re-
sources, and the cloud management process.
In this thesis, identity information on location and implemented security measures of vir-
tual resources, hardware resources, and hosting sites is used to identify the effective level of
security. Such types of information are not usually provided by identity management systems
in cloud infrastructures, since they are not required for identification and authorisation. It is
assumed that an identity and access management system is used to manage access control on
virtual resources, hardware resources, hosting sites and components of the cloud management,
which is in the case in OpenStack (cf. ‘Keystone’ in OpenStack documentation [157]). Further,
it is assumed that it is possible to extend the information basis of the identity and access man-
agement system through informations on location and implemented security measures, which
is possible in principle as shown in this thesis for OpenStack (cf. Section 6.1). The relevance of
identity and access management for this thesis is limited to obtaining and managing informa-
tion on location and implemented security measures of virtual resources, hardware resources,
and hosting sites. Thus, other methods for authentication and authorisation in cloud computing
are not further investigated.
4.2.3.3 Transfer control
According to the legal analysis (cf. Section 3.6.3.3), the cloud provider has to implement
transfer control mechanisms to ensure (1) the authenticity and authorisation of recipients, (2)
the satisfaction of the necessary level of security at the recipient’s location, and (3) compliance
with the applicable transfer restrictions. Further, transfer control has to consider data transfer
to other cloud customers, subcontracted hosting sites and third party service providers, third
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parties accessing virtual resources of the cloud customer (e.g., cloud user or supervisory au-
thorities), and in the case of cloud federation, third party cloud providers (cf. Section 3.6.3.3).
Consequently, transfer control has to be applied on any type of data transfer. This includes
data transmission via communication channels on the one hand, and creation and migration of
virtual resources used for processing data on the other hand.
Figure 4.16: Data transfer in IaaS cloud infrastructures from the cloud provider’s perspective
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Figure 4.16 depicts the possible data transfers in IaaS cloud infrastructures as described
above. The possible data transfers can be classified by (a) transfer to third party (i.e., data trans-
fer in the legal sense; cf. Section 3.2), (b) transfer internal of the cloud provider (depending
on the location of hosting sites operating the cloud management infrastructure this can result
in a cross-boarder transfer, and therefore in data transfer in the legal sense; cf. Section 3.2),
and (c) data transfer to the cloud customer (depending on the location of the cloud customer
this also can result in a cross-boarder transfer). In the following, methods for implementing
transfer control are discussed.
The authenticity and authorisation of recipients can be ensured by using methods of
identity and access management based on the recipients’ identity (cf. Section 100). The iden-
tity and access privileges of recipients can be managed analogous to those used for access
control, and the methods used for verifying the authenticity and authorisation of accessing
identities apply analogously for recipients. For example, a role-based access control model
can be applied to describe and verify the recipients’ identities and their authorisation (e.g., for
privacy-sensitive data [153]).
The satisfaction of the necessary level of security at the recipients’ location is a mandatory
prerequisite for legally compliant data transfer (cf. Section 3.6.1). Therefore, the ensured level
of security at the recipient’s location has to be verified, and according to Section 4.2.1, the
location of the recipient, the transferred data types, the sender’s origin, and applicable transfer
restrictions are used for the decision on the ensured level of security and enforcement of the
necessary level of security.
The compliance with applicable transfer restrictions at the recipient’s location depends
on legal regulations applicable to the transferred data types and may be restricted additionally
by the constraints and agreements specified in the SLA of the service contract (cf. Section 3.2).
To decide on applicable legal regulations and requirements of the SLA, security policies can
be used (cf. Section 4.2.2). The enforcement takes place in the virtual resource scheduling
of the cloud management process, as for example shown for the RESERVOIR architecture
[171] by enforcing resource placement and transfer control for virtual machine migration under
location constraints [139] [132]. The capabilities of virtual resource scheduling in the cloud
management process and related approaches to consider location-determined data processing
are investigated in more detail in Section 5.4.2.
To conclude, transfer control has to be implemented for data transfer and for the assign-
ment and migration of virtual resources. The recipients’ identity and authorisation have to be
identified and verified, which can be achieved by using methods for identity and access man-
agement. Further, the necessary level of security has to be ensured at the recipients’ location
and applicable transfer restrictions have to be applied. This can be done by implementing
decision and enforcement methods on the permissibility of data transfer within the cloud man-
agement process.
In this thesis, transfer control for the assignment of virtual resources is designed by in-
corporating the decision on the ensured level of security and the enforcement process for the
necessary level of security and of the security polices into a single location-determined deci-
sion and enforcement process (cf. Section 5.4.2). Further, reliable methods for identifying
the location of hardware resources and virtual resources are identified (cf. Section 5.4.1). To
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describe the necessary information, an information model is developed using methods of infor-
mation flow control (cf. Section 5.3). In the experimental evaluation, it is shown that transfer
control can be implemented in cloud infrastructures exemplary for virtual machine assignment
in OpenStack (cf. Section 6.1).
4.2.4 Counter measures and incident response
Cloud security management has to be able to deal with disturbances and irregular events (cf.
Section 3.6.3.4). Such disturbances and irregular events can cover (1) unexpected or malicious
behaviour of virtual resources, hardware resources and components of the cloud management
process (e.g., compute server failure, maleware running on virtual machines, and software er-
rors in the cloud management software), (2) unexpected or malicious behaviour of authorised
entities (e.g., insider attack by employees of the cloud provider, unavailability of hosting sites,
and denial of service (DoS) attacks performed by the cloud customer), and (3) unexpected or
malicious behaviour of unauthorised third parties (e.g., intrusion of an external attacker). Cloud
providers are obliged to implement mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and terminating in-
fringements and malicious behaviour that they are aware of (cf. Section 3.6.3.4). To prevent
and detect infringements and malicious behaviour, it is necessary to perform a risk analysis
identifying threats to the security goal defined in the security policies, and specifically, possi-
ble vulnerabilities of used hardware and software. To terminate infringements and malicious
behaviour, countermeasures and measures for incident response have to be defined by the cloud
provider.
The literature identifies several threats, vulnerabilities, and potential countermeasures
identified in cloud infrastructures [97] [89] [105] [212]. A major concern are threats to vir-
tualisation security and vulnerabilities in virtual environments [97, pp. 5 et seqq.], which can
be addressed in general by using trusted hypervisors [21] [179]. Other threats address data
security, service availability, and identity and access violations [97, pp. 3 et seqq.], which can
be addressed by implementing basic security measures (cf. Section 3.6.3.1) and identity and
access management (cp Section 3.6.3.2).
In practice, there exist general recommendations on incident reporting [70]. Further, the IT
security standards give specific recommendations and best practices on risk analysis, on coun-
termeasures, and on incident response (e.g., German ‘IT-Grundschutz’ [31], ISO/IEC 27004
[111], and ISO 27005 [109]) However, there is an increasing number of publicly reported
security incidents in existing cloud infrastructures [47], which indicates the need to further
improve counter measures and incident response in practice.
In this thesis, the design and implementation of legally compliant data processing within
cloud infrastructures is investigated with a focus on the challenge of location inhomogeneity
(cf. Definition 4.6). Countermeasures and incident response are not part of the focus, and there-
fore are not further investigated. In Section 7.3, the support of countermeasures and incident
response using the methods belonging to the approach presented in this thesis are discussed.
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4.2.5 Conclusions on cloud security management
The analysis of existing approaches and practices on cloud security management reveals that
the challenge of inhomogeneity (cf. Definition 4.6) is under-researched and lacks of compre-
hensive implementation in existing cloud infrastructures. The only existing approaches ad-
dressing the challenge are proposed by TClouds [180] and OPTIMIS [202], which are both
recently completed European research projects on secure cloud computing. TClouds provides
methods to securely identify the compute server hosting a virtual machine. OPTIMIS im-
plements methods to automatically decide and enforce virtual resource assignments based on
white-listing locations that satisfy the necessary level of security. None of the approaches
provides an information model that is capable of dealing with requirements on applicable safe-
guards and security measures and particularly not with the ensured level of security at hosting
sites. Such an information model is necessary for solving the challenge of inhomogeneity in
general.
The analysis further reveals that there already exist several methods that can be applied to
formulate security polices, implement security measures, and establish countermeasures and
incident response mechanisms.
To address the challenge of location inhomogeneity in general, this thesis focuses on iden-
tifying and applying (existing and new) methods that are capable of solving the challenge.
This includes the development of an information model particularly covering location informa-
tion (cf. Section 5.3) and the extension of the cloud management process to support location-
determined data processing (cf. Section 5.4.2). In particular, the incorporation of these methods
into the cloud compliance management is investigated (cf. Sections 4.3 and 5.4.3).
4.3 Compliance management in the cloud
Compliance management has to ensure the effectiveness and implementation of safeguards that
are necessary to satisfy legal requirements (cf. Section 3.6.4). Therefore, the cloud provider
is required to (1) document the performed data processing and applied safeguards, (2) monitor
the effectiveness of safeguards and satisfaction of legal requirements, and (3) report on legal
compliance to the cloud customer.
In particular, compliance management of the cloud provider has to ensure the effective
security and compliance at the hosting site by communicating applicable security policies and
monitoring legal compliance at hosting sites.
In this section the technical capacity to implement compliance management in cloud com-
puting is investigated. In Section 4.3.1, methods for logging and documentation of safeguards
and data processing in cloud infrastructures are analysed. Approaches on compliance mon-
itoring for cloud computing (cf. Section 4.3.2) and the capabilities and trustworthiness of
compliance reporting (cf. Section 4.3.3) are then explored.
4.3.1 Logging and documentation
The documentation of preformed data processing and applied safeguards is necessary to pro-
vide an information basis for compliance monitoring and reporting (cf. Section 3.6.4). Relevant
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information for documentation covers in particular the events and location of data processing
and storing, attempted and granted access (to cloud management, virtual resources and hard-
ware resources), and administrator activities (of cloud customer and cloud provider).
In cloud infrastructures, documentation can be implemented on the level of (i) cloud man-
agement, (ii) virtual resources, and (iii) hardware resources. Table 4.2 provides an overview
of possible information sources and the items that can be documented at each level, which are
discussed in the following.
On the cloud management level, it is possible to document the management actions of
cloud customers and cloud provider as well as the behaviour, configuration, and status of the
cloud infrastructure. In particular, documentation of communication with the management in-
terface provides evidence of management actions performed by the cloud customer and cloud
provider and of their information basis (which is provided by the management front-end and
used for management decisions). The same information can be documented for communication
with third party cloud infrastructures. Such information is important for clarifying the respon-
sibility for the configuration of virtual resources and their applied security polices. Further, it
is possible to gather information on virtual resources that are visible to the cloud management
(e.g., virtual resource identifier, resource configuration, and assigned hosting site). Such infor-
mation can be used to verify the compliance of management functions and can be compared
with information gathered on the virtual resource layer and the hardware resource layer for
plausibility checks. However, the value of evidence of information provided by management
interfaces is limited, since the source of information is not verified. For example, the informa-
tion can be taken from the cloud management databases, like the nova database on resources
and their state.1
On the virtual resource level, the interaction of end systems located outside the cloud
with virtual resources located inside the cloud can be documented. This is needed to supervise
access to virtual resources and data transfer to end systems. Additionally, logging mechanisms
of guest OS and applications running on virtual resources can be used to document the data
processing in virtual resources and applied security measures. In IaaS, these logging mecha-
nisms are operated on behalf and within the area of responsibility of the cloud customers and
are not available to the cloud provider. The same holds true for communication between vir-
tual resources via the cloud customer’s VPN. The cloud customer can decide to provide the
logging and communication information to the cloud provider, and additionally, can use it for
comparison with information provided by the cloud provider for plausibility checks.
On the hardware resource level, it is possible to document the operation of the hardware
resources and the hypervisor. The hardware resources and hypervisor are both operated at the
hosting site. Therefore, the visibility of their operation at the cloud management level depends
on the information provided by the hosting sites (for example, via the VMI), and consequently,
can vary in granularity and trustworthiness for different hosting sites. The operation of hard-
ware resources and the hypervisor are not visible at the virtual resource level, because they
are obscured by the resource virtualisation. Therefore, both the hardware resources and the
hypervisor are important information sources for documenting data processing in the cloud. In
1OpenStack wiki entry on ‘HAforNovaDB’ (high availability for Nova database), on the Internet: https://wiki.
openstack.org/wiki/HAforNovaDB (last visited: 30.06.2015).
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Table 4.2: Documentation in cloud infrastructures
Level Information sources Items of documentation
Cloud
management
Communication with management
front-ends, hosting sites, and third party
cloud infrastructures
• Triggered actions
• Requested virtual resource configuration and security policy
• Reported feedback
• Applied communication security
• Actor’s identifier used for authentication
Cloud
management
Information provided by the manage-
ment interfaces (i.e., CMI, FMI, and
VMI)
• Configuration and status of virtual resources
• Configuration and status of cloud management components
• Communication endpoints
• Identifier of virtual resources
Cloud
management
Control messages of the management
interfaces
• Actions triggered and performed by using the management inter-
face
• Response messages of the connected systems
• Identifier of virtual resources
Virtual
resources Communication with end systems
• Access (attempts and granted) to virtual resources
• Data transfer to end systems
• Applied communication security
• Communication endpoints
• Actor’s identifier used for authentication
Virtual
resources
Logs generated within virtual resources
(e.g., by guest OS and applications run-
ning on virtual resources)
• Actions triggered and performed by guest OS and applications
(e.g., data processing)
• Configuration and status of guest OS, applications, and security
measures within the virtual resources
Virtual
resources
Communication between virtual re-
sources
• Actions triggered and performed by virtual resources (and hosted
guest OS and applications)
• Response messages of virtual resources
• Data transfer
• Applied communication security
• Communication endpoints
• Identifier of involved virtual resources
Hardware
resources Communication with end systems
• Applied communication security
• Identifier of involved end systems
• Communication endpoints
• Actor’s identifier used for authentication
Hardware
resources
Information provided by the hardware
management interfaces
• Configuration and status of hardware resources
Hardware
resources Information provided by the hypervisor
• Configuration and status of virtual resources
• Identifier of hardware and virtual resources
Hardware
resources
Logs generated on hardware resources
(e.g., by OS and applications running on
hardware resources)
• Actions triggered and performed by OS and applications (e.g.,
data processing)
• Configuration and status of OS, applications, and security mea-
sures running on the hardware resources
Hardware
resources
communication between hardware re-
sources
• Actions triggered and performed by hardware (and hosted OS
and applications)
• Response messages of hardware resources
• Applied communication security
• Communication endpoints
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particular, the information on their operation can be used to identify the allocated hardware re-
sources that are used for operating virtual resources. Information on resource allocation allows
the verification of the location of data processing and the effective level of security, which are
both important for legally compliant data processing (cf. Section 4.2.1).
Other sources of information are vulnerability analyses performed on hardware resource
and virtual resource level as well as the manual entry of information by involved parties (e.g.,
cloud customer and cloud provider) [207]. Neither is limited to a specific level of cloud infras-
tructures.
A vulnerability analysis allows the inspection of the effectiveness of implemented security
measures, and therefore, provides an information basis on which to verify and extend docu-
mentation on security measures created by the logging mechanisms mentioned above. There
exist frameworks for systematic and comparable vulnerability analyses [101] [216] [155], and
it is possible to perform vulnerability analyses on an automated basis (e.g., by using OpenVAS
[168]). By using existing frameworks and tools, vulnerability analyses can be considered a reli-
able and comprehensive method for gathering information on the effectiveness of implemented
security measures.
Manual entry of compliance relevant information provides the opportunity to document ad-
ditional information that is not directly assessable from the cloud infrastructure (e.g., purpose
of data processing and contract information). Further, the information can be used for plau-
sibility checks of assessable information in the cloud infrastructure (e.g., the geo-location of
hosting sites and customers’ requirements for data processing). The reliability of manual en-
tries is limited to the correctness of the entered information. Due to media discontinuity, there
can be transcription errors and misrepresentation (fraudulently or accidentally). Double check-
ing manual entries, in particular by multiple parties (e.g., cloud provider and cloud customer),
can help to detect transcription errors and misrepresentation. However, transcription errors and
misrepresentation can remain undetected, and therefore, are item of the trust relations between
the involved parties (particularly between the cloud provider and cloud customer).
4.3.2 Compliance monitoring
The purpose of compliance monitoring is to observe and validate the effectiveness and imple-
mentation of safeguards with respect to legal and contractual requirements (cf. Section 3.6.4).
For that purpose, documentation (cf. Section 4.3.1) and applicable security policies (cf. Sec-
tion 3.6.2) are used as an information basis.
To monitor legal compliance, cloud providers have to consider the cloud infrastructure
operated by themselves and the hardware resources of subcontracted data hosting sites and
third party cloud infrastructures (cf. Section 3.6.4). Therefore, compliance monitoring of the
cloud provider relies on documentation and compliance reports provided by hosting sites and
third party cloud infrastructures.
The literature, gives different approaches on compliance monitoring that can be classified
into (i) manual validation performed by a human person, (ii) semi-automated validation per-
formed by a human person using supporting tools, and (iii) fully automated validation without
human interaction.
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For manual validation, standard procedures are described in the information security man-
agement standards using life-circle approaches, for example, described by the ISO/IEC 27001
standard [112] and by the German ‘IT-Grundschutz’ [31]. While procedures on manual valida-
tion are well understood and standardised, they are limited by the human capabilities to observe
and validate information. Therefore, manual validation does not scale in the same way as cloud
infrastructure and service provision do which are both designed for automated and highly scal-
able data processing in general. In particular, manual validation is not feasable for validation at
run-time since automated interaction in clouds is beyond human recognition. However, manual
validation is suitable for initial and periodic validation of overall security and compliance in
cloud infrastructures.
To address scalability, there exist semi-automated approaches on compliance monitor-
ing that can gather and pre-process the data needed to monitor compliance and to present it
in a legible form for further validation. Examples of such approaches are known in the con-
text of privacy protection in Web Services [225] and traditional IT outsourcing [93]. Existing
approaches are also applicable to cloud computing, for example, to perform a privacy impact
assessment [195] or to verify the trustworthiness of provided logging data [144]. An other ap-
proach to support scalability is to perform the validation on randomly selected examples [144].
This reduces the effort for validation to the number of selected examples, and therefore scales
by reduction of the density of selected examples. An advantage of this method is the support
of the principles of data reduction and data economy in data protection law (e.g., German data
protection law, BDSG §3). A drawback of this method is that there remain invalidated ‘blind
spots’ and that reducing the density of selected examples results in the reduction of the evidence
provided, since the number of ‘blind spots’ increases. This drawback can be mitigated by stor-
ing the documentation of ‘blind spots’ for later validation, for example, to provide evidence on
specific data processing to the cloud customer. In general, semi-automated approaches scale
with the data processing, but they require further validation by a human being, and therefore
are not applicable for run-time validation.
To address validation at run-time, there exists fully automated approaches on compliance
monitoring considering run-time information, for example, by introducing automated valida-
tion of SLA parameters by evaluating the operational state of virtual resources and hardware
resources at run-time [62] [63]. Fully automated compliance monitoring is capable of validat-
ing at run-time and additionally scales with the data processing. However, it depends greatly on
the correctness and granularity of the requirements defined within the security policies and the
information documented. For example, the possibility of implausible requirements and docu-
mentation has to be considered when designing the monitoring mechanisms, because additional
checks and validation are required to detect them. While it is possible to detect implausibili-
ties in documentation by using different sources of information (e.g., log-files of hypervisors
and control data of VMIs), the translation of legal requirements to security policies is often
error-prone [158]. Here, the manual validation by a human being has the advantage that incon-
sistencies and implausibilities can be detected more flexibly and during the evaluation process.
Another approach to ensure the correctness of the documentation is using remote attestation in
trusted infrastructure [180, pp. 87 et seqq.]. By using a physical trust anchor (e.g., TPM [203]),
it is possible to implement trusted hypervisors that can remotely attest to the integrity of the
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program code executed and to the integrity of the particular virtual machines being operated
[79]. Assuming the correctness of the program code deployed, the remote attestation provides
strong evidence of the correctness of the information provided by the hypervisor (including the
documentation of virtual machine operation).
In practice, compliance monitoring is addressed in IT security standards, for example,
ISO/IEC 27001 [112] and the German ‘IT-Grundschutz’ [31]. Additionally, there exist recom-
mendations on compliance monitoring provided by security authorities, for example, a check-
list provided by ENISA [68] and guidelines on continuous monitoring provided by NIST [51].
There also exist approaches showing that it is possible to implement compliance monitoring
in existing cloud infrastructures, for example, semi-automated monitoring of SLA compliance
[202, pp. 22 et seqq.], semi-automated validation of compute node integrity in OpenStack [53,
pp. 12 et seqq.] [53, p. 60], and fully automated validation of confidentiality and integrity
using simulated remote attestation [116].
To conclude, there exist several methods, best practices, and implementations for compli-
ance monitoring in cloud infrastructures, but none of these addresses the challenge of location
inhomogeneity by monitoring the effective level of security (cf. Section 4.2.1). Nonetheless,
remote attestation of trusted hypervisors can be used for semi- and fully automated validation
and provides strong evidence of the monitored operations.
In this thesis, monitoring the effective level of security is addressed by proposing a semi-
automated approach to monitoring the compliance of virtual resource placement using hypervi-
sor log validation (cf. Section 5.4.3). Additionally, the capabilities and the limits of compliance
monitoring are reflected in the context of legal evaluation in Section 6.2.1 and technical evalu-
ation in Section 6.2.3.
4.3.3 Compliance reporting
In the context of IT outsourcing to the cloud, the purpose of compliance reporting by the
cloud provider is to provide information and evidence on the compliance of data processing
that is performed on behalf of the cloud customer (cf. 3.6.4). These reports are required by
the cloud customer to verify the compliance with legal requirements and SLAs assured by the
cloud provider. The information basis for compliance reports consists of documentation on
the processing of the cloud customer’s data and the cloud customer’s security policies (i.e.,
SLAs and contractual agreements). In particular, information on data processing and its com-
pliance (with the cloud customer’s requirements) at subcontracted hosting sites and third party
cloud providers have to be considered. In general, the reliability and correctness of compliance
reporting are important, since the cloud customers rely on these reports to evaluate the legal
compliance of data processing in the cloud.
The reporting on the performed data processing and on its compliance with applicable
security requirements can be performed – similarly to the validation in compliance monitoring
– as follows: (i) manually by a human beeing, (ii) in a semi-automated ways by a person using
supporting tools, and (iii) in a fully automated way without human interaction. Each of these
methods has the same implications for scalability and applicability at run-time as the respective
methods have for compliance monitoring (cf. Section 4.3.2). In the following, examples of
compliance reporting in the literature and in practice are discussed.
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In the literature, manual compliance reporting is addressed, for example, when the indus-
trial standards on service operation controls SSAE 16 [7] and the ISAE 3402 [107] define an
audit process performed by a trusted third party (i.e., certified auditor). The scope of the stan-
dards is financial and IT-security-related reporting in outsourcing scenarios and is applicable
to cloud computing, too. In particular, the Service Organization Controls (SOC) 2 report of the
SSAE 16 standard considers the reporting on cloud computing [8, pp. 141 et seqq.].
Approaches to semi- and fully automated compliance reporting make use of reporting ser-
vices that provide compliance information that can be evaluated by a human being. For exam-
ple, it is possible to give fully automated reports on SLA violations [25] [63] and on privacy
protection and transfer control in orchestrated web services [99].
In practice, existing cloud infrastructures usually do not offer compliance reporting. Rather,
the opposite is the case. For example, in the Amazon EC2 Service Level Agreements,1 breaches
of the assured availability have to be reported by the cloud customers in order to get refunded.
An example of implemented compliance reporting is the reporting on data location com-
pliance in the public sector using the RESERVOIR architecture [139]. In this approach, moni-
toring information on virtual storage is enriched with information on the assigned hosting site.
Then, this information is associated with the geographical location of the hosting site. The ap-
proach assumes that the hosting sites and cloud provider are cooperative and does not provide
any mechanisms to ensure the correctness and reliability of the reported information. Using
this approach, it is possible to verify whether data are processed within a specific country or
not.
To conclude, there exist methods for compliance reporting applicable to cloud infrastruc-
tures, in particular for reporting on SLA compliance and violations. Further, it is possible to
offer fully automated reports on data location compliance. In any case, compliance reporting
is not usually implemented in existing cloud infrastructures and existing approaches do not ad-
dress the reporting on legal compliance, and particularly not on compliance with the necessary
level of security.
In this thesis, compliance reporting on the necessary level of security is addressed by
proposing a fully automated approach to visualising the virtual machine placement within the
cloud using a geographical map.
4.3.4 Conclusions on compliance management
The analysis of compliance management in cloud infrastructures reveals that the primary chal-
lenges are the acquisition and validation of telemetry data. Both have to scale with the number
of virtual resources requested by the corporate customer and with the amount of data process-
ing on behalf of the corporate customer. Therefore, manual monitoring and reporting methods
are not suitable and at least semi-automated approaches are required. Existing guidelines on
compliance monitoring and reporting in security standards focus on manual validation (e.g.,
SOC 2 reporting). Using semi-automated approaches allows the enrichment of the manual val-
idation process with automated tool support on information acquisition and validation. When
1Amazon EC2 Service Level Agreement (Effective Date: June 1, 2013), on the Internet: http://aws.amazon.
com/ec2/sla/ (last visited: 30.06.2015).
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doing so, the reliability and correctness of information provided by these automated tools is
paramount.
Further, an important source of information are hypervisors, since they can provide reliable
information on virtual resource operation. Correctness of the information can be ensured by
using, for example, the remote attestation of trusted hypervisors.
In general, there exist approaches on compliance monitoring and reporting in cloud infras-
tructures, but compliance monitoring with respect to the necessary level of security by the cloud
provider and the reporting of this compliance to the corporate customer remains an unsolved
challenge. In this thesis, the gap is addressed by providing a documentation model and identi-
fying monitoring and reporting methods for compliance control (cf. Section 5.4.3). Further, the
applicability of the proposed model and used methods is evaluated in an experimental evalua-
tion using a proof-of-concept implementation (cf. Section 6.1). In additional, the capabilities
and limits of compliance monitoring and reporting are discussed in Section 6.2.3).
4.4 Conclusions on implementing legally compliant clouds
In this chapter, the technical capability of clouds was analysed with respect to the implemen-
tation of the legal requirements identified in the legal analysis (cf. Section 3.6). In a first
step, an entity-relationship model of IaaS clouds was formulated using the formal notation of
an ontology. This model provides a formal basis for describing clouds. It was used in the
analysis made in this chapter and will be used in Chapter 5 to identify and describe informa-
tion flows in clouds. In a second and third step, the technical capabilities of cloud security
management and compliance management in clouds were analysed and the research gap in
addressing legal requirements was identified. In this context, the challenge of location inho-
mogeneity was defined (cf. Def. 4.6. It describes the key challenge of this thesis: to address
the legal necessity of location-determined data processing in clouds (cf. Section 3.5.3) techni-
cally. The analysis of cloud security management reveals that current research is aware of this
challenge, but solutions proposed thus far do not address the challenge or only part of it (cf.
Section 4.2.1). In particular, the need for an information model that is able to describe legal
constraints on location and security in a technically decidable and enforceable way remains
unaddressed. Other aspects of legal compliance, like security policies (cf. 4.2.2) and security
measures (cf. 4.2.3) were thoroughly discussed, but the challenge of location inhomogeneity
remains to be addressed. The analysis of compliance management in clouds revealed that cur-
rent cloud telemetry is able to monitor data processing in the cloud (cf. Section 4.3.1), but lacks
automated compliance monitoring (cf. Section 4.3.2) and compliance reporting (Section 4.3.3).
Both the missing information model and automated compliance monitoring and reporting are
addressed in Chapter 5, where a model for information flow control is proposed, tackling the
challenge of location inhomogeneity in clouds.
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Chapter 5
Tackling location inhomogeneity with
information flow control
In this chapter the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Definition 4.6) is addressed by in-
troducing information flow control to the cloud management process. In this connection, data
transmissions are considered information flows, and transmission control equates to informa-
tion flow control. To address the security goals identified in the legal analysis (cf. necessary
safeguards at the cloud provider in Section 3.3), a model of information flow control in clouds
is described addressing confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location determination (Ob-
jective 5). Further, the implementation of information flow control within the cloud resource
management is proposed in a way so that it (i) introduces location-determined data processing
with respect to cloud resources and (ii) enables the monitoring and reporting of compliance
with respect to the modelled security goals (Objective 6).
To achieve this, we need to understand the information flow in cloud infrastructures first.
Based on this knowledge, the information flow that is relevant for tackling the location inho-
mogeneity can be identified and modelled. This requires the transition of existing methods to
clouds since information flow control in this context is a novel approach. Particularly, mod-
elling availability and location have not been addressed in this connection. Therefore, existing
methods have to be extended by these security properties. For the practical application of in-
formation flow control, it is further necessary to establish a reliable instance that is able to
enforce information flow control within the system. Here, the cloud management process (as
described in Section 4.1.4.4) is identified as a good candidate for doing so since it assigns vir-
tual resources to hardware resources and therefore has control of data transmissions triggered
by virtual resource placement and migration. It is shown that information flow control can be
implemented in the cloud management process and that it is possible to establish a trustworthy
resource classification as well as effective compliance monitoring and reporting in clouds.
In Section 5.1, information flow in cloud infrastructures is analysed and requirements for
modelling information flow in clouds are identified. In particular, the major importance of
controlling information flow caused by virtual resource placement and hardware resource allo-
cation is identified, which is the focus of this thesis.
In Section 5.2, the necessary background on information flow control is provided. After
113
motivating the decision to select the methods of mandatory access control, existing models for
lattice-based access control are described and their issues when it comes to tackling location
inhomogeneity in clouds are discussed.
In Section 5.3, a generalised model for access control is introduced that incorporates the
existing models described in Section 5.2 and, in addition, is able to model information flow
based on location and availability constraints. Further, the application of this model to the
cloud management process is described.
In Section 5.4, the implementation of information flow control in clouds is investigated
with the focus on location-determined data processing. In particular, possible approaches to
trustworthy handling of location information, to location-determined resource management,
and to compliance monitoring and reporting are discussed.
In Section 5.5, the lessons learned with relation to tackling location inhomogeneity in
clouds are concluded.
5.1 Information flow in cloud infrastructures
Before modelling information flow control in cloud infrastructures, information flow in clouds
has to be understood. Beside the information flow in and between the corporate customer’s
applications running on virtual resources, there is information flow between virtual and hard-
ware resources implicated by virtual resource placement of the cloud management process.
For example, whenever a virtual resource is assigned to a specific hardware resource, the in-
formation contained within the virtual resource flows to the assigned hardware resource. Such
information flow has to be considered particularly when implementing information flow con-
trol in cloud infrastructures, since it is usually not visible to corporate customers due to the
hardware resource abstraction of virtualisation.
In a case of IT outsourcing to the cloud, the contracted relationship between corporate
customer and the cloud provider specifies whether information flow is allowed or not. For
example, the information flow between the virtual resources of a single the corporate customer
is usually allowed, since they are operated on the behalf of the corporate customer and therefore
information remains in the corporate customer’s authority. Then again, the information flow
from a German hosting site to a French hosting site is forbidden if the corporate customer is
allowed to process data only within Germany.
Further, it can be observed that there is a separation of responsibility for technically con-
trolling the information flow. On the one hand, the corporate customers control the information
flow from and to their virtual resources, and the cloud provider has little to no influence on the
information flow on this level. On the other hand, the cloud provider controls the resource
management in the cloud, i.e., virtual resource placement and hardware allocation, which gen-
erally triggers information flow in the cloud. As a result, the corporate customer has little to no
influence over the information flow on the level of cloud resource management. For instance,
the cloud provider is responsible for moving a virtual resource from a German hosting site to
a French hosting site, while the corporate customer is responsible for running an application
moving data from a virtual resource hosted in Germany to a virtual resource hosted in France.
This indicates that it is necessary to model information flow control on two different levels: (1)
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on the level of data processing by corporate customers and (2) on the level of cloud resource
management at the cloud provider. Further, it is possible that other actors can cause informa-
tion flow in clouds, which has to be clarified. For example, if a service provider operates an
application that interacts with a database then there is information flow between the application
and the database. The application and the database do not necessarily have to be running on
the same virtual resource and, therefore, may be hosted on different hardware resources.
In Section 5.1.1, the information flow in cloud infrastructures and particularly for IT out-
sourcing to cloud infrastructures is investigated. Based on the involved entities (i.e., actors)
described in Section 2.2, the existing types of information flow are identified, and allowed and
forbidden information flow is classified. Then, in Section 5.1.2, the areas of responsibility of
corporate customers and cloud providers are identified. In particular, the impact on informa-
tion flow control is investigated, which identifies prerequisites for modelling the separation of
responsibilities while technically enforcing information flow control. In conclusion, the as-
sumptions that are made for modelling information flow control in clouds in this thesis are
provided in Section 5.1.3.
5.1.1 Information flow in IaaS cloud computing
Figure 5.1: Information flow between legitimate actors (differentiated by virtual resources, pro-
cessed data, and meta data). The depiction of information flow with authorised third parties is
omitted since they can interact with any other actor.
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There are three different types of information flow that can be identified between the legiti-
mate actors. Figure 5.1 illustrates the three types of information and the way they flow between
the different actors. The different types of information cover (1) the data processed within the
cloud, (2) the virtual resources operated in the cloud, and (3) meta data of hardware and soft-
ware, which are exchanged during their operation. For authorised third parties the information
flow depends on which basis of authorisation the third party acts on and with whom the third
party interacts. For example in a case of full inspection, there can be all three types of infor-
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mation flow. For that reason, the depiction of the information flow for authorised third parties
is omitted in Figure 5.1. Further, it is assumed in this thesis that for authorised third parties
all three types of information flow are allowed. For a more differentiated control of informa-
tion flow to authorised third parties, it is necessary to extend the model of information flow
by conditional constraints indicated under which circumstances a specific information flow is
allowed. This requires additional research with a focus on information flow to authorised third
parties, which is not part of this thesis. Possible extensions are discussed in Section 7.3. In the
following, each type of information flow is discussed.
The first type of information flow (processed data) is related to the customers’ data that
are processed within the cloud. The data are provided by the private and corporate customers
and are processed on their behalf by the service and cloud providers. Further, the data can be
exchanged with others customers, e.g., in a Business-to-Business (B2B) scenario between two
corporate customers, and also between service providers when providing subcontracted cloud
services, e.g., when using a virus scanning service for an email service. In IaaS, the customer
has direct influence on the information flow of the processed data, since the data processing
application are under the customer’s control. The providers can also have an influence, since
they are operating the resources running the applications. However, except for the service
provider, the providers do not directly interact with the data processing applications.
The second type of information flow (virtual resources) is related to the virtual resources
that are operated in the cloud. The information flow of virtual resources differs from that of
processed data, since virtual resources represent a part of the data processing system itself (cf.
Section 4.1.2). Each virtual resource can contain customers’ data (i.e., processed data) men-
tioned in the first type of information flow. Without inspecting the virtual resources, the data
processed within remain hidden inside the virtual resources and beyond the awareness of the
cloud, hardware, and service providers. However, if the virtual resource is migrated, the data
within are migrated too, resulting in an information flow of processed data. There same is true
for initial virtual resource placement, if the customers’ data are contained in a virtual resource
(e.g., in the case of customer defined virtual machine images). Also, the destruction of a vir-
tual resource usually results in the deletion of contained data.1 Therefore, the information flow
of virtual resources usually also covers the information flow of processed data. To conclude,
virtual resources are operated under the control of a service provider, a cloud provider, and
a hardware provider and are exchanged among them (e.g., due to resource migration). The
customers have no direct influence on this type of information flow.
The third type of information flow (meta data) is related to different types of meta data that
are exchanged with the software and hardware vendors. Meta data in this context are data that
is directly related to the software and hardware itself and usually covers information on soft-
ware execution and hardware operation. Examples for meta data are license information, usage
statistics, and error reports on failure. Usually, meta data do not contain customers’ data. How-
ever, it is possible for meta data to contain customers’ data. For example, a memory snapshot
after a hardware failure may contain customers’ data that was loaded into the memory. What
1In this thesis it is assumed that on destruction the allocated hardware resources are freed and no longer can be
addressed by the corresponding customers. However, data are not necessarily deleted or overwritten immediately
after freeing the hardware resource and might be recovered on physical access.
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types of data are transferred to the vendor can vary for different vendors and applications, and
they have to be investigated for every single case. Often, the customers and providers can
directly influence the transmission of meta data, for example, in the case of optional trans-
mission of error reports or by filtering the transmitted data. If such options are consequently
implemented, the information flow of processed data as a part of the meta data can be fully
controlled by the customers and providers, and therefore be handled like the information flow
of processed data. In this thesis it is assumed that the information flow of meta data does not
contain processed data, and it will therefore not be further investigated. Possible extensions of
the information model for covering meta data are discussed in Section 7.3.
To summarize, the information flows of processed data and of virtual resources are most
relevant for compliant data processing in the cloud, since both types of information flow contain
customers’ data that have to be processed in a legally compliant manner and according to the
customers’ mandate. In this thesis following definitions of information flow of processed data
and of virtual resources are made according the observations above.
Definition 5.1 (Information flow of processed data) All types of data that are processed on
behalf of a corporate customer within a virtual resource (of the cloud) a considered to be
processed data. Further, processed data are associated with the corporate customer on whose
behalf they are processed. Then, the information flow of processed data is considered the
access of an actor (cf. Section 2.2.1), virtual resource (cf. Section 4.1.2), or hardware resource
(cf. Section 4.1.3) to the processed data.
Definition 5.2 (Information flow of virtual resources) The term virtual resources is used ac-
cording to the entity-relationship model on IaaS clouds defined in Section 4.1 and covers virtual
machines, virtual storage, virtual links and virtual network services (cf. Section 4.1.2). The
information flow of virtual resources is considered the access of an actor (cf. Section 2.2.1)
or hardware resource (cf. Section 4.1.3) to the virtual resources, for example, due to virtual
resource placement or migration to a specific hardware resource.
Remark 5.1 (Accessing of vs. connecting with virtual resources) There is a difference be-
tween accessing a virtual resource (e.g., a server executes a virtual machine) and connecting
with a virtual resource (e.g., a corporate customer has a network connection with a virtual
machine). While the first is considered the information flow of virtual resources, the latter is
considered the information flow of processed data. In this thesis, accessing and connecting
are distinguished form one antother in that accessing of virtual resources means that virtual
resources are fully accessible on the virtualisation level and connecting with virtual resources
means that a network connection is established with a network endpoint of the virtual machine.
Remark 5.2 (Equivalence of access on virtual resources) The legitimate actors access vir-
tual resources via a hardware resource that hosts the virtual resources. For example, hardware
providers access virtual machines when they are migrated to one of their servers. Another ex-
ample is the duplication of virtual storage for a backup located at a third party cloud provider.
Hardware resources access virtual resources when hosting them. In general, for every hard-
ware resource there is a legitimate actor that is responsible for its operation. Since legitimate
actors access virtual resources via a hardware resource, the access of a legitimate actor can
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always be described by an equivalent access of the involved hardware resource and vice versa.
This equivalence makes it possible to model the information flow of virtual resources on the
basis of hardware resources only.
Further, it is observed that the different types of information flow cannot be controlled by
every actor equally. While the information flow of processed data is primarily controlled by
the customers, the information flow of virtual resources is primarily controlled by the cloud
and the hardware providers. This has a significant impact on how information flow control
has to be implemented in the scenario of IT outsourcing to the cloud. This is because the
control mechanisms have to be operated by different parties. As a result, the actions of these
parties have to be coordinated (to some extent) to achieve the overall security goal: dealing
with the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6). In Section 5.1.2, the impact of this
separation of responsibility and control is investigated, and how it has to be addressed in the
information model.
5.1.2 Separation of responsibility and information flow control
In Section 5.1.1, information flow of processed data (cf. Def. 5.1) and information flow of
virtual resources (cf. Def. 5.2) were identified. To address the challenge of location inhomo-
geneity (cf. Def. 4.6), it is important that both types of information flow can be controlled with
respect to the origin and the target location. Further, information flow is allowed only between
legitimate actors that are authorised to access processed data or virtual resources. In particular,
the actors have to ensure the necessary level of security (cf. 3.6.1). Therefore, it is necessary
to control the information flow of processed data and the information flow of virtual resources
on the basis of target location, involved actors, as well as the necessary level of security and
the ensured level of security. As noted in Section 2.2, the information flow of processed data is
primarily under the control of the corporate customers, and the information flow of virtual re-
sources is primarily under the control of the cloud and hardware providers. Additionally, cloud
providers and corporate customers decide on their own which actors are involved in the data
processing, and often the cloud providers have little or no knowledge of the actors involved by
the corporate customers and vice versa. The question arises as to what impact this separation
of responsibility and control has on the information model.
Due to the separation of responsibility and control, the information flow of processed data
and the information flow of virtual resources can be expressed at two different levels of infor-
mation flow, and it is possible to investigate whether there is information flow between these
two levels. First of all, virtual resources may contain processed data, since the processing of
data is the purpose of virtual resources. This implies that if there is information flow of virtual
resources (e.g., virtual resources are migrated) then there is also information flow of processed
data. Conversely, the information flow of processed data does not result in that of virtual re-
sources. However, the information flow of processed data can change the state of a virtual
resource with respect to whether specific data is contained in a virtual resource or not. This
change of state is important if the hosting location of a virtual resource is decided by the data
processed within a virtual resource. On the other hand, the information flow of virtual resources
does not change the data processed within the virtual resources. However, in the context of in-
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formation flow, it can change the state of the processed data with respect to location, involved
actors and ensured level of security.
The results are summarised in in three observations:
• (Observation 1) The information flow of virtual resources affects that of processed data,
and particularly, it can change the state of processed data with respect to location, in-
volved actors, and the ensured level of security.
• (Observation 2) The information flow of processed data does not affect that of virtual
resources.
• (Observation 3) The information flow of processed data can change the state of virtual
resources with respect to data processed within the virtual resources.
Figure 5.2 exemplifies the observations made on information flow in a scenario with three
hardware resources that are located in two different countries. There are two successive actions
(a) and (b) which result in information flow. In the first action (a) Data I is copied from Virtual
Resource 1 to Virtual Resource 2, which is an information flow of processed data. Copying
data does not result in an information flow of virtual resources (Observation 2). However,
Virtual Resource 2 now contains Data I’ in addition to Data II, which is a change of its state
with respect to data processed within Virtual Resource 2 (Observation 3). In the second action
(b) Virtual Resource 2 is copied from Hardware Resource B to Hardware Resource C, which
is an information flow of virtual resources. By copying the Virtual Resource 2, Data I’ and
Data II are copied and now located on Hardware Resource C, which is an information flow
of processed data that is triggered by an information flow of virtual resources (Observation
1). From the perspective of information flow control, there are two questions arising from this
example. First, if corporate customers trigger action (a), how do they know that their data are
copied cross-boarder to another country? Second, if cloud providers trigger action (b), how
do they know whether the data processed in virtual resources has been allowed to be copied to
the target hardware resources or not? Both questions are explored in a more general context
subsequently.
Figure 5.2: Example of interferences in the information flow between three hardware resources
located in Germany and France
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Applying the three observations to the IT outsourcing scenario provides better insight into
the information flow controlled by corporate customers and by cloud providers. In the IT out-
sourcing scenario, the corporate customers are responsible for outsourcing data processing to
the cloud. Therefore, it is important for them to take control of the information flow of pro-
cessed data. By configuring and controlling the operating systems and applications running on
the virtual resources, the corporate customers can take control of the information flow of pro-
cessed data that is initiated by the operating systems and applications. However, according to
Observation 1, the information flow of processed data is influenced by that of virtual resources,
and the latter is under the control of the cloud provider. This implies that the corporate cus-
tomers have to rely on the cloud provider and the cloud provider controls the information flow
of virtual resources according to their needs (i.e., in compliances with legal and contractual
obligations on data processing). Otherwise, the customers’ efforts to control the information
flow of processed data can fail through side-channels created by the information flow of vir-
tual resources. Inversely, due to Observation 2, the information flow of virtual resources is
not influenced by that of processed data. Thus, the cloud provider does not necessarily need to
consider the information flow of processed data when controlling that of virtual resources. This
makes the information flow of virtual resources a good candidate for establishing the legally
required transmission control in clouds (cf. Section 3.6.3.3), since it cannot be overwritten by
the information flow of processed data but can result in the latter.
To support the corporate customers’ control over the information flow of processed data,
the cloud provider needs to know what information flow of virtual resources complies with
the transmission control requested by the corporate customer. Therefore, an initial agreement
about allowed information flow is necessary. Such an agreement can be made on the basis
of classifying the data contained within a virtual resource. Based on that, the cloud provider
can decide whether information flow of virtual resources is allowed or not. However, due to
Observation 3, it is necessary to consider continuously what types of data are contained within
a specific virtual resource, since this can change due to the information flow of processed data.
This can be addressed by classifying virtual resources based on the types of data they process.
For example, a virtual resource is classified as be usable only for processing personal data
originating from Germany. Further, this virtual resource is to be hosted only by hardware
providers that are allowed to process personal data originating from Germany. Let’s assume
that there are multiple virtual resources that are classified as being usable only for processing
personal data originating from Germany. Then, the corporate customer can allow information
flow between these virtual resources and the information flow complies with the requirements
for processing personal data originating from Germany.
5.1.3 Conclusions on modelling information flow
In this thesis, a model for information flow control in clouds based on the classification of
virtual resources is developed. In this section, the modelling assumptions and prerequisites are
summarised.
Assumption 1: Multiple corporate customers operate concurrently on a cloud infrastruc-
tures with multi-level classification.
Evidence: According to the IT outsourcing scenario, it is reasonable to assume that a cloud
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provider is contracted by multiple corporate customers to provision cloud resources (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2.1). Consequently, there are multiple corporate customers operating concurrently on
cloud infrastructures. Further, for practical and security reasons, a cloud infrastructure has to
be able to distinguish the requests and virtual resources of the different corporate customers.
This property is called multitenancy. Additionally, each corporate customers can have differ-
ent security requirements, and therefore the necessary level of security can be different, too (cf.
Section 3.6.1). This implies that a cloud infrastructure has to be able to handle these differ-
ent levels of security requirement and, thus, has multi-level classification with respect to the
security requirements.
Assumption 2: A cloud infrastructure is operated by a single cloud provider and hosted at
multiple hosting sites, which are operated by hardware providers (one hardware provider per
hosting site).
Evidence: In this thesis, global clouds are investigated, which are operated in multiple coun-
tries (cf. Def. 2.5). This implies that there exist multiple hosting sites that are located in
different countries. Explicitly, national clouds and particularly clouds with only a single host-
ing site are excluded by this assumption. They are not in the scope of this thesis, since they
are generally location homogeneous (cf. Def. 2.2 and usually there is no need for transmission
control within the cloud. Further, for practical reasons, the operation of a cloud infrastruc-
ture requires a single responsible entity coordinating the operation of hardware and virtual
resources. Additionally, such an entity is the contractual partner of corporate customers and is
liable for executing the contracted IT outsourcing in a legally compliantly manner. However, in
a global cloud, there might be multiple national cloud providers operating each a local/global
cluster of the cloud (cf. Section 4.1.4). In any case, there is only a single cloud provider that
is operating the Cloud Service Fabric (cf. Section 4.1.4), since there is only one per cloud in-
frastructure. Otherwise, the existence of multiple Cloud Service Fabrics implies that there are
multiple cloud infrastructures. Therefore, the cloud provider operating the Cloud Service Fab-
ric is considered the cloud provider operating the cloud infrastructure. For analogous reasons,
it is assumed that there is only a single responsible entity (i.e., hardware provider) for each
hosting site, which is the contractual partner of the cloud provider. Having a single responsible
entity for clouds and hosting sites is more structuring than restricting.
Assumption 3: There are two types of information flow relevant to the challenge of location
inhomogeinity: (1) information flow of processed data and (2) information flow of virtual
resources.
Evidence: In Section 5.1.1, three types of information flow were identified in clouds. Further,
the information flow of processed data (cf. Def. 5.1) and that of virtual resources (cf. Def. 5.2)
were identified as the most relevant for addressing the challenge of location inhomogeneity
(cf. Def. 2.2), since they cover customers’ data, which are sensitive to the effective level of
protection. Additionally, it is assumed that the information flow of meta data does not cover
customers’ data and, therefore, is not investigated in this thesis. This assumption is made
plausible in Section 5.1.2, due to the observation that the information flow of processed data
changes the state of virtual resources only with respect to the data contained.
Assumption 4: The information flow of processed data does not cause the information
flow of virtual resources.
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Evidence: The assumption is made plausible in Section 5.1.2 by clarifying that the information
flow of processed data changes the state of virtual resources only with respect to contained
data. Further, this assumptions makes it possible to investigate the information flow of virtual
resources separately from that of processed data.
Assumption 5: The information flow of processed data is classified by categories of data
and by allowed information flow.
Evidence: This assumption is a necessary prerequisite for classifying virtual resources based
on what types of data will be processed within and for controlling the information flow of vir-
tual resources according to the allowed information flow of processed data (cf. Section 5.1.2
and Assumption 6). Good candidates for classifying the information flow of processed data are
the categories (and subcategories) of data to which legal norms correspond (cf. Section 3.1.1
and Section 3.6.1). The same classification can be applied to virtual resources to control infor-
mation flow.
Assumption 6: All virtual resources are classified by categories of data, which are pro-
cessed within the virtual resources. This classification does not change during the lifetime of a
virtual resource, and the corporate customer utilises virtual resources according to their clas-
sification to process data of the respective category.
Evidence: This assumption is made to avoid unwanted interference between the information
flow of processed data and that of virtual resources and to sustain the separation of information
flow control (cf. Section 5.1.2). Without this assumption, the information flow of processed
data can result in the change of classification of virtual resources with respect to the data pro-
cessed within (cf. Section 5.1.2). Such changes of classification can result in security conflicts,
for example, when the new classification is forbidden for the allocated hardware resource. To
prevent such conflicts, it is necessary to verify the classification of hardware resources and
if necessary to migrate virtual resources to hardware resources with sufficient classification.
Thus, every information flow of processed data can result in a reorganisation of the virtual re-
source placement. This implies a shift in the control of virtual resource placement from the
cloud provider to the corporate customers, which is neither in the interest of corporate cus-
tomers nor in the interest of cloud providers. In particular, the corporate customer has no
knowledge of the classification of hardware resources and allocation to host virtual resources,
and consequently, the virtual resource placement can be arbitrary and inefficient. Further, a
migration has to be performed before the classification changes, i.e., before the information
flow of processed data that implies the change of the classification. If the cloud provider pre-
vents conflicted changes of classification then this results in the prevention of the information
flow of processed data. Thus, this is a shift in the control of processed data from the corporate
customer to the cloud provider, which is again in the interest neither of corporate customers
nor of cloud providers. Consequently, it is assumed that changes of classification are not made
during the lifetime of a virtual resource in order to sustain the separation of information flow
control.
Assumption 7: There exists a cloud management process cmp : P(VR)×P(HW) that
is controlled by the cloud provider and assigns virtual resources V R ∈ P(VR) to hardware
resources HR ∈ P(HW) (cf. Section 4.1.4.4).
Evidence: The cloud management process was identified as a part of the cloud infrastructure
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(cf. Section 4.1.4) and is defined in Section 4.1.4.4. With the cloud management process it
is possible to abstract from individual types of virtual resource and hardware resources and
to describe the information flow of virtual resources based on virtual resources and hardware
resources in general.
Assumption 8: Hardware resources are trustworthy with respect to their classification. In
particular, there are no covert channels in hardware resources.
Evidence: This assumption is made to establish the basis for reliable control of the information
flow of virtual resources between hardware resources. Further, it helps to focus on the problem
of location inhomogeneity by avoiding the modelling of information flow that occurs only on
untrustworthy hardware resources (and at untrustworthy hosting sites) like the translocation of
hardware resources and data extraction via physical access (both unauthorised) at the hosting
sites. In practice, the trustworthiness of the hardware resources and the hardware provider is a
common requirement in IT outsourcing scenarios, and is covered by IT security standards like
German ‘IT-Grundschutz’ [30], ISO 27001 [112] and specifically by TÜViT – Trusted Site In-
frastructure [206]. For the control of the information flow of virtual resources, virtual resources
have to be assigned to hardware resources which have a classification that is suitable for the
assigned virtual resource. However, the cloud providers’ control of the operation of hardware
resources is limited since this is in the hardware providers’ sphere of responsibility. Thus, the
cloud provider has to rely on the hardware provider to ensure that the hardware resources are
operated according to their classification (e.g., having the same necessary level of security; cf.
Section 3.6.1). In particular, it is important that the classification of hardware resources does
not change without first notifying the cloud provider. In general, the classification of hard-
ware only changes when it is physically manipulated (e.g., is moved to a different location
or physically reconfigured), which is rather a rare event at hardware providers and is usually
possible only if the hardware resource is powered off beforehand. In contrast, for mobile hard-
ware resources, a change of location is a regular event. However, in cloud infrastructures, it is
reasonable to assume that hardware resources have static locations and, moreover, are not phys-
ically manipulated by the hardware provider. But even if hardware resources have a trustworthy
classification, they can be a source of unrecognised information flow. For example, virtual re-
sources are migrated within hardware pools of virtualised data centres (and without notifying
the cloud provider). Further, the hardware provider can copy or extract any information from
virtual resources (e.g., by using virtual machine introspection [80]). There are methods to pre-
vent such types of unrecognised information flow, for example, by using a trusted hypervisor
[79]. Therefore, it is assumed in this thesis that hardware resources and hardware providers
are trustworthy with respect to their classification and that there are no covert channels on a
hardware level.
Assumption 9: The control on the information flow of processed data and the information
flow of virtual resources is decoupled.
Evidence: Assumption 4, Assumption 5, and Assumption 6 implies that decoupling the con-
trol of the information flow of processed data and that of virtual resources is possible. This is
achieved by classifying both types of information flow by the categories of data that are pro-
cessed by the corporate customers (cf. Assumption 5 and Assumption 6). On the one hand,
this implies that the information flow of processed data does not change the state of virtual re-
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sources with respect to the processed data contained within (i.e., the classification of the virtual
resource does not change). In conjunction with Assumption 4, this implies that the information
flow of processed data does not interfere with the that of virtual resources. On the other hand,
this implies too that the information flow of virtual resources is compliant with the category
of data processed within. Thus, the information flow of processed data that is caused by the
information flow of virtual resources is compliant with respect to the category of data, too.
Consequently, the information flow of processed data cannot result in a forbidden infor-
mation flow of virtual resources and vice versa. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
control of the information flow of processed data and that of virtual resources are decoupled if
Assumption 4, Assumption 5, and Assumption 6 are satisfied.
Remark 5.3 (Focusing on information flow of virtual resources) If the control of the infor-
mation flow of processed data and that of virtual resources are decoupled (cf. Assumption 9)
then the control of both types of information flow can be modelled independently. To address
the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6), it is paramount to control the infor-
mation flow of virtual resources, since this provides a basis for reliably provisioning virtual
resources with the necessary level of security, which is required by the corporate customers
when processing data within. Therefore and without loss of generality, this thesis focuses on
controlling the information flow of virtual resources. How the control of the information flow
of processed data can be established on top of the control of the information flow of virtual
resources is discussed in Section 7.3.
5.2 Limits of existing models for information flow control
In Section 5.1, the need to control the information flow was identified. Existing models for
information flow control aim to achieve access control and propagation/transmission control of
objects containing information with restrictions on access to them and their propagation. Enti-
ties which are accessing objects (via retrieval or propagation) are considered subjects. Further,
objects and subjects are classified by access and propagation permissions (e.g., clearance and
need-to-know levels [20]). This makes it possible to define relations (i.e., rules) between the
different classes of objects and subjects describing the allowed information flow between them.
This section identifies the methods for modelling information flow control, which are ap-
plicable to tackling the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6). For that purpose,
existing models are analysed and the applicable models which are used in this thesis, are in-
troduced. As a result, a lattice-based model for access control based on existing models for
confidentiality and integrity is presented. Further, the design requirements are formulated for a
generalised model addressing the challenge of location inhomogeneity in clouds.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. First, suitable models for information
flow control that apply to the scenario of IT outsourcing are identified. Then, the relevant
models are introduced. Finally, the limits of their application in clouds for addressing the
challenge of location inhomogeneity are discussed.
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5.2.1 Mandatory access control vs. discretionary access control
Models for information flow control are distinguished by Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
and Discretionary Access Control (DAC). MAC describes models with a centralised hierarchy
of classifications with rules that allow the definition of access decisions based on the classifi-
cation of subjects and objects. DAC describes models with a decentralised hierarchy of actor-
centric rules which define access to objects that belong to specific subjects (i.e., subjects own
objects and control these objects) [185] [131]. In this section the two concepts are analysed to
determine which of the two is suitable for addressing the challenge of location inhomogeneity
(cf. Def. 4.6).
To address the challenge of location inhomogeneity, it is necessary to control the informa-
tion flow of virtual resources (cf. Remark 5.3). This is controlled by the cloud providers, since
they operate the cloud management process assigning virtual resources to hardware resources
(cf. Section 5.1.2). The subjects are then the hardware resources and objects the virtual re-
sources. There exist two possible cases: (1) single-cloud scenarios having only a single cloud
provider involved and (2) multi-cloud scenarios where multiple cloud providers are involved.
In single-cloud scenarios, the cloud provider acts as the central authority controlling ac-
cess to virtual resources with respect to utilisation by corporate customers and placement on
hardware resources. Thus, access control can be established by a centralised hierarchy of vir-
tual resource classification that is controlled by the cloud management process, which is MAC.
Further, DAC does not fit very well in the single-cloud scenario since there are is only a single
authority implementing the rules.
In multi-cloud scenarios, there are multiple cloud providers involved. Each virtual resource
can be associated with the cloud provider that is responsible for it, and therefore, there is an
owner relationship between each virtual resource and its corresponding cloud provider. Further,
virtual resources are classified based on the requirements of their owner, i.e., the requirements
requested by the utilising corporate customers which contracted the respective cloud provider.
However, the ownership of virtual resources is not a sufficient requirement when implementing
information flow control with respect to virtual resource placement on hardware resources. It
is also necessary that hardware resources have a sufficient classification, which is independent
of the responsible cloud provider. In particular, cloud providers usually have no knowledge
of the hardware resources and their classification used by other cloud providers, since they
only utilise the virtual resources of other cloud providers (similar to corporate customers).
Therefore, a centralised hierarchy of classification is required that is applicable cross-platform
when controlling the information flow of virtual resources. In particular, a cloud provider
should not grant access to virtual resources to another cloud provider if the other does not have
hardware resources with sufficient classification. The latter is difficult to address in DAC, since
there is by design no central authority that enforces rules on information flows across multiple
subjects. In particular, there is no guarantee of the transitivity of information flow control,
which is important to enforce transfer control (cf. 3.6.3.3). This can be exemplified by an
information flow between three subjects S1,S2,S3. If information is allowed to flow from S1
to S2 and from S2 to S3 then (due to the transitivity of information flow) information can flow
from S1 to S3. However, if S1 does not allow information flow to S3 then this rule is undermined
by the transitive information flow via S2. To solve this, a centralised hierarchy of classification
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is required. Therefore, MAC is a good candidate for information flow control in clouds, since
it supports the control of transitive information flow (while DAC does not).
To conclude, MAC is more suitable than DAC for both single- and multi-cloud scenarios.
However, in practice, it is difficult to introduce a central authority in multi-cloud scenarios
enforcing the information flow control between different clouds. This issue can be addressed
using the decentralised approach of MAC with a central hierarchy of classification but decen-
tralised authorities defining rules on accessing the objects they own. An example of such an
approach is the definition of (1) security labels that are attached to objects specifying their clas-
sification and (2) rules on how security labels are combined if objects belonging to different
subjects are merged [146].
In this thesis, information flow control is modelled using decentralised MAC methodes
from the perspective of a single cloud provider. Without loss of generality, other cloud providers
are treated like corporate customers when utilising virtual resources and like hardware providers
with multiple classifications of hardware resources when hosting virtual resources.
5.2.2 Lattice-based models for access control
To address the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6), it is necessary to control in-
formation flow with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location determination
(cf. Objective 5; Section 1.3). In Section 5.2.1, decentralised MAC was identified as a good
candidate for establishing information flow control in clouds. Existing work in MAC already
addresses confidentiality [20] [52] and integrity [22]. However, none of these models addresses
availability and location constraints. There is research on information flow control addressing
the co-location of virtual resources [201] and user location relative to resource location [166]
(cf. Section 2.4). None of these approaches are capable of dealing with location constraints of
hardware resources directly.
In this section, existing models for information flow control with respect to confidentiality
and integrity that are adopted in this thesis are introduced. Further, it is shown that the models
of Bell and La Padula [20], Denning [52], and Biba [22] are compatible, and therefore can
be combined into a single lattice-based model for access control. Afterwards, existing models
for information flow control are discussed with respect to issues on tackling the challenge of
location inhomogeneity. In particular, the need for information flow control with respect to
availability and location determination is investigated.
5.2.2.1 Confidentiality-based information flow control
Confidentiality-based information flow control was introduced by the fundamental work of Bell
and La Padula [20][127]. In their approach, information flow control is modelled by defining
access privileges for reading and writing on objects, classifying subjects and objects, and based
on that, defining rules on deciding whether a subject is allowed to have an access privilege. By
using a mathematical model, it is possible to prove whether a system with specific rules is
secure in the sense of confidentiality. For this purpose, secure information flow is addressed on
two levels: (1) information flow between subjects and objects (a.k.a. simple-security property)
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and (2) information flow between objects (a.k.a. ∗-property). In the following, the model of
Bell and La Padula is introduced with definitions of its terms and concepts.
Model definition (according to Bell and La Padula [20][127])
First, the entities are defined in terms of where information can flow. These entities are distin-
guished by whether they are active or passive.
Definition 5.3 (Subject [127]) A subject is defined as an active entity interacting with other
entities (e.g., processes, programs in execution). Then, S := {S1, ...,Sn} is the set of subjects Si
and S+ := S∪ /0.
Definition 5.4 (Object [127]) An object is defined as a passive entity with which subjects in-
teract with (e.g., data, files, programs). Then, O:= {O1, ...,On} is the set of subjects Oi.
For controlling information flow between subjects and objects, both are classified in two
dimensions: by clearance level and by need-to-know level. These two dimensions derive from
the access policies used in the military context which the model was originally designed for.
A two-dimensional classification makes it possible to define a general hierarchy for classifica-
tion (i.e., clearance level) and to refine this hierarchy by introducing additional classifications
that are limited to a specific context (i.e., need-to-know level). Examples of classification by
specific context are information flow control based on projects and divisions of a company.
Definition 5.5 (Classification [127]) A classification is defined as a clearance level of subjects
and objects. Classifications are ordered by the >-relation. Then, C:= {C1, ...,Cn} is the set of
classifications Ci where C1 > ... >Cn .
Definition 5.6 (Category [127]) A category is defined as a need-to-know level of subjects and
objects and expresses a special access privilege provided in a specific context (e.g., project,
division of a company). Then K:= {K1, ...,Kn} is the set of categories Ki.
To map classifications and categories to subjects and objects, a relation is defined which is
denoted classification/need-to-knows vector.
Definition 5.7 (Classification/needs-to-know vector [127]) The classification/needs-to-know
vector is defined as the relation F : CS×CO×P(K)S×P(K)O, where f ∈ F is defined f :=
( f1, f2, f3, f4) with
• f1 : S→C, subject-classification function, where each subject is mapped to a classifica-
tion;
• f2 : O→ C, object-classification function, where each object is mapped to a classifica-
tion;
• f3 : S→ P(K) , subject-category function, where each subject is mapped to a set of
categories; and
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• f4 : S→ P(K) , object-category function, where each object is mapped to a set of cate-
gories.
Further, a specification determines how a subject is allowed to access an object. Therefore,
access is distinguished by whether there is information flow and by the direction of information
flow. For example, there is no information flow if the subjects changes the classification of an
object, since no information flows between subject and object. The same is true if the subject
executes the object, i.e., the subject triggers actions of the object (e.g., a program is started).
The direction of information flow is distinguished by: (1) unidirectional from object to subject
(view), (2), unidirectional from subject to object (modify), and (3) bidirectional (view and
modify).
Definition 5.8 (Access attributes [127]) A:= {r,a,w,e,c} is defined as the set of access at-
tributes where the access attributes are defined as follows.
• r (read): subjects are allowed to view objects
• a (append): subjects are allowed to modify objects1
• w (write): subjects are allowed to view and modify objects
• e (execute): subjects are allowed to execute objects
• c (control): subjects are allowed to extend access to other subjects
To assign access attributes to objects with respect to specific subjects, a matrix is defined
that represents the current configuration of access attributes for each object with respect to all
subjects. Considering that there are 25 combinations of access attributes for each entry, the
number of all possible access matrices is c := |S| · |O| ·25.
Definition 5.9 (Access matrix [127]) An access matrix is defined as a |S|x|O|-matrix with en-
tries from P(A), where the entry at (i,j) shows the access attributes of subject Si relative to
object O j. Then, M:= {M1, ...,Mc} with c = |S| · |O| ·25 is the set of all possible access matri-
ces Mi.
To model systems that control information flow between subjects and objects they are de-
fined in a similar way to state machines, with access requests as input and control decisions as
output. In each state, there are subjects having access to objects in specific access modes, and
there is an access matrix and a classification/needs-to-know vector which define allowed infor-
mation flows. Due to a state transition, each of these properties may change. For example, if a
subject S requests access to an object O in read mode (i.e., access privilege r) and this request
is allowed then (S,A,r) is added to the next state. Further, multiple subsequent state-transitions
are described as a sequence of subsequent states.
1In this thesis, the original definition according to Bell and La Padula [20] is used including override and deletion
of unknown content, since this is the most general case of modifying an object. For practical reasons, append can
be implemented by only adding information to an object but not overriding and deleting existing information (for
instance making changes to the end of an file in file systems). For information flow control both cases are valid
object modifications and no information is read from the object.
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Definition 5.10 (State [127]) A state V is defined as a triple V := (b,M, f ) with
• b ⊆ S×O×A set of all subjects S ∈ S having access to objects O ∈ O in what access
mode, which is described by a set of access attributes A⊆ A;
• M ∈M access matrix in the state V ; and
• f ∈ F classification/needs-to-know vector describing classification of all subjects and
objects and the categories associated with the subjects and objects.
Then, Vis the set of states Vi.
Definition 5.11 (State sequence [127]) A state sequence is an arbitrary number of chronolog-
ically ordered states Vi ∈ V. Then, Z : VN is the set of state sequences Zi.
Each state transition is triggered by an access request of a subject. There are seven differ-
ent types of request possible: (1) get access to an object, (2) release access to an object, (3)
give access privileges to an other subject, (4) rescind access privileges of an other subject, (5)
change the classification/category of an object, (6) create an object, and (7) delete an object.
This implies that each request can contain information on up to two subjects, on an object,
on access attributes, and on the classification/needs-to-know vector. Further, the requests of
multiple subsequent state-transitions are described as a sequence of subsequent requests.
Definition 5.12 (Request [127]) A request is defined as a quadruple (S1,S2,O,G) ⊂ S+ ×
S+×O×G with G := A∪ /0∪F. Then, R : S+×S+×O×G is the set of requests Ri.
Definition 5.13 (Request sequence [127]) A request sequence is an arbitrary number of timely
ordered requests Ri ∈ R. Then, X : RN is the set of request sequences Xi.
Definition 5.14 (Request elements [127]) Request elements are requests by a subject. There
exist seven requests, where
• ‘get’ is the request to gain access to an object;
• ‘give’ is the request to give access to another subject with respect to some objects;
• ‘release’ is the request to remove access to an object;
• ‘rescind’ is the request to remove access of another subject with respect to some objects;
• ‘change’ is the request to change the classification/needs-to-know vector for some ob-
jects;
• ‘create’ is the request to create an object in the system; and
• ‘delete’ is the request to delete an object from the system.
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In response to a request, the system returns a decision which is applied to the current state
resulting in a state-transition. While the answer to a request usually is that it is either allowed
or forbidden, it is possible that there is no clear decision, which is considered a conflict. In
particular, this is the case if more than one decision is possible. Further, it is possible that the
request is not recognised by the system, for example, an unknown access attribute is used in
the request. Again, the decisions of multiple subsequent state-transitions are described as a
sequence of subsequent decisions.
Definition 5.15 (Decisions [127]) A decision is defined as a response to be given to any re-
quest. The set of decisions is defined D := {yes,no,error,?} where the decisions are defined
as follows.
• yes: The request is allowed.
• no: The request is denied.
• error: The request cannot be decided due to a conflict.
• ?: The request is not recognised and no decision is made.
Definition 5.16 (Decision sequence [127]) A decision sequence is an arbitrary number of
chronologically ordered decisions Di ∈ D, and Y : DN is the set of decision sequences Yi.
Having defined requests, decisions and states, a system can be described by a request se-
quence, the resulting decision sequence, the corresponding state-transitions, and its initial state.
In particular, each system has a state transition relation describing for each request and each
state the corresponding decision and next state.
Definition 5.17 (System [127]) Let W ⊂ R×D×V×V. The system Σ(R,D,W ,z0) ⊂ X×
Y×Z is defined by (X ,Y,Z) ∈ Σ(R,D,W ,z0) if and only if (Xt ,Yt ,Zt ,Zt−1) ∈ W for each
t ∈ N where z0 := ( /0,M, f ) is initial state with M ∈M initial access matrix and f ∈ F initial
classification/needs-to-know vector. W is denoted state transition relation.
A system is considered secure if subjects only have access to objects according to the
classification and categories. With respect to confidentiality, a subject should gain access to
an object only if information is allowed to flow from the object to the subject and vice versa.
Information can flow from an object to a subject only if the subject can view the object, i.e.,
accessing in read-mode r or write-mode w. On the other hand, information can flow from a
subject to an object, only if the subject can modify the object, i.e., accessing in append-mode a
or write-mode w. Information flow from objects to subjects is addressed by the simple-security
property, while information flow from subjects to objects is addressed by the ∗-property.
Definition 5.18 (Simple-security property [127]) (S,O,A) ∈ S×O×A satisfies the security
condition relative to f = ( f 1, f 2, f 3, f 4) ∈ F if and only if
(i) (A = e)∨ (A = a)∨ (A = c)
(ii) ((A = r)∨ (A = w))∧ (( f1(S)≥ f2(O))∧ ( f3(S)⊇ f4(O)) .
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Further, secure and compromise can be defined for states, state sequences, appearance of a
system and a system.
A state V = (b,M, f ) ∈ V is a secure state if and only if each (S,O,X) ∈ b satisfies the
security condition relative to f . Otherwise, the state v is a compromise state.
A state sequence Z ∈Z is a secure state sequence if and only if every state Zt ∈ Z is a secure
state. Otherwise, the state sequence Z has a compromise.
An appearance (X ,Y,Z) ∈ Σ(R,D,W ,z0) of the system Σ(R,D,W ,z0) is a secure appear-
ance if and only if Z is a secure state sequence. Otherwise, the appearance (X ,Y,Z) has a
compromise.
The system Σ(R,D,W ,z0) is secure if and only if every appearance of Σ(R,D,W ,z0) is
secure. Otherwise, the system Σ(R,D,W ,z0) has a compromise.
In addition to the control of information flow from subjects to objects, it is also neces-
sary to control information flow between objects. In particular, there sholud not be informa-
tion flow between objects not having the sufficient classification and categories. Information
flow between objects is only possible if a subjects views an object and then modifies another.
Therefore, information flow from a subject to an object (i.e., the subject modifies the object)
is allowed only if (1) the subject has sufficient classification and categories, and (2) all objects
viewed by the subject have no classification or categories that are not covered by the modified
object. Both are addressed by the ∗-property.
Definition 5.19 (∗-property [127]) Let b(S : A1, ...,Ak) the set of objects where subject S ∈ S
has access in the access modes A1, ...,Ak ∈ A and k ∈ N for a given state V = (b,M, f ), i.e.,
b(S : A1, ...,Ak) := {O : O ∈O∧ (∀i ∈ {1, ...,k} : (S,O,Ai) ∈ b)}
where b is the set of all subjects having access to which objects in which access mode of the
respective state, M ∈M is access matrix, and f ∈ F is classification/needs-to-know vector (cf.
Def. 5.10).
A state V = (b,M, f ) ∈ V satisfies the ∗-property if and only if
∀S ∈ S : b(s : w,a) 6= /0∧b(s : r,w) 6= /0
⇒∀O1 ∈ b(s : w,a),O2 ∈ b(s : r,w) : f2(O1)≥ f2(O2)∧ f4(O1)⊇ f4(O2) .
Analogously to (simple-security) secure condition (cf. Def. 5.18), the satisfaction of the ∗-
property is defined for state sequences, appearances of a system, and system Σ(R,D,W ,z0).
Based on the simple-security property and the ∗-property, it is possible to design secure
systems that satisfy the ∗-property. Therefore, it is necessary to define rules that map requests
to decisions according to the current state of the system and return the next state based on
the decision. In a secure system, only secure states are allowed. Therefore, each rule has
to be security preserving, which means that it maps secure states to secure next states only.
Analogously, in systems that satisfy the ∗-property, each rule has to be ∗-property preserving.
Definition 5.20 (Rule [127]) A rule is a function ρ : R×V→ D×V that maps a request and
a state to a decision and a state, analogously to a state-transition function of a finite-state
machine.
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A rule ρ is security persevering if and only if
∀(R,V ) ∈ R×V ∃D ∈ D ∃V ′ ∈ V :
ρ(R,V ) = (D,V ′)∧V is secure state⇒V’ is secure state.
Analogously, a rule ρ is ∗-property preserving if and only if state V satisfies ∗-property implies
state V ′ satisfies the ∗-property.
If a rule handles a request then decision D ∈ {yes,no,error}, otherwise D = ?.
Given a set of rules. The system response D to a request R is defined:
• D = ? if no rule handles the request;
• D = error if more than one rule is applicable;
• D = yes if a unique rule is applicable and the decision of the rule is yes; and
• D = no if a unique rule is applicable and the decision of the rule is no.
Based on the request elements (cf. Def. 5.14), LaPadula et al. defines Ω := {ρ1, ...,ρ10} a
set of rules [127] for a secure system that satisfy the ∗-property. The rules ρ1, ...,ρ10 can be
summarised as follows.
• Rule 1 (get-read) ρ1: A subject S gets read access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute r is an element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix, S has the same as or higher classification than O and the
categories of S cover the categories of O; and
(ii) (∗-property preserving) all objects O′ where S can write to (i.e., access in append
or write mode) have the same as or higher classification than O and their categories
cover the categories of O.
• Rule 2 (get-append) ρ2: A subject S gets append access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute a is as element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix; and
(ii) (∗-property preserving) all objects O′ that S can read from (i.e., access in read or
write mode) have a lower classification than O and their categories are covered by
the categories of O.
• Rule 3 (get-execute) ρ3: A subject S gets execute access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) the access attribute e is element of the
corresponding entry of the access matrix.
• Rule 4 (get-write) ρ4: A subject S gets execute access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute w is an element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix, S has the same as or higher classification than O and the
categories of S cover the categories of O; and
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(ii) (∗-property preserving [append]) all objects O′ where S has append access have the
same as or higher classification than O and their categories cover the categories of
O.
(iii) (∗-property preserving [read]) all objects O′ where S has read access have lower
classification than O and their categories are covered by the categories of O.
(iv) (∗-property preserving [write]) all objects O′ where S has write access have the
same classification as O and their categories are the same with that of O.
• Rule 5 (release-read/write/append/execute) ρ5: A subject S can release read/write/ap-
pend/execute access to an object O (if the request is valid).
• Rule 6 (give-read/write/append/execute) ρ6: A subject S gives to a subject S′ read-
/write/append/execute access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) S has read/write/append/execute access
and control access to O.
• Rule 7 (rescind-read/write/append/execute) ρ7: A subject S rescinds read/write/ap-
pend/execute access to an object O for a subject S′ if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) S has read/write/append/execute access
and control access to O.
• Rule 8 (change- f ) ρ8: A subject S can change the classification/need-to-know vector f
if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) S changes only classifications and cat-
egories of objects that no subject has access to.
• Rule 9 (create-object) ρ9: A subject S can create an object O if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) O does not exist.
• Rule 10 (delete-object) ρ10: A subject S can delete an object O if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) the access attribute c is an element of
the corresponding entry of the access matrix.
Based on the rules Ω, LaPadula et al. formulates the basic Security Theorem for secure
systems which satisfy the ∗-property:
Theorem 5.1 (Security theorem [127]) The rules Ω are security preserving and ∗-property
preserving. Further, a system Σ(R,D,W ,z0) using theses rules is a secure system and satisfies
the ∗-property if Z0 is a secure state which satisfies the ∗-property.
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Proof The proof of the Security Theorem is provided by LaPadula et al. [127]. 
Further, LaPadula et al. identifies two properties that are important for the design of rules
in secure systems:
Definition 5.21 (Covering and disjoint [127]) A set of rules is considered covering if there is
always an applicable rule. Further, a set of rules is considered disjoint if there is only a single
rule applicable (i.e., for all requests there is no error in response).
Covering is important, because otherwise there are requests that remain unrecognised by
the system. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish between unrecognised requests that were
forgotten in the design of rules and unrecognised requests that are illegal. In particular, when
testing a system, it is important to identify illegal and forgotten requests clearly.
Disjoint is important for avoiding conflicts which are considered a flaw in the design of
rules. In particular, a conflict indicates that there exist requests that are not modelled correctly
in the design of the rules.
Remark 5.4 (Covering and disjoint Ω [127]) It can be observed that the rules in Ω are dis-
joint but not covering. However, covering can be achieved by introducing a new decision,
called illegal, and a ‘catching rule’ that applies if no other rule apply. Then, when ever the
‘catching rule’ applies, the decision illegal is returned indicating that the request is not pro-
cessed by the system.
5.2.2.2 Lattice-based information flow control
The model of Bell and La Padula focuses on direct access control of subjects and objects based
on a two-dimensional classification of confidentiality. However, the approach lacks of the abil-
ity to model access control based on information flow in general. A more general approach to
modelling information flow control was presented by Denning [52]. In Denning’s approach, a
lattice of so called security classes is used for classification of subjects and objects, and access
is controlled based on the order in the lattice and with respect to information flow between se-
curity classes. In comparison to Bell and La Padula, decisions on access control have a reduced
complexity since they are based on information flow between security classes organised in a
lattice. This reduces the decision to comparing two security classes. Additionally, the model
is more flexible with respect to the expressiveness of the classification and its management. In
particular, there are rules for how security classes are combined. This flexibility is also key
for extending the model to cover multiple security properties (in this thesis: confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and location determination) which are exploited in Section 5.3 to de-
velop a model on information flow control in clouds. Further, the simplicity and flexibility of
Denning’s approach ensures that it is compatible with Bell and La Padula’s approach, and as a
result, both models can be combined into a single model which is demonstrated in this section.
In the following, Denning’s model on lattice-based access control [52] is introduced, and
based on the model of Bell and La Padula, both models are combined into a lattice-based model
for information flow control.
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Model definition (according to Denning [52])
Analogously to the model of Bell and La Padula (cf. Section 5.2.2.1), there exist subjects
accessing objects. Hence, the definition of Bell and La Padula is applicable, too (cf. Def. 5.3
and Def. 5.4). Subjects and objects are classified by security classes, which cover classification
(cf. Def. 5.5) and categories (cf. Def. 5.6) of Bell and La Padula’s model but are not limited
to them. In the Denning’s model, access control decisions are made on the basis of allowed
information flow between security classes. For that purpose, two compare relations are defined.
The first defines how security classes are allowed to be combined, which is needed to model
the join of information having different security classes. Also, it can be used to identify the
security class that is necessary to access multiple objects associated with different security
classes. The second defines the allowed information flow between security classes which is
required to determine whether a subject is allowed to access an object. Having this in mind,
the model is defined as follows.
Definition 5.22 (Information flow model [52]) An information flow model is defined as a
quintuple (S,O,SC,⊕, 7→) where
• S is a set of subjects (cf. Def. 5.3);
• O is a set of objects (cf. Def. 5.4);
• SC := {SC1, ...,SCn}, a set of security classes SCi;
• SCB : (S∪O)×SC is a set of security bindings where each element is a binding of an
object or subject to a security class
• ⊕ : SCB×SCB→ SCB with ⊕(SC1,SC2) = SC1⊕SC2 = SC3 and SC1,SC2,SC3 ∈ SCB
is a class-combining operator that provides for a pair of security bindings (SC1,SC2) a
combined security binding SC3; and
• 7→: SC×SC is a flow relation describing an allowed information flow between two se-
curity classes with SC1 7→ SC2 if and only if information in SC1 is allowed to flow to SC2
(SC1,SC2 ∈ SC).
After defining the model, the lattice on security classes is established. For that reason,
two compare relations are required. The flow relation and the class-combining operator are
compare relations like those proved by Denning [52]. In particular, Denning formulated four
axioms that have to be satisfied to establish a lattice as follows.
Theorem 5.2 (Denning’s Axioms [52]) (SC, 7→,⊕) is a lattice, since the following assump-
tions (Denning’s Axioms) hold true.
(1) (SC, 7→) is a partially ordered set.
(2) SC is finite.
(3) SC has a lower bound SCL such that SCL 7→ SC for all SC ∈ SC.
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(4) ⊕ is a least upper bound operator on SC.
Further, these assumptions imply that there exists a greatest upper bound operator, which is
denoted by ⊗.Additionally, the existence of ⊗ implies that there exists an upper bound SCH
such that SC 7→ SCH for all SC ∈ SC.From this follows that (SC, 7→,⊕,⊗) is a lattice with
upper bound SCL and lower bound SCH .
Proof The proof of Denning’s Axioms is provided by Denning [52]. 
Remark 5.5 (Modifications on the model) Any modifications on the model that are made in
this thesis have to satisfy these axioms to ensure that the security classes still form a lattice and
that all statements made on the basis of these axioms still apply.
5.2.2.3 Joint model on lattice-based information flow control for confidentiality
A lattice-based approach for modelling information flow between security classes provides an
elaborate but simple model for deciding on access control. However, it lacks the ability to
distinguish between the different modes of access a subject can have (i.e., read, write, append,
execute, control; cf. and Def. 5.8). It is possible to model for each mode of access the corre-
sponding information flow – for example, subject read object is modelled as information flows
from object to subject – but it is rather complex to introduce specific access modes for each
possible pair of subject and object (which is done in the model of Bell and La Padula). In par-
ticular, changing allowed access modes would require a change of associated security classes
and may even require a change of the flow relation. To overcome this flaw, it is necessary to
combine lattice-based security classes and access modes in a single model.
An obvious approach is to combine the models of Bell and La Padula and Denning. This
can be achieved by a four-step modification of the model of Bell and La Padula: In the first
step, it is necessary to define a unified classification. Therefore, classifications and category
are mapped on security classes to enable the utilisation of security classes for access control
decisions. Then, as a second step, it is possible to bind subjects and objects to security classes
as a replacement for classification/needs-to-know vector. In a third step, it is necessary to
redefine the simple security property and the ∗-property which now have to be applicable on
security classes instead of classifications and categories. In the fourth step, the rules have to be
adjusted in such a way that the decisions are made on security classes.
Based on these steps, a lemma on constructing a combined model is formulated as follows.
Lemma 5.1 (Lattice-based information flow control) The model for information flow con-
trol by Bell and La Padula (cf. Section 5.2.2.1) and the information flow model by Denning (cf.
Section 5.2.2.2) are compatible and can be combined into a single model by:
(1) mapping classifications in C and categories in K to security classes in SC, which are
denoted confidentiality classes;
(2) using security bindings SCB (cf. Def. 5.22) instead of the classification/needs-to-know
vector F (cf. Def. 5.7);
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(3) redefining the simple-security property (cf. Def. 5.18) and the ∗-property (cf. Def. 5.19)
based on the mapped security classes (instead of classifications and categories); and
(4) redefining Ω based on mapped security classes (instead of classifications and cate-
gories). The redefined set of rules is denoted cΩ.
Proof To prove Lemma 5.1, it is shown that (i) a combined model exists (by defining one),
(ii) Denning’s Axioms (cf. Theorem 5.2) are satisfied by the combined model, and (iii) the
security theorem (cf. Theorem 5.1) is shown for the combined model).
Proof of part (i): Construction of the combined model (proof of existence) It is shown
in Appendix B that it is possible to define a c-system cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) with a set of c-rules cΩ
which is analogous to the system Σ(R,D,W ,z0) with a set of rules Ω (cf. Section 5.2.2.1) and
which uses the set of confidentiality classes cSC being a subset of the set of security classes
SC (cf. Section 5.2.2.2).
The allowed information flow between confidentiality classes is defined on the bases of the
comparison of classifications and categories, which are mapped to the respective confidentiality
classes. Then, confidentiality classes are defined as follows.
Definition 5.23 (Confidentiality class) A confidentiality class cSC :=(C,K) is a security class
with C ∈C and K ∈K. Then, cSC := { cSC1, ..., cSCn} is set of confidentiality classes cSCi and
cSC⊆ SC.
Further, let CSC1 7→ cSC2 for all CSC1, CSC2 ∈ cSC with cSC1 = (C1,K1), cSC2 = (C2,K2),
and C1,C2 ∈ C and K1,K2 ∈K if and only if C1 ≤C2∧K1 ⊆ K2.
Further, the simple-security property (cf. Def. 5.18) is redefined on information flow be-
tween confidentiality classes. The original simple-security property addresses the information
flow from objects to subjects, which is the case when a subject accesses an object in read-mode
or write-mode. Accessing an object in read-mode or write-mode is allowed only if the subject’s
classification is greater than the object’s classification and the object’s categories are contained
in the subject’s categories (cf. Def. 5.18). According to the definition of confidentiality classes
(cf. Def.5.23), this condition is equivalent to the condition that information is allowed to flow
from the object to the subject. This equivalence is used to redefine the simple-security property
on information flow between confidentiality classes. The new property is denoted the simple-
confidentiality property and defined as follows.
Definition 5.24 (Simple-confidentiality property) (S,O,A)∈ S×O×A satisfies the security
confidentiality condition relative to cSCB⊆ cSCB if and only if
(i) (A = e)∨ (A = a)∨ (A = c); and
(ii) ((A = r)∨ (A = w))∧ ( cscb(O) 7→ cscb(S))
with
c
scb(S) ∈ cSCB security binding of subject S and cscb(O) ∈ cSCB security binding of
object O.
Analogously to the simple-security property (cf. Def. 5.18), secure and compromise are
defined for c-states, c-state sequences, appearances of a c-system and a c-system.
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To redefine the ∗-property (cf. Def. 5.18) on information flow between confidentiality
classes, the conditions on sufficient classification and categories of the accessed objects are
replaced by the equivalent condition on allowed information flows between objects’ confi-
dentiality classes. The ∗-property addresses the information flow from subjects to objects and
between objects (caused by a subject). Both are implicated if subjects access objects in append-
mode or write-mode. Accessing an object in append-mode or write-mode is allowed only if all
objects that can be accessed by the subject in read-mode or write-mode have a classification
that is less or equal to the accessed object and each of them has a category that contains the
accessed object’s category (cf. Def. 5.19). This condition is equivalent to the condition that in-
formation is allowed to flow from each object that can be accessed by the subject in read-mode
or write-mode to the accessed object (cf. Def. 5.23). This equivalence is used to redefine the
∗-property on information flow between confidentiality classes. The new property is denoted
the confidentiality ∗-property and defined as follows.
Definition 5.25 (Confidentiality ∗-property)
Let b(s : A1, ...,Ak) := {O : O ∈O∧ (∀i ∈ {1, ...,k} : (S,O,Ai) ∈ b)} where k ∈ N, A1, ...,Ak ∈
A, and b the set of all subjects having access to what objects in what access mode of the
respective c-state (cf. Def. B.1).
A c-state cV = (b,M, cSCB) ∈ cV satisfies the confidentiality ∗-property if and only if
∀S ∈ S : b(s : w,a) 6= /0∧b(s : r,w) 6= /0
⇒∀O1 ∈ b(s : r,w),O2 ∈ b(s : w,a) : cscb(O1) 7→ cscb(O2) .
with
c
scb(O1),
c
scb(O2) ∈ cSCB⊆ cSCB security binding of object O1 and O2, respectively.
Analogously to the secure confidentiality condition (cf. Def. 5.24), satisfaction of the confi-
dentiality ∗-property is defined for c-state sequences, appearances of a c-system, and c-system.
Remark 5.6 (Partially ordered confidentiality classes) For plausibility and consistent usage
of the simple-confidentiality property and confidentiality ∗-property, it is important that the
confidentiality classes are partially ordered. Otherwise, a comparison of confidentiality classes
is not possible and the defined properties are not consistent for cSC. Therefore, partially or-
dered confidentiality classes are a prerequisite for constructing a secure system for controlling
information flow with respect to confidentiality.
This demonstrates that existence of a lattice-based model for information flow control,
consolidating the models of Bell and La Padula and Denning. 
Proof of part (ii): Satisfaction of Denning’s Axioms (cf. Theorem 5.2)
Showing Axiom (1): That (cSC, 7→) is a partial order is implied by the fact (C,>) is totally
ordered and (K,⊃) is partially ordered (cf. Def. 5.23).
Showing Axiom (2): cSC is finite since C and K are finite (cf. Def. 5.23).
Showing Axiom (3): With out loss of generality, it is assumed that (C,>) has lower bound
CL ∈C and (K,⊃) has lower bound KL ∈K. Further, let cSCL := (CL,KL)∈ cSC (with out loss
of generality). Then, cSCL is lower bound with cSCL 7→ cSC for all cSC ∈ cSC.
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Showing Axiom (4): ⊕ is least upper bound operator as shown by Denning [52].
According to Denning [52], the existence of lower bound cSCL and least upper bound op-
erator ⊕ implies that greatest lower bound operator ⊗ exists, and by satisfaction of all axioms,
(cSC, 7→,⊕,⊗) is a lattice. 
Proof of part (iii): Proving the Security Theorem (cf. Theorem 5.1)
For the combined model, the equivalent of the Security Theorem is denoted Confidentiality
Theorem and is formulated as follows.
Theorem 5.3 (Confidentiality Theorem) The c-rules cΩ are security preserving and confi-
dentiality ∗-property preserving. Further, a c-system cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) using these c-rules is a
secure system and satisfies the confidentiality ∗-property if cz0 is a secure c-state which satisfies
the confidentiality ∗-property.
The proof of the Confidentiality Theorem consists of two parts:
(a) Showing all c-rules cρ ∈ cΩ are security preserving and ∗-property preserving:
The rules Ω := {ρ1, ...,ρ10} are security preserving and ∗-property preserving [127]. There-
fore, the c-rules cρ i = ρ i for i∈{3,5,6,7,9,10} are security preserving and ∗-property preserv-
ing, too. According to the definition of confidentiality classes (cf. Def. 5.23), it is easy to see
that c-rule cρ i is equivalent to rule ρ i for i ∈ {1,2,4} and therefore, security preserving and ∗-
property preserving, too. That cρ8 is security preserving and ∗-property preserving is justified
by the fact that changing security bindings is equivalent to changing classification and cate-
gories. Therefore, cρ8 and ρ8 are equivalent and both are security preserving and ∗-property
preserving. Thus, all c-rules cρ ∈ cΩ are security preserving and ∗-property preserving.
(b) Showing that cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) is secure and satisfies the confidentiality ∗-property:
Let cZ0 initial secure c-state which satisfies the confidentiality ∗-property. This also implies
that cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) is secure and satisfies the confidentiality ∗-property. (Proof by induc-
tion)
Base step: Let ‖ cV‖ = 1 with cz0 the only c-state in cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0). Then, all c-states
in cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) are secure c-states and satisfy the confidentiality ∗-property.
According to Definition 5.24 (in conj. with Def. 5.18), all c-states in cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) are
secure, which implies that all c-state sequences, and all appearances of cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) are
secure, and therefore cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) is secure too. Further, according to Definition 5.25 (in
conj. with Def. 5.19), all c-states in cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) satisfy the confidentiality ∗-property,
which implies that all c-state sequences, all appearances of cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0), and therefore
cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) satisfy the confidentiality ∗-property.
Induction step: Let |cV| = n+ 1 with n ∈ N. Then, there exists c-state cV ∗ ∈ cV with
|cV\{ cV ∗}| = n such that all cV ∈ cV\{ cV ∗} are secure states and satisfy the confidentiality
∗-property (induction hypothesis). Let cV∗ ⊆ (cV\{ cV ∗}) set of all c-states cV where cρ ∈ cΩ
with cρ( cR, cV ) = (D, cV ∗) exists for some cR ∈ cR and D ∈ D. All rules in cΩ are security
preserving and ∗-property preserving and all cV ∈ cV∗ ⊆ (cV\{ cV ∗} are secure and satisfy the
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confidentiality ∗-property. With Definition B.6 it follows that cV ∗ is secure and satisfies the
confidentiality ∗-property, and therefore, all c-states in cV. With Definition 5.24 (in conj. with
Def. 5.18) it follows that cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) is secure. Further, according to Definition 5.25 (in
conj. with Def. 5.19), cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) satisfies the confidentiality ∗-property. 
5.2.2.4 Integrity-based information flow control
Integrity-based information flow control was introduced by Biba [22]. In this approach, infor-
mation flow control is modelled analogously to Bell and La Padula by defining access privi-
leges for reading and writing on objects, classifying subjects and objects, and based on that,
defining rules on deciding whether a subject is allowed to have an access privilege. Further, a
model for strict integrity is constructed in the same way as the model of Bell and La Padula.
Strict integrity consists of two axioms that are the duals of the simple-security property (cf.
Def. 5.18) and the ∗-property (cf. Def. 5.19). Therefore, strict integrity is fully compatible
with the model of [20] and, therefore, information flow control with respect to strict integrity
and confidentiality can be described in a combined model [175].
In this thesis, information flow control with respect to strict integrity is modelled in the
same way as the lattice-based model for access control defined in Section 5.2.2.2. In the fol-
lowing the model for integrity-based information flow is constructed.
Model definition (according to Biba [22])
First, a model for integrity levels has to be defined. In the original work by Biba, integrity
is modelled in multiple, partially-ordered integrity levels based on the trustworthiness of the
information. Without loss of generality, this classification can be replaced by any other finite
and partially ordered set of integrity levels. The partial order is required to allow access
decisions based on the integrity level as defined by Biba [22], and for consistent construction
of a secure system (cf. Remark 5.6). Additionally, finiteness is required to satisfy Denning’s
Axioms (cf. Lemma 5.2).
Therefore and without loss of generality, integrity is modelled on the two discrete levels,
low integrity and high integrity, as follows.
Definition 5.26 (Integrity level) An integrity level iL ∈ {0,1} is a measure that classifies
whether the integrity is low ( iL := 0) or high ( iL := 1). Then, iL := {0,1} is set of integrity
levels.
Based on the integrity level, security classes are defined which are denoted integrity classes.
Then, analogously to the model for lattice-based information flow control (cf. Lemma 5.1), a
model is defined on the basis of integrity classes as follows.
Definition 5.27 (Integrity class) An integrity class iSC is a security class corresponding to
an integrity level iL ∈ iL, and int : iSC 7→ iL is a function that returns for integrity classes the
corresponding integrity level. Then, iSC := { iSC1, ..., iSCn} is set of integrity classes iSCi and
iSC ⊆ SC. Further, let ( iSC1 7→ iSC2 for all iSC1, iSC2 ∈ iSC) if and only if (int( iSC1) >=
int( iSC2)). Additionally, iSCB is a set of integrity security bindings describing the binding
of integrity classes to subjects and objects. Consequently, i-state iV ∈ iV, i-state sequence
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iZ ∈ iZ, i-request iR∈ iR i-request sequence iX ∈ iX,and i-system iΣ(iR,D, iW , iz0) are defined
analogously to c-state, c-state sequence, c-request, c-request sequence, and c-system by using
integrity-based definitions instead of the confidentiality-based ones.
Further, the simple-integrity property and the integrity ∗-property are introduced analo-
gously to the simple-confidentiality property (cf. Def. 5.24) and confidentiality ∗-property (cf.
Def. 5.25).
Definition 5.28 (Simple-integrity property) Analogously to simple-confidentiality property
(cf. Def. 5.24), (S,O,A) ∈ S×O×A satisfies the security integrity condition relative to
iSCB⊆ iSCB if and only if
(i) (A = e)∨ (A = a)∨ (A = c); and
(ii) ((A = r)∨ (A = w))∧ ( iscb(O) 7→ iscb(S))
with
i
scb(S) ∈ iSCB security binding of subject S and iscb(O) ∈ iSCB security binding of
object O.
Analogously to the simple-security property (cf. Def. 5.18), secure and compromise are
defined for i-states, i-state sequences, appearances of an i-system and an i-system.
Definition 5.29 (Integrity ∗-property)
Let b(s : A1, ...,Ak) := {O : O ∈O∧ (∀i ∈ {1, ...,k} : (S,O,Ai) ∈ b)} where k ∈ N, A1, ...,Ak ∈
A, and b the set of all subjects having access to what objects in what access mode of the
respective i-state. Analogously to the confidentiality ∗-property (cf. Def. 5.25), an i-state iV =
(b,M, iSCB) ∈ iV satisfies the integrity ∗-property if and only if
∀S ∈ S : b(s : w,a) 6= /0∧b(s : r,w) 6= /0
⇒∀O1 ∈ b(s : r,w),O2 ∈ b(s : w,a) : iscb(O1) 7→ iscb(O2)
with
i
scb(O1),
i
scb(O2) ∈ iSCB⊆ iSCB security binding of object O1 and O2, respectively.
Analogously to the secure integrity condition (cf. Def. 5.28), the satisfaction of the integrity
∗-property is defined for i-state sequences, appearances of an i-system, and i-system.
Based on these properties, rules for a secure system are defined as follows.
Definition 5.30 (10 i-rules for a secure i-system) An i-rule is defined (analogously to a c-
rule; cf. Def. B.6) as a function iρ : R× iV→ D× iV. An i-rule maps a request and an i-state
to a decision and an i-state. Then, analogous to to the definition of cΩ (cf. Def. B.7), iΩ :=
{iΩ1, ..., iΩ10} is the set of i-rules for a secure i-system where iρ i := ρ i for i ∈ {3,5,6,7,9,10}
and iρ1, iρ2, iρ4, iρ8 are defined with
i
scb(S),
i
scb(O),
i
scb(O′)∈ iSCB corresponding security
bindings of subject S ∈ S and objects O,O′ ∈O:
• I-Rule 1 (get-read) iρ1: A subject S gets read access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute r is an element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix, and
i
scb(O) 7→ iscb(S); and
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(ii) (∗-property preserving) for all objects O′ where S can write to (i.e., access in ap-
pend and write mode) is true:
i
scb(O′) 7→ iscb(O).
• I-Rule 2 (get-append) iρ2: A subject S gets append access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute a is an element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix; and
(ii) (∗-property preserving) for all objects O′ where S can read from to (i.e., access in
read and write mode) is true:
i
scb(O) 7→ iscb(O′).
• I-Rule 4 (get-write) iρ4: A subject S gets execute access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute w is an element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix, and
i
scb(O) 7→ iscb(S); and
(ii) (∗-property preserving [append]) for all objects O′ where S has append access is
true:
i
scb(O′) 7→ iscb(O).
(iii) (∗-property preserving [read]) for all objects O′ where S has read access is true:
i
scb(O′) 7→ iscb(O′).
(iv) (∗-property preserving [write]) for all objects O′ where S has write access is true:
i
scb(O′) = iscb(O).
• I-Rule 8 (change- iSCB) iρ8: A subject S can change the security bindings iSCB⊆ iSCB
if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) S changes only security bindings of ob-
jects that no subject has access to.
• I-Rules 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 are constructed analogously to the rules 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 (respec-
tively) of Ω, since these rules describe general system behaviour, which do not change
when modelling integrity
Having defined the model, it is easy to see that the model satisfies Denning’s Axioms (cf.
Theorem 5.2) and formulates the Security Theorem (cf. Theorem 5.1) with respect to integrity.
For later use, the lemma on forming a lattice of integrity classes and the Integrity Theorem
(which is the analogon of the Confidentiality Theorem; cf. Theorem 5.3) are formulated as
follows.
Lemma 5.2 (Lattice of integrity classes) Given 7→,⊕,⊗ operands on security classes as de-
fined by Denning [52] (cf. Def. 5.22 and Theorem 5.2). Then, (iSC, 7→,⊕,⊗) is a lattice.
Proof The proof is analogous to part (ii) of the proof of Lemma 5.1 by using integrity def-
initions instead of confidentiality definitions, and particularly by using the fact that integrity
classes are finite and partially ordered. 
Theorem 5.4 (Integrity Theorem) Each i-rule in iΩ is security preserving and ∗-property
preserving. Further, an i-system iΣ(iR,D, iW , iz0) using iΩ is secure and satisfies the integrity
∗-property if iz0 is a secure i-state which satisfies the integrity ∗-property.
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Proof The proof is analogous to part (iii) of the proof of Lemma 5.1 by using integrity defi-
nitions instead of confidentiality definitions, and particularly by using the fact that (iSC, 7→) is
partially ordered – which is a necessary prerequisite (cf. Remark 5.6) – in conjunction with the
simple-integrity property (cf. Def. 5.28) and the integrity ∗-property (cf. Def. 5.29). 
Remark 5.7 (Generalising the model) An interesting observation is that the models for in-
tegrity and confidentiality are analogous and differ only with respect to the defined security
classes (i.e., confidentiality classes and integrity classes) and the allowed information flow be-
tween security classes. This is due to the fact that the respective security properties (i.e., simple-
confidentiality property, simple-integrity property, and respective ∗-properties) and rules (i.e.,
c-rules and i-rules) are defined based upon allowed information flow instead of comparing se-
curity classes of subjects and objects directly. Consequently, modelling access control based on
allowed information flow allows the definition of a generalised model that applies to arbitrary
types of lattice-based security class where allowed information flow is defined specifically for
each type of security class.
In Section 5.3, such a generalised model is presented which is used in this thesis to model
the previously (in Section 5.2.2) introduced properties of confidentiality and integrity as well
as the newly (in Section 5.3) introduced properties of location and availability.
5.2.3 Issues on tackling location inhomogeneity in clouds
To address the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6), it is necessary to control
the information flow of virtual resources (cf. Remark 5.3) with respect to confidentiality, in-
tegrity, availability, and location determination (cf. Objective 5; Section 1.3). Without loss of
generality, the information flow of virtual resources can be modelled as the access of hardware
resources to virtual resources (cf. Remark 5.2). Therefore, hardware resources can be consid-
ered subjects (cf. Def. 5.3) and virtual resources can be considered objects (cf. Def. 5.4).
Virtual resources are accessed by hardware resources in several possible ways, which can
result in information flow. There exist two types of operation that result in information flow.
First, a hardware resource can view a virtual resource, e.g., when loading the virtual machine
image or introspecting the virtual machine memory. In this case, information flows from the
virtual resource to the hardware resource which is equivalent to access in read mode r (cf.
Def. 5.8). Second, a hardware resource can modify a virtual resource, e.g., when instantiat-
ing/deleting a virtual resource or changing its configuration. Then, information flows from
the hardware resource to the virtual resource which is equivalent to access in append mode a
(cf. Def. 5.8). It is also possible that hardware resources view and modify virtual resources at
the same time (for example, when migrating the virtual resource from one hardware resource
to another), which corresponds to accessing in write mode w (cf. Def. 5.8). Further, there
are operations that do not cause information flow. There is no information flow when virtual
resources are executed by hardware resources. Possible operations of hardware resources are
starting, stopping, suspending, and continuing the execution of virtual resources. These op-
erations correspond to accessing in execute mode e (cf. Def. 5.8). Additionally, there is no
information flow when controlling access to virtual resources. On the one hand, hardware re-
sources can gain or release access to virtual resources, and on the other hand, they can give or
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rescind access to virtual resources with respect to other hardware resources. These operations
correspond to accessing in control mode c (cf. Def. 5.8).
Based on these atomic operations, it is possible to describe the more complex operations
of the virtual resource management in clouds as follows.
• Virtual resource creation: the virtual resource is instantiated by the hardware resource
(no access privilege required), and the virtual resource is started by the hardware resource
(execute).
• Virtual resource destruction: the virtual resource is stopped by the hardware resource
(execute), and the virtual resource is deleted by the hardware resource (control).
• Virtual resource duplication: the virtual resource is instantiated by the hardware resource
by copying a virtual resource from another hardware resource (write), and the new virtual
resource is started by the copying hardware resource (execute).
• Virtual resource migration: the virtual resource is created by the hardware resource by
copying a virtual resource from another hardware resource (write), the new virtual re-
source is started by the copying hardware resource (execute), the copied virtual resource
is stopped by the other hardware resource (execute), and the copied virtual resource is
destroyed by the other hardware resource (control).
Consequently, all access operations of hardware resources on virtual resources can be mod-
elled with access modes (cf. Def. 5.8). Therefore, the information flow of virtual resources in
clouds can be modelled with respect to the access operations of hardware resources on virtual
resources by using the approach of Bell and La Padula. Further, this implies that the models for
confidentially-based and integrity-based information flow control presented in Section 5.2.2.2
and Section 5.2.2.4 are applicable, too. In particular, these models apply such that only subjects
(i.e., hardware resources and, therefore, hardware providers) gain access to objects (i.e., virtual
resources) which comply with the subjects’ security classes (i.e., confidentiality classes and in-
tegrity classes, respectively). This is due to the fact that information flow is modelled between
security classes generally and, therefore, independently of considered objects and subjects.
This implies that the models for lattice-based access control presented in Section 5.2.2 are ap-
plicable to model information flow control on virtual resources with respect to confidentiality
and integrity.
Even though the presented models are applicable, they do not address availability and lo-
cation determination. Nonetheless, both are important security properties for tackling the chal-
lenge of the location inhomogeneity in clouds (cf. Def. 4.6). Hence, the question arises as to
how these properties can be modelled in the context of information flow control in general and
with respect to virtual resources. In particular, what are the corresponding security classes and
how do they apply on controlling the access operations? Existing approaches do not provide
answers to these questions (cf. Section 2.4).
In Section 5.3, these open questions will be addressed by introducing a general model
of information flow control which covers confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location
determination. In particular, security classes and allowed information flows for availability and
location of virtual resources will be defined.
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5.3 Towards a complete model of information flow control
In Section 5.2, models for lattice-base information flow control on virtual resources war iden-
tified good candidates for addressing the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6).
Existing approaches focus on single security aspects rather than addressing multiple aspects
generally. The first models started in the 1970’s with confidentiality [20] [52] and integrity
[22]. Since then little progress has been made on introducing new security properties. There are
some approaches looking into some aspects of location constraints [201] [166] but, for exam-
ple, availability as a major security property has remained unaddressed until now. TO address
the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6, it is necessary to address information
flow control with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location determination at
the same time (cf. Objective 5; Section 1.3). Thus, it is necessary to define a general model
that is able to address multiple security constraints and allow the introduction of availability
and location determination.
In this Section, a general model for lattice-based information flow control is derived from
the existing methods. Based on this model, information flow control on virtual resources is
modelled with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location determination. To
this end, new methods for modelling availability and location determination are developed.
Finally, the application of the general model to the cloud management process is described.
5.3.1 General model on information flow control
Existing models on lattice-based information flow have in common that they can be described
analogously with respect to information flow between security classes (cf. Remark 5.7). This
observation is used to develop a general model for lattice-based information flow control in this
section, which applies to partially ordered security classes generally. The model’s construction
is based on the models for lattice-based information flow with respect to confidentiality and
integrity, which are described in Section 5.2.2. On the one hand, the general model is a consoli-
dation and extension of the existing models for access control developed by Bell and La Padula,
Denning, and Biba. On the other hand, restriction in the original design were removed and re-
placed by more flexible elements, allowing the modelling of multiple security properties at the
same time and the introduction of novel security properties beyond those already introduced
by this thesis.
To define a general model for information flow control, the following definitions according
to the model of Bell and La Padula (cf. Section 5.2.2.1) are used.
• Subject S ∈ S (cf. Def. 5.3).
• Object O ∈O (cf. Def. 5.4).
• Access attributes A= {r,w,e,a,c} (cf. Def. 5.8);
• Access matrix M ∈M (cf. Def. 5.9).
• Decision D ∈ D= {yes,no,error,?} (cf. Def. 5.15);
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• Decision sequence Y ∈ Y, timely ordered sequences (cf. Def. 5.15).
• Request elements ‘get’, ‘give’, ‘release’, ‘rescind’, ‘change’, ‘create’, and ‘delete’ (cf.
Def. 5.14).
Further, the following definitions according to Denning’s model (cf. Def. 5.22) are used.
• Security class SC ∈ SC.
• Security binding SCB ∈ SCB : (S∪O)×SC.
• Class-combining operator ⊕ : SCB×SCB→ SCB.
• Flow relation 7→: SC×SC.
According to Denning’s Axioms (cf. Theorem 5.2), (SC, 7→,⊕,⊗) is a lattice with upper
bound SCH and lower bound SCL, and where ⊗ : SCB× SCB→ SCB is least upper bound
operator.
Analogously to the models for confidentiality (cf. Section 5.2.2.2) and integrity (cf. Sec-
tion 5.2.2.4), the following generalised definitions are made for state, state sequence, request,
request sequence, and system.
Definition 5.31 (γ-state) A γ-state γV is defined (analogously to c-state; cf. Def. B.1) a triple
γV := (b,M,SCB) with
• b ⊆ S×O×A set of all subjects S ∈ S having access to objects O ∈ O in what access
mode, which is described by a set of access attributes A⊆ A;
• M ∈M access matrix in the state γV ; and
• SCB ⊆ SCB set of confidentiality security bindings describing the binding of confiden-
tiality classes to subjects and objects.
Then, γV is the set of γ-states γV i.
Definition 5.32 (γ-state sequence) A γ-state sequence is (analogously to c-state sequence; cf.
Def. B.2) an arbitrary number of timely ordered γ-states γV i ∈ γV. Then, γZ : γVN is the set of
request sequences γZi.
Definition 5.33 (γ-request) A γ-request is defined (analogously to c-request; cf. Def. B.3)
a quadruple (S1,S2,Os, γG) ⊂ S+× S+×O× γG with γG := A∪ /0∪P(SCB). Then, γR :
S+×S+×O× γG is the set of requests γRi.
Definition 5.34 (γ-request sequence) A γ-request sequence is (analogously to c-request se-
quence; cf. Def. B.4) an arbitrary number of timely ordered γ-requests γRi ∈ γR. Then,
γX : γRN is the set of γ-request sequences γX i.
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Definition 5.35 (γ-system) Let γW ⊂ γR×D×γV×γV. A γ-system γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0)⊂ γX×
Y× γZ is defined (analogously to c-system; cf. Def. B.5) by ( γX ,Y, γZ) ∈ γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0)
if and only if ( γX t ,Yt , γZt , γZt−1) ∈ γW for each t ∈ N where γz0 := ( /0,M,SCB) is initial state
with M ∈M initial access matrix and SCB ⊆ SCB initial security bindings. γW is considered
γ-state transition relation.
Further, a generalised form of the simple-security property and ∗-property is defined analo-
gously to the properties of the models for confidentiality (cf. Section 5.2.2.2) and integrity (cf.
Section 5.2.2.4).
Definition 5.36 (General simple-security property) (S,O,A) ∈ S×O×A satisfies the gen-
eral security condition relative to SCB⊆ SCB if and only if
(i) (A = e)∨ (A = a)∨ (A = c); and
(ii) ((A = r)∨ (A = w))∧ (scb(O) 7→ scb(S))
with scb(S) ∈ SCB security binding of subject S and scb(O) ∈ SCB security binding of object
O.
Analogously to the simple-security property (cf. Def. 5.18), secure and compromise are
defined for γ-states, γ-state sequences, appearances of a γ-system and a γ-system.
Definition 5.37 (General ∗-property)
Let b(s : A1, ...,Ak) := {O : O ∈O∧ (∀i ∈ {1, ...,k} : (S,O,Ai) ∈ b)} where k ∈ N, A1, ...,Ak ∈
A, and b the set of all subjects having access to what objects in what access mode of the
respective c-state (cf. Def. B.1).
Analogously to Def. 5.25, a γ-state γV = (b,M,SCB) ∈ cV satisfies the general ∗-property
if and only if
∀S ∈ S : b(s : w,a) 6= /0∧b(s : r,w) 6= /0
⇒∀O1 ∈ b(s : r,w),O2 ∈ b(s : w,a) : scb(O1) 7→ scb(O2) .
with scb(O1),scb(O2) ∈ SCB⊆ SCB security binding of object O1 and O2, respectively.
Analogously to the general secure condition (cf. Def. 5.36), the satisfaction of the general
∗-property is defined for γ-state sequences, appearances of a γ-system, and γ-system.
Further, the rules for a secure system are defined analogously to the models for confiden-
tiality (cf. Section 5.2.2.2) and integrity (cf. Section 5.2.2.4).
Definition 5.38 (γ-rule) A γ-rule is (analogously to a c-rule; cf. Def. B.6) a function γρ :
γR× γV→ D× γV. A γ-rule maps a γ-request and a γ-state to a decision and a γ-state.
A γ-rule γρ is security preserving if and only if
∀( γR, γV ) ∈ γR× γV ∃D ∈ D ∃ γV ′ ∈ γV :
γρ( γR, γV ) = (D, γV ′)∧ γV is secure γ-state⇒ γV ′ is secure γ-state.
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Analogously, a γ-rule γρ is ∗-property preserving if and only if the γ-state γV satisfies the
generalised ∗-property implies that γ-state γV ′ satisfies the generalised ∗-property.
The handling of γ-requests by a γ-rule and the response of a γ-system are defined analo-
gously to rules and systems (cf. Def. 5.20).
Definition 5.39 (10 γ-rules for a secure γ-system) Analogously to cΩ and iΩ (and therefore,
analogously to the rules for a secure system Ω defined by LaPadula et al. [127]), γΩ :=
{γρ1, ..., γρ10} is the set of γ-rules for a secure γ-system where γρ i := ρ i for i∈{3,5,6,7,9,10}
and γρ1, γρ2, γρ4, γρ8 are defined with scb(S),scb(O),scb(O′)∈ SCB respective security bind-
ings of subject S ∈ S and objects O,O′ ∈O:
• γ-Rule 1 (get-read) γρ1: A subject S gets read access to an object O if:
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute r is an element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix, and scb(O) 7→ scb(S); and
(ii) (∗-property preserving) for all objects O′ where S can write to (i.e., access in ap-
pend and write mode) is true: scb(O) 7→ scb(O′).
• γ-Rule 2 (get-append) γρ2: A subject S gets append access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute a is an element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix; and
(ii) (∗-property preserving) for all objects O′ where S can read from (i.e., access in
read and write mode) is true: scb(O′) 7→ scb(O).
• γ-Rule 4 (get-write) γρ4: A subject S gets execute access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute w is an element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix, and scb(O) 7→ scb(S);
(ii) (∗-property preserving [append]) for all objects O′ where S has append access is
true: scb(O) 7→ scb(O′);
(iii) (∗-property preserving [read]) for all objects O′ where S has read access is true:
scb(O′) 7→ scb(O); and
(iv) (∗-property preserving [write]) for all objects O′ where S has write access is true:
scb(O′) = scb(O).
• γ-Rule 8 (change-SCB) γρ8: A subject S can change the security bindings SCB ⊆ SCB
if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) S changes only security bindings of ob-
jects that no subject has access to.
• γ-Rules 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 are constructed analogously to the rules 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 (respec-
tively) of Ω, since these rules describe general system behaviour, which does not change
for different security properties.
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Having defined the model, it is possible to formulate the General Security Theorem analo-
gously to the Confidentiality Theorem (cf. Theorem 5.3) and the Integrity Theorem (cf. Theo-
rem 5.4).
Theorem 5.5 (General Security Theorem) Each γ-rule in γΩ is security preserving and ∗-
property preserving. Further, a γ-system γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) using γΩ is secure and satisfies the
generalised ∗-property if γz0 is a secure γ-state which satisfies the generalised ∗-property.
Proof The proof is analogous to part (iii) of the proof of Lemma 5.1 by using the generalised
definitions instead of confidentiality definitions, and particularly by using the fact that (SC, 7→)
is partially ordered (which is a necessary prerequisite, cf. Remark 5.6) in conjunction with the
general simple-security property (cf. Def. 5.36) and the general ∗-property (cf. Def. 5.37). 
Remark 5.8 (Modelling confidentiality and integrity) Confidentiality can be modelled in the
generalised model for information flow control by defining SC:=cSC, and this implies that
γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) = cΣ(cR,D,
cW , cz0). Integrity can be modelled similarly by defining SC :=
iSC, which implies that γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) = iΣ(iR,D,
iW , iz0). Further, confidentiality and
integrity can be modelled at the same time by using combined security classes that are de-
fined as pairs of confidentiality and integrity classes [175] which are defined by: c,iSC ⊂
cSC× iSC with c,iSCi = (cSCi, iSCi) ∈ c,iSC where cSCi ∈ cSC and iSCi ∈ iSC. Allowed in-
formation flow is defined: c,iSC1 7→ c,iSC2 if and only if cSC1 7→ cSC2 and iSC1 7→ iSC2 where
c,iSC1, c,iSC2 ∈ c,iSC, cSC1, cSC2 ∈ cSC, and iSC1, iSC2 ∈ iSC. Then, (c,iSC, 7→) is partially or-
dered and finite (due to the fact that cSC and iSC are partially ordered and finite). Therefore,
Denning’s Axioms apply (cf. Theorem 5.2) and (c,iSC, 7→,⊕,⊗) is a lattice with lower bound
c,iSCL = (cSCL, iSCL) and upper bound c,iSCH = (cSCH , iSCH).
5.3.2 Introducing location-determination in information flow control
When modelling allowed information flows of virtual resources in the context of the challenge
of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6), it is necessary to describe the ensured level of se-
curity at the location of the hardware resources (i.e., subjects) and how they comply with the
necessary level of security of virtual resources (i.e., objects). In general, the ensured level of
security depends on applicable legislation of the country a hardware resource is based in (cf.
Section 3.6.1). Therefore, location has to be modelled by using two dimensions: (1) the geo-
graphical location of subjects and objects and (2) the geographical application of legislation.
For example, for a virtual resource that contains tax data of a German corporate customer that
is allowed to be hosted only on hardware resources that are located in Europe, it is necessary
to model the location of the hardware resources and virtual resources dependent on the country
they are based in.
The geographical application of legislation can be classified by territories with their own
legislation. Territories can be part of other territories (e.g., Germany is part of the EU/EEA).
Further, territories usually do not overlap, i.e., they are fully part of another territory or com-
pletely different. However, it is possible for territories to overlap due to contractual agree-
ments, for example, the United Kingdom is a member of the EU/EEA and the Commonwealth
149
of Nations. Therefore, territories can be modelled as the geographical area with their own leg-
islation, and territories are (partially) ordered by the subset relation of their geographical areas.
Additionally, an upper and lower bound for territories can be defined. The upper bound is the
global territory that contains all other territories. Without loss of generality, the lower bound
is defined as the empty territory that has an empty intersection with all other territories and, by
definition, is contained in every territory. The existence of this territory has no impact on other
territories but makes it possible to model the special case where information is not allowed to
be part of the system. In the context of IT outsourcing to the cloud, the security calls empty
territory is used when information is not allowed to flow to the cloud and has to remain at the
corporate customer.
The geographical location of subjects and objects is specified by a geographical and organ-
isational closed space which is associated with a legal or real person. For example, hardware
resources are geographically located at a hosting site operated by a hardware provider. Further,
each location is based in one or more hierarchically contained territories. For example, a Ger-
man hosting site that is located in Passau is based in the following four territories: (1) in the
administrative district of Passau, (2) in the federal state of Bavaria, (3) in the German state, and
(4) in the EU/EEA.
Consequently, location, territory, and their interdependency are defined in the model as
follows.
Definition 5.40 (Location) A location loc is defined as a geographical and organisational
closed space where specified subjects and objects are located, and LOC := {loc1, ..., locn} set
of locations loci.
Definition 5.41 (Territory) A territory T is defined as a geographical area having its own
legislation, and T := {T1, ...,Tn} set of territories Ti. Further, loc :T→P(LOC) is the function
returning the set LOCT ⊂ LOC where all locations loc ∈ LOCT are geographically located in
territory T . In addition, Tglobal ∈ T with loc(Tglobal) = LOC is defined as the global territory
containing all locations, and Tlocal ∈ T with loc(Tlocal) = /0 is defined as the empty territory
containing no location. Then, T is partially ordered by the⊂-relation on loc with upper bound
Tglobal and lower bound Tlocal . Further, T is finite when modelling real-world systems.
Based on the definition of location and territory, it is possible to define location classes
and the information flow allowed between them. For each territory, a location class is defined.
Then, a location class corresponds to the ensured level of security within a specific territory.
Further, the information flow allowed between location classes depends on the compatibility
of their ensured level of security. In general, the ensured level of security of a territory is
compatible with that of another territory only if in the first territory the legislation of the second
applies. This is the case only if the first territory is contained in the second territory. For
example, the ensured level of security in Germany is compatible with that in the EU/EEA since
Germany is a member state of the EU/EEA, and basically the legislation of the EU/EEA also
applies to Germany. On the other hand, the ensured level of security in the EU/EEA does
not necessarily have to be compatible with that in Germany since Germany is not the only
member state and German legislation is not applicable in other member states generally. This
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implies that information flow between location classes is allowed only if the territory of the
target location class lies in the territory of the source location class. For example, information
is allowed to flow from Germany to France if the information is classified to flow within the
EU/EEA. Consequently, location classes and the information flow allowed between them are
defined as follows.
Definition 5.42 (Location class) A location class locSCT is defined as the corresponding secu-
rity class to territory T ∈ T, and locSC⊆ SC is defined as a set of location classes locSCT .
Also, let locSCglobal ∈ locSC the corresponding security class to the global territory Tglobal ,
locSClocal ∈ locSC the corresponding security class to the empty territory Tlocal .
In addition, let (locSCT1 7→ locSCT2) if and only if (loc(T1)⊇ loc(T2)) where T1,T2 ∈ T and
locSCT1 ,
locSCT2 ∈ locSC (i.e., information in locSCT1 is allowed to flow to locSCT2 if and only if
all locations in territory T2 also lie in territory T1).
For an object or subject, the location class can be interpreted as a boundary of their possible
locations. Thereby, it is possible to model the geographical location of subjects and objects.
Further, because territories are finite and partially ordered, it follows that (locSC, 7→) is also
finite and partially ordered, and locSCglobal is the corresponding lower bound and locSClocal is
the upper bound. This implies that Denning’s Axioms apply to location classes and (locSC, 7→
,⊕,⊗) is a lattice.
In addition, (locSC, 7→) is partially ordered and implies that γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) with SC =
locSC is a secure system satisfying the general ∗-property (cf. Theorem 5.5). This is made
plausible by looking at the general simple-security property (cf. Def. 5.36) and the general ∗-
property (cf. Def. 5.37). The general simple-security property defines allowed information flow
from objects to subjects. Information can flow from object O ∈O to subject S ∈ S only for the
access modes read and write (since viewing the object causes information flow to the subject).
Let locSCTO ∈ locSC be the security class of O and locSCTS ∈ locSC the security class of S with
TO,TS ∈ T being the corresponding territories. Then, according to the definition of location
classes, information flow (locSCTO 7→ locSCTS) is allowed if and only if (loc(TO) ⊇ loc(TS)).
This means that information flow is allowed if and only if the possible locations of the object
covers the possible locations of the subject. This implies that objects are accessible only by
subjects that are based at locations that are also allowed for the object. The object’s necessary
level of security is therefore satisfied by the subject’s ensured level of security. The general ∗-
property defines the information flow allowed between objects via subjects and, therefore, the
information flow from subjects to objects. Here, the access of a subject to objects is allowed if
and only if information is allowed to flow from objects which are accessed in read and write
mode to objects that are accessed in write and append mode. With respect to location classes,
information flow is allowed if and only if the possible locations of the viewed object covers the
possible locations of the modified objects. This implies that the necessary level of security of
viewed objects is satisfied by the necessary level of security of modified objects. Consequently,
the location classes locSC satisfy the General Security Theorem (cf. Theorem 5.5).
Remark 5.9 (Modelling confidentiality, integrity, and location) Analogously to Remark 5.8,
confidentiality, integrity, and location can be modelled at the same time by using combined se-
curity classes that are defined as triples of confidentiality, integrity, and location classes which
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are defined by: c,i,locSC ⊂ cSC× iSC× locSC with c,i,locSCi = (cSCi, iSCi, locSCi) ∈ c,i,locSC
where cSCi ∈ cSC, iSCi ∈ iSC, and locSCi ∈ locSC.
Allowed information flow is defined: c,i,locSC1 7→ c,i,locSC2 if and only if cSC1 7→ cSC2
and iSC1 7→ iSC2 and locSC1 7→ locSC2 where c,i,locSC1, c,i,locSC2 ∈ c,i,locSC, cSC1, cSC2 ∈ cSC,
iSC1, iSC2 ∈ iSC, and locSC1, locSC2 ∈ locSC.
Then, (c,i,locSC, 7→) is partially ordered and finite (due to the fact that cSC, iSC, and locSC
are partially ordered and finite). Therefore, Denning’s Axioms apply (cf. Theorem 5.2) and
(c,i,locSC, 7→,⊕,⊗) is a lattice with lower bound c,i,locSCL = (cSCL, iSCL, locSCL) and upper
bound c,i,locSCH = (cSCH , iSCH , locSCH).
5.3.3 Introducing availability in information flow control
Another important security property for addressing the challenge of location inhomogeneity
(cf. Def. 4.6) is the availability of virtual resources. When being utilised, virtual resources
have to be accessible and functional. Both depend on several factors, which are internal and
external to the virtual resources. The accessibility depends, for example, on the connectiv-
ity of the access network (external) and the functioning of the connection end-points of the
virtual resources (internal). The functioning of virtual resources depends, for example, on
the functioning of the hosting hardware resources (external) and the applications running on
them (internal). For the information flow of virtual resources, external factors that influence
the availability of virtual resources can change, while internal factors do not change due to
migration. For example, the migration of a virtual resource from a highly available hardware
resource to another with lower availability also reduces the availability of the virtual resource,
but the migration itself does not change the state of applications running on the virtual ma-
chine (assuming that downtimes during migration are negligible and virtual resources are fully
functioning after migration which is possible when using live migration [72]). With respect
to information flow of virtual resources, availability can be modelled as a requirement for a
subject (i.e., hardware resource) when gaining access to an object (i.e, virtual resource). For
that reason, objects are classified by their required availability and subjects are classified by
their provided availability.
To model classifications by availability the following definition of availability is used.
Definition 5.43 (Availability [221]) According to Xie et al. [221, pp. 11–12], availability A(t)
is defined as the probability that a system is up at a given time t. Further, the asymptotic
availability is given by
A = lim
t→∞A(t) =
system up time
system up time+ system down time
=
MT T F
MT T F +MT T R
where MT T F is the mean time to failure of a system, and MT T R is the mean time to repair of
a system. In the following, the term availability is used in the sense of asymptotic availability.
Remark 5.10 (Availability is totally ordered and finite) According to the Def. 5.43, avail-
ability is represented by a value of the interval [0,1], and therefore, it is totally ordered by
the <-relation. Theoretically, there are infinite values for availability, but in practice, only a
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finite number of availabilities are relevant. The reason is that availability is used in practice by
the following scheme: 90%, 95%, 99%, 99.5%, 99.9%, 99.95%, 99.99%, 99.995%, ..., 100%.
Further, the highest availabilities that are used can be found in function safety standards and
are not higher then 0.99999%, which is the upper boundary of safety integrity level 4 (based
on IEC 61508 [108]). Therefore, the number of relevant availabilities in practice is finite.
This makes availability (according to Def. 5.43) a good candidate for classifying subjects and
objects in a lattice-based model for information flow control.
In the model, the required availability of an object is classified by the minimum availability
that has to be provided by an accessing subject. Analogously, the provided availability of a
subject is classified by the minimum availability that is provided by the subject. Consequently,
availability classes are defined as follows:
Definition 5.44 (Availability class) An availability class avSCx := [x,1] with x ∈ [0,1] is de-
fined as a continuous interval of (asymptotic) availabilities A ∈ avSCx. Then, avSC is set of
availability classes avSCx. Further, let avSCx1 7→ avSCx2 for all x1,x2 ∈ [0,1] and avSCx1 , avSCx2 ∈
avSC if and only if avSCx1 ⊇ avSCx2 , i.e., information in avSCx1 is allowed to flow to avSCx2 if
and only if availability x1 is less or equal availability x2.
Then, (avSC, 7→) is partially ordered since ⊂-relation partial order and availabilities are
totally ordered by the <-relation. Further, avSC is finite for availabilities that are relevant in
practice (cf. Remark 5.10). In addition, avSC100% ∈ avSC is upper bound and avSC0% ∈ avSC is
lower bound. This implies that Denning’s Axioms apply for availability classes and (avSC, 7→
,⊕,⊗) is a lattice.
Moreover, the fact that (avSC, 7→) is partially ordered implies that γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) with
SC = avSC is a secure system satisfying the general ∗-property (cf. Theorem 5.5). Analo-
gously to location classes (cf. Section 5.3.2), this is made plausible by looking at the general
simple-security property (cf. Def. 5.36) and the general ∗-property (cf. Def. 5.37). The gen-
eral simple-security property defines allowed information flow from objects to subjects, which
is caused by viewing objects. This is allowed only if the object’s availability class contains
the subject’s availability class, i.e., the availability provided by the subject is higher then the
required availability of the object. Thereby, the subject can ensure the required availability
of the object – which is the intention of information flow control with respect to availabil-
ity. The general ∗-property defines the information flow allowed between objects via subjects
(and, therefore, from subjects to objects), which is caused by modifying objects. Here, the
access of a subject to an object is allowed only if the availability of objects that are modified is
higher than the availability of objects that are viewed. This implies that information can flow
only from lower availability classes to higher availability classes – which is again the intention
of information flow control with respect to availability. Consequently, the availability classes
avSC satisfy the General Security Theorem (cf. Theorem. 5.5).
Remark 5.11 (Deletion and availability) When deleting an object, the availability of the ob-
ject is no longer given. Therefore, deletion is allowed only if the availability of the object is
no longer needed. The information model addresses this in the rule γρ10 for deleting objects
by allowing the deletion of objects only where no other subject has access to those objects. As
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long as at least one subject has access to an object, the deletion of the object is forbidden. In
such a case, the object is said to be “locked”. This mechanism of locking objects can be used
to control the deletion of objects. In addition, a new subject having the object’s security class
is added to the system γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0). The new subject is used to lock the object (or its
backup instance) as long as it has to be available. It is possible then to control the deletion of
objects by giving and rescinding access privileges to the locking subject.
Remark 5.12 (Modelling confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location) Analogously
to Remark 5.8 and Remark 5.9, confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location can be mod-
elled at the same time by using combined security classes that are defined as quadruples of
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location classes which are defined by:
c,i,av,locSC⊂ cSC× iSC×avSC× locSCwith c,i,av,locSCi =(cSCi, iSCi, avSCi, locSCi)∈ c,i,av,locSC
where cSCi ∈ cSC, iSCi ∈ iSC, avSCi ∈ avSC, and locSCi ∈ locSC.
Allowed information flow is defined:
c,i,a,locSC1 7→ c,i,a,locSC2 if and only if cSC1 7→ cSC2 and iSC1 7→ iSC2 and avSC1 7→ avSC2 and
locSC1 7→ locSC2 where c,i,a,locSC1, c,i,a,locSC2 ∈ c,i,av,locSC, cSC1, cSC2 ∈ cSC, iSC1, iSC2 ∈ iSC,
avSC1, avSC2 ∈ avSC, and locSC1, locSC2 ∈ locSC.
Then, (c,i,av,locSC, 7→) is partially ordered and finite (due to the fact that cSC, iSC, avSC,
and locSC are partial ordered and finite). Therefore, Denning’s Axioms apply (cf. Theorem 5.2)
and (c,i,av,locSC, 7→,⊕,⊗) is a lattice with upper bound c,i,av,locSCL =(cSCL, iSCL, avSCL, locSCL)
and lower bound c,i,av,locSCH = (cSCH , iSCH , avSCH , locSCH).
5.3.4 Information flow control in the cloud management process
In Section 5.3.1 a general model for lattice-based information flow control was introduced
which applies to modelling the security properties that are essential for addressing the challenge
of location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6), namely, confidentiality and integrity (cf. Remark 5.8),
availability (cf. Section 5.3.3), and location determination (cf. Section 5.3.2). To address the
challenge of location inhomogeneity in clouds, the control of the information flow of virtual
resources has to be modelled and decisions on allowed information flow have to be integrated
into the resource management of cloud infrastructures. The resource management of cloud
infrastructures is formally described in the IaaS cloud computing entity-relationship model in
Section 4.1. In particular, the cloud management process cmp : P(VR)×P(HW) (cf. Sec-
tion 4.1.4.4) maps virtual resources VR to hardware resources HW. This makes is possible to
describe for each virtual resource vr ∈VR the hosting hardware resource hr = cmp(vr)∈HW.
In this section, the application of the lattice-based model for information flow control on
the cloud management process is presented. Further, it is shown that if decisions of the resource
management are modelled as the cloud management process then the validity of these decisions
is enforceable by security classes defined on virtual resources and hardware resources.
5.3.4.1 Application of lattice-based information flow control on virtual resources
According to the considerations on modelling information flow of virtual resources in Sec-
tion 5.2.3, hardware resources are modelled as subjects, i.e., S = HW, and virtual resources
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are modelled as objects, i.e., O = VR. Further, security bindings for virtual resources are de-
fined according to the corporate customers’ requirements on confidentiality, integrity, availabil-
ity, and location-determination using corresponding security classes SC := c,i,av,locSC covering
these properties (cf. Remark 5.12). Analogously, security bindings for hardware resources
are defined according to their provided security properties. Further, the access operations of
hardware resources on virtual resources are described as follows.
• r (read): virtual resource is viewed by hardware resource (e.g., loading virtual machine
image).
• a (append): virtual resource is modified by hardware resource (e.g., configuring virtual
resource).
• w (write): virtual resource is viewed and modified by hardware resource (e.g., coping
virtual resource).
• e (execute): virtual resource is executed by hardware resource (e.g., starting virtual ma-
chine instance).
• c (control): hardware resource extends access to other hardware resources (e.g., migra-
tion triggered by hardware resource operating as compute manager, cf. Section 4.1.4.1).
Access requests by hardware resources are modelled as request elements (cf. Def. 5.14) and
requests (cf. Def. 5.12). For example, when hardware resource hw ∈ HW has to configure a
virtual resource vr ∈VR, the corresponding request element is get with request ( /0,hw,vr,a) ∈
γR (cf. Def 5.33). Then, rule γρ2 applies.1
Further, there are operations on virtual resources that are controlled by the cloud man-
agement process, namely, creation, destruction, duplication, and migration. According to the
considerations in Section 5.2.3, these operations can be described by combined access opera-
tions as follows.
• Virtual resource creation: hardware resource accesses virtual resource in execute mode,
in particular covered by the access element create (cf. Def. 5.14);
• Virtual resource destruction: hardware resource accesses virtual resource in execute and
control mode, in particular covered by the access element delete (cf. Def. 5.14);
• Virtual resource duplication: hardware resource accesses virtual resource in write2 and
execute mode;
1According Bell and La Padula [127], the first subject of a request has to be empty when requesting access in
append mode.
2Copying a virtual resource includes viewing the virtual resource at the source hardware resource and modifying
it at the target hardware resource. This includes the creation of a new virtual resource at the target hardware
resource. The new virtual resource is a copy of the virtual resource at the source hardware resource. A copy is
intentionally identical to the original version, but does not necessarily have to be, for example, due to bit errors
during the copying process or malicious modification. Therefore, copying virtual resources is modelled as access
in write mode.
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• Virtual resource migration: hardware resource accesses virtual resource in write and ex-
ecute mode (copying and starting new virtual resource), and hardware resource accesses
virtual resource in execute and control mode (stopping and deleting original virtual re-
source).
The access requests of the hardware resources necessary for each access operation are again
modelled as request elements (cf. Def. 5.14) and requests (cf. Def. 5.12). Additionally, the
cloud management process controlling the combined access operations has to be modelled,
which is described in Section 5.3.4.2.
Then, the system γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) (cf. Def. 5.35) with the rules γΩ (cf. Def. 5.39) de-
scribes the access of hardware resources to virtual resources based on the information flow
allowed between security classes of subjects and objects.
5.3.4.2 Modelling information flow control in the cloud management process
In cloud infrastructures, the information flow of virtual resources is coordinated by the cloud
management process cmp (cf. Section 4.1.4.4). The cloud management process assigns virtual
resources to hardware resources. To decide and enforce the allowed information flow, this as-
signment has to comply with the decisions of the system γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0). To achieve this,
the operations on virtual resources controlled by the cloud management process (namely, cre-
ation, destruction, duplication, and migration) are modelled as request elements (cf. Def. 5.14)
and requests (cf. Def. 5.12) in the system γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0), and the decisions (cf. Def. 5.15)
of γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) are applied to the cloud management process enforcing the allowed in-
formation flow. The modelling of each operation on virtual resources controlled by the cloud
management process is described in the following.
The creation of virtual resources is modelled as the request element create (cf. Def. 5.14).
For example, if a virtual machine vm ∈ VM is requested by a corporate customer, the cloud
management processes selects a compute server with hypervisor cshs ∈CS at hosting site hs ∈
HS for hosting vm. In γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0), cshs is subject Scshs ∈ S and vm is object Ovm ∈
O. Since a new virtual machine is requested and should be started (i.e., executed) by the
selected compute server, the corresponding request element is create (cf. Def. 5.14) with the
corresponding request ( /0,Scshs ,Ovm,e) ∈ γR (cf. Def 5.33). Then, rule γρ9 applies.1
When creating new objects, it is necessary to classify them (i.e., assigning a security class).
By default, the security class of the creating subject is assigned to the created object, which is
reasonable for ensuring a secure system [127]. In the context of cloud computing, the secu-
rity class of the object is requested by corporate customers, which do not necessarily have to
comply with the security class of assigned hardware resources. Therefore, it is necessary to
ensure that information flow from the requested security class to the security class of the hard-
ware resource is allowed (security preserving; cf. Def. 5.36), and that information flow from
the requested security class to the security class of other virtual resources that are modified by
the hardware resource is allowed (∗-property preserving; cf. Def. 5.36). A possible solution
is to select only hardware resources with security classes where information flow is security
1According Bell and La Padula [127], the first subject of a request has to be empty when requesting the object
creation.
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preserving and ∗-property preserving. Then, the virtual resource is created by the hardware
resource (i.e., create) and, afterwards, the security class is set to the security class requested
by the corporate customer (i.e., change). It is also possible to combine the two requests to a
single request by introducing a new request element create+ for creating objects with assigned
security classes. The corresponding rule is derived from the existing rule γρ9 as follows.
• Rule 9+ (create+-object-with-assigned-security-class) ρ+9 : A subject S can create an
object O where scb(O) = sc with scb(O)∈ SCB security binding of object O and sc∈ SC
assigned security class if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) O does not exist;
(ii) (security preserving) scb(O) 7→ scb(S); and
(iii) (∗-property preserving) for all objects O′ where S can write to (i.e., access in append
and write mode) is true: scb(O) 7→ scb(O′).
By design, the rule ρ+9 is security preserving (cf. Def. 5.36) and ∗-property preserving (cf.
Def. 5.37). The extended set of rules including ρ+9 is denoted:
γΩ+ := γΩ∪{ρ+9 }. Then, the
system γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) with the rules γΩ+ is secure and satisfies the ∗-property.
The destruction of a virtual resource is modelled as the request element delete. There is
no information flow during the deletion of a virtual resources. Therefore, objects are deleted
independently of their security class, and the rule γρ10 applies without modifications. To en-
sure availability, it might be necessary to prevent deletion by “locking” virtual resources using
a hardware resource sustaining access to the virtual resource (cf. Remark 5.11). A possible im-
plementation in the cloud management process is that a specific hardware resource is assigned
to operate the virtual resource (or a backup instance) which is deleted only on the request of
the corporate customer (or when the availability of the virtual resource is no longer needed).
Remark 5.13 (Deletion through hardware failure) It is possible that the failure of a hard-
ware resource results in the deletion of virtual resources that are running upon them. For
example, the hardware resource is physically destroyed. The resulting deletion of the virtual
resource is an illegal operation in the information model since the deletion of objects is caused
by the removal of subjects and not by a requested access of a subject. Such dependency of
subjects and objects is specific to the information flow of virtual resources and is not covered
by the general model on information flow. Therefore, the deletion of virtual resources due to
the failure of hardware resources is a covert channel in the model undermining the availability
property. This covert channel can be addressed in the cloud management process by assign-
ing recovery functions to hardware resources (cf. fault management in Section 4.1.3.2) which
ensure the recovery of virtual resources in the even of such deletions. However, the mitiga-
tion/prevention of the covert channel depends on the effectiveness of the recovery functions.
The duplication of virtual resources is modelled as the request element get requesting
write access in combination with the request element create+. This is made plausible by look-
ing at the four steps that are necessary to duplicate a virtual resources. First, the hardware
resource requires access to the origin virtual resource in read mode (step 1). Second, the hard-
ware resource has to create a new virtual resource with the same security class as that of the
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origin virtual resource (step 2). Third, the hardware resource requires access to the created
virtual resource in append mode for copying data and states of the origin virtual resource (step
3). Finally, after completion of the copy process, the hardware resource requires access to the
created virtual resource in execute mode for starting it (step 4). Therefore, a subject requires
access in read, append, and execute mode to complete the duplication. The duplication is only
possible if all necessary access privileges are granted and information flow between the sub-
ject’s and object’s security class is allowed according to the corresponding rules (i.e., ρ1 and
ρ2). The access in execute mode depends solely on the granted execute access privilege for
the newly created virtual resource, since execute is allowed independently of the subject’s and
object’s security class. Further, the execute access privilege can be assigned on object creation
by the creating subject. Thus, access in execute mode is allowed if execute access privilege is
assigned on object creation. The access in read and append mode depends on granted access
privileges and allowed information flow between the subject’s and object’s security class. Both,
origin object and duplicate object have the same security class. Therefore, access to the dupli-
cate object in append mode is allowed if and only if access to the origin object in append mode
is allowed. Further, access in read and append mode is equivalent to access in write mode.
This implies that access to the origin object in write mode is allowed if and only if access to the
origin object in read mode and access to the duplicate object in append mode is allowed. Con-
sequently, all access operations necessary for the duplication are allowed if access to the origin
object in write mode is allowed and execute access privilege is assigned on object creation. If a
subject does not have the write access privilege on the origin object or execute is assigned when
the object is created, the duplication fails and is aborted. On abortion, the system is still secure
which is made plausible by looking at each step. If duplication fails at step 1 then the subject
is not allowed to access the origin object in read mode (i.e., γρ1 return the decision no). If du-
plication fails at step 2 the subject is allowed to access the origin object in read mode but is not
allowed to create a new object (i.e., γρ9 return the decision no). If duplication fails at step 3 the
subject is allowed to access the origin object in read mode and to create a new object but is not
allowed to access the created object in append mode (i.e., γρ2 return the decision no). Since
the access privilege append is set when the object is created, this can happen only if the created
object has a security class to which information is not allowed from security classes of other
objects that the subject has access to. This implies that a wrong security class was assigned
on creation in step 2. However, the system is secure since no information flow is allowed. If
duplication fails on step 3 then the subject is allowed to access the origin object in read mode,
to create the new objects, and to access the new object in append mode but is not allowed to
access the new object in execute mode (i.e., γρ3 return the decision no). This only can happen
if execute access privilege was not set when the object was created in step 2. Since there is no
information flow on access in execute mode, the system is secure, independently of whether
it has execute access privilege set. Moreover, it is possible to manually set the execute access
privilege by the cloud management process, to repeat step 4, and to successfully complete the
duplication.
The migration of virtual resources is modelled similarly to the duplication of virtual
resources by the request element get requesting write and execute access in combination with
the request elements create+ and delete. This is made plausible by looking at the six steps that
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are necessary to migrate a virtual resource. The first four steps are identical to the duplication
of virtual resources. After duplication the hardware resources require access to the origin
virtual resources in execute mode to stop it (step 5). Then, the hardware resource requires
access in control mode to delete the origin virtual resource (step 6). Therefore, additionally to
duplication, the execute and control access privileges for the origin virtual resource are required
and the deletion of the origin virtual resource must be possible. Otherwise, the migration is
aborted after duplication. Consequently, before starting duplication, the subject that requests
access for migrating the object must have the write, execute, and control access privileges for
the origin object. As with the duplication, the system is secure if migration is aborted. This is
made plausible by looking at each step. Steps 1-4 are analogous to duplication. If migration
fails on step 5 the subject is not allowed access to the origin virtual resources in execute mode
(i.e., γρ3 return the decision no). As in step 3, the system is secure independently of whether the
execute access privilege is set, which means that it is possible to manually set the execute access
privilege through the cloud management process, to repeat step 5, and to successfully complete
the duplication. If migration fails on step 6 then the subject is not allowed to delete the object
(i.e., γρ10 return the decision no). There are two cases: (1) the subject is not allowed to access
the object in control mode, and (2) there exist other subjects having access to the object. In both
cases, the system is secure since no information flow is allowed. In the first case, the subject is
allowed to access the object in write and execute mode but not in control mode. This is the case
if the object was created by another subject because the control access privilege is only set on
object creation. A possible solution is that the cloud management process signals the subject
which has access privilege to delete the object. Another solution is to define a request element
for handing over the control of an object to another subject and define an applicable rule. Since
there is no information flow when accessing an object in control mode, in both solutions the
systems is secure. In the second case, the origin object is locked by the access of another
subject. In general, the system remains secure if the object is not deleted, since the system is
secure before requesting the object’s deletion and γρ10 is security and ∗-property preserving
(in particular, if requests are rejected). Moreover, after migration, all access operations on the
origin object have to be redirected to the new object, since the new object replaces the origin
object. Therefore, it is reasonable that all access operations on the origin object terminate after
the migration is completed. However, it can take some time until all access operations are
terminated. For that reason, the cloud management process has to coordinate the termination
and redirection of access operations to ensure the origin object’s deletion. Further, the point of
time, when the origin object is deleted, has no influence on the system’s security since access
control on the object is decided by the system normally until the object is deleted.
To conclude, information flow control for all operations controlled by the cloud manage-
ment process can be modelled as the system γΣ(γR,D, γW , γz0) with the rules ρ+9 . Further, the
cloud management process is not modelled as a subject of the system but on the access opera-
tions of subjects that are instructed by the cloud management process. In particular, the cloud
management process interacts with subjects of multiple security classes and, therefore, operates
on multiple levels of security. Consequently, the cloud management process has to be trusted
in the sense of not introducing covert channels between objects (i.e., virtual resources) and/or
subjects (i.e., hardware resources). In this thesis, it is assumed that the cloud management
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process is trusted in the sense of not introducing covert channels. A possible approach using
non-interference policies [193] in the cloud management process is discussed in the outlook in
Section 7.3.
5.3.4.3 Implementing security policies using security classes and security bindings
To express legal requirements and corporate customers’ preferences on virtual resource
placement in clouds, security polices have to be defined and enforced at the cloud providers.
This is done by defining security classes expressing the necessary and provided level of pro-
tection of hardware resources and virtual resources. For example, if a corporate customer
requests a virtual resource that is processed only in Germany, the assigned location class is
locSCDE ∈ locSC where DE ∈ T is corresponding territory of the German legislation. Further,
the ordering of security classes is used to define security policies for allowed information flow.
For example, if information is allowed to flow from Europe to Germany but not vice versa
then information flow for the corresponding security classes locSCDE , locSCEU ∈ locSC is de-
fined locSCEU 7→ locSCDE . By defining security bindings for hardware resources and virtual
resources, the applicability of the security policies to hardware resources and virtual resources
is specified.
Figure 5.3: Example for security classes on confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location-
determination
Secret
High
Low
99.99%
99.95%
99.9%
Public
100%
0%
Confidentiality Classes
Integrity Classes
Location Classes Availabilty Classes
Global
US
EU
DE FR
Local
Figure 5.3 depicts an example of security classes with respect to confidentiality, integrity,
availability and location-determination. In the figure, information is allowed to flow from
bottom to top but not vice versa. Confidentiality is modelled using the two discrete confiden-
tiality classes public and secret, where, for example, secret is applied to resources that support
hardware-based encryption (like TPM) and public to any resource else. Integrity is also mod-
elled using the two discrete integrity classes low and high, where, for example, high is applied
to resources that support cryptographic integrity checks (like remote attestation of TPM) and
low to any resource else. Location is modelled using the location classes corresponding to the
territories of Germany (DE), France (FR), European Union (EU), and USA (US) as well as the
lower bound (Global) and upper bound (Local) of location classes locSCglobal, locSClocal ∈ locSC.
Availability is modelled using five availability classes including the lower and upper bound
avSC0%, avSC100% ∈ avSC.
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Figure 5.4: Example of classifying hardware resources and embedded virtual resources by allowed
information flow
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Figure 5.4 depicts an example of applying the security classes depicted in Figure 5.3 to
hardware and virtual resources, and deciding on the resource embedding by the cloud provider.
There are five hardware resources operated by three hardware providers and one virtual re-
source processing personal data of German customers. The hardware resources and the virtual
resource have assigned security classes and for each hardware resource the placement of the
virtual resource is evaluated by allowed information flow. Further, there are two possible place-
ments: (1) on Hardware Resource A.1 and (2) on Hardware Resource B.2. All other
hardware resources do not have sufficient security classes. An interesting observation is that
Hardware Resource A.1 is a perfect match and Hardware Resource B.2 over-provisions
in respect of availability. In addition, the under-provisioning of Hardware Resource B.1 is
limited to integrity, which is less severe then the under-provisioning of Hardware Resource
A.2 that also does not fulfil the confidentiality requirements. The Hardware Resource A.2
under-provisions with respect to location. With respect to data protection law, under-provi-
sioning location is considered a more severe problem than under-provisioning confidentiality
or integrity.1 To efficiently embed virtual resources on hardware resources, it is necessary to
avoid over-provisioning. Further, for evaluating compliance breaches (i.e., assigning virtual
resources to hardware resources with insufficient security classes) it is necessary to measure
the severity of under-provisioning. To address this issue, in Section 5.4.2, metrics on security
classes are defined that allow the degree of under- and over-provisioning to be measured.
1A transmission to a wrong location is a breach of data protection law since data are transferred to an unauthorised
recipient. A lack of confidentiality may result in access to an unauthorised recipient (since data are not sufficiently
protected) but does not necessarily have to. A lack of integrity can cause unauthorised modifications but never
results in an unauthorised access. However, neglecting confidentiality and integrity is a breach of the due diligence.
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During life-time of a virtual resource or hardware resource, it can be necessary to change its
security class. In the information model presented in Section 5.3, changing the security classes
of objects is allowed, if no subject is accessing it. Further, it is assumed that security classes of
subjects do not change. This implies that the security class of a virtual resource can be changed
if no hardware resource has access to it, i.e., the virtual resource is neither executed nor stored
by any hardware resource. This is reasonable since security classes of virtual resources are
changed only on the request of the corporate customers and the changed security classes do not
necessarily have to comply with the currently assigned hardware resource. Further, only an en-
tity operating on multiple levels of security is allowed to change the classification, i.e., only the
cloud management can do that. Again, this is reasonable since the cloud provider executes the
customers’ requests (including changing security classes of virtual machines). Consequently,
changing security classes of virtual machines is implemented by stopping and withdrawing
them from the assigned hardware resource (e.g., by temporarily storing them through the cloud
management process and deleting them at the hardware resources). Then, the security class is
changed and it is reassigned to a hardware resource with a sufficient security class. That there
is no change to the security classes of hardware resources is also reasonable since hardware re-
sources in clouds are not mobile and the security properties of hardware usually do not change.
However, it may be necessary to change security classes of hardware resources because of
an exceptional event (e.g., relocating servers to another data centre or upgrading availability).
This can be done by removing the hardware resource from the system after all access to virtual
resources has been terminated and then adding it again with changed security classes. Since all
access is terminated before removing the subject, the security of the system is given. However,
the cloud management process has to ensure that no covert channels occur (e.g., the hard disk
of a server is not deleted before changing security classes).
To conclude, the information model presented in Section 5.3 is applicable to model secu-
rity policies at the cloud provider, which are necessary to address the challenge of the location
inhomogeneity in clouds (cf. Def. 4.6). In particular, (1) the location of data processing is
modelled as the location classes of hardware resources, (2) the category of processed data is
modelled as the corresponding security classes describing the necessary level of security, (3)
the origin of processor, controller, and data subject is modelled as the location class of virtual
resources which is utilised to process data of the corresponding entity describing the ensured
level of security, and (4) applicable requirements from contracts and SLA are modelled as se-
curity classes with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location-determination.
Therefore, the security classes classify the hardware resources and virtual resources. Security
policies describes the information flow allowed between security classes, and they are applied
according to the security bindings of hardware resources and virtual resources. Therefore, the
lattice-based model on information flow control presented in this section is suitable to address
the challenge of the location inhomogeneity in clouds.
5.4 Implementing information flow control
To solve the challenge of location inhomogeneity in clouds (cp. Def. 4.6), it is necessary to
describe the context of decision and enforcement. This can be done by using an information
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model for a decision based on the ensured level of security and to enforce the necessary level
of security. In Section 5.3, a suitable information model was presented that applies to the cloud
management process for deciding and enforcing allowed information flow. In addition to the
information model – for addressing the challenge of the location inhomogeneity in clouds – it
is necessary to reliably identify information on the location of data processing and its ensured
level of security as well as to implement decision and enforcement in the resource allocation
in cloud infrastructures. Further, monitoring of and reporting on legally compliant decision-
making and enforcement is important for fulfilling the contract of IT outsourcing to the cloud
(cf. Section 4.3). For that reason, the cloud provider has to monitor the resource allocation and
report on its legal compliance to the corporate customer.
In this section, possible approaches on trustworthy resource classification, resource alloca-
tion and management, and compliance reporting and management are investigated. First, meth-
ods for reliably providing information on the location of hardware resources and their effective
level of security are discussed. In particular, the management of trust between cloud providers
and hardware providers is addressed. Then, implementation of the information model in the re-
source allocation is investigated with respect to effective decision-making and enforcement. In
particular, metrics for measuring over- and under-provisioning with respect to security classes
of virtual resources and hardware resources are presented. Finally, methods for monitoring and
reporting on compliant resource allocation by the cloud provider are investigated. Particular
consideration is given to the application of operation control by the corporate customers.
5.4.1 Trustworthy resource classification
When operating a cloud infrastructure, the cloud provider has to ensure the compliant allo-
cation of hardware resources for hosting virtual resources requested by corporate customers.
The decision-making and enforcement when it comes to resource allocation are based on the
classification of hardware resources which depends on the hardware resources’ location and
the effective level of security (cf. Section 5.3.4). In general, the hardware resources are not
under the direct control of the cloud provider since they are operated by subcontracted hard-
ware providers. Therefore, the cloud provider has to rely on the correctness of the location of
hardware resources and the effective level of security provided by the hardware provider. In
particular, the information on hardware resource location and the effective level of security has
to be accurate, to allow a correct classification of hardware resources. Since this information is
provided by the hardware provider, the cloud provider has to be able to trust this information,
i.e., there has to be a relationship of trust between cloud provider and hardware provider. In
practice, the relationship of trust is established on a contractual basis. When subcontracting
hardware providers, location and the effective level of security is defined in the contract signed
by the hardware provider. However, provided hardware resources do not necessarily have to
comply with the contractual requirements. For example, due to hardware failure the availability
of hardware resources is lower that what was contracted. It is also possible that requirements
for hardware resources may vary and are requested on demand. For example, hardware re-
sources are highly available only when explicitly requested at the time when virtual resources
are assigned, otherwise they have a lower availability. Therefore, for operation control, it is
necessary that the cloud provider should have the capability to verify the hardware resource lo-
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cation and the effective level of security. Manual controls, i.e., inspecting each hosting site and
their hardware resources physically, are not suitable for large cloud infrastructures. In partic-
ular in global cloud scenarios there are multiple hosting sites established in multiple countries
which have to be inspected individually by personnel being physically present. Additionally,
hosting sites does not host exclusively for a single cloud provider but can have multiple cus-
tomers. Thus, physical inspections by each customer are often not practical and, moreover,
physical security may be undermined if physical access is frequently granted to externals. In
addition, there exist IT security standards for the secure operation of hardware resources (e.g.,
Trusted Site Infrastructure [206], ISO/IEC 27001 [112]).
A better solution is for all information on location and the effective level of security to be
provided and validated automatically, and instead of physically inspecting the hosting sites, the
hosting sites security is implemented and certified according to IT security standards such as
Trusted Site Infrastructure [206] and ISO/IEC 27001 [112]. Consequently, the question arises
as to what technical possibilities exist to validate hardware resources’ location and an effec-
tive level of security remotely and automatically. In the context of this thesis, the hardware
resources’ effective level of security depends on their capabilities to ensure confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability. In the following, technical capabilities when it comes to remote and
automated validation of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location are discussed:
Confidentiality can be ensured remotely by transmitting only encrypted data and keeping
the key for decryption secret. Data processing on encrypted data at the current state of the art is
possible using homomorphic encryption schemes. They are, however feasible only for simple
operations like computing sum and variance of numeric values [147]. Complex operations
on encrypted data like program or virtual machine execution are still beyond the state of the
art. Therefore, data has to be decrypted at remote locations to enable data processing. For that
reason, hardware resources at remote locations have to be able to protect decrypted information
from disclosure, and the effectiveness of enforcing non-disclosure has to be attested remotely.
Here, it is possible to ensure trusted computing in cloud infrastructures by using a trusted
hypervisor [79]. In particular, trusted hypervisors can be utilised to ensure confidential data
processing on virtual resources by controlling access to virtual resources and enforcing the
encryption of virtual storage [180, pp. 19-26]. Further, trusted hypervisors support remote
attestation of executed virtual resources and software [79] [180, pp. 16-19], which can be
utilised to validate whether there was access to confidential virtual resources and they were
operating correctly. This information can be used to validate whether confidentiality has been
ensured at remote locations, and particularly, to detect unauthorised access to virtual resources
[80].
Integrity is difficult to ensure remotely since existing methods on integrity protection ad-
dress detection and correction of modifications but do not prevent the processing of modified
data (cf. Section 4.2.3.1). Therefore, hardware resources at remote locations have to be able to
protect the integrity of virtual resources (e.g., ECC [94] and cryptographic hashes [59]). Fur-
ther, it is possible to validate integrity by using cryptographic hash functions in combination
with signature schemes reliably (e.g., Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [152]). Using trusted
hypervisors as well, the integrity of virtual resources, executed software and processed data at
remote locations can be attested remotely [79] [180, pp. 16-19].
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Availability is also difficult to ensure remotely since controlling availability requires phys-
ical access to the hardware resource. Therefore, the availability of hardware resources has to be
ensured at the remote location (i.e., by the hardware provider). A possible strategy to address
this issue remotely is to introduce redundancy where the use of multiple hardware resources
ensures the operation of specific virtual resources (e.g., distributed storage replication [124]).
This can help to ensure the availability of virtual resources but does not help to ensure the
availability of individual hardware resources. However, the availability of a specific hardware
resource can be validated remotely by measuring its uptime and downtime based on possible
remote access and calculating the asymptotic availability (cf. Def. 5.43).
Location of hardware resources cannot be ensured remotely since physical control of the
hardware resource is necessary. Further, determining the location of hardware resources re-
motely is a widely investigated problem. In wired networks, existing approaches can be clas-
sified into semantic-based and measurement-based. In semantic-based approaches, the infor-
mation on the IP address is mapped to location information, for example by using the routing
information and location information of reference hosts to locate clusters of IP addresses [160].
In measurement-based approaches, the round trip time is used to estimate the propagation de-
lay and the resulting distance to so called ‘landmarks’ (i.e., hosts with known location), for
example, Shortest Ping [226]. There also exist approaches using multiple landmarks, e.g.,
Constraint Based Geolocation (CBG) [91]. Further, there exist hybrid approaches which are
semantic- and measurement-based, for example, 3-Tier Geolocation [218] which estimates the
postal address of hosts by combining Constraint Based Geolocation, traceroute, and mapping
IP addresses to postal codes. Semantic-based approaches are limited by the topographic neigh-
bourhood of the IP addresses and do not apply to private address spaces.1 In virtual networks,
private address spaces are used, and at the access network, gateways with Network Address
Translation (NAT) are usually used, masking the connection endpoint in the virtual network.
Measurement-based approaches are limited by the accuracy of measuring the propagation de-
lay. Since the round-trip time is measured to estimate the propagation delay, the measurement
is influenced by any delay that applies to the round-trip time. In virtual networks, the substrate
network does not necessarily have the same topology as the embedded network. Therefore,
additional delays are introduced by hidden routers and links in the substrate network. Further,
the connection end-point does not necessarily have to be the host processing the data, since
network relaying to the data processing host is possible. Then, the propagation delay after
the connection end-point is indistinguishable from the processing delay of the back-end sys-
tem. Nonetheless, measurement-based approaches can be accurate if sufficient landmarks are
available and they are combined with semantic-based approaches – for example, 3-Tier Ge-
olocation has a mean error of less than 1 km [218]. An alternative approach to determining
the location of hardware resources remotely is to let the hardware resources themselves pro-
vide location information and validate the correctness of this information (e.g., by plausibility
checks using measurement-based location determination like 3-Tier Geolocation). If hardware
resources support TPM it is possible to authenticate hardware resources uniquely by their cryp-
tographic key [15]. In addition, the location of hardware resources with TPM support can be
verified through physical inspection (particularly by authorised third parties), and it is possible
1According to RFC 1918 [169], private address spaces are 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, and 192.168.0.0/16.
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to reference these hardware resources in contracts.
To conclude, cloud providers can classify hardware resources’ thrustworthiness by confi-
dentiality, integrity, availability, and location, since it is technically possible to verify the clas-
sification remotely for each hardware resource. The key technology is the hardware resources’
support of TPM which enables remote attention and authentication of hardware resources.
5.4.2 Resource allocation and management
The compliant allocation of hardware resources for hosting virtual resources requires the con-
sideration of security bindings of hardware resources and virtual resources and the allowed
information flow between them. This has a major impact on resource allocation and man-
agement since the allowed embeddings of virtual resources on hardware resources are limited
by security constraints. For practical implementation, it is necessary to provide measures to
establish whether an embedding is compliant with the security constraints, and for optimal
resource utilisation, the degree of over-provisioned hardware resources in respect of security
constraints of virtual resources has to be quantified. Based on the qualitative observations in
Section 5.3.4.3, a quantitative approach to validating the resource embedding and its integration
into existing resource allocation strategies are discussed in this section. First, a brief overview
of the resource allocation problem and the importance of metrics on optimisations criteria is
given. Then, possible approaches to and application of quantitative metrics based on security
classes are discussed.
In general, resource allocation is an NP-hard optimisation problem which corresponds to
the multi-dimensional bin packing problem (e.g., finding an embedding of all virtual resources
[214]), to the knapsack problem (e.g., maximising the economic profit and SLA fulfilment
[210]), and to the min-max optimisation problem generally (e.g., minimising required hard-
ware resources and maximising the use of hardware resources [133]). In the context of virtual
network embedding, a comprehensive classification of the resource allocation problem and its
possible solutions is provided by Fischer et al. [73]. In the survey, it is observed that possible
solutions for virtual network embedding can be classified into accurate and heuristic solutions.
Moreover, the quality of the heuristic solutions is evaluated by using metrics based on opti-
misation criteria like QoS-compliance, economic profit, and resilience. These observations
also apply to resource allocation in clouds where existing approaches address similar optimisa-
tion criteria (e.g., performance, costs, locality, and reliability) on recource allocation [132, pp.
12–16]. Consequently, metrics on optimisation criteria are an important input for resource allo-
cation strategies and their evaluation. This is also true when implementing resource allocation
based on security bindings and allowed information flow. Metrics with respect to confidential-
ity, integrity, availability, and location are required to evaluate resource allocation according to
the constraints of information flow control.
A good candidate for defining metrics are the distances between the partially ordered se-
curity classes. By comparing the required security class with the assigned security class, it is
then possible to measure the quality of the embedding. Because of the partial order, there are
four cases that have to be considered when comparing the required security class SCreq ∈ SC
with the assigned security class SCass ∈ SC:
166
Case 1 (SCreq = SCass): If both security classes are equal there is a perfect match and the
distance is defined as zero.
Case 2 (SCreq 7→ SCass): If information flow is allowed from the required security class to
the assigned security class then there is a valid match. If the two security classes are not the
same there is over-provisioning and, assuming the security classes are ordered equidistantly,
the distance between two security classes is measured by counting the number of edges on the
path between the two security classes within the lattice of security classes.1
Case 3 (SCass 7→ SCreq): If information flow is allowed from the assigned security class to
the required security class then there is an invalid match, if the two security classes are not the
same. Then, there is under-provisioning and the distance is defined by the negative distance of
both security classes analogously to case 2.
Case 4 (No information allowed): If there is no information flow allowed between re-
quired and assigned security classes then there is an invalid match. Since there is no infor-
mation flow allowed, the distance cannot be measured by the distance between both security
classes. However, the greatest lower bound of both security classes defines the smallest secu-
rity class to where information is allowed to flow from both security classes and a valid match
would have been possible. This makes the greatest lower bound of both security classes a good
candidate to specify the distance of both security classes. Thus, the distance is defined (analo-
gously to case 2 and 3) by the negative distance from the required security classes to the least
upper bound of both security classes.
Figure 5.5 exemplifies the paths in the lattice of security classes for a single required se-
curity class SCreq ∈ SC and three assigned security classes SCass1,SCass2,SCass3 ∈ SC. The
information flow is allowed from bottom to top. The information flow from SCreq to SCass1 and
SCass2 is not allowed. Therefore, the distance is calculated by the path from SCreq to the corre-
sponding greatest lower bound which is SCGLB1 = SCreq⊕SCass1 and SCGLB2 = SCreq⊕SCass2,
respectively. The calculated path has a length of 2 for SCGLB1 and of 1 for SCGLB2, respec-
tively. Since the information flow is not allowed, the corresponding distance calculated by the
metric is negative. Further, the information flow from SCreq to SCass3 is allowed and the calcu-
lated path has a length of 1. Since the information flow is allowed, the corresponding distance
calculated by the metric is positive.
Figure 5.5: Example of paths and their lengths in the lattice of six security classes for a single
required and three assigned security classes. Information flow is allowed from bottom to top.
SCGLB1
SCass1
SCGLB2
SCreq SCass2
SCass3
Edge
Path to SCGLB1
Path to SCGLB2
Path to SCass3
1
12
1Edge and path are used in the context of the graph theory, i.e., an edge is a link between two vertexes (i.e., security
classes) and a path is a sequence of edges which connects a sequence of vertices.
167
According to the previous considerations, the metric dSC(SCreq,SCass) measuring the dis-
tance between required security class SCreq and assigned security class SCass is defined as
follows.
dSC(SCreq,SCass) =

0 : SCreq = SCass∣∣{SC ∈ SC\{SCreq} :
SCreq 7→ SC∧SC 7→ SCass
}∣∣ : SCreq 7→ SCass ∧
SCreq 6= SCass
− ∣∣{SC ∈ SC\{SCreq} :
SCass 7→ SC∧SC 7→ SCreq
}∣∣ : SCass 7→ SCreq ∧
SCreq 6= SCass
− ∣∣{SC ∈ SC\{SCreq} :
(SCreq⊕SCass) 7→ SC∧SC 7→ SCreq
}∣∣ : else
where SCreq,SCass ∈ SC security classes. (5.1)
The number of edges in the lattice is equal to the number of security classes on the path minus
one. Therefore, the security classes on the path are counted without starting security class (or
ending security class, respectively) SCreq. If the required and the assigned security classes are
not equal, the number of security classes in SC\{SCreq} where information flow is allowed
as specified in Equation 5.1 are counted, which is equal to the number of security classes on
the path minus one. This can be made plausible when looking at Figure 5.5. For example,
the path from SCreq to SCGLB1 has the length 2. The security classes SC ∈ SC\{SCreq} where
information flow is allowed to flow from SCGLB2 to SC are {SCGLB1,SCGLB2}. Further, the
security classes SC ∈ SC\{SCreq} where information flow is allowed to flow from SC to SCreq
are {SCGLB1,SCGLB2,SCass3}. The intersection of both results is {SCGLB1,SCGLB2} which has a
cardinality of 2.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the application of the metric dSC for the quantitative evaluation on an
example1 of virtual resource embedding. In the example, the metric is applied on confiden-
tiality classes, integrity classes, availability classes and location classes individually for each
hardware resource. The assignment of VIRTUAL RESOURCE 1 to HARDWARE RESOURCE
A.1 returns a perfect match for the distance of the confidentiality classes, integrity classes, and
availability classes, since required and assigned security classes are equal. For location, the
required security class is SCEU and the assigned security class is SCDE . Here, case 2 of the
metric applies since information flow is allowed. The calculated distance is 1 since SCEU and
SCDE are directly connected in the lattice (cf. location classes illustrated in Figure 5.3). The
assignment of VIRTUAL RESOURCE 1 to HARDWARE RESOURCE C.1 has a negative distance
for location classes since case 4 of the metric applies and the greatest lower bound SCGlobal is
used for calculating the path length resulting in a negative distance -1.
The metric dSC can be used in resource allocation strategies to find optimal embeddings
having a distance close to zero. To compare embeddings on the basis of different dimensions,
summing up non-negative values provides good results. However, considering negative values
is more complex, since summing up can result in distances close to zero, while the distance on
1The presented example corresponds to the example used in Figure 5.4. The corresponding security classes of the
example are illustrated in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.6: Example for quantitative evaluation of virtual resource embedding.
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each dimension can be high but positive and negative distances annihilate each other. A possi-
ble solution is to sum up the absolute values, and if negative values (due to under-provisioning)
should be avoided then it is possible to sum up positive and negative values separately. The lat-
ter allows the optimisation for the embedding explicitly in respect to avoiding negative values.
Further, the metric dSC is based on the assumption that all security classes are equidistant.
This is not necessarily always true. For example, embedding virtual resources with required
location class SCEU on a hardware resource with assigned security class SCUS can have a more
severe impact on legal compliance than embedding virtual resources with required location
class SCDE on a hardware resource with assigned security class SCFR. This results from the
fact that Germany and France are both in the legislation of the EU/EEA, which is an area with
harmonised legislation, while the USA and the EU/EEA do not have harmonised legislation.
For that reason, a weighted distance model can be more suitable in providing more accurate
results for the evaluation of embedding quality. In addition, every edge in the lattice is weighted
with a factor ρ ∈R+ and the length of a path in the lattice is calculated by summing all weights
of the path’s edges.
Figure 5.7 illustrates an example of weighted distances of location classes. It is assumed
that location classes corresponding to a country are on the same level. Based on that, the
edges from location classes corresponding to a country to the maximum location class SCLocal
is weighted highest, with 5 since placement in the cloud or locally considered the decision
with the most severe impact. The edges between location classes corresponding to a country
and the minimum location class SCGlobal is weighted with 3 since it is still a severe decision
to place virtual resources within a specific country or globally. The edges between location
classes corresponding to a member state of the EU/EEA and the location class corresponding
to the EU/EEA are weighted with 1 and the edge between location classes corresponding to the
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EU/EEA and SCGlobal is weighted with 2. Then, the sum of weights on the path from location
classes corresponding to a member state to SCGlobal is 3, which corresponds to the weight of
edges between location classes corresponding to a country and SCGlobal . Further, the placement
within the EU/EEA is considered to have less severe impact than the placement outside of the
EU/EEA.
Figure 5.7: Example of weighted distances of location classes.
Global
US
EU
DE FR
Local
5 55
3
1 1
2
The weights can be assigned for each edge in the lattice individually and with respect to
applicable security requirements. It is also possible to use weights to compare security classes
of different security requirements. For example, edges of location classes are weighted at ten
times the upper bound of distances between integrity classes to ensure that location has a higher
priority than integrity when embedding virtual resources.
To conclude, the lattice-based model for information flow control also supports the defi-
nition of metrics which can be used for evaluating the quality of resource allocation in clouds
with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location. The metrics are defined
based on the length of paths between security classes in the lattices. The distance of incompa-
rable security classes can be described by the distance to the greatest upper bound. Moreover,
distances can be measured either based on equidistant security classes or on weighted edges in
the lattice.
5.4.3 Compliance monitoring and reporting
In the scenario of IT outsourcing to the cloud, compliance management by the cloud provider
and reporting on compliance to the corporate customers and authorised third parties is nec-
essary (cf. Section 4.3). When applying lattice-based information flow control to resource
allocation in clouds, the cloud provider needs mechanisms to monitor the effective resource
allocation and its compliance with the applied information control policies. Further, the results
of compliance monitoring have to be reported to the corporate customer. In the following, com-
pliance monitoring based on logging and documentation on the hardware resource and cloud
management level is investigated. Then, the reporting on compliant resource allocation by the
cloud provider to the corporate customer and authorised third parties is discussed.
Compliance monitoring in cloud infrastructures
Compliance monitoring requires logging and documentation of the performed actions and can
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be done in clouds at the level of hardware resources, virtual resources, and the cloud manage-
ment (cf. Section 4.3.1). The cloud provider operates the cloud management and, therefore,
can access logging data and documentation on the cloud management level directly. The hard-
ware resources are operated by the hardware provider. Consequently, the cloud provider has
to request the necessary logging data and documentation from the subcontracted hardware
providers. In Section 5.4.1, methods for verifying the security classification of hardware re-
sources remotely by the cloud provider are identified. These methods apply to monitoring
the compliance of resource allocation with information flow control policies and can also be
used to collect logging data and documentation provided by hardware resources. When look-
ing at IaaS, the virtual resource level is under the control of corporate customers and is not
available to the cloud provider (cf. Section 4.3.1). However, the corporate customer may use
logging information from the the virtual resource level to perform plausibility checks of the
compliance reports of the cloud provider. Further, logging data and documentation from the
virtual resource level are not necessarily required for monitoring compliant resource allocation
by cloud providers if logging data and documentation from the hardware resource level and
cloud management level are available. This is because the resource allocation has to comply
with the allowed information flow of virtual resources, and therefore depends on the correct as-
signment of virtual resources to hardware resources with respect to their security classification.
The security classification of hardware resources is monitored on the hardware resource level.
The correct assignment of virtual resources to hardware resources according to their security
classification is done in the cloud management process, and is thus monitored on the cloud
management level. Therefore, the cloud provider has access to logging data and documenta-
tion that is sufficient to monitor the compliance of resource allocation in clouds.
A possible approach is to use self-describing hardware resources in combination with TPM
support, providing trustworthy information on their security classification (cf. Section 5.4.1).
In particular, the TPM support allows the implementation of trusted hypervisors that can be
used by the cloud provider to test the integrity of virtual resources remotely [79]. The secu-
rity classification of virtual resources, the security policies on allowed information flow, and
the decisions on resource allocation can be logged and documented in the cloud management
process. If the cloud management process is operated on TPM-supporting hardware resources,
the integrity of the cloud management process can be attested, too. The compliant execution of
the cloud management process can be evaluated by using security metrics as described in Sec-
tion 5.4.2 if logging and documentation covers reliable identification of hardware and virtual
resources, their security classification and accurate information of time and mode of access to
virtual resources by hardware resources. The results of the evaluation can be used by the cloud
provider to monitor the compliance of the resource allocation at run-time and, if the results of
the evaluation are stored, also at any point in the future.
Compliance reporting to customers and authorised third parties
It is possible to use the evaluation results of the compliance monitoring to generate reports for
corporate customers (e.g., for the purpose of service operations controls) and authorised third
parties (e.g., for the purpose of IT security auditing). The metrics on confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and location which were discussed in Section 5.4.2 can be used to automatically
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detect SLA violations and, therefore, are applicable to extending existing approaches on auto-
mated compliance reporting based on SLA violations [25] [63]. The evaluation results of the
compliance monitoring can also be used as input for reporting on service operation controls.
For example, when reporting on service operation controls by ISAE 3402, the [107] the auditor
inspects the evaluation results of the compliance monitoring with respect to virtual resources
utilised by the corporate customer.
In general, it is important to consider that externals usually do not have knowledge of the
cloud infrastructure and allocated hardware resources the way the cloud provider does. In
particular, the externals’ interests lie on verifying the compliance of utilised virtual resources.
Therefore, information on the cloud infrastructure and allocated hardware resources is required
only when the SLA violation is analysed or the provided information in the compliance report
is verified for its correctness. In addition, it is generally not in the interest of the cloud provider
to provide internal information on the cloud infrastructure and hardware resources unneces-
sarily (e.g., due to protecting trade secrets). Therefore, compliance reports to externals should
focus in general on the utilised virtual resources and their compliance with respect to requested
location and the effective level of security. Additional information on how and where to find
information on involved hardware resources and related logging data should be provided to
support the analysis and verification of the information provided in the report. This can be cov-
ered by providing contact information for the entity that is responsible for hosting the virtual
resource (i.e., usually the cloud provider but it can also be the responsible hardware provider)
and the hardware resource identifiers (e.g., the cryptographic key to TPM-supporting hardware
resources [15]) to link the information provided in the report with corresponding logging data
and documentation at the cloud provider or hardware provider.
Monitoring and reporting architecture in cloud infrastructures
Assuming that all hardware resources support TPM, it is possible to attest to the security clas-
sification of hardware resources remotely (cf. Section 5.4.1) and access operations performed
by hardware resources (cf. compliance monitoring in cloud infrastructures in this section).
In particular, it is possible to use the logging data to evaluate the quality of resource alloca-
tion (cf. Section 5.4.2) and detect SLA violations (cf. compliance reporting to customers and
authorised third parties in this section). This can be utilised to build a monitoring and re-
porting architecture that aggregates and checks logging data and generates compliance reports
automatically.
Figure 5.8 illustrates a possible architecture for compliance monitoring and reporting in
cloud infrastructures. For each local cluster, logging data and results of the TPM-remote-
attestation are collected via a logging bus and stored in a database at the LOGGING AGGRE-
GATION. The LOGGING AGGREGATION provides via an access API the data to the global
cluster’s COMPLIANCE MONITOR which performs automated log checking and report gen-
eration. The logs are checked by verifying the security classification of hardware resources
and applying metrics for evaluating the quality of the resource allocation (cf. Section 5.4.2).
The reports are then generated based on the evaluation results specifically for cloud customers,
cloud providers, and authorised third parties. The logging aggregation is located at the local
cluster since the local cluster directly interacts with the hardware provider and, therefore, with
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Figure 5.8: Monitoring and reporting architecture in cloud infrastructures.
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the hardware resources. The local clusters are coordinated by the global clusters which per-
form the cloud management operations. Therefore, the compliance monitoring is located at the
global clusters since there the decisions of resource allocation have to be validated with respect
to the corporate customers’ requests.
For a secure and trustworthy operation of the monitoring and reporting architecture, it is
necessary to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the logging data and reports with respect to
their communication and their processing by the LOGGING AGGREGATOR and COMPLIANCE
MONITOR. Further, access control mechanisms have to be implemented at the reporting front-
ends to ensure authorised access only. In addition, the information provided in the reports has
to specifically address the purpose of the reporting and must not contain information that is
not to be disclosed to the recipient of the report (e.g., reports to corporate customers must not
contain data correlated to other corporate customers).
In Section 6.1, a proof-of-concept implementation of the proposed architecture based on the
OpenStack cloud platform is presented and evaluated for the scenario of compliance monitoring
and reporting with respect to location-determination.
5.5 Conclusions on tackling location inhomogeneity in clouds
The work presented in this chapter shows how the challenge of location inhomogeneity in
clouds can be addressed by controlling the flow of information between virtual resources. The
results are as follows.
1. A classification of information flows in clouds and their interdependency identifying
the information flow of processed data, which is under control of corporate customers,
and information flow of virtual resources, which is under control of cloud providers (cf.
Section 5.1)).
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2. A lattice-based model for information flow control on virtual resources combing
and extending existing methods of Bell and La Padula, Denning, and Biba to support
multidimensional security classifications generally (cf. Section 5.3).
3. Two lattices of security classes modelling availability and location constraints, which
are used (in conjunction with existing lattices on confidentiality and integrity) to model
information flow control in clouds tackling the challenge of location inhomogeneity (cf.
Section 5.3.2 and Section 5.3.3).
4. A proposal for the implementation of information flow control in the cloud manage-
ment process including a trustworthy resources classification, secure resource allocation
and management, and reliable compliance monitoring and reporting (cf. Section 5.4).
5. A security-class-based metric for evaluating the quality of resource allocation in
clouds, which allows to compare mutli-dimensional security characteristics and is ready
to use in existing resource allocation algorithms (cf. Section 5.4.2).
6. A compliance monitoring and reporting architecture in clouds, which is based on the
classification of virtual resources and hardware resources (cf. Section 5.4.3).
It is now possible to introduce information flow control to the cloud management process,
which is able to allocate cloud resources according to the effective levels of security at the
hardware resource locations. The corporate customers can assign the necessary level of secu-
rity when requesting virtual resources, which are then classified to the corporate customers’
specifications. The methods of information flow control enable the cloud provider to properly
assign the requested virtual resources to hardware resources in compliance with the necessary
level of security. Further, the trustworthy classification of cloud resources allows for continu-
ous monitoring of resource placement and enables compliance reporting to corporate customers
and authorised third parties. Moreover, the cloud provider can use the monitoring and reporting
for internal inspections. In Chapter 6, the feasibility of the approach presented is investigated
through experimental evaluation of a proof-of-concept implementation and analytical evalua-
tion in respect to technical and legal characteristics.
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Chapter 6
Implementation and Evaluation
In Chapter 5, an information model is presented which is able to describe information flow con-
trol based on legal requirements identified in Chapter 3. A particular requirements are access
and transfer control of cloud resources, whose technical implementation bears the challenge of
location inhomogeneity (cf. Def. 4.6). This challenge is addressed in this thesis particularly by
introducing location-determined data processing in clouds.
In this chapter, a proof-of-concept implementation of location-determined data processing
including compliance monitoring and reporting is presented (Objective 6). Further, the fea-
sibility of trustworthy compliance management in clouds is evaluated experimentally on the
basis of the implemented demonstrator in OpenStack and analytically with respect to scalabil-
ity, reliability, trustworthiness, and legal compliance (Objective 7). In conclusion, the legal and
technical boundary implicated by established legislation and the cloud computing paradigm
(Objective 4) is identified. In particular, the boundary of tackling the challenge of location
inhomogeneity in clouds (cf. Def. 4.6) is determined.
In Section 6.1, the implementation of the approach proposed in Section 5 is described and
evaluated experimentally with respect to location-determined data processing in OpenStack.
For that reason, the resource management and logging mechanisms of OpenStack are intro-
duced (cf. Section 6.1.1) and their extension to the Location-Determining resource manage-
ment and logging Architecture (LDA) developed in this thesis is described (cf. Section 6.1.2).
Further, the proof-of-concept experiment and its results are presented (cf. Section 6.1.3). In
Section 6.2, the trustworthiness and legal compliance of cloud computing is evaluated with
respect to observations made in the experiment and with respect to legal and technical con-
siderations in general. First, the achieved legal compliance and the trade-off between legal
compliance and usability (cf. Section 6.2.1) are investigated. Further, the technical feasibility
of legally compliant clouds is investigated (cf. Section 6.2.2). In particular, technical obser-
vations on scalability, reliability, and trustworthiness made in the experiment are discussed. In
conclusion, the legal and technical boundaries of tackling the challenge of location inhomoge-
neity in clouds are identified in Section 6.3.
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6.1 Implementing and evaluating location determination in Open-
Stack
As a proof of concept and to evaluate the methods for information flow control in clouds that
were presented in Chapter 5, location-determining resource management and logging is imple-
mented in the IaaS cloud platform OpenStack [157]. Location determination is selected for the
proof of concept, because it provides a complex lattice of security classes with incomparable
security classes, and from the legal perspective, it is considered a fundamental security criterion
for achieving legal compliance (cf. Section 3.6.1). Confidentiality, integrity, and availability
can be addressed the same way, but require different input when verifying the correctness of
the security classification of hardware resources (cf. Section 5.4.1).
OpenStack [157] is selected as reference platform for implementing the proof of concept
for multiple reasons. First, OpenStack is a prominent cloud platform in the literature and in
praxis (cf. Section 4.1.2.1). Further, the OpenStack infrastructure is representative for IaaS
cloud infrastructures since it implements all components of a cloud infrastructure in the IaaS
cloud computing ontology (cf. Section 4.1.4). In addition, OpenStack supports the pooling
of hardware resources which can be utilised for location-determined resource allocation, and
moreover, sophisticated and extendible logging of resource allocation is also supported by
OpenStack (cf. Section 6.1.1). Last but not least, OpenStack is fully open source and doc-
umented [157]. Therefore, modification and extension of existing program code is possible.
Consequently, OpenStack is a good candidate for implementing a proof of concept.
In this section, the implementation and evaluation of the LDA in OpenStack is presented.
First, the resource management and logging in OpenStack and their extensions to the LDA
implemented in this thesis are described. Then, the experiment and results are presented.
6.1.1 Resource management and logging in OpenStack
The resource management and logging in OpenStack is visualised in Figure 6.1. The figure
also includes the extensions necessary for implementing the LDA. In the following, the orig-
inal components of OpenStack are introduced briefly, providing a basic understanding of the
extensions, which are then presented in Section 6.1.2.
In OpenStack, hardware resources are organised by OpenStack Compute Cells (cf. ‘cells’
in OpenStack documenation [157]). Introduced in the OpenStack Version ‘Grizzly’ in 2013,
these cells are considered experimental and are not included in the stable releases before the
OpenStack Version ‘Juno’ in October 2014 (which is after the completion of implementation
and experimentation). For the purpose of this thesis, the progress of development in the version
from 2013 is mature enough to fully demonstrate location-determined resource allocation based
on cells. Cells are organised hierarchically on multiple levels and represent local clusters in the
cloud infrastructure (cf. Section 4.1.4). Each cell consists of a control node (cf. ‘compute
manager’ in Section 4.1.4) responsible for the management of the cell’s hardware resources
and compute nodes hosting the hypervisors running corporate customers’ virtual machines.
Cells are controlled via the so-called API CELL encapsulating the management of each cell.
When requesting a virtual machine to be spawned on hardware resources of a specific cell,
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Figure 6.1: Extended resource management and logging architecture for virtual machine provi-
sioning in OpenStack.
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the API CELL is called with parameters of the requested virtual machine and the target cell.
The request is then forwarded to the target cell and managed locally by the target cell’s control
node.
The resource management is performed by the module OpenStack Compute Nova (cf.
‘compute’ in OpenStack documenation [157]). The module consists of the Nova Server coor-
dinating the resource management and service orchestration (cf. ‘compute fabric’ and ‘service
orchestrator’ in Section 4.1.4) and local NOVA COMPUTE agents located at each control node
and each compute node. The nova server is contacted via the NOVA API accepting virtual
resource requests and returning status information on the operated virtual resources. All status
and control information of operated virtual resources is stored in the NOVA DATABASE. The
allocation of hardware resources and the placement of virtual resources is performed by the
NOVA SCHEDULER. Based on the parameters provided to the NOVA API, hardware resources
are selected and the configuration of the virtual resource is forwarded via the API CELL to the
local agent NOVA COMPUTE at the control node and the executing compute node.
The management front-end in OpenStack is provided by OpenStack Dashboard Horizon
(cf. ‘dashboard’ in OpenStack documenation [157]). The DASHBOARD is operated on the
Horizon Server and provides management access for cloud providers and corporate customers.
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Access to the DASHBOARD is granted via the web using HTTP and HTML. There are dif-
ferent views for the cloud provider, i.e., admin view, and the corporate customers, i.e., user
view. In admin view, the DASHBOARD provides an overview on all hardware resources and all
virtual resources. In user view, only the user’s virtual resources are visible. In addition, the
DASHBOARD allows in both views to manage virtual resources, and particularly, to request,
configure, and release them.
Logging services of virtual resources is provided by OpenStack Telemetry Ceilometer (cf.
‘telemetry’ in OpenStack documenation [157]). The logging architecture consists of the log-
ging aggregator operated on the Ceilometer Server and the local agents CEILOMETER AGENT
COMPUTE located at each compute node. In the original version, the local agents collect infor-
mation on the actions executed by the local NOVA COMPUTE and provides the information via
the RabbitMQ AMQP Messaging Bus (cf. ‘RabbitMQ’ in OpenStack documenation [157]) for
collection. The logging data are then collected by the CEILOMETER COLLECTOR and stored
in the CEILOMETER DATABASE. The logging data can be accessed by using the CEILOMETER
API providing the information via SQL requests sent to the CEILOMETER DATABASE and for-
warding the SQL answers in return. All logging data are handled in OpenStack as key-value
pairs which are organised into JSON objects [66]. By default, there is no visualisation service
for logging data.
6.1.2 Location-determining resource management and logging architecture
When addressing the challenge of location inhomogeneity in clouds (cf. Def. 4.6) with respect
to location determination in OpenStack, it is necessary to extend (1) resource management
to include the ability to decide and enforce the location of virtual resource placement and
(2) the logging mechanisms to provide all information necessary for compliance monitoring
and reporting. This extension is called the Location-Determining resource management and
logging Architecture (LDA), and is presented in the following.
The implementation work presented in this thesis was developed between 2012 and 014
with the support of several bachelor’s and master’s theses [19] [118] [23] [58], which were
(co-)supervised by the author of this thesis.
In parallel to this thesis, the concept of geo-tagging using trusted computing pools was
developed in OpenStack by the Intel Corporation and demonstrated first on 11 April 2013 at
the Forum of the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) [217]. The concept
of geo-tagging is based on the draft on Trusted Geolocation in the Cloud: Proof of Concept
Implementation developed by the NIST since December 2012 [17]. Correspondingly, there
exists an OpenStack blueprint on geo-tagging1 which was created2 on the 25th of September
2013 and proposes generally the same code intervention points in OpenStack Compute Nova
and OpenStack Dashboard Horizon as were chosen in this thesis. The implementation of the
OpenStack blue-print is not publicly available and not yet included in any released version of
1The OpenStack blue-print on geo-tagging can be found in the OpenStack Wiki at https://wiki.openstack.
org/wiki/GeoTagging (last visited: 30.06.2015).
2According to the page information of the OpenStack wiki the blueprint was created on 09:29, 25. Sep. 2013 (in
the OpenStack Wiki https://wiki.openstack.org/w/index.php?title=GeoTagging&action=info; last
visted: 30.06.2015).
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OpenStack.1 Therefore, a comparison with the implementation work presented in this thesis is
limited to the OpenStack blueprint and the correlated demonstration of the Trusted Geolocation
in the Cloud: Proof of Concept Implementation [217].
The LDA presented in this thesis has been implemented independently of any work done
on the concept of geo-tagging. Consequently, both implementations are individual pieces of
work with their own contribution to a proof of concept for trusted location determination in
clouds. In particular, the model for information flow control presented in Section 5.3 marks a
major difference between the two implementations since these methods for information flow
control are neither included nor considered in the concept of geo-tagging. Another major
difference between the two implementations is that LDA is based on OpenStack Compute
cells while the approach on geo-tagging uses trusted computing pools2 which are based on
Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) technology for implementing TPM support and
is therefore limited to hardware resources providing TXT support (i.e., using Intel-CPUs).
This restriction to a specific hardware vendor (i.e., the Intel Corporation) limits the general
applicability to hardware resources of other hardware vendors. The LDA is not limited to
hardware resources of a specific hardware provider and can be applied generally.
To implement the LDA, the resource management, logging mechanisms, and the dashboard
has been extended by (1) location-determined resource management, (2) location determined
logging, and (3) compliance reporting. Figure 6.1 illustrates the components modified and
added here as well as additional control flow and logging data flow. Examples of configu-
ration, execution, and logging are presented in the context of the experimental evaluation in
Section 6.1.3.
The implementation of location-determined resource management consists of (i) adding
location parameters to the configuration of virtual machines in the DASHBOARD, (ii) extend-
ing the NOVA API and NOVA DATABASE to process the added location parameters, (iii) im-
plementing an XML-based location policy determining virtual machine placement with respect
to location parameters, and (iv) implementing a location filter in the NOVA SCHEDULER en-
forcing the location policy [19]. The location parameters for virtual machine configuration
are data type (i.e., category of processed data) and origin (i.e., origin of processor, controller,
and data subjects or ‘data owner’) which are required for deciding on the necessary level of
protection (cf. Section 3.6.1 and Def. 4.6). In addition, an option for creating a back-up in-
stance of a virtual machine is provided. When selected, two virtual machines are created, one
productive virtual machine and one back-up instance. The location policy contains rules which
return applicable cells in OpenStack based on data type and origin. An XML Schema Defini-
tion (XSD) for XML-based location policies and the example polices used in the experimental
evaluation can be found in Appendix C. Assuming that each cell is located in a single specified
and known country, the rules of the location policy enables the resource scheduler to decide on
the target location of virtual resources based on the parameters, data type and origin, specified
by the corporate customers. Further, a dedicated set of rules for allocating hardware resources
for back-up instances is specified which is used when creating back-up instances. The location
1Last time verified on 30.06.2015.
2The OpenStack blueprint on trusted computing pools can be found in the OpenStack Wiki on the Internet: https:
//wiki.openstack.org/wiki/TrustedComputingPools (last visited: 30.06.2015).
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filter at the NOVA SCHEDULER filters the available cells in OpenStack based on the location
parameters and the applicable rules of the location policy. For each requested virtual machine,
logs of the applied rules and filtered cells are written at the Nova Server locally. The filtered
list of available cells is then forward to the API CELL where a cell is selected from this filtered
list according to the original resource allocation process in OpenStack. Then, the requested
virtual resource is created on a hardware resource selected by the cell locally. Consequently,
the location filter does not affect the resource allocation in OpenStack but reduces the search
space of the resource allocation algorithm to those hardware resources that are in compliance
with the location parameters (i.e., hardware resources of cells that are located in countries with
an adequate level of protection). In the case of allocating hardware resources for a virtual
machine with back-up instance, the location filter applies the location policy for the virtual
machine and its back-up instance individually. In particular, it is possible to schedule virtual
machines and back-up instances on disjunct sets of cells, thereby enforcing their hosting on
hardware resources of separated cells.
The implementation of location-determined logging consists of (i) the extension of the
CEILOMETER AGENT COMPUTE by a plug-in that gathers the logging data of the hypervisors
and (ii) extending the CEILOMETER COLLECTOR, CEILOMETER DATABASE, and CEILOME-
TER API to also process hypervisor logs [118]. The hypervisor logs are accessed via the VMI
libvirt (cf. ‘LibvirtAPI’ in OpenStack documenation [157] and libvirt documenation [167]).
By using the LIBVIRTAPI of OpenStack, logs are gathered independently of the used hypervi-
sor, and therefore, logging is supported for a large number of hypervisors.1 The authenticity
and integrity of logging are addressed by using a public-private key signature scheme with
an individual private key for each compute node for signing logging data and a corresponding
public key for verifying the integrity and authenticity of the logging data [58].
For the purpose of compliance reporting, two new components were added to the Horizon
Server: (i) the COMPLIANCE CHECKER evaluating the logging data of the Ceilometer Server
and the Nova Server and (ii) the AUDIT BOARD visualising compliance reports on evaluation
results [23]. Detected compliance breaches are wrong placements of virtual machines with
respect to the location policy and location parameters and deviations in the virtual machine
execution from the requested configuration (e.g., CPU, memory, and storage). For logging
evaluation, the logging data provided by the CEILOMETER API is compared with the local
logs of the NOVA SCHEDULER and the location policy stored at the Nova Server. The com-
pliance reports are visualised via the AUDIT BOARD which is implemented as a plug-in of
the DASHBOARD. There are three different views of the compliance reports: (1) the cloud
customer’s view, (2) the cloud provider’s view, and (3) the view for authorised third parties.
The views are implemented according to the monitoring and reporting architecture proposed
in Section 5.4.3. Consequently, the cloud customer’s view reports on virtual resources of the
respective cloud customer only. The cloud provider’s view reports on all hardware resources
and virtual resources. The view for authorised third parties is implemented for two use cases
with different information levels: (a) an investigation by a tax officer and (b) service operations
controls by an external auditor instructed by a cloud customer. The information level pre-
1An overview of hypervisors supported by libvirt can be found in the Internet: http://libvirt.org/drivers.
html (last visited: 30.06.2015).
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sented to a tax officer is limited to location information of virtual resources of the investigated
cloud customer, while the external auditor has the same information level as the instructing
cloud customer. Access to the different views is controlled via the access control mechanism
of OpenStack. The cloud customer’s view is accessible only by user accounts and the cloud
provider’s view only by admin accounts. For the views of authorised third parties, two addi-
tional roles are added to OpenStack: (a) tax officer and (b) auditor. Fo each role, access to the
audit board is restricted to information appropriate to that role.
6.1.3 Experimental set-up and evaluation results
The experimental set-up is based on four physical servers which are virtualised using VMWARE
ESXi in Version 5.1.0. All components of OpenStack are installed on virtual servers running
Ubuntu 13.10. OpenStack is installed in release version 2013.2.3, ‘Havana’. The only excep-
tion is the OpenStack Telemetry Ceilometer, which is installed in OpenStack release version
2014.1, ‘Icehouse’. The version of the messaging bus RabbitMQ is 3.1.3.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the experimental set-up of virtual servers and virtual networks. In to-
tal, there are 20 virtual servers. Seven virtual servers are hosting the management components
including OpenStack Compute Nova, OpenStack Dashboard Horizon, and OpenStack Teleme-
try Ceilometer, which is modified as described in Section 6.1.2. Further, there are 13 virtual
servers organised in five OpenStack Compute Cells simulating a globally distributed cloud in-
frastructure. The simulated locations are Germany (DE Cell), France (FR Cell), Switzerland
(CH Cell), the United Kingdom (UK Cell), and Singapore (SG Cell). Each cell is configured
to operate in a dedicated VLAN and consists of a control node and either one or two com-
pute nodes which is shown in Figure 6.2. The compute nodes use QEMU version 1.5.0 for
the nested virtualisation of virtual machines. The nested virtualisation is controlled via libvirt
using version 1.1.1. The CEILOMETER AGENT COMPUTE at the COMPUTE NODES is con-
figured to log and forward the state of the hypervisor every ten minutes, which is the default
setting of OpenStack Telemetry Ceilometer.
Figure 6.2: Experimental configuration of virtual servers and virtual networks.
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In the experiment, the functionality of the location-determined resource allocation for
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virtual machine placement as well as the logging and reporting mechanisms of the LDA are
demonstrated. For that purpose, a set of eight location classes locSC, which are illustrated in
Figure 6.3, are defined according to Definition 5.42. Hardware resources of each cell are as-
signed the location class of the corresponding country, e.g., DE COMPUTE NODE 1 is assigned
locSCDE ∈ locSC. Based on locSC, a location policy is defined covering rules for two data types
(i.e., personal data and financial data) and six origins (i.e., Germany, France, United King-
dom, Switzerland, Singapore, and EU/EEA). The rules of the location policy are illustrated in
Figure 6.4. For each data type and data origin, a set of allowed cells Celluser is defined. Addi-
tionally, there is defined a set of cells Cellbak for hosting back-up instances.1 When requesting
a virtual machine with a dedicated back-up instance, the location filter of the NOVA SCHED-
ULER allocates the virtual machine at Celluser\Cellbak and the back-up instance at Cellbak and
if Celluser = Cellbak both instances are located at the same cell, i.e., Celluser. For example,
when requesting a virtual machine for processing personal data originating from Germany,
the virtual machine is located at locSCEU\ locSCUK = {locSCDE , locSCFR, locSCUK}\ locSCUK =
{locSCDE , locSCFR} and the back-up instance is located at locSCUK (cf. Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.3: Location classes locSC in the ex-
periment.
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Figure 6.4: Location policy in the experiment.
EU
DE
FR
UK
CH
SG
D
a t
a  
o r
i g
i n
Personal data Financial data
EU UK
DE, FR FR
EU DE
EU DE
CH CH
SG SG
Celluser Cellbak Celluser Cellbak
EU FR
DE DE
FR FR
UK UK
CH CH
SG SG
Data type
The experiment consists of requesting four virtual machines with different configurations
for data type, data origin and back-up option. All logging data of the experiment and sample
screen shots of the modified DASHBOARD and AUDIT BOARD can be found in Appendix D.
Table 6.1 lists the configuration of the virtual machines, the result of the decision by the loca-
tion policy and the allocated compute nodes. First, three virtual machines configured to host
financial data of different origins are requested, one after another. The rules on financial data
are very restrictive (cf. Figure 6.4) and only allow the allocation of hardware resources that are
located in the cell corresponding to the country of data origin. In the experiment, the compute
nodes are selected accordingly to the decision by location policy. If the back-up option is se-
lected the virtual machine and the back-up instance are distributed over both compute nodes
of each selected cell. This implies that load balancing is active. Then, the forth virtual ma-
chine is configured to host personal data originating from the EU/EEA. In this case, the most
relaxed rule applies since the location policy allows the allocation of any cell located within
the EU/EEA. The dedicated cell for back-up instances is located in United Kingdom. The se-
lected compute node for the virtual machine is DE COMPUTE 2 and for the back-up instance,
UK COMPUTE 1. This is in compliance with the decision with respect to the location policy.
1Celluser and Cellbak are disjunct to demonstrate the concept of local separation in scenarios of disaster recovery.
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Additionally, the resource allocation of the forth virtual machine illustrates the compliant op-
eration of the location filter in several ways. First, compute nodes located within the EU/EEA
are selected albeit there are unused compute nodes in the CH Cell (i.e., CH COMPUTE NODE
1) and SG Cell (i.e., SG COMPUTE NODE 1). This is in compliance with the location policy
where CH Cell and SG Cell are not allowed for personal data originating from the EU/EEA.
This implies that the decision with respect to the location policy outweighs load balancing. A
second observation is that even within the cells located in the EU/EEA the virtual machine
is placed on the already used compute node, DE COMPUTE 2, instead of being placed on
the unused compute node, UK COMPUTE 1. Again, this is in compliance with the location
policy according to which the UK Cell is reserved for back-up instances, and is therefore not
available for the placement of the virtual machine itself. This implies that the decision by
the location policy also outweighs load-balancing with respect to the disjointed placement of
back-up instances. Finally, it is observed that the back-up instance is placed on compute node
UK COMPUTE 1, which complies with the location policy. Screenshots of the DASHBOARD
showing the extended virtual machine configuration, the overview on running compute nodes,
and the overview on virtual machine instances can be found in Appendix D.3.
Table 6.1: Virtual machine configuration with resulting decisions and resource allocation
Virtual machine configuration Decision by location policy Selected compute node
No. Data type Data origin Back-up Celluser Cellbak Virtual machine Back-up instance
1 Financial data Germany yes DE DE DE COMPUTE 2 DE COMPUTE 1
2 Financial data Switzerland no CH CH CH COMPUTE 2 —
3 Financial data France yes FR FR FR COMPUTE 2 FR COMPUTE 1
4 Personal data EU/EEA yes EU UK DE COMPUTE 2 UK COMPUTE 1
Observations in the experiment are logging data of the hypervisors collected by the Ceilo-
menter Server and logging data of the applied rules and filtered cells collected by the Nova
Server. All logging data can be found in the Appendix D.1 and Appendix D.2. The structure
and information content of the logs are exemplified by the request of the virtual machine no. 4.
Listing 6.1: Nova Server log-file of virtual ma-
chine no. 4.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " p e r s o n a l "
3 o r i g i n = " eu "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 2 : 3 2 : 1 5 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 f r = t r u e
7 de = t r u e
8 sg = f a l s e
9 ch = f a l s e
10 uk = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: 1ADAFF73-6741-422B-B2F0-7C0E1A2459BD
Listing 6.2: Nova Server log-file of back-up
instance of virtual machine no. 4.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " p e r s o n a l "
3 o r i g i n = " eu "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 2 : 3 2 : 1 6 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 uk = t r u e
7 sg = f a l s e
8 f r = f a l s e
9 ch = f a l s e
10 de = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: 6EDED12F-B120-4FC6-8C21-DAA4084630A0
Listing 6.1 and Listing 6.2 list the log-files recorded at the Nova Server. Each log-file is
associated by file name with the virtual machine’s ID in OpenStack. Further, each log-file
contains the location parameter TYPE (i.e., data type) and ORIGIN (i.e., data origin) that the
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Listing 6.3: Excerpt of ceilometer log for DE
COMPUTE 2 before requesting virtual machine
no. 4.
1 (
2 . . .
3 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 7 : 2 8
4 . . .
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
6 (
7 . . .
8 [ c e l l ] => de
9 [ compute_node ] => DeCompute2
10 . . .
11 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] =>
12 4 b59295f−56a9−4126−8c07−4f f 0 e 7 9 3 f 9 1 9
13 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 1
14 . . .
15 )
16 . . .
17 )
Listing 6.4: Excerpt of ceilometer log for DE
COMPUTE 2 after requesting virtual machine
no. 4.
1 (
2 . . .
3 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 3 7 : 2 8
4 . . .
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
6 (
7 . . .
8 [ c e l l ] => de
9 [ compute_node ] => DeCompute2
10 . . .
11 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => 4 b59295f−56a9
−4126−8c07−4f f 0 e 7 9 3 f 9 1 9
12 [ i n s t a n c e s . 1 ] => 1 a d a f f 7 3 −6741
−422b−b2f0−7c0e1a2459bd
13 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 2
14 . . .
15 )
16 . . .
17 )
decision is based on and the timestamp of the decision. In addition, the result of the decision is
listed for each available cell where TRUE indicates that the cell is accepted and FALSE that the
cell was rejected. The logged decisions comply with the applicable rule of the location policy
(cf. Figure 6.4). In addition, the timestamps imply that the decision on the placement of the
virtual machine was made before that on the placement of the back-up instance. Listing 6.3
and Listing 6.4 show an expert ceilometer log for DE COMPUTE 2 before and after the virtual
machine no. 4 is requested (cf. Listing D.18 and Listing D.19 for the complete log). In the
listings, selected key-value-pairs of the JSON-object used by OpenStack Telemetry Ceilometer
for representation are shown with respect to relevance for validating the placement of virtual
machine no. 4. Each ceilometer logging entry particularly provides the timestamp of creation
and information on hosting cell and compute node as well as the hosted instances by number
and ID. The first excerpt is created before the request and indicates that there is only a single
virtual machine running on DE COMPUTE 2. Then, after the request, the second excerpt of
the log indicates that there is an additional virtual machine running which has the ID of the
virtual machine no. 4 (cf. Listing 6.1). Consequently, virtual machine no. 4 is placed on DE
COMPUTE 2 which is compliant with the observations made in the experiment (cf. Figure 6.1).
The cloud provider’s view in the AUDIT BOARD visualises all active cells using an inter-
active world map where countries with running virtual machines are highlighted. Further, the
AUDIT BOARD provides information on the virtual machines that are located in each cell and
on the decisions made by LOCATION FILTER for each individual virtual machine. Screenshots
of AUDIT BOARD can be found in the Appendix D.4.
In addition to the proof of concept, there are observations made on legal compliance, tech-
nical feasibility, and trustworthiness of the LDA which are investigated in Section 6.2.
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6.2 The price and return on legally compliant cloud computing
The implemented LDA is not only a proof of concept showing that location determination is
possible for cloud computing but also provides insight into the feasibility of legally compliant
cloud computing in general and of location-determined cloud computing in particular. The
LDA introduces legal compliance with respect to the location of data processing for the price
of increased complexity in resource allocation and logging mechanisms. The same approach
can be applied to confidentiality, integrity, and availability by using the corresponding security
classes to classify cells and allowed information flow. The major differences are that the loca-
tion policy is replaced by confidentiality, integrity, or availability policies and that the acquired
logging data have to be extended by additional information on the respective security property
to verify the resources’ classification (cf. Section 5.4.1).
However, when implementing legally compliant cloud computing like the LDA, the ques-
tion arises: At what price does legal compliance come and what is gained in return? Good
indicators for the price are potential reductions in the functionality and usability of the cloud
with respect to its characteristics (cf. Section 2.1.1). The gains are likely to be increased legal
certainty and the increased trustworthiness of the technical implementation.
In the following, the impact on legal compliance and legal certainty are investigated in
Section 6.2.1. Further, the observations on the feasibility of legally compliant cloud computing
are examined in Section 6.2.2. Finally, the trustworthiness of the technical implementation is
discussed in Section 6.2.3
6.2.1 Complying with legislation and corporate customers’ requirements
In the scenario of IT outsourcing to the cloud, cloud providers have to comply with multi-
ple legal requirements, which derive from the legal requirements of their corporate customers.
The legal analysis in Chapter 3 identifies the general requirements that cloud providers have
to implement technically (cf. Section 3.6). The identified requirements are: (1) the identifi-
cation of the necessary level of security; (2) the implementation of security policies covering
applicable legal and technical requirements; (3) the implementation and enforcement of safe-
guards covering (i) basic security measures, (ii) access control, (iii) transmission control, and
(iv) countermeasures and incident response; and (4) compliance monitoring, documentation,
and reporting. These technical requirements have to be implemented by the cloud providers
in such a way that it is possible to support the legal requirements that apply to their corporate
customers. To what extend the approach proposed in this thesis supports legal compliance is
discussed in what follows.
The identification of the necessary level of security is based on the information on loca-
tion, category of data, origin, and applicable requirements (cf. Section 3.6.1). The proposed
approach is able to determine the location of hardware resources and support the placement
of virtual resources according to existing location constraints (cf. Section 5.3.4). Further, it
is possible to address additionally applicable requirements with respect to confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability (cf. Section 5.4.2). In the LDA proof-of-concept implementation, it is
shown that providing the category of data and their origin is sufficient to request virtual ma-
chines which are then assigned to hardware resources in compliance with applicable location
185
constraints (cf. Section 6.1.2 and Section 6.1.3). Thus, cloud providers using the LDA are able
to identify the necessary level of security and to assign virtual resources to hardware resources
which are compliant with the necessary level of security. This includes the specific case of
providing an adequate level of protection in terms of the European and German data protection
law, since hardware resources are selected only if they are established at a location having an
adequate level of protection. Moreover, it is possible to deal with location constraints gener-
ally, as is required in the case of German tax law (cf. Section 3.5.3.2) and export control (cf.
Section 3.4.3).
This is achieved by implementing security policies, which describe the applicable rules for
each corporate customer by assigning category of data and origin to a set of security classes
corresponding to the necessary level of security. Due to the way information flow control meth-
ods are used, security classes directly translate into applied safeguards and security measures
in respect of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and location constraints. Further, it is pos-
sible to extend the underlying information model used for information flow control and intro-
duce additional security characteristics like non-repudiation and authenticity (cf. Section 7.3).
However, new security characteristics increase the complexity of decision and enforcement in
the cloud management process. Even though the complexity scales well with an increasing
dimension of security characteristics, it still might not be feasible for very large numbers of
security characteristics (cf. impact on rapid elasticity/scalability in Section 6.2.2). In any case,
the presented approach fully supports the implementation of enforceable security policies ex-
pressing the individual legal requirements of each corporate customer. Moreover, corporate
customers can specify their legal demands for each virtual machine individually by classifying
them according to data category and origin. These specifications can be made in the outsourc-
ing contract. Afterwards, corporate customers simply specify the data category and the origin
on each virtual resource request, and the cloud provider can apply the rules of the security
policies automatically when provisioning the requested resource.
The implementation and enforcement of safeguards at the cloud provider is supported
by applying the rules of information flow control described in the security policies in an au-
tomated manner. Hardware resources are selected according to their security classification,
which cover the implementation of basic security measures like confidentiality, integrity, and
availability but also the location of their establishment. Further, it is possible to control the
access to and transmission of virtual resources. This is done on the level of virtualisation man-
agement in the cloud management process, i.e., controlling the access and transmission with
respect to hardware resources (i.e., controlling the information flow of virtual resources). The
network access to virtual resources and resulting data transfer is in the administrative respon-
sibility of the corporate customers, and is therefore not controlled by the cloud provider (cf.
Section 5.1.2). The cloud provider has the administrative control of the information flow of
virtual resources, and is therefore responsible for controlling it in compliance with law. This
is possible for location constraints using the LDA (cf. Section 6.1.3) and can be extended
to cover other security constraints (cf. Section 5.3.4). Further, it is possible to support coun-
termeasures and incident response management, for instance, malicious/suspicious hardware
resources can be isolated by changing their security classification in such a way that virtual
resources are no longer assigned (cf. Section 7.3).
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The monitoring, documentation, and reporting of compliance are particularly necessary
when legal requirements on the inspection of the cloud provider apply, as they exist in German
data protection law (cf. Section 3.2.2), German finance law (cf. Section 3.4.1), and German
tax law (cf. Section 3.4.2). The inspection of the clouds can be done internally by the cloud
provider, by the corporate customers (or an authorised third party) and by competent security
authorities (cf. Section 3.2.2). Trustworthy monitoring, documentation and reporting in clouds
is possible in general (cf. Section 5.4.3), and in particular, can be implemented in existing cloud
infrastructures as it is shown for location constraints in the proof-of-concept implementation
LDA (cf. Section 6.1.3). Moreover, specific inspection requirements for availability and local-
ity can be supported. For example, for tax inspections of corporate customers, virtual resources
can be assigned exclusively to hardware resources which are located in the territory where the
competent tax office can exercise its inspection. Another example is when a search warrant has
been issued for a corporate customer, the cloud provider can support the investigative authority
by preventing the virtual resources of the searched corporate customer from being migrated to
foreign countries (i.e., avoiding aiding the corporate customer by accidentally or intentionally
preventing the search warrant).1
To conclude, the approach proposed in this thesis supports all technical requirements iden-
tified in the legal analysis (cf. Section 3.6). The cloud provider using this approach can place
virtual resources in compliance with the legal requirements of their corporate customers. Fur-
ther, each corporate customer can request virtual resources with specific legal requirements,
and they are automatically provisioned by the cloud provider in compliance with legal require-
ments. Whether data processing in IaaS clouds is compliant or not depends on which legal
requirements are specified by the corporate customers and on how consequently they are en-
forced by the cloud provider. Both are supported at the technical level by the approach proposed
in this thesis.
6.2.2 Technical feasibility of legally compliant cloud computing
Based on the implementation work, the experiment, and general considerations, there are mul-
tiple observations made with respect to the impact of legally compliance cloud computing on
cloud characteristics [141] [211], i.e., (1) resource pooling/virtualisation, (2) rapid elasticity/s-
calability, (3) on-demand self-service/pay-per use utility model, (4) measured service, and (5)
broad network access (cf. Section 2.1.1), which are discussed in the following.
The impact on resource pooling/virtualisation is not considerable, since resource pool-
ing and virtualisation are rather prerequisites than restrictions. When classifying hardware and
virtual resources by location, it is still possible to organise resources by using virtualisation
techniques and pooling them for provisioning. For legal compliance, it is sufficient that each
resource pool can be classified correctly by location and effective level of security. For this
purpose, resource allocation has to be made accordingly to the information flow allowed be-
tween the security class of the resource pool and security class of the assigned virtual resource.
Usually, the clouds are organised in subsets of resource pools which are each operated by an
1This can be achieved by locking the virtual resources of searched corporate customer in place by changing their
security classification to enforce the current placement, which can be the first step to initiate what is called a
quick-freeze (cf. Section 3.5.2).
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individual hosting site (cf. global clusters and local clusters in Section 4.1.4). Therefore, the
security class of each resource pool is determined by the location of its operating hosting site
and its effective level of security. Even if a resource pool is operated by multiple hosting sites,
the security classes can be determined correctly by the least upper bound of the security classes
of the involved hosting sites, i.e., by applying the ⊗-operator (cf. Section 5.3.1). Further, it is
possible to cover differences in the effective level of security of individual hardware resources.
In such a case, hardware resources of the same security class are pooled. Then, each resource
pool consists of homogeneously classified hardware resources and is classified accordingly. In
the LDA, resources are pooled by using OpenStack Compute Cells and virtualisation is per-
formed by compute nodes. The management of cells is very flexible and compute nodes can be
added and removed during run-time (cf. ‘cells’ in OpenStack documenation [157]). Since the
LDA is based upon OpenStack Compute Cells, the resource pooling/virtualisation characteris-
tic is a prerequisite for location determination and is not restricted by its implementation.
The impact on rapid elasticity/scalability can be considerable since security constraints
can limit the hardware resources that are available for virtual resource allocation. Only hard-
ware resources with sufficient security classes can be assigned if virtual resources require a
specific location and theensured level of security. If hardware resources with sufficient security
classification are not available, additional virtual resources either cannot be created (reject) or
have to be assigned to hardware resources with insufficient security classification (SLA breach).
Alternatively, reorganising the embedding of virtual resources can help the offort to find a more
efficient embedding, freeing hardware resources with sufficient security classification through
reduction of over-provisioning (cf. evaluating embeddings in Section 5.4.2). Further, it is also
possible to degrade the security classification of virtual machines to security classes where
hardware resources are available. Which strategy is used (i.e., rejection, SLA breach, reorgan-
isation, or degradation) usually depends on the contractual agreement between cloud provider
and corporate customer. A common practice of cloud providers is to accept the SLA breach
and refund the corporate customers for the degraded services (e.g., amazon’s EC2 service level
agreements on availability1). However, there are cases where service degradation and SLA
breaches are not acceptable. For example, without explicit permission of the responsible tax
office, it is forbidden to process data that are relevant to German tax law abroad (cf. Sec-
tion 3.5.3.2). Here, a degradation or SLA breach can result in administration fees (e.g., BDSG
§43, 44 and StGB §204) and custodial sentences (e.g., BDSG §44 and StGB §203, 204). There-
fore, reorganisation and rejection are better strategies with respect to legal certainty than service
degradation and accepted SLA breaches. In addition, it is possible to increase the number of
hardware resources of the specific security classification to better fit the corporate customers’
demands.
When applying metrics to evaluate the quality of the embedding (cf. Section 5.4.2), it is
possible to determine the degree of over- and under-provisioning. This empowers the cloud
provider to consider the legal and technical consequences when scheduling virtual resources.
Therefore, rapid elasticity and scalability may be reduced when it is necessary to enforce le-
1Amazon charges their cloud customers for a 99.95% availability and refunds gradually when lower availability
is provided; cf. EC2 service level agreements in the Internet: http://aws.amazon.com/de/ec2/sla/ (Last
visited: 30.06.2015).
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gal compliance, due to a shortage of hardware resources with sufficient security classification.
However, cloud computing remains rapid, elastic and scalable if hardware resources with suffi-
cient security classification are available. The proof-of-concept implementation shows that the
virtual machine configuration can be extended by security parameters, which allows automated
decision-making and enforcement of resource allocation (cf. Section 6.1.3). The impact on run-
time behaviour is not the focus of this thesis and, is therefore not investigated in the experiment.
In any case, the impact can be estimated analytically. Each included security parameter (i.e.,
location, confidentiality, integrity, and availability) introduces an additional dimension to the
NP-hard decision problem of virtual resource allocation (cf. Section 5.4.2). The complexity
of existing algorithms solving this class of decision problems in general scales with the num-
ber of dimensions on a square-logarithmic base (vector scheduling), logarithmic base (vector
bin packing), and linear base (knapsack problem) [39]. This is also observable for resource
allocation algorithms for virtualised service hosting platforms and specifically cloud infras-
tructures [189]. Therefore, the impact of the additional dimensions on the run-time complexity
of resource scheduling algorithms is rather low in comparison to the exponential complexity
of finding optimal embedding. Investigations into the proof-of-concept implementation shows
that also logging scales on a linear basis with respect to number of log entries generally and
with respect to the number of logged compute nodes specifically [118].
The impact on on-demand self-service and pay-per-use utility model is not significant
since corporate customers can order virtual resources on-demand with or without security con-
straints, which are then processed automatically by the cloud platform. In the proof-of-concept
implementation, location constraints are specified by the corporate customer when requesting
virtual resources in the DASHBOARD. The virtual resources are then scheduled and provi-
sioned automatically, which facilitates the on-demand self-services. Further, the pay-per-use
utility model can be directly applied on requested security constraints by charging based on
provided security properties. For example, the cloud provider can charge an additional fee for
requesting location-determined hosting to compensate the reduced flexibility in virtual resource
placement due to location constraints. Therefore, introducing security constraints for legally
compliant cloud computing fully complies with the characteristic of on-demand self-service
and the pay-per-use utility model.
The impact on measured services is considerable since monitoring and reporting of le-
gal compliance requires the measurement of security classifications and extended logging with
respect to security properties (cf. Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.3). In the proof-of-concept
implementation, existing logging mechanisms are used and extended to log security relevant
information at the hypervisors, and the information is made available for monitoring and report-
ing in the DASHBOARD (cf. Section 6.1.2). Further, the implemented logging and monitoring
architecture is fully automated (cf. Section 6.1.2) and scalable (cf. ‘impact on on rapid elastic-
ity/scalability’ above). Therefore, the characteristic of measured services is feasible for legally
compliant clouds which support scalable and automated service monitoring and reporting.
The impact on broad network access is in principle not significant since virtual resources
remain accessible irrespective of the security properties that are applicable. This is because
access to virtual resources has no impact on the information flow of virtual resources but on
the information flow of processed data in virtual resources (cf. Section 5.1.2). However, the
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control of access to virtual resources is relevant with respect to the location and the effective
level of security at the point of access. For example, according to German data protection law,
transmitting personal data to a third country in general is illegitimate if no explicit statutory
permission applies, independent of whether these data are processed inside or outside of the
cloud. Then again, the control of information flow of processed data – and therefore the ac-
cess to virtual resources – is in the responsibility of the corporate customer (cf. Section 5.1.2).
For that reason, there are no limitations in the broad network access from the cloud providers’
perspective. Nevertheless, if the cloud provider is managing access control to virtual resources
on behalf of the corporate customers then the cloud provider has to restrict the broad network
access to communications end-points with respect to the end-points’ location and their effec-
tive level of security. Consequently, there is an impact on broad network access with respect
to control the information flow of processed data (which is usually handled by the corporate
customers) but not with respect to control the information flow of virtual resources (which is
handled by the cloud providers).
6.2.3 Trustworthiness of legally compliant cloud computing
For corporate customers, it is important that cloud providers fulfil the service contract and pro-
vide the virtual resources in compliance with legislation and SLAs. Therefore, cloud providers
have to monitor the service delivery of hardware providers which operate the hardware re-
sources, and cloud providers have to provide evidence of the delivery of legally compliant
services by reporting to their corporate customers (cf. Section 3.6.4).
The monitoring and reporting architecture in cloud infrastructure proposed in Section 5.4.3
addresses this requirement by introducing hardware-based authenticity and integrity to logging
of hardware resources and virtual resources. By these means, evidence of the operation of hard-
ware resources by the hardware providers and on operation of virtual resources on hardware re-
sources is gathered at the cloud provider’s site. The logging provides information on hardware
identifiers which allow the verification of location and security properties by manual inspec-
tion (cf. Section 5.4.1). Further, the logging provides evidence of the security classification of
hardware resources and virtual resources which can be used to verify the resource allocation
with respect to requirements on location and the effective level of security (cf. Section 5.4.2).
In addition, the evidence of security classification is a basis for generating compliance reports
on the delivery of virtual resource services to the corporate customers. The use of hardware
identifiers in the reports helps to reference hardware resources when clarifying questions asked
by the corporate customers or providing additional evidence on the hardware utilisation, for
example, in the context of a lawsuit. Further, the corporate customers can assign an auditor to
audit whether the service delivery is in compliance with law, for example in the context of the
standards on service organisation controls SSAE 16 [7] and ISAE 3402 [107].
In the LDA proof-of-concept implementation, it is shown that it is possible to log at hyper-
visor level [118] and to ensure the authenticity and integrity of telemetry data [58]. In partic-
ular, the hardware resource’s and virtual resources’ identifier uniquely identify the resources
which, in combination with the timestamps and information on assigned compute cells, allows
the resource allocation and service delivery to be retrospectively verified. For example, in the
excerpt of the ceilometer log of DE COMPUTE 2, after requesting virtual machine no. 4 in
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the experiment (cf. Listing 6.4), the timestamp indicates the point in time when the log entry
was created. Further, the virtual resource’s identifiers of virtual machine no. 4 (and that of
virtual machine no. 1) are contained in the log, and to identify hardware resource, the hard-
ware resource’s identifier and the corresponding public key are contained in the log, too (cf.
Listing D.19 in Appendix D.2). The signature contained in the log allows the integrity of
the log entry to be verified, and in combination with the public key, it is possible to perform
authenticity checks on the hardware resource’s identity by creating the log entry [58].
If one is not using officially regulated digital signature schemes (like in the German Sig-
nature Act and the European Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework for electronic
signatures) the “suitability for providing evidence in legal proceedings is very low” [173].
Therefore, it is necessary to implement mechanisms for integrity and authenticity in compli-
ance with applicable legislation. As a result, depending to the chosen signature scheme, the
evidence of the signature may not be given in some countries. From a technical perspective, it
is possible to use multiple signature schemes at the same time where each complies with spe-
cific applicable legislation, and collectively, all applicable legislations are covered. However,
this increases the size of the logs, and therefore, requires additional computational resources
to generate and verify the signatures. Further, from the perspective of economics, additional
investments for each additionally used signature scheme is necessary (e.g., for buying signature
key certificates at accredited certification authorities as required by the German digital signa-
ture act [173]). This implies that if the signature schemes used are not compliant with applica-
ble legislation there is no legal certainty that cloud providers can provider evidence on service
delivery, even if the signature schemes are considered best practices. Although the corporate
customers may trust the evidence of a best practice signature scheme (like using X.509 secu-
rity certificates of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), for example, the Symantec Managed PKI
Service [194]) without a guarantee of legal certainty, because these best practices are usually
widely accepted, de facto standards and their implementation often comply with IT-Security
standards (e.g., Symantec Managed PKI Service [194] is certified to comply with SSAE 16 [7]
/ ISAE 3402 [107] and WebTrust [6]).
Consequently, the trustworthiness of compliance monitoring and reporting primarily de-
pends on the integrity and authenticity of the logging. Technically, the integrity and authentic-
ity of the logging data can be ensured through signature schemes. If the signature schemes used
follow best practice, the trustworthiness can be considered high, but legal certainty is achieved
only by signature schemes that comply with the applicable legislation.
6.3 Conclusions on legal and technical boundary
It is usually technically possible to support legal compliance of IT outsourcing to globally
distributed IaaS clouds is generally possible. In particular, the cloud providers can aid their
corporate customers in achieving legal compliance individually. Assuming that only trustwor-
thy hardware resources are used in the cloud, the cloud provider can place virtual resources
compliantly to the necessary level of security considering the effective level of security of the
hardware resources. This includes requirements for necessary legal framework conditions at
the hardware resource locations. This means the cloud provider is able to provide corporate
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customers with cloud resources accordingly to their legal requirements. This empowers the
corporate customers to request and utilise the cloud resources in compliance with legal re-
quirements, which are applicable to their data processing in the cloud. In this way, the cor-
porate customers keep control over their own compliance management, and can even verify
the compliance of virtual resources used with the specified necessary level of security using
the compliance monitoring and reporting architecture of the cloud. An analysis of the cloud
characteristics shows that introducing legal compliance to the cloud management process has
significant impact with respect to (i) increased storage complexity on monitoring and logging,
(ii) increased computational complexity in decision on resource allocation and (iii) restricted
flexibility of the hardware resource utilisation due to legal constraints. Nonetheless, the imple-
mentation of legal compliance is feasible and scales with increased complexity in computation
and storage (linear complexity is an observable upper boundary in both cases).
This is a great step towards legally compliant IT outsourcing to clouds. However, there
are limits that have to be respected when planing IT outsourcing. First of all, IT outsourcing
is not admissible in all cases. In Germany for example, the outsourcing of accounts keeping
requires explicit approval of the competent tax office (cf. Section 3.4.2), and hospital facilities
and penal doctors must not outsource the billing of their patients (cf. Section 3.4.4). Further,
cloud providers can support their corporate customers in their efforts to achieve legal compli-
ance only according to the requirements specified by the corporate customers. It is up to the
cloud customers to specify and utilise the cloud’s resources in compliance with the legal re-
quirements which are applicable to the processing of the data. Moreover, in the particular case
of IT outsourcing to IaaS clouds, the cloud customers are responsible for all data processing
done by applications running on virtual resources in clouds, since the corporate customer have
administrative control over the applications. This may differ for PaaS clouds and SaaS clouds,
where service providers have administrative control over the applications running in the cloud.
Another limitation is that only legal requirements that refer to technical measures can be en-
forced in the cloud management process. In particular, organisational measures are not covered
and have to be implemented separately – for instance, by defining operating instructions for the
technical and administrative staff of the cloud providers and hardware providers. In addition,
it is not possible to implement legal requirements that do not match with the technical charac-
teristics of clouds. For instance, the regulation on direct inspection of the original IT system
in German tax law prohibits remote enquiry, where the latter is de facto always the case in
cloud computing (cf. Section 3.4.2). In such cases, exceptions have to be made to the regular
data processing procedures, or explicit agreements with the competent authorities on legally
compliant data processing have to be negotiated. For instance, the conflict with direct access of
the original IT system in clouds, mentioned above, can be solved in two ways. The first way is
to not outsource the original IT system to the cloud, which is very restrictive. The second way
is to agree with the competent tax office that indirect access, which is also an option in the tax
code, is sufficient for inspections (cf. Section 3.4.2).
To conclude, it is possible for cloud providers to support their corporate customers in
achieving legal compliance. However, corporate customers remain responsible for control-
ling the legal compliance of their data processing in the cloud, which becomes possible when
use the compliance monitoring and reporting architecture of the cloud.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and directions for future
research
Starting with the two research questions, which legal requirements apply when outsourcing IT
to clouds and how these requirements be can supported by cloud providers, this thesis con-
tributes to the identification of the legal and technical boundary of cloud computing. Covering
a legal and a technical analysis of data processing in clouds, the mutual dependencies of leg-
islation and technology are investigated. One result of the understanding gained in this thesis
is a proposal for an information-theoretical approach modelling the control of the information
flow of virtual resources in clouds and its proof-of-concept implementation exemplifying the
feasibility of location-determined data processing.
This chapter concludes the research work done in this thesis and provides an outlook on
practical applications and directions of future research . In Section 7.1, the main contributions
and results are reflected with respect to the initial research questions asked in the description
of the problem (cf. Section 1.2) and with respect to the goal and objectives of the thesis (cf.
Section 1.3). Section 7.2 discusses the application of the results and the impact on current
cloud practices. An outlook on future research directions identified in this thesis is given in
Section 7.3.
7.1 Main contributions and results
To answer the question on how to implement legally compliant cloud computing technically,
the information-theoretical approach of this thesis is supported by a descriptive analysis of
legal requirements in the European and particularly German legislation. In this analysis, the
requirements which are applicable to cloud computing are identified. Using an interdisciplinary
approach, this thesis identifies two synergies that can be exploited to achieve legally cloud
computing. The first synergy is identified between different legal norms, which imply that
there are technical requirements that generally apply in cloud computing. The second synergy
is identified between the technical process of decision-making/enforcement and compliance
monitoring and reporting. Here, the classification of cloud resources can be utilised to support
both, and it forms the basis for achieving legally compliant cloud computing.
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The technical requirements observed in the legal norms investigated indicate that there is a
list of technical requirements which every cloud provider has to implement to support legally
compliant IT outsourcing to clouds (cf. Section 3.6). In particular, ensuring the necessary
level of security and the necessary legal framework conditions (including an adequate level of
protection when processing personal data) in the cloud is key to achieving legal compliance.
However, the technical analysis revealed that existing cloud platforms do not support this key
requirement to the necessary extent. Research addresses these requirements only in the con-
text of European data protection law and without having automated compliance monitoring
and reporting in mind (cf. Section 4.2), ignoring the existence of synergies between different
legal norms and between decision/enforcement and monitoring/reporting. However, the syn-
ergies identified can be exploited when using the classification of data categories defined in
law, i.e., classification by location, category of data, origin, and applicable requirements. Then,
it is possible to define an information model based on this classification which can be used
for decision-making and enforcement as well as for compliance monitoring and reporting (cf.
‘challenge of location inhomogeneity’, Def. 4.6).
For that purpose, an information model is proposed in this thesis, which (1) classifies vir-
tual resources and hardware resources and (2) describes the admissible assignment of virtual re-
sources to hardware resources based on legal requirements of cloud customers. This is achieved
by using a lattice-based model for the control of information flow of virtual resources in clouds
which is implemented in the cloud management process (cf. Section 5.4). For the construc-
tion of the model, multiple steps are necessary. First, a cloud taxonomy and entity-relationship
model is developed, describing virtual resources, hardware resources, and the cloud manage-
ment process formally using sets and relations of an ontology (cf. Section 4.1). Second, an
information flow analysis of clouds is performed, identifying that the information flow of vir-
tual resources is key to controlling the information flow in clouds generally (cf. Section 5.1.2).
Third, the existing methods of information flow control are extended to a general model on
lattice-based information flow control (cf. Section 5.3.3), including the definition of the new
types1 of security classes for location and availability as well as the opportunity to introduce
additional security classes on measurable2 security characteristics. Fourth, the final step in
adopting the general model to virtual resources and cloud computing (cf. Section 5.3.4 and
Section 5.4).
The technical feasibility of the information model proposed in this thesis is shown in a
proof of concept for location-determined data processing in clouds. For that purpose, the LDA
is implemented based on the open-source Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud platform,
OpenStack, introducing location-determined resource management as well as compliance mon-
itoring and reporting (cf. Section 6.1). Moreover, the technical requirements identified in the
legal analysis can be implemented in cloud infrastructures generally (cf. Section 6.2.1). How-
ever, only technical aspects of the data processing can be considered by the approach proposed
in this thesis. Organisational aspects like instructing personnel are not covered. They have to be
implemented by the cloud provider additionally. Also, the information flow of processed data
1Existing security classes are know for their confidentiality [52] and integrity [175].
2Based on Denning’s Axioms (cf. Theorem 5.2), the security classes have to be partially ordered and finite, and the
existence of a lower bound and a least upper bound operator on the security classes is required.
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whose control is in the responsibility of cloud customers is not addressed by the approach (cf.
Remark 5.3). This is because control of this type of information flow can be decoupled from
that of the information flow of virtual resources if virtual resources are utilised according to the
security classification,1 and therefore, it is not investigated in this thesis. An outlook on how
cloud customers can control their information flows is given in Section 7.3. While decoupling
the information flows in clouds enables the information flow control in cloud management pro-
cess, it is also a technical boundary of legally compliant computing, since the responsibility
for controlling the information flow has to be split. This is because the cloud provider can-
not overcome the limitations of a services provider who has to follow the instructions of their
client. Cloud providers cannot (and should not) control how their cloud customers utilise the
cloud resources. However, this is a general restriction on IT outsourcing and not an exclusive
restriction in cloud computing. Further, there is a legal boundary. The admissibility of IT out-
sourcing is regulated and so is outsourcing to clouds. IT outsourcing is not necessarily always
admissible. The again, if IT outsourcing is admissible it must be possible to support the legal
requirements of cloud customers. However, it is not possible to implement legal requirements
that needs sorting technical characteristics of clouds. An example is the requirement for direct
inspection of the original IT system under German tax law (cf. Section 3.4.2), which excludes
the possibility of remote enquiries which are generally necessary in cloud computing. Even if
there are not many such conflicts observable – only this one was identified in this thesis – they
are possible and exist. In these cases, the cloud customers have to comply with the applicable
regulations and if there is no legally compliant alternative cannot outsource to the cloud. The
case of German tax law can be solved by agreeing with the competent tax office to accept re-
mote enquiries since there exist alternative regulations for access to IT systems for the purpose
of tax inspections (cf. Section 3.4.2).
In general, this thesis finds that the legal and technical boundary of cloud computing does
not necessarily have to deviate from that of IT outsourcing generally. For legally compliant
cloud computing the following items are important: (1) the transformation of the cloud cus-
tomers’ legal requirements into security policies that are enforced in the cloud management
process and (2) the monitoring of the virtual resource assignment and its reporting to cloud
customers. The approach presented in this thesis demonstrates that both are technically feasi-
ble.
7.2 Application and practical implications
The current practice in global cloud computing of assigning virtual resources is using a best-
effort strategy, optimising the utilisation of hardware resources. However, this does not support
the cloud customers the process their data in compliance with legal requirements. In particu-
lar, location-determined assignment of virtual resources is not guaranteed by cloud providers.
There exist concepts on pooling resources by location of hardware resources, but commonly
they are not used for supporting the legal compliance of the data processing. An exception
from this are national clouds, which are operated by a cloud provider established in a single
1It is assumed in this thesis that this is possible in general (cf. Assumption 9 in conj. with Assumptions 4, 5, 6 in
Section 5.1.3).
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country and where only cloud resources located in that country are utilised. However, these
national clouds do not fully support the flexibility of global clouds. Particularly in cases where
data without location constraints needs reworking hosted in global clouds more cost-efficiently.
The approach presented in this thesis enables cloud providers of global clouds to support
their cloud customers to achieve legal compliance while using the full flexibility of a global
cloud infrastructure (within legal boundaries). Further, it is possible to implement national
clouds in global clouds virtually by restricting the information flow of virtual resources to
hardware resources located in a single country. Thereby, hybrid clouds consisting of global
and national cloud computing are feasible. By introducing comprehensive monitoring of and
reporting on the virtual resource assignment, it is further possible to empower the cloud cus-
tomers to track the achieved legal compliance of the cloud resources utilised. However, there
are still cases where national clouds cannot be combined with global clouds. This happens
when there is need for dedicated cloud resources which are operated in a single country exclu-
sively, for example the case of governmental cloud computing. In governmental cloud com-
puting, cloud providers often have to specialise in the specific applications and requirements
of their cloud customers (i.e., public administrations). The cloud providers have to be public
administrators themselves when data are processed that are relevant to the responsibilities of
public administrations, (cf. Section 3.4.5).
Another aspect is the processing of personal data in global clouds on behalf of European
and particularly German companies. Currently, there is no guarantee that global clouds can
support an adequate level of protection when processing personal data. To clear these doubts,
cloud providers have to guarantee that personal data outsourced by European and German com-
panies are processed only in countries that have an adequate level of protection. This is not the
case for current market leaders in global cloud computing, and in addition many of them are
established in the USA where the US Patriot Act applies, which conflicts with European data
protection law. By controlling the information flow of virtual resources, these cloud providers
are able to support the legal requirements of their customers technically and provide evidence
on their enforcement. The conflict between US and European law cannot be solved through
this approach, but it is technically possible to provide evidence on which legal norms have been
applied by the cloud provider. In general, it is possible to assign a virtual resource containing
personal data only to hardware resources in countries having an adequate level of protection.
This also applies to any type of data that has to be processed within specific countries or on
hardware resources with specific security requirements. In this way, cloud providers can help
their cloud customers to achieve legal compliance. Further, the necessary trust in legally com-
pliant cloud computing can be established by providing evidence of preformed data processing.
This is done by using monitoring and reporting mechanisms which apply on the resource allo-
cation process, i.e., cloud management process. Moreover, cloud customers can request virtual
resources which have to comply with specific legal requirements on-demand. This perfectly
supports the concept of self-service in cloud computing. As long as cloud resources which
have the level of security requested (in respect to the applicable legal requirements) are avail-
able, the cloud resources can be provided automatically. However, the consideration of legal
requirements for virtual resource assignment comes with the cost of limiting the flexibility of
resource allocation and might result in reduced hardware utilisation and can therefore increase
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the operating costs of virtual resources.
When looking into multi-cloud scenarios, it is important for cloud providers to connect
with other cloud providers and, when it comes to achieving legal compliance, to negotiate the
service levels (including the legal requirements) with each other. Here, it is important that ap-
plicable legal requirements can be communicated and their enforcement can be monitored and
reported. The security classification of virtual and hardware resources provides a good basis
for standardising the communication of these legal requirements and their enforcement, moni-
toring, and reporting. This also enables cloud providers to identify other cloud providers that
have the capacity to support legal requirements – which supports the listing of cloud services
in directory services – and to share cloud resources with them automatically and on demand,
in compliance with the individual requirements of each cloud resource. Further, this enables
cloud providers to report back to their cloud customers concerning cloud resource assignment
and whether applicable legal requirements were properly considered. This unfolds a new di-
mension of supporting the achievement of legal compliance in multi-cloud scenarios, including
the scenario of the “cloud of clouds” which – similar to the idea of “network of networks” of
the Internet – interconnects cloud infrastructures globally and seamlessly.
7.3 Outlook on directions of future research
This thesis focuses on IaaS clouds, but cloud computing also covers the service models, PaaS
and SaaS. The major difference between SaaS and IaaS is that cloud customers do not utilise
virtual resources but rather applications provided to them on demand. For the data processed
in these applications the same legal requirements may apply as to virtual resources in IaaS. The
applications are provided by service providers and, therefore, they responsible for the informa-
tion flow of processed data caused by running these applications. Further, the cloud customers
have no control over how the applications are hosted (whereas in IaaS they do have). This is
in the control of the service providers. For that reason, the service providers are responsible
for controlling the information flow of processed data in the cloud. To address this, the model
for information flow control has to be extended to the application level including classification
of applications and modelling information flow caused by them. A starting point is the pro-
jection of applications to the virtual resources which are hosting them. Then, the control of
information flow of virtual resources can be used for hardware resource allocation. Further,
additional security requirements apply in SaaS [191], including assuring secure communica-
tion between virtual resources, implementing access control to applications, and dealing with
the vulnerabilities of the applications. This results in new information flows and criteria for
allowed information flows, which have to be modelled. Additionally, admissible information
flows have to be considered for service orchestration, since only virtual resources which have
proper security classification can be allocated to run the application. It is also necessary to
identify and classify the connection endpoints of the applications to enable proper control of
admissible information flows using network connections. This has to be considered when de-
veloping cloud services. Otherwise the application might connect to endpoints which do not
have a sufficient security classification. There exist approaches for controlling information flow
in the development of cloud services which can help to address this issue [13]. However, the
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research in this area is in the wings. In the context of PaaS, additional requirements for operat-
ing the development platform apply. As with SaaS, it is possible to project the platform to the
virtual resources utilised and apply the control of information flow of virtual resources. How-
ever, unlike with IaaS and SaaS there are two levels of SLAs, i.e., the SLAs with the service
providers which use the cloud resources for developing the cloud applications, and the SLAs
with the cloud customers which utilise the applications developed [81]. Basically, it is possible
for the cloud provider to apply the SLAs of service providers and those of cloud customers
individually, but the service providers also have to guarantee legally compliant operation of the
developed cloud applications. Therefore, it is necessary that the service providers can control
the information flow of virtual resources utilised for hosting the cloud applications as requested
by the cloud customers. This can be achieved by classifying the applications individually to the
cloud customers’ demands and projecting these classification to the virtual resources utilised
for hosting. Then it is possible to treat PaaS and SaaS similarly and implement information
flow control on top of that used for IaaS.
The approach proposed in this thesis focuses on the control of information flows of vir-
tual resources. However, there also exist information flows of processed data and those of
meta data (cf. Section 5.1.1). These information flows also have to be controlled to achieve
legal compliant data processing. Therefore, it is necessary to identify all possible information
flows of each type and classify the involved subjects and objects. After having done this, it
is possible to apply the general model on lattice-based information flow control described in
Section 5.3.1, since it addresses the information flow between security classes generally. The
identification and classification of the information flows of meta data can be complex, since
these information flows can be individual for every type of hardware and software and usually
involve multiple hardware and software providers. Generally, in this case, the meta data are
considered objects while the software, hardware and the competent providers are considered
subjects. Assuming that any data processed in virtual resources can become meta data, objects
(i.e., meta data) are classified according to the classification of the virtual resource they origin
from. Subjects are classified according to their need-to-know level and provided safeguards
of the involved providers. This makes it possible not only to identify the allowed information
flow but also to decide whether hardware or software are allowed to access the meta data of
a specific virtual resource. However, this does not cover third-party recipients of meta data
other than the competent providers (e.g., subcontractors, service organisations, and public au-
thorities). In the model, these third-party recipients are considered subjects. In practice, they
are difficult to identify without the cooperation of the relevant provider. Any third party that
remains unidentified results in a covert channel undermining the control of the information
flow of meta data. The information flow of processed data is generally in the individual con-
trol of every cloud customer (in the case of IaaS). As with processed data, information flows
have to be identified and subjects and objects have to be classified. The data processed are
considered objects, and the recipients accessing the data via connections to the virtual resource
and the virtual resources themselves are considered subjects. The classification of the objects
is done according to the legal requirements applying to them (similar to the classification of
virtual resources). The classification of the subjects is done accordingly to their need-to-know
level and the safeguards provided by them. Then, similar to meta data, it is possible to model
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the information flow control using the general model on lattice-based information flow control
described in Section 5.3.1.
A specific case of information flow control is the access by authorised third parties. This
is because authorised third parties usually require access to a large number of objects, e.g., to
all objects of a specific cloud customer in the case of an tax inspection. However, it is not
necessary to provide access to those objects that are not relevant to the authorised third parties.
For example, in the case of a tax inspection the competent tax authority must have access to tax
data but not to personal data. Therefore, it is necessary to control the allowed information flows
more specifically. Basically, it is possible to filter the access of the authorised third parties by
security classifications, and provide access only to objects that have the security classification
relevant to the authorised third party. In the example of the tax inspection, access is granted
only to virtual resources that contain tax data. However, these virtual resources can also contain
personal data, to which access then has to be accepted since access to tax data has priority. In
any case, it is possible to control the access of authorised third parties in such a way that access
is granted only to objects that contain data which are relevant to the authorised third party and
that access to all other objects is excluded.
In this thesis, legal compliance is investigated for cloud infrastructures. There also are the
client systems accessing the cloud infrastructure. To control the information flow from and
to these clients, it is necessary to classify client systems as well as cloud resources. Classifi-
cation of client systems can be complex since they can be located all over the world and are
often mobile (e.g., in the scenarios of the mobile cloud and the internet of things [115]). In
particular, client systems can change their classification when physically crossing a boarder
into another country. It is possible to model the change of security classification, but this intro-
duces additional complexity and may result in covert channels if not modelled properly [20].
Additionally, it is complex to verify the security classification remotely. In particular, the re-
mote verification of the current location is limited to identifying the network access point, and
physical inspection provides little or no evidence on the client system location in the past or the
future. However, it is possible for client systems to provide data on their current location us-
ing location services such as Global Positioning System (GPS), which can be used to perform
plausibility checks on the client system location.
The support of countermeasures and incident response is an important requirement for
the secure operation of a cloud infrastructure (cf. Section 3.6.3.4). The approach presented in
this thesis does not directly address this requirement since it is not the focus of this thesis. How-
ever, it is possible to support countermeasures and incident response by using the mechanisms
of controlling the information flow of virtual resources. For example by isolating a malicious/-
suspicious virtual resource for further inspection and preventing information flow with other
virtual resources (or client systems). It is also possible to consider hardware resources that are
attacked or operating in a degraded mode. Both are possible by either changing the security
class of the degraded security characteristic or flagging the resource with a new one. This
allows an effective response to incidents that have an effect on the security characteristics of
cloud resources, including the use of isolation as a countermeasure against malicious behaviour
of cloud resources.
In general, it is possible to introduce new security characteristics to the information
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model presented in this thesis (cf. Remark 5.7). Possible candidates for introduction are the
authenticity of objects and subject (i.e., the truthfulness of their identity, origin, and provided
safeguards) and non-repudiation (i.e., an action cannot be repudiated due to proof of its exis-
tence, e.g., due to audit-proof logging). Based on Denning’s Axioms (cf. Theorem 5.2), new
security characteristics have to be modelled by security classes which are partially ordered and
finite, and where the existence of a lower bound and a least upper bound operator is given.
Both authenticity and non-repudiation can be modelled by a set of two security classes using
the class ’high’ if the characteristic is guaranteed and ’low’ otherwise [174].
In principle, it is possible to also introduce security characteristics addressing the require-
ments of property-rights-protected data. Property rights basically address origin/owner of
the data and the permitted actions allowed on the protected data. This is very similar to control-
ling the access to processed data and the information flow control of processed data. However,
there might be differences which have to be identified. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate
the legal requirements that generally and specifically apply in property right law and derive ap-
plicable technical requirements as well as the security characteristics that have to be enforced.
Possible candidates for security characteristics that can be modelled by the approach presented
in this thesis are confidentiality (if data are not allowed to be shared freely), integrity (if data
are not allowed to be modified freely), and authenticity (to ensure the origin of data and the
identity of owners and accessing subjects).
Another topic of interest for further investigation is the verification of security policies.
The security polices used in the experiment are manually derived from the information model
and not very complex (i.e., there is only a small number of rules) due to the investigation of a
small number of hardware resources and a single cloud customer. The complexity of the secu-
rity policies increases with the increasing number of hardware resources, security classes and
cloud customers. With increased complexity, the likelihood of introducing errors and interfer-
ence between different security policies increases, too. Here, verification of security policies is
necessary. In the thesis, this issue is considered by defining an XSD describing the structure of
the security policies. More advanced verification is necessary in multi-cloud scenarios where
security policies are exchanged between cloud providers [88]. Whenever multiple policies ex-
ist there is the risk that these policies will interfere, i.e., that there will be a conflict between
the rules of different policies. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how approaches to non-
interference policies [193] can be used in the cloud management process and for exchanging
security polices with other cloud providers.
This thesis takes a first step towards an IaaS cloud computing ontology by proposing a
taxonomy and an entity-relationship model for virtual resources, hardware resources and the
cloud management process (cf. Section 4.1). The next step is to perform a formal concept
analysis to verify the consistency and completeness of the model. This can be done by using a
formal concept analysis tool such as “The Concept Explorer”1 and the “ToscanaJ Suite”.2
1Documentation of “The Concept Explorer” on the Internet http://conexp.sourceforge.net/ (last visited:
30.06.2015).
2Documentation of the “ToscanaJ Suite” on the Internet http://toscanaj.sourceforge.net/ (last visited:
30.06.2015).
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Appendix A
Comparison of virtual resources in
current cloud infrastructres
Three commercial and two open cloud infrastructures are selected as reference for existing
cloud infrastructures and are analysed on the basis of current documentation and literature. For
the commercial cloud infrastructures, the following candidates are selected:
• Amazon Web Service (AWS) [5] is selected for its mature concept of distributed resource
provision. Additionally, it is well documented in literature.
• Windows Azure [143] is selected as one of the major competitors of AWS, which unlike
from AWS provides both PaaS and IaaS. Windows Azure is well documented as well.
• Fujitsu Cloud IaaS Trusted Public S5 is selected because of its mature concepts for high
availability, which are beyond current standards in practice.
Following the recommendation of Voras et al., OpenStack [157] and OpenNebula [156])
are selected as candidates for open cloud infrastructures.
Based on the investigation of these cloud infrastructures, a classification of IaaS computing
resources is provided in Section 4.1.2.
In the following, the summary of the comparison is listed in four tables, one for virtual
machines (cf. Tab. A.1), one for virtual storages (cf. Tab. A.2), one for virtual links (cf.
Tab. A.3), and one for virtual network (cf. Tab. A.4).
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Appendix B
Construction of a lattice-based system
using confidentiality classes
In the first step of the construction, classifications in C and categories in K are mapped to
security classes in SC, which are denoted confidentiality classes. The allowed information
flow between confidentiality classes is defined on bases of the comparison of classifications
and categories which are mapped to the respective confidentiality classes. Then, confidentiality
classes are defined according to Definition 5.23.
In the second step of construction, the classification/needs-to-know vectors are replaced by
security bindings. Therefore, it is necessary to redefine all parts of the model that are based
on classification/needs-to-know vectors which are state, request, request sequence, and system.
As a naming convention and to allow distinguishing between the original and the redefined
terms, the newly introduced terms will carry the prefix ‘c-’ where ‘c’ indicates the context of
confidentiality. For example the redefine state will become c-state.
State is redefined by replacing the classification/needs-to-know vector with security bind-
ings of confidentiality classes. Consequently, state sequence has also to be redefined to apply
to the new definition of state.
Definition B.1 (C-state) A c-state cV is defined (analogously to state; cf. Def. 5.10) as a triple
cV := (b,M, cSCB) with
• b ⊆ S×O×A set of all subjects S ∈ S having access to objects O ∈ O in what access
mode, which is described by a set of access attributes A⊆ A;
• M ∈M access matrix in the state cV ; and
• cSCB⊆ SCB set of confidentiality security bindings describing the binding of confiden-
tiality classes to subjects and objects, and cSCB⊆ SCB set of all confidentiality security
bindings in SCB.
Then, cV is the set of c-states cV i.
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Definition B.2 (C-state sequence) A c-state sequence is (analogous to state sequence; cf.
Def. 5.11) an arbitrary number of chronologically ordered c-states cV i ∈ cV. Then, cZ : cVN is
the set of request sequences cZi.
Further, request has to cover that subjects may change security bindings of objects. There-
fore, it is necessary to replace the set of classification/needs-to-know vectors by the set of
security bindings of confidentiality classes. Consequently, request sequence has also to be
redefined to apply to the new definition of request.
Definition B.3 (C-request) A c-request is defined (analogously to request; cf. Def. 5.12) as
a quadruple (S1,S2,Os, cG) ⊂ S+×S+×O× cG with cG := A∪ /0∪ cSCB. Then, cR : S+×
S+×O× cG is the set of requests cRi.
Definition B.4 (C-request sequence) A c-request sequence is defined (analogously to request
sequence; cf. Def. 5.13) as an arbitrary number of chronologically ordered c-requests cRi ∈ cR.
Then, cX : cRN is the set of c-request sequences cX i.
Then, system is redefined by applying the new definitions of state and request as follows.
Definition B.5 (C-system) Let cW ⊂ cR×D× cV× cV. A c-system cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0)⊂ cX×
Y× cZ is defined (analogously to system; cf. Def. 5.17) by ( cX ,Y, cZ) ∈ cΣ(cR,D, cW , cz0) if
and only if ( cX t ,Yt , cZt , cZt−1) ∈ cW for each t ∈ N where cz0 := ( /0,M, cSCB) is initial state
with M ∈M initial access matrix and cSCB⊆ cSCB initial security bindings. cW is considered
c-state transition relation.
Based on the simple-confidentiality property (cf. Def. 5.24) and the confidentiality ∗-
property (cf. Def.5.25=, the rules for a secure system are redefined.
Definition B.6 (C-rule) A c-rule is (analogously to a rule; cf. Def. 5.20) a function cρ : cR×
cV→ D× cV. A c-rule maps a c-request and a c-state to a decision and a c-state.
A c-rule cρ is security persevering if and only if
∀( cR, cV ) ∈ cR× cV ∃D ∈ D ∃ cV ′ ∈ cV :
cρ( cR, cV ) = (D, cV ′)∧ cV is secure c-state⇒ cV ′ is secure c-state.
Analogously, a c-rule cρ is ∗-property preserving if and only if c-state cV satisfies confiden-
tiality ∗-property implies c-state cV ′ satisfies confidentiality ∗-property.
The handling of c-requests by a c-rule and the response of a c-system are defined analo-
gously to rules and systems (cf. Def. 5.20).
Definition B.7 (10 c-rules for a secure c-system) Analogously to the rules of a secure sys-
tem Ω defined by LaPadula et al. [127], cΩ := {cρ1, ..., cρ10} is the set of c-rules of a se-
cure c-system where cρ i := ρ i for i ∈ {3,5,6,7,9,10} and cρ1, cρ2, cρ4, cρ8 are defined with
c
scb(S),
c
scb(O),
c
scb(O′) ∈ cSCB corresponding security bindings of subject S ∈ S and ob-
jects O,O′ ∈O:
• C-Rule 1 (get-read) cρ1: A subject S gets read access to an object O if
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(i) (security preserving) the access attribute r is element of the corresponding entry of
the access matrix, and
c
scb(O) 7→ cscb(S); and
(ii) (∗-property preserving) for all objects O′ where S can write to (i.e., access in ap-
pend and write mode) is true:
c
scb(O) 7→ cscb(O′).
• C-Rule 2 (get-append) cρ2: A subject S gets append access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute a is element of the corresponding entry of
the access matrix; and
(ii) (∗-property preserving) for all objects O′ where S can read from (i.e., access in
read and write mode) is true:
c
scb(O′) 7→ cscb(O).
• C-Rule 4 (get-write) cρ4: A subject S gets execute access to an object O if
(i) (security preserving) the access attribute w is element of the corresponding entry
of the access matrix, and
c
scb(O) 7→ cscb(S); and
(ii) (∗-property preserving [append]) for all objects O′ where S has append access is
true:
c
scb(O) 7→ cscb(O′).
(iii) (∗-property preserving [read]) for all objects O′ where S has read access is true:
c
scb(O′) 7→ cscb(O).
(iv) (∗-property preserving [write]) for all objects O′ where S has write access is true:
c
scb(O′) = cscb(O).
• C-Rule 8 (change- cSCB) cρ8: A subject S can change the security bindings cSCB ⊆
cSCB if
(i) (security preserving/∗-property preserving) S changes only security bindings of ob-
jects where no subject has access to.
• C-Rules 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 are constructed analogously to the rules 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10
(respectively) of Ω, since these rules describe a general system behaviour, which does
not change when modelling confidentiality.
With conferring the definition of allowed information flow between confidentiality classes
(cf. Def. 5.23), it is easy to see that the c-rules cρ1, cρ2, and cρ4 are defined analogously to
the corresponding original rules ρ1, ρ2, and ρ4. Further, c-rule cρ8 is corresponding to rule ρ8
where the classification/needs-to-know vector is replaced by the security bindings. In all other
rules, the decision does not depend on the classification of subjects and objects, and therefore
no modification is required.
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Appendix C
XML-based location policies
To assign virtual machines to nova compute cells in OpenStack in the experiment, XML-based
security policies are defined, which are used in the NOVA SCHEDULER (cf. Section 6.1.3). In
the following the XSD and the security policies used in the experiments are given [19].
C.1 XML Schema Definition
Listing C.1: XML Schema definition for security policies used in the experiment.
1 <? xml v e r s i o n =" 1 . 0 " e n c o d i n g ="UTF−8" ?>
2 < xs : schema x m l n s : x s =" h t t p : / /www. w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema">
3
4 < x s : e l e m e n t name=" d e c i s i o n ">
5 < xs :complexType >
6 < x s : s e q u e n c e >
7 < x s : e l e m e n t name=" d a t a t y p e " maxOccurs=" unbounded ">
8 < xs :complexType >
9 < x s : s e q u e n c e >
10 < x s : e l e m e n t name=" o r i g i n " maxOccurs=" unbounded ">
11 < xs :complexType >
12 < x s : s e q u e n c e >
13 < x s : e l e m e n t name=" c e l l " maxOccurs=" unbounded ">
14 < xs :complexType >
15 < x s : s i m p l e C o n t e n t >
16 < x s : e x t e n s i o n base =" x s : b o o l e a n ">
17 < x s : a t t r i b u t e name=" name " t y p e =" x s : s t r i n g " use =" r e q u i r e d " / >
18 < / x s : e x t e n s i o n >
19 < / x s : s i m p l e C o n t e n t >
20 < / xs :complexType >
21 < / x s : e l e m e n t >
22 < / x s : s e q u e n c e >
23 < x s : a t t r i b u t e name=" name " t y p e =" x s : s t r i n g " use =" r e q u i r e d " / >
24 < x s : a t t r i b u t e name=" d e f a u l t " t y p e =" x s : b o o l e a n " use =" r e q u i r e d " / >
25 < / xs :complexType >
26 < / x s : e l e m e n t >
27 < / x s : s e q u e n c e >
28 < x s : a t t r i b u t e name=" name " t y p e =" x s : s t r i n g " use =" r e q u i r e d " / >
29 < x s : a t t r i b u t e name=" d e f a u l t " t y p e =" x s : b o o l e a n " use =" r e q u i r e d " / >
30 < / xs :complexType >
31 < / x s : e l e m e n t >
32 < / x s : s e q u e n c e >
33 < x s : a t t r i b u t e name=" d e f a u l t " t y p e =" x s : b o o l e a n " use =" r e q u i r e d " / >
34 < / xs :complexType >
35 < / x s : e l e m e n t >
36
37 < / xs : s chema >
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C.2 Example policies used in the experiment
Listing C.2: Policy to allocate virtual machines without backup instance.
1 <? xml v e r s i o n =" 1 . 0 " e n c o d i n g ="UTF−8" s t a n d a l o n e =" no " ?>
2 < d e c i s i o n x m l n s : x s i =" h t t p : / /www. w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema−i n s t a n c e "
3 xs i :noNamespaceSchemaLoca t ion =" c e l l d e c i s i o n m a t r i x . xsd "
4 d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
5 < d a t a t y p e name=" p e r s o n a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
6 < o r i g i n name=" g l o b a l " d e f a u l t =" t r u e " / >
7 < o r i g i n name=" eu " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
8 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
9 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
10 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
11 < c e l l name=" ch "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
12 < / o r i g i n >
13 < o r i g i n name=" de " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
14 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
15 < c e l l name=" f r "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
16 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
17 < c e l l name=" ch "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
18 < / o r i g i n >
19 < o r i g i n name=" f r " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
20 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
21 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
22 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
23 < c e l l name=" ch "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
24 < / o r i g i n >
25 < o r i g i n name=" uk " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
26 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
27 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
28 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
29 < c e l l name=" ch "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
30 < / o r i g i n >
31 < o r i g i n name=" ch " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
32 < c e l l name=" de "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
33 < c e l l name=" f r "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
34 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
35 < c e l l name=" ch "> t r u e < / c e l l >
36 < / o r i g i n >
37 < o r i g i n name=" sg " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
38 < c e l l name=" sg "> t r u e < / c e l l >
39 < / o r i g i n >
40 < / d a t a t y p e >
41 < d a t a t y p e name=" f i n a n c i a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
42 < o r i g i n name=" g l o b a l " d e f a u l t =" t r u e " / >
43 < o r i g i n name=" eu " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
44 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
45 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
46 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
47 < / o r i g i n >
48 < o r i g i n name=" de " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
49 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
50 < / o r i g i n >
51 < o r i g i n name=" f r " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
52 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
53 < / o r i g i n >
54 < o r i g i n name=" uk " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
55 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
56 < / o r i g i n >
57 < o r i g i n name=" ch " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
58 < c e l l name=" ch "> t r u e < / c e l l >
59 < / o r i g i n >
60 < o r i g i n name=" sg " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
61 < c e l l name=" sg "> t r u e < / c e l l >
62 < / o r i g i n >
63 < / d a t a t y p e >
64 < / d e c i s i o n >
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Listing C.3: Policy to allocate virtual machines with backup instance.
1 <? xml v e r s i o n =" 1 . 0 " e n c o d i n g ="UTF−8" s t a n d a l o n e =" no " ?>
2 < d e c i s i o n x m l n s : x s i =" h t t p : / /www. w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema−i n s t a n c e "
3 xs i :noNamespaceSchemaLoca t ion =" c e l l d e c i s i o n m a t r i x . xsd "
4 d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
5 < d a t a t y p e name=" p e r s o n a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
6 < o r i g i n name=" g l o b a l " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
7 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
8 < c e l l name=" sg "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
9 < / o r i g i n >
10 < o r i g i n name=" eu " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
11 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
12 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
13 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
14 < / o r i g i n >
15 < o r i g i n name=" de " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
16 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
17 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
18 < / o r i g i n >
19 < o r i g i n name=" f r " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
20 < c e l l name=" de "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
21 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
22 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
23 < / o r i g i n >
24 < o r i g i n name=" uk " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
25 < c e l l name=" de "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
26 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
27 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
28 < / o r i g i n >
29 < o r i g i n name=" ch " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
30 < c e l l name=" ch "> t r u e < / c e l l >
31 < / o r i g i n >
32 < o r i g i n name=" sg " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
33 < c e l l name=" sg "> t r u e < / c e l l >
34 < / o r i g i n >
35 < / d a t a t y p e >
36 < d a t a t y p e name=" f i n a n c i a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
37 < o r i g i n name=" g l o b a l " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
38 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
39 < c e l l name=" sg "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
40 < / o r i g i n >
41 < o r i g i n name=" eu " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
42 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
43 < c e l l name=" f r "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
44 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
45 < / o r i g i n >
46 < o r i g i n name=" de " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
47 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
48 < / o r i g i n >
49 < o r i g i n name=" f r " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
50 < c e l l name=" de "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
51 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
52 < / o r i g i n >
53 < o r i g i n name=" uk " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
54 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
55 < c e l l name=" f r "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
56 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
57 < / o r i g i n >
58 < o r i g i n name=" ch " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
59 < c e l l name=" ch "> t r u e < / c e l l >
60 < / o r i g i n >
61 < o r i g i n name=" sg " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
62 < c e l l name=" sg "> t r u e < / c e l l >
63 < / o r i g i n >
64 < / d a t a t y p e >
65 < d a t a t y p e name=" p u b l i c " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
66 < o r i g i n name=" g l o b a l " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
67 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
68 < / o r i g i n >
69 < o r i g i n name=" eu " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
70 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
71 < / o r i g i n >
72 < o r i g i n name=" de " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
73 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
74 < / o r i g i n >
75 < o r i g i n name=" f r " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
76 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
77 < / o r i g i n >
78 < o r i g i n name=" uk " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
79 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
80 < / o r i g i n >
81 < o r i g i n name=" ch " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
82 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
83 < / o r i g i n >
84 < o r i g i n name=" sg " d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
85 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
86 < / o r i g i n >
87 < / d a t a t y p e >
88 < / d e c i s i o n >
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Listing C.4: Policy to allocate backup instances.
1 <? xml v e r s i o n =" 1 . 0 " e n c o d i n g ="UTF−8" s t a n d a l o n e =" no " ?>
2 < d e c i s i o n x m l n s : x s i =" h t t p : / /www. w3 . org / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema−i n s t a n c e "
3 xs i :noNamespaceSchemaLoca t ion =" c e l l d e c i s i o n m a t r i x . xsd "
4 d e f a u l t =" t r u e ">
5 < d a t a t y p e name=" p e r s o n a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
6 < o r i g i n name=" g l o b a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
7 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
8 < / o r i g i n >
9 < o r i g i n name=" eu " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
10 < c e l l name=" de "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
11 < c e l l name=" f r "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
12 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
13 < / o r i g i n >
14 < o r i g i n name=" de " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
15 < c e l l name=" de "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
16 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
17 < / o r i g i n >
18 < o r i g i n name=" f r " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
19 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
20 < c e l l name=" f r "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
21 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
22 < / o r i g i n >
23 < o r i g i n name=" uk " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
24 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
25 < c e l l name=" f r "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
26 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
27 < / o r i g i n >
28 < o r i g i n name=" ch " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
29 < c e l l name=" ch "> t r u e < / c e l l >
30 < / o r i g i n >
31 < o r i g i n name=" sg " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
32 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
33 < / o r i g i n >
34 < / d a t a t y p e >
35 < d a t a t y p e name=" f i n a n c i a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
36 < o r i g i n name=" g l o b a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
37 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
38 < / o r i g i n >
39 < o r i g i n name=" eu " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
40 < c e l l name=" de "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
41 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
42 < c e l l name=" uk "> f a l s e < / c e l l >
43 < / o r i g i n >
44 < o r i g i n name=" de " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
45 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
46 < / o r i g i n >
47 < o r i g i n name=" f r " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
48 < c e l l name=" f r "> t r u e < / c e l l >
49 < / o r i g i n >
50 < o r i g i n name=" uk " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
51 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
52 < / o r i g i n >
53 < o r i g i n name=" ch " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
54 < c e l l name=" ch "> t r u e < / c e l l >
55 < / o r i g i n >
56 < o r i g i n name=" sg " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
57 < c e l l name=" sg "> t r u e < / c e l l >
58 < / o r i g i n >
59 < / d a t a t y p e >
60 < d a t a t y p e name=" p u b l i c " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
61 < o r i g i n name=" g l o b a l " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
62 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
63 < / o r i g i n >
64 < o r i g i n name=" eu " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
65 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
66 < / o r i g i n >
67 < o r i g i n name=" de " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
68 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
69 < / o r i g i n >
70 < o r i g i n name=" f r " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
71 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
72 < / o r i g i n >
73 < o r i g i n name=" uk " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
74 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
75 < / o r i g i n >
76 < o r i g i n name=" ch " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
77 < c e l l name=" uk "> t r u e < / c e l l >
78 < / o r i g i n >
79 < o r i g i n name=" sg " d e f a u l t =" f a l s e ">
80 < c e l l name=" de "> t r u e < / c e l l >
81 < / o r i g i n >
82 < / d a t a t y p e >
83 < / d e c i s i o n >
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Appendix D
Logs and screenshots of the
experiment
In the following, all logged telemetry data and screenshots of the experiment described in
Section 6.1.3 are provided.
D.1 Log-files of the nova server
The log-files are created by the NOVA SERVER during the experiment described in Section 6.1.3
and describes the result of the decisions made on basis of the security policies applied (cf.
Appendix C.2).
Listing D.1: Nova Server log-file of virtual
machine no. 1.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " f i n a n c i a l "
3 o r i g i n = " de "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 1 : 5 4 : 3 6 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 de = t r u e
7 sg = f a l s e
8 f r = f a l s e
9 ch = f a l s e
10 uk = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: 4B59295F-56A9-4126-8C07-4FF0E793F919
Listing D.2: Nova Server log-file of back-up
instance of virtual machine no. 1.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " f i n a n c i a l "
3 o r i g i n = " de "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 1 : 5 4 : 3 6 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 de = t r u e
7 sg = f a l s e
8 f r = f a l s e
9 ch = f a l s e
10 uk = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: EA3CC036-87EE-4B70-B5A7-081345A17BDC
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Listing D.3: Nova Server log-file of virtual
machine no. 3.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " f i n a n c i a l "
3 o r i g i n = " f r "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 2 : 2 0 : 1 4 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 f r = t r u e
7 sg = f a l s e
8 ch = f a l s e
9 de = f a l s e
10 uk = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: A3E635C1-73A3-4263-8CA4-0F6249AA9D34
Listing D.4: Nova Server log-file of back-up
instance of virtual machine no. 3.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " f i n a n c i a l "
3 o r i g i n = " f r "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 2 : 2 0 : 1 4 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 f r = t r u e
7 sg = f a l s e
8 ch = f a l s e
9 de = f a l s e
10 uk = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: E827366A-EDB2-4E44-8619-EB8217E5818F
Listing D.5: Nova Server log-file of virtual
machine no. 4.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " p e r s o n a l "
3 o r i g i n = " eu "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 2 : 3 2 : 1 5 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 f r = t r u e
7 de = t r u e
8 sg = f a l s e
9 ch = f a l s e
10 uk = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: 1ADAFF73-6741-422B-B2F0-7C0E1A2459BD
Listing D.6: Nova Server log-file of back-up
instance of virtual machine no. 4.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " p e r s o n a l "
3 o r i g i n = " eu "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 2 : 3 2 : 1 6 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 uk = t r u e
7 sg = f a l s e
8 f r = f a l s e
9 ch = f a l s e
10 de = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: 6EDED12F-B120-4FC6-8C21-DAA4084630A0
Listing D.7: Nova Server log-file of virtual
machine no. 2.
1 [ d a t a ]
2 t y p e = " f i n a n c i a l "
3 o r i g i n = " ch "
4 t imes t amp = " 2014−11−27 1 2 : 0 5 : 5 1 UTC"
5 [ a c c e p t e d ]
6 ch = t r u e
7 sg = f a l s e
8 f r = f a l s e
9 de = f a l s e
10 uk = f a l s e
11 a p i = f a l s e
ID in OpenStack and file name: BDB8E85E-0C6D-4AC6-83FB-77BA00AFA5B7
D.2 Logging data of ceilometer
In the following, the telemetry data logged by the CEILOMETER API in OpenStack during
the experiment described in Section 6.1.3 are provided. All telemetry data are described by
JSON-objects consisting of key-value pairs.
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Listing D.8: Ceilometer log for DE COM-
PUTE 2 before requesting virtual machine no.
1.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8e89−46cc−5084599315
e5
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 4 7 : 2 7
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 4 7 : 2 4 . 9 8 7 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => de
12 [ compute_node ] => DeCompute2
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 0
20 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
21 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8e89−46cc
−5084599315 e5
22 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
23 [ s i g n a t u r e ] => <removed s i g n a t u r e va lue >
24 [ s i g n a t u r e _ h o s t _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8
e89−46cc−5084599315 e5
25 [ s i g n a t u r e _ p u b k e y ] => <removed p u b l i c key >
26 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
27 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
28 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 2 f 79 a1 5 c 8 e
89−46 cc 50 84 59 93 15 e5
29 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
30 )
31 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
32 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
33 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
34 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
35 [ message_ id ] => 291 b3bc6−762b−11e4−b512−000
c299315e5
36 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
37 )
DE COMPUTE 2 is running extended protocol on authentication and integrity. The
values of the keys SIGNATURE and SIGNATURE_PUBKEY has been removed due to
lack of space.
Listing D.9: Ceilometer log for DE COM-
PUTE 2 after requesting virtual machine no. 1.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8e89−46cc−5084599315
e5
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 5 7 : 2 8
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 5 7 : 2 5 . 5 5 4 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => de
12 [ compute_node ] => DeCompute2
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => 4 b59295f−56a9−4126−8c07−4
f f 0 e 7 9 3 f 9 1 9
20 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 1
21 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
22 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8e89−46cc
−5084599315 e5
23 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
24 [ s i g n a t u r e ] => <removed s i g n a t u r e va lue >
25 [ s i g n a t u r e _ h o s t _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8
e89−46cc−5084599315 e5
26 [ s i g n a t u r e _ p u b k e y ] => <removed p u b l i c key >
27 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
28 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
29 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 2 f 79 a1 5 c 8 e
89−46 cc 50 84 59 93 15 e5
30 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
31 )
32 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
33 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
34 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
35 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
36 [ message_ id ] => 8 f73f146 −762c−11e4−b512−000
c299315e5
37 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
38 )
DE COMPUTE 2 is running extended protocol on authentication and integrity. The
values of the keys SIGNATURE and SIGNATURE_PUBKEY has been removed due to
lack of space.
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Listing D.10: Ceilometer log for DE COM-
PUTE 1 before requesting virtual machine no.
1.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d522a−0d36−ac84−dac2−
e55915e40dd6
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 4 7 : 1 8
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 4 7 : 1 5 . 4 8 4 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => de
12 [ compute_node ] => DeCompute1
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 0
20 [ memory ] => 4048352 KiB
21 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d522a−0d36−ac84−dac2−
e55915e40dd6
22 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
23 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
24 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
25 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 52 2 a 0d 36 ac
84−da c2 e5 59 15 e4 0d d6
26 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
27 )
28 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
29 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
30 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
31 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
32 [ message_ id ] => 240 f f 1 e e −762b−11e4−86e9−000
c29e40dd6
33 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
34 )
Listing D.11: Ceilometer log for DE COM-
PUTE 1 after requesting virtual machine no. 1.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d522a−0d36−ac84−dac2−
e55915e40dd6
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 5 7 : 1 9
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 5 7 : 1 5 . 6 9 7 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => de
12 [ compute_node ] => DeCompute1
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
ht , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => ea3cc036−87ee−4b70−b5a7−081345
a17bdc
20 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 1
21 [ memory ] => 4048352 KiB
22 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d522a−0d36−ac84−dac2−
e55915e40dd6
23 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
24 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
25 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
26 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 52 2 a 0d 36 ac
84−da c2 e5 59 15 e4 0d d6
27 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
28 )
29 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
30 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
31 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
32 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
33 [ message_ id ] => 89 dccf32 −762c−11e4−86e9−000
c29e40dd6
34 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
35 )
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Listing D.12: Ceilometer log for CH COM-
PUTE 2 before requesting virtual machine no.
2.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 dd34c−03c3−0448−db0c−
db3fced6ed57
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 5 6 : 2 6
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T11 : 5 6 : 2 3 . 4 6 1 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => ch
12 [ compute_node ] => ChCompute2
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 0
20 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
21 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 dd34c−03c3−0448−db0c−
db3fced6ed57
22 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
23 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
24 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
25 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d d3 4 c 03 c3 04
48−db 0 c db 3 f ce d6 ed 57
26 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
27 )
28 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
29 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
30 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
31 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
32 [ message_ id ] => 6 ab7b6a8−762c−11e4−ab7f−000
c29d6ed57
33 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
34 )
Listing D.13: Ceilometer log for CH COM-
PUTE 2 after requesting virtual machine no. 2.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 dd34c−03c3−0448−db0c−
db3fced6ed57
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 0 6 : 2 7
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 0 6 : 2 3 . 9 2 1 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => ch
12 [ compute_node ] => ChCompute2
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => bdb8e85e−0c6d−4ac6−83fb−77
ba00a fa5b7
20 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 1
21 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
22 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 dd34c−03c3−0448−db0c−
db3fced6ed57
23 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
24 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
25 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
26 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d d3 4 c 03 c3 04
48−db 0 c db 3 f ce d6 ed 57
27 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
28 )
29 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
30 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
31 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
32 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
33 [ message_ id ] => d0a592ea−762d−11e4−ab7f−000
c29d6ed57
34 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
35 )
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Listing D.14: Ceilometer log for FR COM-
PUTE 2 before requesting virtual machine no.
3.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d7cb4−ac36−0305−dab8−98
d3d9d32dec
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 1 8 : 3 0
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 1 8 : 2 6 . 9 8 2 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => f r
12 [ compute_node ] => FrCompute2
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 0
20 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
21 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d7cb4−ac36−0305−dab8−98
d3d9d32dec
22 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
23 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
24 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
25 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 7 c b4 ac 36 03
05−da b8 98 d3 d9 d3 2d ec
26 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
27 )
28 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
29 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
30 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
31 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
32 [ message_ id ] => 7 fa33c60 −762f−11e4−a713−000
c29d32dec
33 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
34 )
Listing D.15: Ceilometer log for FR COM-
PUTE 2 after requesting virtual machine no. 3.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d7cb4−ac36−0305−dab8−98
d3d9d32dec
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 8 : 3 1
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 8 : 2 7 . 4 8 9 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => f r
12 [ compute_node ] => FrCompute2
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
ht , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => a3e635c1−73a3−4263−8ca4−0
f6249aa9d34
20 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 1
21 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
22 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d7cb4−ac36−0305−dab8−98
d3d9d32dec
23 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
24 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
25 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
26 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 7 c b4 ac 36 03
05−da b8 98 d3 d9 d3 2d ec
27 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
28 )
29 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
30 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
31 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
32 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
33 [ message_ id ] => e5974ede−7630−11e4−a713−000
c29d32dec
34 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
35 )
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Listing D.16: Ceilometer log for FR COM-
PUTE 1 before requesting virtual machine no.
3.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d8305−76a9−030a−4f13−
a66be29c2ac1
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 1 7 : 5 3
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 1 7 : 5 0 . 2 7 6 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => f r
12 [ compute_node ] => FrCompute1
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 0
20 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
21 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d8305−76a9−030a−4f13−
a66be29c2ac1
22 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
23 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
24 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
25 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 83 05 76 a9 03
0a−4f 13 a6 6b e2 9 c 2 a c1
26 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
27 )
28 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
29 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
30 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
31 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
32 [ message_ id ] => 69 c22fbe −762f−11e4−9096−000
c299c2ac1
33 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
34 )
Listing D.17: Ceilometer log for FR COM-
PUTE 1 after requesting virtual machine no. 3.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d8305−76a9−030a−4f13−
a66be29c2ac1
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 7 : 5 4
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 7 : 5 1 . 3 7 5 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => f r
12 [ compute_node ] => FrCompute1
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => e827366a−edb2−4e44−8619−
eb8217e5818f
20 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 1
21 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
22 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d8305−76a9−030a−4f13−
a66be29c2ac1
23 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
24 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
25 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
26 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 83 05 76 a9 03
0a−4f 13 a6 6b e2 9 c 2 a c1
27 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
28 )
29 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
30 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
31 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
32 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
33 [ message_ id ] => d01196e6−7630−11e4−9096−000
c299c2ac1
34 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
35 )
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Listing D.18: Ceilometer log for DE COM-
PUTE 2 before requesting virtual machine no.
4.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8e89−46cc−5084599315
e5
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 7 : 2 8
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 7 : 2 5 . 1 4 0 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => de
12 [ compute_node ] => DeCompute2
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => 4 b59295f−56a9−4126−8c07−4
f f 0 e 7 9 3 f 9 1 9
20 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 1
21 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
22 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8e89−46cc
−5084599315 e5
23 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
24 [ s i g n a t u r e ] => <removed s i g n a t u r e va lue >
25 [ s i g n a t u r e _ h o s t _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8
e89−46cc−5084599315 e5
26 [ s i g n a t u r e _ p u b k e y ] => <removed p u b l i c key >
27 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
28 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
29 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 2 f 79 a1 5 c 8 e
89−46 cc 50 84 59 93 15 e5
30 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
31 )
32 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
33 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
34 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
35 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
36 [ message_ id ] => c00f8186−7630−11e4−b512−000
c299315e5
37 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
38 )
DE COMPUTE 2 is running extended protocol on authentication and integrity. The
values of the keys SIGNATURE and SIGNATURE_PUBKEY has been removed due to
lack of space.
Listing D.19: Ceilometer log for DE COM-
PUTE 2 after requesting virtual machine no. 4.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8e89−46cc−5084599315
e5
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 3 7 : 2 8
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 3 7 : 2 5 . 7 1 7 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => de
12 [ compute_node ] => DeCompute2
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
ht , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => 4 b59295f−56a9−4126−8c07−4
f f 0 e 7 9 3 f 9 1 9
20 [ i n s t a n c e s . 1 ] => 1 a d a f f 7 3 −6741−422b−b2f0−7
c0e1a2459bd
21 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 2
22 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
23 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8e89−46cc
−5084599315 e5
24 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
25 [ s i g n a t u r e ] => <removed s i g n a t u r e va lue >
26 [ s i g n a t u r e _ h o s t _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d2f79−a15c−8
e89−46cc−5084599315 e5
27 [ s i g n a t u r e _ p u b k e y ] => <removed p u b l i c key >
28 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
29 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
30 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 2 f 79 a1 5 c 8 e
89−46 cc 50 84 59 93 15 e5
31 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
32 )
33 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
34 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
35 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
36 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
37 [ message_ id ] => 25 f42bd6−7632−11e4−b512−000
c299315e5
38 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
39 )
DE COMPUTE 2 is running extended protocol on authentication and integrity. The
values of the keys SIGNATURE and SIGNATURE_PUBKEY has been removed due to
lack of space.
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Listing D.20: Ceilometer log for UK COM-
PUTE 1 before requesting virtual machine no.
4.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d93e9−8a7c−f 7 a f−b c f f −814
f 9 f f 4 2 8 3 b
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 9 : 2 4
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 2 9 : 2 1 . 0 8 3 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => uk
12 [ compute_node ] => UkCompute1
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 0
20 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
21 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d93e9−8a7c−f 7 a f−b c f f
−814 f 9 f f 4 2 8 3 b
22 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
23 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
24 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
25 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 93 e9 8 a 7 c f7
af−bc f f 81 4 f 9 f f4 28 3b
26 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
27 )
28 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
29 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
30 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
31 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
32 [ message_ id ] => 0586 a5d2−7631−11e4−a7dd−000
c29f4283b
33 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
34 )
Listing D.21: Ceilometer log for UK COM-
PUTE 1 after requesting virtual machine no. 4.
1 (
2 [ i s _ a u t h e n t i c ] =>
3 [ coun te r_name ] => h o s t _ d a t a
4 [ u s e r _ i d ] => −
5 [ r e s o u r c e _ i d ] => 564 d93e9−8a7c−f 7 a f−b c f f −814
f 9 f f 4 2 8 3 b
6 [ t imes t amp ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 3 9 : 2 5
7 [ r e c o r d e d _ a t ] => 2014−11−27T12 : 3 9 : 2 1 . 5 9 3 0 0 0
8 [ r e s o u r c e _ m e t a d a t a ] => Array
9 (
10 [ a r c h i t e c t u r e ] => x86_64
11 [ c e l l ] => uk
12 [ compute_node ] => UkCompute1
13 [ c p u _ f e a t u r e s ] => h y p e r v i s o r , osxsave , xsave ,
h t , ss , ds , vme
14 [ c p u _ t y p e . c o r e s ] => 4
15 [ c p u _ t y p e . model ] => Penryn
16 [ c p u _ t y p e . s o c k e t s ] => 1
17 [ c p u _ t y p e . t h r e a d s ] => 1
18 [ c p u _ t y p e . vendor ] => I n t e l
19 [ i n s t a n c e s . 0 ] => 6 eded12f−b120−4fc6−8c21−
daa4084630a0
20 [ i n s t a n c e s . amount ] => 1
21 [ memory ] => 4048256 KiB
22 [ n o d e _ i d e n t i f i e r ] => 564 d93e9−8a7c−f 7 a f−b c f f
−814 f 9 f f 4 2 8 3 b
23 [ s e c u r i t y _ m o d e l s ] => apparmor , dac
24 [ s y s i n f o . m a n u f a c t u r e r ] => VMware , I n c .
25 [ s y s i n f o . p r o d u c t ] => VMware V i r t u a l P l a t f o r m
26 [ s y s i n f o . s e r i a l ] => VMware−56 4d 93 e9 8 a 7 c f7
af−bc f f 81 4 f 9 f f4 28 3b
27 [ s y s i n f o . v e r s i o n ] => None
28 )
29 [ s o u r c e ] => o p e n s t a c k
30 [ c o u n t e r _ u n i t ] => h o s t
31 [ c o u n t e r _ v o l u m e ] => 1
32 [ p r o j e c t _ i d ] => −
33 [ message_ id ] => 6 b78e16a−7632−11e4−a7dd−000
c29f4283b
34 [ c o u n t e r _ t y p e ] => gauge
35 )
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D.3 Screenshots of the dashboard
In the following, the screenshots which were made of the dashboard during the experiment
described in Section 6.1.3 are provided.
Figure D.1: Configuration of virtual machine no. 1.
Figure D.2: Running instances after requesting virtual machine no. 1.
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Figure D.3: Running instances after requesting all four virtual machines.
Figure D.4: Hypervisor overview after requesting all four virtual machines.
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D.4 Screenshots of the audit board
In the following, the screenshots which were made of the Analytics Board during the experi-
ment described in Section 6.1.3 are provided.
Figure D.5: Cloud provider’s view (i.e., Analytics Board) after requesting all four virtual machines.
Figure D.6: Details on hosted virtual machine in DE Cell.
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Figure D.7: Visualisation on decision details for virtual machine no. 4.
Figure D.8: Visualisation on decision details for back-up instance of virtual machine no. 4.
225
226
Glossary
accessing of a virtual resource [inf.] a virtual resource is accessed on the virtualisation level
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